

## NDPC nails Congress with voting survey

by D. Stephen Pepper

At the National Democratic Policy Committee's day of lobbying in the nation's capital on July 23, NDPC chairman Warren Hamerman released to the public the first definitive survey of the U.S. Congress, just conducted by the NDPC national office in Washington, D.C. "Using this weapon," Hamerman said, "we, the mobilized citizens of this country, will be able to expose the members of the Congress for what they are, traitors to the national interest of this country." This new rating is a line-by-line analysis of how every member of the Senate and House voted on 19 key issues from 1983 to the present. Armed with this "weapon," more than 600 lobbyists from a dozen states spent three hours confronting their elected representatives with the hard facts on how their congressmen have systematically betrayed the country's security needs.

Every flea-bag political outfit and self-appointed policy group already produces a rating of Congress, so why do we need yet another analysis? The answer lies in the selection of votes used to establish the ratings of Congress in the NDPC analysis. Developed by Susan Kokinda, who, with her husband, Ron, heads the NDPC's national lobbying effort, the survey has the unique feature of representing not a special-interest bias (e.g., Chamber of Commerce, COPE), or an ideological tilt (American Conservative Association or Americans for Democratic Action), but an overview of the crucial votes on matters of fundamental national interest.

In this first survey, the tallies reflect an over-emphasis on straight military-related matters, at the expense of important economic infrastructure programs, such as water-resources projects of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway type. This has the effect of skewing the results in favor of certain Republican legislators such as Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), and against Democrats such as John Melcher (D-Mt.), who tends to be blind to certain national security needs, while vigorously promoting infrastructure requirements. As a result, Helms, who suffers acutely from the Republican disease of unrecon-

structed "free enterprise" obsession, scores a high 89% because of his generally sound commitment to military concerns, whereas Melcher is way down at 32%. The ideal legislator, who does not yet exist, would combine the two outlooks.

In fact, since 1983 when the NDPC survey begins, there have been very few votes in the House or Senate which have even posed the issue of American System economic development. Legislators did not even give themselves the opportunity to vote on vital infrastructure projects!

Despite this caveat, the report represents a breakthrough, as the only reliable guide for the perplexed patriot. The survey begins with the vote in 1983 on the reconfirmation of Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, and continues through the July 16 Senate vote on the confirmation of Richard Burt as ambassador to West Germany. Among the highlighted issues is the vote on the MX missile, specifically the Nunn amendment to limit MX production to 50 missiles. Only 13 senators voted to oppose this sellout of U.S. security interests and in favor of the minimum requirement to build 100 missiles (7 others voted against the amendment, but with the goal of killing the MX entirely). The NDPC position is that the United States should build 1,000 missiles a year for the next three to five years, and employ laid-off auto-workers to do so.

Only 10 senators voted against the Burt nomination, and of the sitting senators, only 16 voted against Volcker. This tells a crucial truth about the problem patriots confront in changing the Senate. On most vital issues, in which the nation's survival is involved, one can only muster between 10 and 20 votes! So the door is opened to compromises crafted by experts in such dubious efforts, such as Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), who produce proposals, like Nunn's MX amendment, that are accepted as the "best possible result in a worst-case scenario." The pragmatic approach of the White House and the majority, allows

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE  
Vote Rating Report

+ is agreement  
with NDPC position.  
See end for vote  
descriptions

Percentages indicate  
agreement with  
NDPC position

Year:	8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8																PERCENT			
Vote descr. (read down)	3 3 3 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 3																When	All		
SUPPORT Position:	V I I M M S S S S A A N B P N A A C																SUPPORT			
	O M M X X X D D D D S S T R O U S S R																When	All		
	L F F I I I I T T O T P C R R B																Voting	Votes		
	N N N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y N N Y N N N																			
McClure (R-ID)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	?	+	94	89
Helms (R-NC)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	89	89
Symms (R-ID)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	?	+	+	-	+	89	84

## Tallying up the Senate

This table explains the codes (in bold-face) used in the NDPC Vote Rating Report, to evaluate the voting record of U.S. senators.

**VOL**—1983 reconfirmation of Paul Volcker as Federal Reserve Board chairman. NDPC position: NO.

**IMF**—1983, HR3959. Supplemental Appropriations, Fiscal 1984. Garn's final motion on IMF. NDPC position: NO.

**IMF**—1983, S695. International Monetary Fund Authorization. Senate motion to kill amendment to reduce U.S. authorization for IMF. NDPC position: NO.

**MX**—1985, S1160. Department of Defense Authorization, Fiscal 1986. Nunn amendment to accept compromise limit of 50 MX missiles. Those voting against wanted full 100 missile complement. (Several liberals voted against this amendment, because they wanted fewer or no MX missiles. Their support position in the chart has been changed to reflect that.) NDPC position: NO.

**MX**—1985, S1160. Department of Defense Authorization. Hart amendment against initial MX production. NDPC position: NO.

**MX**—1984, S2723. Omnibus Defense Authorization. Tower motion to kill Moynihan amendment to stop MX deployment. NDPC position: YES.

**SDI**—1984, S2723. Omnibus Defense Authorization. Tower amendment to table (kill) Percy amendment to cut SDI spending. NDPC position: YES.

**SDI**—1985, S1160. Department of Defense Authorization. Wallop amendment to move toward deployment

of some SDI components. NDPC position: YES.

**SDI**—1985, S1160. Department of Defense Authorization. Gore amendment to reduce from \$2.96 billion to \$2.5 billion the SDI funds. NDPC position: NO.

**SDI**—1985, S1160. Department of Defense Authorization. Bumpers amendment to straightjacket SDI research and to cut budget. NDPC position: NO.

**AST**—1984, S2723. Omnibus Defense Authorization. Warner amendment to tie hands of President on anti-satellite missile testing. NDPC position: NO.

**AST**—1984, S2723. Omnibus Defense Authorization. Wallop amendment to allow unrestricted ASAT testing. NDPC position: YES.

**NTO**—1984, S2723. Omnibus Defense Authorization. Tower motion to table (kill) Nunn NATO troop pullout amendment. NDPC position: YES.

**BRT**—1985 confirmation of Richard Burt as ambassador to West Germany. NDPC position: NO.

**POP**—1985, S1003. State Department Authorizations. Kassebaum amendment to table (kill) Helms amendment to curtail U.S. support for international population control efforts. NDPC position: NO.

**NUK**—1984, S979. Export Administration Act Amendments. McClure amendment to allow nuclear exports to certain developing-sector nations. NDPC position: YES.

**AGR**—1984, HR4072. Agricultural Programs Adjustment Act. Baker motion to table (kill) Melcher amendment to raise grain price supports. NDPC position: NO.

**AGR**—1984, HR5743. Agriculture Appropriations. Cochran motion to table (kill) Exon amendment to raise grain price supports. NDPC position: NO.

**CRB**—1983, HR3959. Supplemental Appropriations. Humphrey amendment to kill Clinch River Breeder Reactor. NDPC position: NO.

the outright KGB-influenced types such as Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) an inordinate power.

While this sad situation dominates the present body, there is a ray of hope, in the potential for a bipartisan coalition on the national interest. The 10-20 potentially sound senators are drawn from both parties; for example, Democratic Senators Tom Heflin (Ala.), Edward Zorinsky (Nebr.), and John Stennis (Miss.) joined seven Republicans in voting against Burt. Lyndon LaRouche, the founder of the NDPC, pointed out that this bipartisanship represented a potentially more important gain in the long run than the short-run defeat suffered in the Burt case ("LaRouche hails patriotic senators who rejected Burt," *EIR*, July 19, 1985, p. 32). Other Democrats who rank in the 50% or better category, in the NDPC's tally, include David Boren (D-Okla.), Russell Long (D-La.), and Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.).

On the other hand, the survey exposes the myth of the so-called middle-of-the-road Democrat, supposedly represented by Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.), Nunn, and John Glenn (D-Ohio). Bentsen scores 65% in the American Conservative Association rating, whereas the NDPC rated him at 12%. The NDPC gave Nunn a shameful 16% and Glenn a marginally higher 19%. To give the reader a better appreciation of the value of the current survey, compare the 90% rating for Nunn and Glenn in the National Security Index of the American Security Council. The methodological flaw of the NSI rating, is to weight all defense-related matters equally, so that a simple vote on appropriations is counted the same as a crucial vote on the SDI, the MX, or troop deployments in Europe. The strength of the NDPC's survey lies in the selection of votes based upon a strategic perspective.

One final observation based on the Senate analysis: There is, on the whole, a clear demarcation between those in the 50% and up category, and those below 50%—with the exceptions of Melcher, Max Baucus (D-Mont.), and James Exon (D-Nebr.), explained above. The former category represents 42 senators, who, while imperfect, to say the least, occasionally display some healthy instincts. For example, Hollings (D-S.C.), who scores 50%, astonished a Democratic caucus meeting by coming out solidly for the Strategic Defense Initiative, because he thought it was right. Those below 50%, with the exceptions cited above, behave like traitors. Here we find Cranston (D-Calif.) scoring 7%, William Proxmire (D-Wisc.) 5%, and Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) a well-deserved 0%.

The conclusion to be drawn is that ruthless pressure must be brought to bear on the 50% and up group, to act as a patriotic bipartisan leadership, while the other 55 senators must be turned out of office. As a weapon to realize this, the NDPC vote-rating report is invaluable.

*The report is available for a \$10 contribution, plus handling charges, from Susan Kokinda, NDPC, P.O. Box 17729, Washington, D.C., 20041-0729.*

## Regan assumes role of 'prime minister'

by Nicholas Benton

As Washington moved into its last week before the great August recess, concern over the growing influence of the White House "Palace Guard," especially the role of Chief of Staff Donald Regan, intensified.

The reasons were well founded: impasse on the budget, inertia in the White House, failure to aggressively pursue the President's key programs—especially the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Did Don Regan have something to do with all this? Many believe so.

The White House chief of staff is supposed to have a position with as much influence as the chief cleaning lady. But Regan has used it to assert more influence, insiders say, on any President since former New Hampshire Gov. Sherman Adams used to decide what President Eisenhower could or could not read.

Not only Regan, but also National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, Secretary of State George Shultz, and Treasury Secretary James Baker III have muscled into much more direct decision-making postures.

Regan's assumption of "prime minister-like" powers first came to wide public attention during the President's brief stay at Bethesda Naval Hospital for his cancer operation. It was Regan, according to reports, who told Vice-President George Bush to "take a hike" during the operation, such that Bush didn't even meet with the President for five days. It was Regan, also, who allegedly convinced the President to sign over his powers of office for the brief eight hours that he was in surgery. And finally, there was Regan's role in building the President's operation into an inelegant circus of successionist speculation, making the decision to give the press access to full technical medical briefings on the nature of the President's condition.

However, the deeper danger involved in the Regan-McFarlane-Shultz-Baker "inside putsch" involves undermining the SDI.

Columnists Evans and Novak alluded to this on July 26, commenting, "The lack of a sure political touch under hard-driving Don Regan has hurt the President on the SDI and on chemical warfare." They were referring to the fact that, since April, "for whatever reason, the White House staff distanced itself from herculean efforts of pro-defense congressmen to prevent the new anti-defense mood from gutting Reagan's SDI."