

New phase of Operation PAN launched by Kissinger's CSIS

by Tim Rush

A new phase of the destabilization of Mexico was launched on June 3-4 at an extraordinary private conference of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), held in Washington, D.C. Entitled "The Future of the Mexican Economy and Implications for the United States," this CSIS conference served as the occasion for intensive discussion and promotion of the role of the National Action Party (PAN) in the upcoming July 7 midterm election. After two years of quietly building up the PAN behind-the-scenes, and one year of building major public exposure, the order was ready to go out: Let everything roll.

The CSIS took the occasion to issue a policy study entitled "The Mexican Midterm Elections," part of its Latin American election studies series. But, as the paper itself notes, Mexican midterm elections are notoriously boring. What is crucial about this one is that the U.S. Eastern Establishment has determined to use it to blow up U.S.-Mexican relations, leading to the removal of U.S. troops from Europe, and eventually the invasion of Mexico itself. The crucial instrument for this policy, which directly serves the Soviet interest in removing the United States from Europe, is the infamous dope-pushers' party of Nazi-communists in Mexico, the PAN.

Susan Kaufman Purcell, Mexican case officer for the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), put it this way: "The reason the upcoming elections have gained such importance and visibility is because of the role of the U.S. media. . . . These are the first elections where there will be a very large foreign press presence. This reduces the Mexican government's ability to control the portrait of such elections."

This also heightens "the possibility of violence," Purcell

announced, "in part because some of the opposition people see the possibility of using the presence of the media in order to further their cause." She triumphantly observed that "whether the PAN wins or loses, the PRI [the government party] loses, because there is a perception the PAN could win, and there is a perception that the Mexican government has often resorted to fraud."

The accompanying paper by the CSIS staff accepted an explosion on the border as a given, and looked for it to "increase political polarization and violence." "Genuinely competitive elections in Mexico may be an exhilarating prospect, but are not without their risks," the study reads.

Should anyone doubt the policy-making role of such a conference, he or she need only look at the density of U.S. government officials attending. Of 130 participants, 39 came from the U.S. government (15 from the State Department alone, including the entire staff of the Office of Mexican Affairs); 33 from top business circles; 37 from prominent think tank circles; and 9 from leading press.

In addition, the conference brought in several leading PAN supporters from Mexico, who well exemplify the Nazi school of economics of that party. These included leading Mexican Friedmanite Luis Pazos, billed as an "independent Mexican economist," and the head of the Mexican branch of the Mont Pelerin Society, Lic. Agustin Navarro.

The role of economics

The first panel of the conference was chaired by Norman Bailey, former member of the National Security Council and currently a senior associate at a private consulting firm which includes former CIA director William Colby. Bailey was

blunt: A Mexican government official just told me that U.S.-Mexican relations have never been worse, short of a declaration of war, he said. I disagree, he went on; they "are in a state of decomposition," but they can always get worse.

Bailey then introduced Thomas Trebat, the vice-president of Bankers Trust and a key negotiator of Mexico's International Monetary Fund package, who exemplified precisely how relations between the United States and Mexico will be exacerbated. Under the title of "Fruits of Austerity," Trebat demanded a new ratchet of IMF conditions, ranging from the end of all tariff protection, to the opening up of all sectors to foreign capital.

Trebat was followed by Luis Pazos, who went into a tirade about the "socialist" Mexican government, and insisted that austerity had not even begun in Mexico. Pazos had to be cut off by moderator Bailey.

It was up to Gerard Van Heuven, however, the executive vice-president of the U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce, to discuss the relationship between the PAN and the austerity demands of the IMF and the U.S. banks. Van Heuven revealed that three members of the Chamber's former board of directors were running with the PAN, and noted that the PAN pressure is succeeding in making the government "more flexible" in meeting economic demands.

Breeding ground for violence

As the second day of the conference made clear, however, the CSIS has no illusions that it is using the PAN to implement its economic program. What this gang is aiming for is to provoke violence—and ultimately the invasion of Mexico as a tool for destroying not only Mexico, but U.S. global power.

Speaking for the CFR on the topic of "fissures in the political and social fabric" in Mexico, was Susan Kaufman Purcell, a former State Department planner who had just returned from Mexico.

"For the first time, the PAN stands a chance of winning an important governorship, the governorship of Sonora . . . where the PAN is ahead," she predicted, although "not necessarily by a whole lot." Purcell heaped praise on PAN gubernatorial candidate Adalberto Rosas, who has called for the "liberation" of California, Arizona, and various other southwestern states by force. "The PAN candidate is a charismatic person who has been campaigning heavily," she added.

Then, as if she were sending a message down to the 30,000 armed PAN goons stationed across the U.S.-Mexican border, ready to shoot when the green light is given, Purcell predicted massive violence if the PRI "resorts to fraud." Furthermore, she added, the massive presence of U.S. media representatives will guarantee that the PAN will use the opportunity to "further their cause."

What could result from such violence, aside from banner headlines in the U.S. media, is the political and territorial disintegration of the Republic of Mexico. Purcell characterized the PAN and its followers as "separatists," people iden-

tified with the "values and culture" of the United States, and therefore willing to wage a war of secession against the federal government of Mexico City.

Purcell was followed by Sol Sanders, a "journalist" who let loose the whole scenario in lurid detail. The U.S. government has neglected Mexico, Sanders said, and therefore we are going to have to pay.

Reviewing the history of conflicts between the United States and Mexico, Sanders proceeded to *predict* how the next one would occur. With a new period of instability in Mexico, Sanders said, Washington would wake up one morning after the first shots of a new upheaval, to find literally millions of refugees scampering across the poorly defended U.S. southern border. This is the nightmare which Americans have to consider.

Already there is a problem of law and order on the border, he continued, as a belt of increasing criminal activity is created. And, if this continues, the almost universal corruption in Mexican law enforcement "will demand, as it did in the 1970s, direct American intervention in northern Mexico with the obvious infringement of Mexican sovereignty, at a time when Mexico City is already smarting under the constraints of the U.S. banks and the IMF. . . ."

Troops on the border

What Sanders recommends has been outlined at a series of CSIS affairs, including one in mid-May, as well as in the 1984 CSIS publication called *Strategic Requirements for the Army in the year 2000*. No policy guideline drafted in Moscow itself could have stated premises more to the advantage of the Kremlin: "The main thrust of this book is that the existing military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the U.S. will obviate a Soviet attack in central Europe—that is, World War III—during this century. Thus, any conflict that erupts will emerge in the Third World. The NATO alliance is largely irrelevant in that world."

The CSIS study calls for revamping the U.S. military structure for Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) kinds of interventions into what the CSIS, following British psychological warfare terminology, calls "low-intensity operations." "Perhaps the citizens of the U.S. will have to accept a new definition of 'winning' in military events which would countenance vague and ambiguous results short of a clear-cut victory," is the way CSIS describes these new Vietnams.

Where would these interventions occur? The most likely conflict, *Strategic Requirements for the Army* states, would stem from "an outward spread of communist subversion and main-force military violence from Nicaragua threatening Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Belize, and southern Mexico (and the oil fields of the latter three.)"

On May 15-17, 1985, the CSIS went even further. America must overcome its "fixation on Europe," and redeploy its troops out of Europe. Where they would go would be the much-cited 2,000-mile border between Mexico and the United States. And the Soviets would take over Europe.

'Violence, then U.S. intervention'

We publish below extracts from speeches delivered at the CSIS conference, "The Future of the Mexican Economy and Implications for the United States," held in Washington, D.C. June 3-4.

Sol Sanders, former International Editor of Business Week.

For more than a half century, the U.S. has been able to treat Mexico, to use Senator Moynihan's famous phrase with a different context, "with benign neglect."

That traditional lack of understanding in a world where the interrelationship has become so intense could easily be transformed into confrontation.

Our solid land boundary of 2,000 miles has remained virtually undefended, permitting us to use those military resources elsewhere. . . .

One has only to remember the attempt on the life of the President of Mexico May 1 in Mexico City. If a group of students, possibly supported by the Cubans, had been more successful in their aims of firebombs at the reviewing stands we would have had the Mexico crisis. . . Mexico has no experience for handling an emergency succession. The whole course of Mexican history in relations with the U.S. would have been changed, as is always the case elsewhere by such short-term occurrences.

Franklin Roosevelt's decision not to try to use force to halt Cárdenas's expropriation of the foreign oil companies in Mexico in 1938 marked the end of U.S. attempts to guide Mexican policy through the use of force. . . .

The almost universal corruption of Mexican law enforcement officials arising out of their low salaries and their long tradition of 'mordida' [bribe] and the enormous profit in the drug trade will demand, as it did in the 1970s, direct American intervention in Northern Mexico, with obvious infringement of Mexican sovereignty at a time when Mexico City is already smarting under the constraints of the U.S. banks and the IMF. . . .

Susan Kaufman Purcell, Council on Foreign Relations Mexico analyst and former State Department policy planner.

. . . I would argue that part of the reason the upcoming elections have gained such importance and visibility is because

of the role of the U.S. media. The Mexican government is used to having a fair amount of control over the media. These are the first elections where there will be a very large foreign press presence. This reduces the Mexican government ability to control the portrait of such elections. There is also the possibility of violence in part because some of the opposition people see the possibility of using the presence of the media in order to further their cause.

I was in Mexico last week. The subliminal thing is that if you vote for the PRI, you vote for Mexico. In 20 years that I have been working on and traveling to Mexico, never have I seen the level of anti-Americanism in the sense of paranoia about a U.S. carefully orchestrated [sic] campaign against Mexico.

The PAN is being portrayed as a foreign party, the party with foreign links. The PRI is indigenous to Mexico.

there is a lot of criticism against the U.S. ambassador [John Gavin] for having talked, gone to the north of the country and dealt with the PAN and the Church.

The Introduction from CSIS's Report on Midterm Elections.

Given the predictable nature of election outcomes in Mexico, midterm elections usually do not arouse much excitement. But the July 1985 elections have stirred an unusual degree of interest and Mexican press coverage. Important changes in the dynamics of Mexican politics have given new meaning to the electoral process. . . .

Two developments are responsible for the infusion of new meaning into the Mexican elections. *First*, the 1985 elections are likely to be the most competitive and most contested that Mexico has seen in years. For 55 years, Mexican politics have been dominated by a single political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). However, a series of opposition victories in the 1982 elections breathed life into an electoral system that most had considered moribund. This new competitiveness coincides with a 1985 election schedule that is notable for the breadth of offices to be decided. The possibility exists for the first time that opposition parties might control a substantial power base at the state, local, and national levels.

Second, the 1985 elections are taking place in an atmosphere of heightened social and political discontent. What began as a financial crisis with Mexico's near default on its foreign debt in 1982, has shown signs of developing into a political crisis. Years of corruption, electoral irregularities, economic mismanagement, and deteriorating living standards have undermined confidence not only in the PRI, but in the very foundations of the Mexican political system. Many of these political strains are likely to be expressed in the upcoming elections. The mixture of discontent and democratization, when combined with the scope of the 1985 elections, might presage a changing balance in the Mexican political system in the long term.