

The two qualitative facets of the Ogarkov war plan

from EIR's 'Global Showdown' Report

The following is an abridged version of the introductory section of EIR's Special Report, "Global Showdown: The Russian Imperial War Plan for 1988," released in Washington, D.C. on July 24, 1985.

At present, the Soviet Union is in a full-scale prewar mobilization, with the objective of acquiring all capabilities needed to survive and win a full-scale thermonuclear-led assault against the United States, according to the Ogarkov Doctrinal War-Plan, by approximately 1988. The economic mobilization in progress is best characterized as an overlay of two complementary general policies. These two, overlaid, policies we have designated as *Plan A* and *Plan B*, respectively.

Plan A, signifies the aspect of the current economic mobilization governed by a Soviet version of "systems analysis," the portion of the mobilization based on mobilization policies of practice in place prior to 1983.

Plan B, signifies a new dimension of Soviet mobilization policy, which was made visible in Soviet war-planning during the 1983-84 period, and has been implemented on a massive and accelerating scale immediately following General Secretary Gorbachov's installation in office. Fairly described, *Plan B* represents a virtual revolution in Soviet economic policy of practice. The intent of its addition, is to forestall any U.S. move to a "crash program" method of implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative. It introduces to Soviet practice, "science-driver crash-program" methods of rapid technological upshifting of Soviet production in general.

What we have named *Plan B*, is based significantly on Moscow's exhaustive study and monitoring of the writings of U.S. economist Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. As far as we are able to determine thus far, this monitoring of LaRouche is centered within the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The Soviets fear that the Reagan administration might adopt the reforms in economic policy proposed by LaRouche and his associates. Soviet planners associated with Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov and General Secretary Gorbachov, are purging the Soviet apparatus of the so-called "Brezhnev Mafia," at an accelerating rate, in the effort to bring a Soviet imitation of LaRouche's "crash program" doctrine into effect.

The relevant Soviet strategic estimate is broadly as follows.

Option A: If the United States continues the monetary, economic, and defense-budget policies now in force, by 1988, the Soviet empire will have the degree of strategic superiority needed to launch, survive, and win a general "first strike" assault against the United States with degrees of losses acceptable to the Soviet command, on condition that the U.S.A. does not adopt a "launch on warning" doctrine. For this case, *Plan A* is sufficient for Soviet war-economy mobilization.

Option B: However, in the case, that the United States not only adopts "launch on warning," but also unleashes those changes in monetary, economy and budgetary policies needed for implementation of an SDI "crash program," *Plan A* would fail.

If the Soviets knew, that the U.S.A. had adopted a "launch on warning" doctrine, then a Soviet "first strike," a crucial feature of the maximum option under the Ogarkov Plan, would not be possible as early as 1988. At the earliest, Soviet "first strike" would be postponed to the 1990s, awaiting the deployment of a more advanced generation of Soviet BMD than is projected for deployment by approximately 1988.

If Soviet ability to survive and win a general war is postponed from the 1987-89 interval to the 1990-92 interval, as U.S. "launch on warning" would tend to have this effect, and if the United States also turns to a "crash program" implementation of SDI, Soviet *Plan A* war-economy mobilization would be disastrous for Moscow's ambitions. On this account, the Soviet planners are introducing *Plan B* rapidly and most forcefully at this time.

The relevant Soviet fear is: The cultural resistance to rapid technological progress within much of the Soviet population, often labeled the "peasant problem" in Soviet production, would mean that even a scientifically inferior United States could outpace the Soviet economy technologically under the condition that the U.S.A. changed its present monetary and economic policies in the manner required for transforming the SDI into a "crash program." The Soviets are deathly fearful of the projected rate of increase of U.S. economic and technological prowess under revival of precedents of the 1939-43 mobilization and the pre-1966 phase of the U.S. aerospace program, a U.S. return to "pre-McNamara" defense policies.

Therefore, the current Soviet push to activate *Plan B*.

On the surface, *Plan B* takes the form of a massive purge of Soviet bureaucrats, to appoint industrial managers who are committed to forcing Soviet workforces to accept very high rates of adaptation to technological progress. This takes the form most visible from the scope and depth of the current barrage of policy-statements from the highest levels in Moscow, of introducing the managerial methods of the Soviets' high-technology military industries, especially the aerospace and nuclear sectors, into the management of firms generally.

Lyndon LaRouche's keynote address of June 15, 1985, on the principles of "science-driver crash programs," to the Krafft Ehrlicke Memorial Conference of the Schiller Institute [published as an appendix in the "Global Showdown" report], summarized the methods by aid of which, the United States could transform the SDI's implementation into a "crash program," the methods which the Soviets fear and seek to emulate.

Soviet administration has been long familiar with certain important features of successful "crash programs." Soviet knowledge and past practice of "crash programs" depended greatly on captured documents and veterans of the German Peenemünde Projects. The Soviets employed thousands of veterans of those Projects; without these captured German scientists and engineers, the postwar aerospace and ther-

monuclear-fusion accomplishments of the Soviet military would not have been possible. The grafting of captured German science and scientists, onto Pasteur Institute-trained Academician Vernadsky's Atom Project, identifies the essence of Soviet knowledge and experience in this connection.

Moscow has recognized that LaRouche's work as an economist has opened up new dimensions of insight into the causal relationship between scientific progress and increases of economic growth-rates. Although Moscow lists "LaRouche" as a "dangerous principled adversary," whom it wishes to destroy, this is not the first time that Moscow sought to learn as much as possible from those it seeks to destroy.

Soviet interest in LaRouche's work is twofold.

On the one count, President Reagan's March 23, 1983 announcement of an SDI policy congruent with LaRouche's earlier specifications, came at a time that leading Democratic Party circles had solemnly assured Moscow, that the President was efficiently blocked from taking such action. Consequently, Moscow exaggerated greatly LaRouche's influence on the President, to the degree Moscow worked together with its U.S. collaborators, including NBC-TV and the Anti-Defamation League, to orchestrate early 1984 demands that the President publicly distance himself from LaRouche.

More generally, and more accurately, Moscow recognized that LaRouche's work as an economist had opened up new dimensions of insight into the causal relationship between scientific progress and increases of economic growth-rates. Obviously enough, although LaRouche has provided the first successful theory for such programs, successful "crash programs" existed long before the circulation of LaRouche's discoveries. The existence of a competent theory of "crash programs" is merely an important, and very practical advancement in present-day knowledge. Although Moscow lists "LaRouche" as a "dangerous principled adversary," whom it wishes to destroy, this is not the first time that Moscow sought to learn as much as possible from those it seeks to destroy.

Moscow hates LaRouche on another relevant count. In

analyzing Moscow's explosive rejection of the President's offer of March 23, 1983, LaRouche and his collaborators, beginning May 1983, published documentation of the Soviet political-philosophical outlook which caused this particular form of response. This documentation of the Soviet imperial doctrine of "Third Rome," is summarized in this report, below. Much as they hate the publication of this documentation, Moscow knows better than any other authority, that this documentation and the associated evaluations offered, is absolutely correct. LaRouche et al. have, in other words, revealed some of the innermost "family secrets" of the Soviet ruling class (the *Nomenklatura*) to Moscow's adversaries. This public exposure, the Soviets hate. Yet, Moscow recognizes that LaRouche et al. have put their index fingers on the kernel of the economic and administrative problems of the Soviet empire, the so-called "peasant problem."

This touches one of the most important facts about the character and internal problems of Soviet society, facts which most official U.S. intelligence agencies and private think tanks usually ignore, and sometimes deny to exist.

Briefly. We of Western Europe and the Americas, have inherited a cultural tradition, the Augustinian Judeo-Christian tradition, which is in every way vastly superior to the Byzantine tradition in Russia and other Byzantine-dominated sectors of Eastern Europe. As part of this, because our tradition places the emphasis in all matters on the creative-scientific and related potentialities of the individual human mind, and locates individual merit in the fostering of scientific and technological progress, the Augustinian heritage supplies society with a vastly superior potential for not merely new and profound scientific discoveries, but also for rapid adoption of the technological benefits of those discoveries in production and other leading features of daily practice of the society as a whole.

Although the heritage of classical Greek language and culture within the Eastern Roman Empire, is essentially the same as the Augustinian current of Western European culture, the open conflict between Western and Eastern Europe since the time of Charlemagne, is the deep root of the East-West conflict in Europe and the Mediterranean ever since.

For example. Russia itself is a Byzantine creation. "Rus" is a Swedish name for the various tribes subjugated by the Scandinavian Varangians, Varangians who were themselves clients of Byzantium, the same Scandinavians deployed by Byzantium against Charlemagne's order and against the British Isles as part of Byzantium's efforts to obliterate Western European Christendom.

The characterization of the Soviet state as "Marxist," is essentially an absurdity. The truth begins to be clear, once we examine the so-called "socialist" reforms of the Emperor Diocletian, the Diocletian who was the patron of Constantine, and who shifted the seat of the Roman Empire to the East. If we compare the organization and philosophical outlook of Soviet society today with the form of "socialism" imparted to Byzantium by the Diocletian reforms, and study

this connection in the light of the history of Eastern Europe since Cyril and Methodius, Russian "socialism" is more than 1,000 years old.

So, today's Soviet ruling class views history. The Soviets see Moscow as the successor to the cities of Rome and Constantinople, as the capital of a world-empire, and consciously, explicitly trace the precedents for the planned Russian world-empire to such Mesopotamian precedents as the Persian Empire. The Soviet ruling class, the *Nomenklatura*, is a ruling bureaucracy in the tradition of the collections of families composing the ruling bureaucracies of the Roman and Byzantine empires.

Soviet ideology is "oriental socialism," in that specific sense: the imperial socialism of an empire ruled by one "superior race," the "Great Russians" of Muscovy.

On this account, the modern form of the strategic conflict between Eastern and Western Europe dates from the 1439-40 A.D. Council of Florence, at which time Muscovy became the bastion of Eastern counteroffensive against the Augustinian doctrines affirmed at that Council of Florence.

This cultural foundation of Soviet strategic outlook has been a perpetual crisis inside Russia since the rise of the Romanovs. Repeatedly, enlightened Russian leaders, such as Peter the Great, Alexander II, Count Witte, and Lenin, have emphasized, that Russia could not become a world-power without assimilating Western science and technology to a large degree. Yet, the introduction of Western science and technology collides directly and bloodily with a "Russian peasant soul," a "peasant soul" which embodies the characteristic features of an Eastern, anti-Western religious and philosophical outlook. Consequently, for Russia to become a world-power, either Western European culture must destroy itself from within (as we have done to a large degree since the middle 1960s launching of the "post-industrial countercultural shift"), or the Russian population must be induced to accept a large degree of "cultural paradigm-shift," bringing the intrinsically inferior Russian culture up to the level of the hated Western European culture.

The result of this conflict is the schizophrenia exhibited by the plans of the Russian "Nazi," Fyodor Dostoevsky, for establishing a Russian "Third Empire" ("Third Reich"). Dostoevsky, much like Hitler, saw the need to combine Russian-style mystical irrationalism with the apparatus of a military-industrial power developed in Siberia. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov expresses the same conflict today. He is fairly characterized, as the equivalent of a mad Dostoevsky who has nonetheless qualified as an honors graduate of the Prussian General Staff: militarily super-rational, but also mystically irrational. So, one might say of the presently ruling Suslov-Andropov dynasty in Moscow: They are the reincarnation of the Brothers Karamazov, with a nineteenth-century Prussian General Staff's attention to military-industrial thoroughness.

The prospect of a U.S. "crash program" implementation of the SDI, brings this underlying conflict within Soviet

society to a most acute form. They can not match the U.S.A. to the degree their strategic perspective requires, unless they rudely confront the "peasant problem" in production, unless they confront directly cultural hostility to rapid rates of technological progress in methods of production, a hostility which is endemic in the "Russian soul." Hence, their rage against the SDI is of a fury comparable to the most violent propaganda of the World War II period. A "crash program" implementation of SDI obliges Moscow to impose a key aspect of Western European values upon the Soviet population in general. In terms of the present institutions of Soviet society, this means a resumption of the methods of the Stalin period.

So, as Hamilton's anti-Adam Smith American System of political economy typifies this policy, we in Western European culture place emphasis of merit upon the individual person's commitment and capacity to discover and to implement advances in science and technology. Eastern European culture places the emphasis of merit on "traditional ways"; Eastern European culture has a mystical hatred of technological progress, which it tends to regard as sacrilege against the local "blood and soil's" choice of mother-earth-goddess.

Here lies the most immediate cause for the bloody violence which erupts in Russia, whenever one faction attempts to "impose" rapid rates of technological progress upon the Russian people generally. It must never be forgotten, in such conflicts, both factions are equally "Russian." Even among the pro-technology factions, only a fraction is morally and philosophically committed to scientific and technological progress; the factions rallied behind the cause of technological progress have been dominated by those who adopt such progress with moral reluctance, as a strategic imperative of the East-West conflict.

Partly, they hate the SDI because it spoils their plans of imperial conquest; this is the rational component of Soviet babbling against "militarization of space." More profoundly, they hate the SDI, because they regard its implementation as forcing them to return to Stalinist methods of mobilization of the Soviet labor-force as a whole. They see themselves so forced, because they are absolutely committed to a war-winning margin of military superiority over the United States; as Soviet officials have said publicly, repeatedly, during recent years, they can not accept strategic equality with the United States; they must have absolute superiority. In face of even a modest rate of development of the U.S. SDI, the gaining of absolute Soviet military superiority means a Soviet war mobilization which is massive not only in scale, but also massive in terms of rates of forced technological progress.

The economic science of Soviet war-plan 'Option B'

Recent changes in the levels of understanding of "crash programs" among leading circles of the Soviet Academy of

Science, are based chiefly on accelerated studies of the economic writings of LaRouche over a known period of approximately 15 years. Although the evidence available is fragmentary, and the conclusions legitimately drawn from that evidence necessarily limited in scope, the evidence demanding certain broad but extremely important evaluations is conclusive in nature.

Initially, during the 1968-70 interval, Soviet institutions viewed LaRouche and his associates as a novel and potentially important phenomenon, to be explored, to determine whether this phenomenon could be penetrated and played to Soviet advantage. Soviet-deployed "sleepers" were sent into LaRouche's environment. Approximately 1971, East Germany-controlled ("Stasi") operations under Soviet direction launched a series of operations aimed at destroying LaRouche's influence in Western Europe and disrupting LaRouche's associations in the Americas. These Stasi operations were run during 1972-74 in conjunction with the Palme-Brandt faction of the Socialist International, and elements of British intelligence, including the London Tavistock Institute, which were then and now heavily penetrated by Soviet intelligence. As early as 1974, it was indicated by Soviet officials, that these operations were run with knowledge and direction from the highest levels of the Soviet command. The most recent phase of Soviet-directed operations against LaRouche and his associates was launched during April 1983, on decisions made at the level of then Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko; most of the remaining "sleepers" assigned to penetrate the association were activated for counter-operations against LaRouche, and a massive campaign by leading elements of the Soviet news-media was launched, from spring 1983 into spring 1984, together with leading Soviet fellow-travelers in the U.S. news-media, Democratic Party, and elsewhere.

Soviet estimates of the work of LaRouche and his associates as "very dangerous" and as a "principled adversary," center around the estimate by highest levels of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, that LaRouche's own work in economic science represents an important new development in economic science, and is at the same time the most competent analysis of the U.S. and Western economies currently available. On this account, chiefly, LaRouche is officially described in the Soviet news-media as the "ideologue of late-capitalism."

In the lexicon of Soviet dogma, "ideologue of late-capitalism" signifies the Soviet estimate, that economist LaRouche has presented a more or less comprehensive basis for reviving and saving the capitalist system. For example, at a recent, high-security Paris conference of world-wide Communist parties, June 12-13, 1985, Moscow reinstated the old Communist International (Comintern). The featured theme of this conference, was the Soviet presentation of the thesis, that the United States had entered a new general economic depression, which would be the "final crisis of capitalism." Moscow assumes, that unless there is a sudden change in the

monetary and economic policies of the OECD countries, the capitalist system is now in a "final stage of collapse." Moscow views LaRouche's proposed reforms as a set of means for saving capitalism from collapse, and thus depriving Moscow of the delights of a "final collapse of capitalism."

Moscow considers LaRouche "very dangerous," because it fears that LaRouche's proposed reforms are competent. Moscow views LaRouche's February 1982 proposal of what is now called the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, as both militarily competent, and also as a form of military-economic mobilization which could save the capitalist system through a new "crash program" like the 1939-43 war-economy mobilization under President Franklin Roosevelt.

Soviet officials have stated, that they view LaRouche as philosophically a Catholic, whose criticisms of Marx's Capital from this vantage-point constitute the basis for a "neo-capitalist" revival.

From Moscow's standpoint, LaRouche's work does in fact appear as a rigorous critique of Marx's work from a Catholic philosophical standpoint, the standpoint of St. Augustine, Nicolaus of Cusa, et al. From the Eastern standpoint in religion and philosophy, Western Christian tradition, excepting Gnostic tendencies introduced to Western churches, is the same thing to Russians as Catholicism in general; despite the doctrinal and related differences among Western European currents of Judaism, Catholicism and Protestantism, the common features of these currents are those which the Russians more or less accurately identify as Augustinian.

Respecting economics, in Soviet Russia today, there are only two general currents of thought: more or less "orthodox" Marxism on the one side, and the post-1966 growth of Cambridge "systems analysis" on the other. LaRouche's axiomatic criticisms of Marx's errors define LaRouche in Russian eyes as a "revisionist," to be debated from the standpoint of a more or less "orthodox" Marxism. However, the failures of Soviet systems analysis, and the failures of the econometricians of the West, have conditioned some among present-day Soviet circles to accept as "scientifically legitimate," any criticism of Marx's economics on points Marx employs some of the same premises as the Cambridge systems analysts.

Therefore, from the Soviet standpoint, if LaRouche's economics works, as they are inclined to believe it does, they hate LaRouche as much on this account as they hate his efforts to introduce the SDI to the military policies of OECD nations. The Soviets do not wish the Western nations to adopt any technology which might work to the strategic advantage of the Western alliances. Just as hatred of U.S. SDI does not prevent the Soviets from developing ballistic missile defense full-speed for their own forces, so, hatred of LaRouche's "neo-capitalist" economic science does not discourage the Soviets from studying and copying as much as might be to Soviet advantage.

Present Soviet views on the exceptional competence of LaRouche's contributions to economic science, date from

about 1980-81. Their attention was focused on the fact that a first-approximation application of the LaRouche-Riemann Method, to computer-based economic forecasting, had been consistently accurate, whereas all other Western forecasting services of governments and private agencies alike, had been discredited by events. The Soviets, too, had employed "Western" systems-analysis methods for their economic forecasting, and these had failed just as the econometricians of the West had failed. It was the fact that the LaRouche-Riemann forecasts were computer-based, which particularly attracted Soviet attention during this period; they tend to be impressed more by mathematics than by principled issues of scientific method, and have an increasing fascination with computer technologies and their applications.

It was the highest levels of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, especially the mathematics and physics sectors in the orbit of Academician Aleksandrov, which manifested the greatest degree of concentrated interest in the LaRouche-Riemann Method.

It has been clear, through statements by Aleksandrov and other relevant circles, since the close of the Brezhnev period, that during the process of consolidation of the factional position of Suslov's heirs of the currently ruling "Andropov dynasty," Soviet policy-making has moved toward replacement of the old industries "mafia" by managerial cadres from the military-industrial sector. The planning of purges to accomplish this was already adopted by spring 1982, purges delayed during the Chernenko period, set fully into motion immediately by Gorbachov's accession to the party leadership. The barrages of statements to this effect, by Aleksandrov and others, since March 1985, do not signify the sudden eruption of a newly formed policy: They are the unleashing of a policy already adopted no later than spring-summer 1982.

There can not be a competent appraisal of the emerging "Plan B" aspects of current Soviet war-mobilization policy, without comparing ongoing shifts in Soviet policy with the central features of the published material on the LaRouche-Riemann Method. What the Soviets have been studying over the years, is most conveniently summarized in LaRouche's 1984 textbook in elementary mathematical economics, and in a series of articles in *EIR*. From the standpoint of commonplace errors of assumption of U.S. econometricians, the most crucial points to be considered, in evaluating current directions in Soviet policies, are as follows.

U.S. econometrics today, is immediately a combined by-product of the work of Professor Wassily Leontief, on input-output analysis, merged with the analysis of systems of linear inequalities which grew up through the influence of the late John von Neumann and Operations Research. The most important incompetencies of econometrics today are either explicitly or implicitly arrayed in von Neumann's and Morgenstern's *Theory of Games & Economic Behavior*.

The first general error of modern econometrics, is the

adoption of the notion of "marginal utility," as this was developed, first, in Jeremy Bentham's "felicific calculus," and elaborated on that basis by J. S. Mill, Jevons, and Marshall. This assumes that the relative price paid for an object or service converges statistically (ergodically) upon an equilibrium-price; it assumes that the only value to be considered in economics is the convergence of price, as a reflection of marginal utility, upon such an equilibrium-price, in an "indefinitely extended n-person game."

The second major fallacy, is that dogma introduced most authoritatively by von Neumann, that the solution of all problems of analysis in economies, could be accomplished by stating input-output expressions of the Leontief type as systems of linear inequalities.

The third, more subtle fallacy, is the analysis of economies solely in terms of changes in quantities and prices of inputs and outputs, without examining the impact on the economy of transformations internal to the processes of production as such.

Consider the third of these fallacies first.

It is easily shown, that military expenditures as such do not contribute to increase of the productivity of labor, and are not either producers' goods or households' goods. Therefore, it appears to be the case, that military expenditures constitute economic waste, simply a depressive tax upon the economy as a whole.

Yet, throughout the nineteenth century, and twentieth century to date, the greatest rates of progress in per-capita wealth of economies have appeared as by-products of war-economy mobilizations! The recovery of the U.S. economy from the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the more recent 1959-66 recovery under mobilization of aerospace programs, are characteristic examples of this.

Where lies the answer to this paradox? It lies in the fact, that war-economy mobilizations subsume mobilization of higher rates of technological progress in weapons-systems and in investment in production for producing weapons-systems. In this respect, war-economy mobilization forces rapid advances in investment in productive processes, in an energy-intensive, capital-intensive mode. The acceleration of technology of capital-goods production, and the spill-over of this advancement in capital-goods technologies into production in general, causes rises in productivity in the non-military-goods sectors of production.

In other words, any "cost-benefit analysis" treatment of merely the addition of military-output requirements to an economy, is intrinsically an absurd form of analysis. We must consider the technological impact of increases in military production upon the increase of productivities in the economy in general.

In all cases, the primary thing to be considered, is not simply inputs and outputs as such. The most powerful impact upon an economy, is the impact of technological progress upon the process of production itself.

Translate this into the language of Soviet strategic doctrine. In previously established Soviet doctrine, *Plan A* doctrine, military production is treated as a drag upon the economy. Therefore, *Plan A* thinking reasons, if one power cranks up to full-scale war-economy mobilization, and a comparable opposing power does not, the weakening of the first power by such war-economy mobilization can be compensated only by either victorious warfare or other capitulation by the opposing power. If *Plan B* follows the LaRouche-Riemann Method on this point, then the power whose war-economy mobilization is at the higher technological level, can sustain such a mobilization indefinitely, constantly gaining in margin of economic advantage over the other. In economic terms, a full-scale war-economy mobilization, is a source of cumulative economic superiority, not weakening, on condition that the principle of a "science-driver" variety of "crash program" is adopted.

There lies the practical implication of the difference between *Plan A* and *Plan B*. There lies the feature of recent and current *Plan B*-type Soviet policy-statements, which must have first rank in evaluations.

In other words, if Soviet policy follows *Plan A*, the likelihood of warfare is at the greatest during approximately 1988. At that point, the Soviet war-economy mobilization will have peaked, and the religious mobilization leading into the 1988 celebrations will also have peaked. According to a version of Soviet strategic doctrine based on *Plan A*, the Soviet Union must launch a full-scale war against the United States by approximately 1988. After 1988, according to *Plan A* reasoning, the relative advantage to the Soviets will erode at an accelerating rate, unless NATO military capabilities and economies collapse of their own weight.

What, then, if the United States shrewdly focuses upon Soviet ideology respecting acceptable losses to the Soviet empire's Great Russian master-race, by adopting an operational policy of launch on warning, directed at Great Russia and choice Siberian targets? Even if the Soviets won the war otherwise, the losses associated with such victory become "unacceptable." This buys the U.S.A. several years of postponement of Soviet attack, until, as we have already indicated, Moscow deploys a "second generation" quality of strategic ballistic missile defense. Assume also, that the U.S. revises its monetary and economic, as well as military-budget policies, to foster a general economic recovery and increased SDI expenditures. Under that condition, the logic of *Plan A* appears to be problematic for the Soviets.

Against that contingency, Moscow is obliged to begin shifting rapidly from *Plan A* to *Plan B*. In that case, then 1988 is no longer a maximum point of relative strength for Moscow, but, rather, the date of maximum strength is shifted to a later date, to a critical point during the early to middle 1990s.

That critical point is rather simply defined. Let X, Soviet total capability, be greater than Y, the total capability of the

NATO alliance. Let the exponent of growth-rate for X be designated by "a," and let "a" be less than the exponent of growth for Y, "b." The point at which the absolute margin of growth of Soviet capability ceases to be greater than the absolute margin of growth for NATO capability, is a critical value. This is indicated better, by assuming, as is the normal case, that the growth-rate exponents "a" and "b" are not linear, and that "b" increases more rapidly than "a": in other words, a U.S. mobilization "takes off" as did the 1939-43 mobilization. Once NATO's economies reach the critical value corresponding approximately to 1943, the rate of growth of NATO's power will accelerate relative to the rate of growth of the Soviets, on condition that the Soviets do not introduce an effective "cultural paradigm-shift," away from deeply-embedded Eastern cultural matrices during that interval.

Given, such broadly obvious distinctions between *Plan A* and *Plan B* varieties of policy-making, the practical question is circumscribed: How do we measure choices of investment in such a way as to obtain the optimal *Plan B* type of effect? The first step, is to throw away all "systems analysis," and "analysts": economies do not function in the mode implied by solutions to systems of linear inequalities; every decision based on such fallacious methods will be an absurd decision. Economic processes are characteristically "non-linear."

Restate the practical question: How can we calculate the estimated increases of growth of productivity resulting from a choice of investment in improved technology? This obliges us to discard every British, Swiss, and Viennese economist, from the Physiocrat Quesnay, through Smith, Bentham, Malthus, Ricardo, Marx, the Mills, Walras, Say, Pareto, Marshall, Keynes, Friedman, Hayek, and so forth. We must return to the source of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's American System of political-economy, the establishment of economic science by Gottfried Leibniz.

'Crash program' methods

LaRouche's principled contribution to economic science, centers around his improvement in Leibniz's definition of "technology," an improvement based on the work of Karl Gauss, Dirichlet, Weierstrass, Riemann, and Cantor. From this standpoint, the measure of increase of productivity and the military criteria of increases of firepower and mobility, have a precise mathematical correlation. This correlation is based upon a mathematical measurement of technology, a measurement accomplished by resituating Leibniz's original definition of technology within a Riemannian hyperspherical function: in other words, the notions associated with synthetic-geometrical construction of a Riemann Surface. This is indicated within LaRouche's elementary mathematical-economics textbook, as amplified in such published sources as his *EIR* items on "Artificial Intelligence" (May 14, 1985) and exposing the fallacies of Leontief's featured piece in the June 1985 *Scientific American* (*EIR*, June 10, 1985).

In ordinary scientific research, scientists construct instruments for experimental work, chiefly, in collaboration with tool-makers skilled in development work. This used to be accomplished, chiefly, in machine shops associated with university and other laboratories, until the foolish introduction of line-item budgeting of such work, such that experimental work is usually delayed by months or years, while the scientists seek to win authorization for a line-item budget from among various governmental or private-grants institutions. These silly methods of budgeting have been one of the more important brakes against scientific progress, especially over the recent quarter-century since the Hoover Commission's proposed increase in the bureaucratization of government.

A weapon is essentially a scientific instrument adapted for military usage; so is a new type of machine-tool. Let us imagine that we take two steps. First, we junk the line-item budgeting of scientific research, and return to the sensible practice of budgeting only the staffing and equipping of the research-institution as a whole, and not the detailed activities within it. Second, for purposes of military development, we supply scientists with use of budgeted sections of generalized production-capacity in the economy as a whole. In this second feature, we budget only the indicated portions of capacity as a whole, and budget the use of these portions of capacity only for a species of materials or instruments, rather than some specified material or instrument.

For example. The SDI is most usefully defined as based upon a complex of species of technologies, species which are assorted as a whole into two general classifications, primary and auxiliary. The primary classes are controlled high-energy plasma-reactions, coherently directed beams, and optical biophysics. The auxiliary technologies, are those required to deliver, aim and fire the primary technologies. On this basis, we know in advance, at least in practice, the kinds of materials and instrumentation we shall require for yet-unspecified kinds of applications of these technologies.

What we wish to avoid, is the situation in which our scientists prove that a certain sort of instrument for military uses can be produced, but in which we do not have available the kinds of production facilities needed to produce the materials and instruments this design requires. Therefore, we assign manufacturers to allot some corner of their total capacity, to mastering the production of one or more of the varieties of materials or instruments we shall require. In other words, once we have determined the need for a specific sort of material or instrument, we have a working group in some industry qualified to work up a material or instrument to the level of specifications required.

Once we have produced a prototype of some instrument, we use the lessons we have learned in producing the materials and instruments for that prototype, to launch expanded general production of such materials and instruments.

That is the first-approximation of a "science driver" variety of "crash program." What we have done, in such a case,

is to expand the instrument-making resources of the scientific laboratory, beyond the scope of the machine-shop attached to that laboratory, to the effect of making production as a whole increasingly the machine-shop in which scientific research works.

This is key to understanding the reasons that such a "crash program" takes the form of an accelerating rate of growth in quality and scale, from initially small beginnings.

This process subsumes a spread of new materials, instruments, and skills, from the initial interface between scientists and corners of production, into production more generally. This is the "spill over" of the new technologies into production generally. In other words, the "spill over" does not occur in the form of taking completed new designs from the isolated laboratory into production; the "spill over" is organic, is the effect of increasing the relative scale of production directly under the influence of the combined fundamental research and development work of scientific teams, by integrating manufacturing with laboratories engaged in fundamental research.

In this way, scientific research directly transforms the processes of production, in an energy-intensive, capital-intensive mode. This impact is mediated chiefly through the tool-making aspect of capital-goods production, such that the rate of increase of productivity tends to be in proportion to the capital-intensity of investment in production generally.

This rarely occurs in larger-scale private manufacturing firms, even technology-intensive firms. Something like it tends to occur more frequently among newly formed small firms, created by scientists and engineers motivated more by a passionate commitment to a scientific principle than to precalculable rates of profit. It occurs, otherwise, only through commitment of governments, either in warfare or preparations for warfare, in which the risk of losing war, or the cost of unacceptable levels of warfare damage, outweigh the ordinary considerations of precalculable profitability.

This behavior of private entrepreneurs is ultimately very silly. There has never been a case in modern history of industry, that a new scientific principle was not most generously profitable, provided sufficient breadth and professional staffing of the investment were supplied. Expressed in terms of statistics, it ought to be U.S. policy, that the employment for research and development in physical and biological technologies ought to be about 10% of the total employment of the labor-force, perhaps 15%. If this investment in employment were made, adequately supported, and utilized, the resulting rate of increase of productivity of the labor-force as a whole would exceed the highest rates in modern history. The result would be, that the economy functioned in something like a "science-driver" "crash program" mode all of the time. However, with rare exceptions, practice in that direction occurs only under the pressure of perceived military expediences.

This is the direction in which *Plan B* aspects of current

Soviet policy are moving. Technically, from the standpoints of both physics and economic science, those efforts portend the highest rates of economic growth in the Soviet Union so far. The impediments to such an effort are chiefly cultural, as we have indicated here already, cultural impediments with potentially profound political implications for Soviet society as a whole. In the meantime, we must assume that the acceleration of Soviet urgency and confidence in its military imperatives, will overwhelm the cultural opposition, such that cultural resistance may impede success, but not prevent it entirely.

Our remarks on the nature and theory of a *Plan B* approach, here, should not be taken to imply that the Soviets are fully committed to the theory of practice which we have outlined here, nor are we estimating the probable net result of opposing cultural resistance and present efforts to force through a "science driver" approach. Our task here, is to alert readers to this important aspect of current Soviet policy of practice, and to insist that existing U.S. governmental studies of the Soviet war-plans and economy must be replaced by methods appropriate to the close study of both Soviet policy and shifting Soviet capabilities.

All those who echo Henry A. Kissinger, in babbling the falsehood, that the "Soviet empire is crumbling," and so forth, should be disregarded or jailed, as proper statutes may prescribe for such cases. Soviet society is by no means "crumbling"; it is the NATO alliance which is already crumbling, as we note in such cases as recent developments in Greece and Scandinavia, and the threat that Willy Brandt's Soviet-allied Social-Democratic forces might come to power in Germany, and pull Germany rapidly out of the U.S. alliance.

There are sources of troubles inside the Warsaw Pact, and in Soviet society itself. Soviet society is inherently a very violent society, whose culture prescribes periodic convulsions. *Plan B* efforts will increase the potential for such convulsions, as we have indicated. However, the likelihood that either the Warsaw Pact or Soviet society itself will begun to crumble internally very soon, is so small as to be almost non-existent under present conditions. The classical counter-offensive policy for Soviet attack through East Germany, to sweep into Poland and declare the national sovereignty of that nation's existing government, is not a practical alternative in the present correlation of forces.

In the present term, our attention to troubles within the Soviet empire must be less wishfully ambitious, more precise, and more practical. It is important to watch closely the frictional impulses of cultural and policy conflicts, impulses not likely to cause the Soviet empire to crumble during the foreseeable future, but impulses which will affect greatly the way in which Soviet policy and performance shift marginally during the period ahead. The cultural and policy conflicts arising in the overlay of *Plan A* and *Plan B* are the best choice of benchmark for such observations and analysis.