

## The arms control mafia tightens grip on Reagan

by Kathleen Klenetsky

As this issue of *EIR* went to press, President Reagan and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko were still in the midst of their Sept. 28 meeting at the White House. But it isn't necessary to have the "inside story" on what the two men may have discussed, or even possibly agreed upon, to understand the real implications of their tête-à-tête.

As events over the last few weeks have demonstrated with shattering clarity, Henry Kissinger and the arms-control mafia he represents have deftly exploited the President's election-year desire to appear as a man of peace to worm their way right into the middle of Reagan administration relations with the Soviet Union.

Even if the Reagan-Gromyko conference produces nothing of substance, the Kissinger crowd is confident, reliable sources say, that they are now in a position to convince the President to continue discussions with the Soviets through various official and unofficial channels. By embroiling the President in such a process, the Kissinger crowd expects to be able to force Reagan into making key concessions, especially in the area of space-defense, by constantly holding up the prospect that the U.S.-Soviet dialogue will fall apart should the United States fail to satisfy Moscow's demands.

### Henry's back in town

After an intensive, two-year campaign to get himself hired as the Reagan administration's major "backchannel" to Moscow, Kissinger has apparently achieved that goal. Using the opportunity presented by the Reagan-Gromyko meeting, Kissinger and his collaborators, both in and out of government, are now carefully steering President Reagan down the same primrose path of the "arms-control process" through which Kissinger convinced another conservative president,

Richard Nixon, to negotiate away U.S. strategic superiority to Moscow via the 1972 SALT I and ABM accords. In what has to be one of Kissinger's more obscenely cynical moves, the former secretary of state even arranged to have Reagan sit down for an off-the-record session with Nixon on Sept. 24, just a few days before the President's meeting with Gromyko.

How significant a role Kissinger is now playing vis-à-vis the Reagan administration was dramatically highlighted when he stopped by the White House on Sept. 25 at Reagan's invitation to "counsel" the President on how to conduct his meeting with Gromyko.

According to one Washington insider who maintains close contacts with Kissinger circles as well as with the administration and who recently returned from Moscow, "Kissinger was sent in there to train the President on how to handle Gromyko."

Emerging from the meeting, Kissinger declared that President Reagan has apparently made up his mind to "move toward negotiated coexistence with the Soviet Union." He said: "I believe that in a crab-like manner [the Soviets] are going to move toward negotiations with us." Kissinger announced that he was "convinced the President is absolutely prepared" for the meeting, and forecast that Reagan would stay on this "negotiations" course after the November elections, because "he is running for history and not for any other office."

Although Kissinger refused to provide details on his meeting with Reagan, it's not hard to figure out what advice he offered the President. For the past months, Kissinger has been using every opportunity to spread the KGB disinformation line that the Soviets are now sincerely interested in

restarting arms-control talks with the United States and has been confidently predicting that "serious negotiations" between the superpowers were on the immediate horizon.

Before his meeting with Reagan, in fact, Kissinger had gone on ABC-TV's "Good Morning, America," where he baldly lied that "we are at the beginning of a Soviet peace offensive." Kissinger predicted that "there definitely will be a warming of relations" between the United States and the Soviets, and that negotiations between the superpowers are a certainty. "The only challenge is what you bring to the negotiating table." Kissinger then apologized for the Soviets' vicious attacks on the President and the United States, claiming that their harsh statements are merely a rhetorical "wrapping" around their sincere desire to negotiate.

Kissinger repeated this disinformation on the McNeill-Lehrer public television show Sept. 27, claiming that, while Soviet rhetoric may be "extravagant," their actions "are extremely cautious. Their rhetoric is to cover a retreat," Kissinger asserted. "We are not anywhere near the danger of war."

Asked by an interviewer whether the post-election President Reagan would be the Reagan who viewed the Soviets as an "evil empire" or a moderate Reagan, Kissinger gloatingly replied: "We will see the new conciliatory Reagan. . . . I have *no doubt* that he will pursue this policy."

### Reagan's 'crumbling empire' fantasies

What could account for Reagan's giving so much credence to Kissinger, whose sell-out arms-control policies he had explicitly campaigned against in 1976 and 1980?

According to highly informed sources, the President has been conned into believing that the Soviet Union is a "crumbling empire," collapsing under the combined weight of religious and ethnic dissent and severe economic problems, and is therefore being forced to seek an accommodation with the West.

Reagan is being fed this hogwash by key advisers in the administration, as well as by the likes of the Rev. Billy Graham, who just returned from a tour of the Soviet Union claiming that the Soviets are "desperate for peace"—a KGB lie that Graham has obediently conveyed to the President.

The truth, which Reagan advisers like Kissinger protégé Robert McFarlane, head of the National Security Council, Kissinger crony George Shultz, and Kissinger himself are carefully concealing from the President, is that the Soviets are using their phony "peace offensive" as a cover for escalated war preparations.

### 'Step-by-step' to defeat

Kissinger's highly publicized meeting with the President demonstrates that the United States' most notorious Soviet agent of influence is close to success in his drive to take over White House strategic policymaking. Warnings from *EIR* founder, Democratic presidential candidate Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., that Kissinger was moving to exert a dominant influence over the administration are now demonstrated

to have been completely accurate. As LaRouche has also warned, the key target of Kissinger's machinations is the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, which Moscow is demanding be dropped as part of the "New Yalta" deal which Kissinger and his friends in the Western oligarchy believe they are making with the Kremlin.

President Reagan's speech to the United Nations on Sept. 24 indicated the strength which the Kissinger "New Yalta" approach has gained over the President. Every specific proposal in the President's speech was taken straight from Kissinger (and Mondale)—including the proposals for regular summits between the American President and his Soviet counterpart, for periodic meetings between cabinet-level personnel from both sides, and the suggestion that Reagan was prepared to discuss "measures of restraint" while negotiations proceed on the "militarization of space."

The speech was littered with references to "step-by-step negotiations" and other Kissingerian formulations. One of the centerpieces was the call for increased informal contacts between both sides—a mode of operation Kissinger used to create a controlled environment around the ABM and SALT I negotiations, in which President Nixon was conned into giving away the store.

While stressing that his main objective was to create a "new beginning" for U.S.-Soviet relations and establish a long-term "framework" for arms negotiations between the superpowers, Reagan in fact ignored the only realistic such framework—the fullscale U.S. commitment to full military readiness, including a crash program on particle-beam-weapon defense.

The President's discussion of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was noncommittal, but framed in language geared not to be abrasive. Stating that opening talks on the "militarization of space" should take place by the end of this year, or early next year at the latest, Reagan said he would also consider "measures of restraint" that could be taken on space matters during the talks. This is a direct reference to the Kremlin's insistence that such negotiations be preceded by a mutual ban on the testing and deployment of all space-defense-related technology, including the series of American ASAT tests scheduled for the fall.

Since it is still unlikely that Reagan would willingly accede to the Soviets' demand that the United States abandon its beam-weapons program outright, Kissinger has come up with a new twist aimed at convincing the President to "trade away" the SDI at the negotiating table in exchange for some meaningless Soviet concessions.

Kissinger laid out this Jesuitical approach in a Sept. 23 syndicated column, which appeared in the *Los Angeles Times* and dozens of newspapers around the world (see Documentation). There, Kissinger poses as a convert to the SDI program, but then reveals what his true intentions are: "Perhaps the most compelling argument [for developing space weapons] is the possible beneficial effect of some missile defense on arms control," Kissinger writes. Noting that the "center-

piece” of the Soviet “peace offensive . . . will be the demilitarization of space,” Kissinger advocates that the United States “be prepared to negotiate over arms control of *all* defensive weapons” and reach an agreement for “limited defense” with the Soviet Union.

In other words, the major purpose of strategic defense is to be used as a bargaining chip—not as a means of freeing the world’s population from the balance of nuclear terror instituted by the Kissinger-authored doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction.

### **Kissinger, the Kremlin, and Walter Mondale**

What Kissinger is doing is playing a role in a sophisticated “inside-outside” job which the Soviets and the “New Yalta” crowd in the West are jointly running on Reagan. According to the way this gameplan has started to operate, Kissinger advises Reagan to make certain offers, which the Soviets then reject as inadequate, at which point Mondale or some other representative of the U.S. arms-control crew starts whining that Reagan is insincere about reaching an agreement with the Soviets. Kissinger then intervenes, urging Reagan to be just a wee bit more generous, and so on, until such point that the President has been hornswaggled into dismantling the national defense.

All the while this charade is going on, of course, the Soviets are continuing their intensive military buildup, keeping open the possibility of an actual military strike into Western Europe should that be required to force the United States into making what Moscow deems sufficient concessions.

This game is already in full swing. Just hours after Reagan’s conciliatory U.N. speech, TASS issued a dispatch charging that it was “a vessel with nothing inside it,” and “contained no indication of change in the essence of present United States policy” of achieving “military superiority.” This statement was echoed nearly verbatim by Mondale, who charged that same day in a speech in Washington that Reagan’s U.N. address was the product of a “deathbed conversion” of which voters should be “skeptical.” “This presidential sea change,” said Mondale, “raises a crucial question: How can the American people tell which Reagan would be President if he were elected?”

Two days later, Gromyko addressed the United Nations, demanding that the Reagan administration produce “deeds, not words” and proceed with agreements to ban weapons in space. Gromyko blasted the administration, charging that the “tug-of-war between the groups that determine U.S. foreign policy has been won by the militaristically minded.” He accused U.S. officials of making “statements . . . that the United States is within its right to deliver a first nuclear strike, that is to say, to unleash a nuclear war.” The West, he went on, “would have people believe that they favor a reduction in world tensions, but only by establishing more and more military bases, by militarizing outer space, and by deploying new kinds of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.”

Gromyko’s speech came just hours before his 1½-hour

meeting with Walter Mondale, at which, Mondale reported, the main focus of discussion was how to stop space-weapons. Mondale told a press conference that he had stressed to Gromyko that the world is at “a fateful point,” and that if a ban on weapons in space is not negotiated now, a “dangerously destabilizing” situation will occur. Mondale also disclosed that Gromyko had told him much the same thing.

Shortly after the Gromyko-Mondale meeting, TASS issued another statement, which simultaneously castigated the Reagan administration while lavishing praise on Mondale. The TASS statement accused the administration of having “wrecked” negotiations on arms control, including “all questions dealing with the cessation of the arms race.” By contrast, said TASS, Mondale’s ideas on arms control “would open up certain possibilities for bringing the positions of the two powers closer.”

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## **Documentation**

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### **Statements by Kissinger, Reagan, and Gromyko**

*Excerpts from Henry A. Kissinger’s Sept. 23, 1984 syndicated column “Should We Try to Defend Against Russia’s Missiles?”*

We may be witnessing the preliminaries of a Soviet peace offensive. . . . The Soviets seem intent on showing a milder face to the world. A full-scale peace campaign may await the outcome of our elections. But there can be little doubt that its centerpiece, whenever it comes, will be the demilitarization of space. . . .

The Soviets have been vociferous about banning defensive weapons in outer space, where U.S. technology is superior. They have been ambivalent or silent about land-based defensive weapons, in which they have conducted vigorous research. . . .

I have not yet made up my own mind on what position the United States should ultimately take on that issue [whether to deploy a space-based ABM]. I was less than enthusiastic about President Reagan’s “Star Wars” speech when I first read it. . . . [A] foolproof defense of civilian population—that seemed implied by that speech—is a mirage; even a 90% defense would still let enough weapons through to destroy an unacceptable proportion of our population.

As I reflected, that argument more and more struck me as superficial. . . .

Perhaps the most compelling argument is the possible beneficial effect of some missile defense on arms control.

Arms-control theory is now at a dead end; the stalemate in negotiations reflects an impasse in thought. The reductions proposed by the Reagan administration would add little to stability; the freeze which is its alternative would perpetuate what needs correction.

A breakthrough requires reductions of the numbers of warheads on a scale inconceivable so long as the strategic balance depends entirely on offensive weapons. . . .

The real debate will be joined after the American election. Theoretically, both superpowers should have an interest to prevent war by miscalculation and irresponsible third nuclear powers from blackmailing them with nuclear weapons. Neither side can gain from seeking unilateral advantage.

Thus, a renewal of negotiations will be a test less of ingenuity than of political maturity. . . . This article argues that some limited defense—yet to be analyzed—coupled with a revolutionary approach to reduction of offensive forces by agreement may advance us toward the elusive goal of stability. It remains to be seen whether we can overcome debate by sloganeering and internationally whether the superpowers can move the quest for peace from polemics to a joint enterprise.

*Excerpts from President Reagan's address to the United Nations General Assembly, Sept. 24, 1984:*

We recognize that there is no sane alternative to negotiations on arms control and other issues between our two nations [the U.S. and the Soviet Union], which have the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it. . . .

I propose that our two countries agree to embark on periodic consultations at policy level about regional problems. We will be prepared, if the Soviets agree, to make senior experts available at regular intervals for in-depth exchanges of views. I've asked Secretary Shultz to explore this with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

I am committed to redoubling our negotiating efforts to achieve real results. In Geneva, a complete ban on chemical weapons; in Vienna, real reductions to lower and equal levels in Soviet and American, Warsaw Pact, and NATO conventional forces; in Stockholm, concrete practical measures to enhance mutual confidence to reduce the risks of war and to reaffirm commitments concerning non-use of force. . . .

I believe the proposal of the Soviet Union for opening U.S.-Soviet talks in Vienna provided an important opportunity to advance these objectives. We've been prepared to discuss a wide range of issues . . . such as the relationship between defensive and offensive weapons, and what has been called the militarization of space.

During the talks, we would consider what measures of restraint both sides might take while negotiations proceed. . . .

Our approach in all these areas will be designed to take into account concerns the Soviet Union has voiced. It will attempt to provide a basis for an historic breakthrough in

arms control.

I'm disappointed that we were not able to open our meeting in Vienna earlier this month. . . . I hope we can begin these talks [on space weapons] by the end of the year or shortly thereafter.

There's much more we [the superpowers] could do together. I feel particularly strongly about breaking down the barriers between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and between our political, military, and other leaders.

Now, all of these steps I've mentioned, and especially the arms-control negotiations, are extremely important to a step-by-step process toward peace. But let me also say we need to extend the arms-control process to build a bigger umbrella under which to it can operate; a road map, if you will, showing where during the next 20 years or so these individual efforts can lead.

This can greatly assist step-by-step negotiations and enable us to avoid having all our hopes or expectations ride on any single set of series of negotiations. If progress is temporarily halted at one set of talks, this newly established framework for arms control could help us take up the slack at other negotiations.

*Excerpts from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's address to the United Nations General Assembly, Sept. 27, 1984:*

It is necessary to single out the question of preventing the race in nuclear and other weapons in outer space, which some people want to turn into a springboard for waging war. And we know who this is, who these people are.

The extension of the arms race to outer space, unless checked in time, could become an irreversible process.

It is our belief that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. . . . should do everything in their power to keep outer space peaceful. . . . But responsibility for the failure to hold the talks [on space weapons] lies wholly with the U.S. side. Washington is unwilling to engage in talks.

We urge the U.S. government to recognize that the militarization of outer space threatens the whole of mankind, including the American people themselves. . . .

In other words, agreement must be reached on the prohibition and elimination of space-attack weapons of all systems and kinds. . . .

In recent years, [U.S.-Soviet] relations have been disrupted through the efforts of Washington. They have spared no effort to wreck all the gains that have been accomplished. . . . What is more, they virtually flaunt their indifference to the reputation of the U.S. side as a partner in international affairs. . . . Those who dictate U.S. policy today have a great deal to do if they want the words and obligations they assume to be trusted.

The Soviet Union believes that it is precisely concrete deeds and not verbal assurances that can lead us to the normalization of the situation in our relations with the U.S. . . .