

New Yalta deal: ready to sign

by Linda de Hoyos

In his speech before the United Nations General Assembly Oct. 24, President Ronald Reagan put forward what he called a "bold plan" for the Soviet Union and the United States to negotiate an end to regional conflicts involving the two superpowers. The areas cited by the President were Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola, and Nicaragua. Reagan proposed that the "starting point must be a process of negotiation among the warring parties in each country I've mentioned, which, in the case of Afghanistan, includes the Soviet Union. . . . There is a second level: Once negotiations take hold . . . representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union should sit down together. . . . In some cases it might well be appropriate to consider guarantees for any agreements already reached."

This is to be the framework presented by Reagan during the summit with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in November, which will feature a special section on "regional matters" to review "the legitimate interests" of the two superpowers in different "spheres of influence."

Throughout Ibero-America, Asia, and Africa, U.S.-allied governments have expressed their displeasure with the formulation. Sources across a wide political spectrum in Washington are unanimous in their assessment that Reagan's formula for solving regional conflicts is the public unveiling of the administration's assent to the pact between the Soviet Union and the West's oligarchical faction for a New Yalta division of the globe.

The New Yalta deal, as stated by Henry Kissinger in 1982, stipulates that the United States would recede to 25% of the world influence it commanded in the 1970s. U.S. influence is to be circumscribed within the Western Hemisphere. Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, including the Pacific, are to be ceded to Moscow, with China playing a secondary role in Asia. The sovereignty of the

nations subjected to this deal is, from the standpoint of Moscow and its Western oligarchical partners, irrelevant. New Yalta rests on the assumption that the world's economy will continue to be dominated by the destruction of national economies directed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

New Yalta is the prevailing doctrine of the State Department and has been so since Kissinger's official tenure there. It accounts for the undeniable fact that the State Department has led the United States into one foreign policy debacle after another, knifed one ally after another in the back—from Tunisia to the Middle East, through Pakistan to the Philippines and South Korea; through Western Europe where the New Yalta crowd has crowed for the "decoupling" of Western Europe from the United States and the reassignment of U.S. troops stationed in Europe to Central America. The debacles are deliberate, as the State Department enacts U.S. strategic withdrawal from those areas to come under Soviet hegemony.

How the deal will work

The details of the New Yalta plans behind Reagan's deal emerged in two locations over the last month. One is the fast-paced process leading to the reopening of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union. The other is the idea of mutual concessions in solving regional conflicts, concessions defined by New Yalta. This second aspect was aired by Zbigniew Brzezinski on Oct. 6 in an op ed in the *New York Times*. Brzezinski, famous for his 1979 assertion that "Islamic fundamentalism is a bulwark against communism," operates out of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown, the State Department's quasi-official back channel to Moscow. Brzezinski argues for a

trade-off on Afghanistan and Nicaragua. "The two situations may involve not only a political parallel," writes Brzezinski, "but also some degree of indirect political linkage. To put it differently, a constructive solution to the Afghan tragedy has to be based on a formula that the United States can also accept in Nicaragua. Such a formula should involve 'external neutralization and internal self-determination.'"

As Brzezinski then makes evident, this is purely a stratagem for agreement between empires, "External neutralization would involve arrangements to ensure that the country concerned *not become allied with forces hostile to the relevant [!] superpower* or engage in political or military activities *contrary to the regional interests of that superpower*. Internal self-determination would mean that political arrangements within the country correspond to the freely expressed views of the population *and that such arrangements be at least initially reinforced by external forces acceptable to, but not controlled by, the pertinent superpower*" [emphasis added].

The Afghanistan-Nicaragua *quid pro quo* is part of a larger New Yalta plan, explained Bruce McCole of Freedom House, an outfit close to Brzezinski. This larger deal, he said,

resignation and disappearance in late September is part of the Southeast Asia complex of deals, out of which would emerge a "neutralized Cambodia under Vietnamese hegemony." (*EIR* has subsequently corroborated this with area sources, who say, however, that this deal reflects primarily agreement between China and Russia. The United States would agree to be "cut out" in exchange for concessions in Central America.) The Soviets would also agree to keep out of Thailand. On South Africa, the deal involves a gradual Soviet withdrawal of assets from South West Africa, allowing the Soviets to retain Angola as an asset. Namibia is to be "neutralized"; South Africa is to be given guarantees it would not be touched.

The New Yalta fix

These are the parameters that have been set for the Reagan-Gorbachov "regional review." But Reagan and Gorbachov will just be placing the finishing touches on a deal that has already gone into effect. "The way New Yalta is working," William Sullivan, former ambassador to the Philippines and Iran and now president of the American Assembly, explained, is through the bilateral discussions officials of the State Department have had over the last year with their Soviet counterparts.

Talks have been held twice on the Middle East; on Afghanistan; on the Far East; on southern Africa; and pre-summit talks are scheduled on Ibero-America. On the U.S. side, the negotiators have been Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East and Southwest Asia Richard Murphy; Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker; and Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz.

The bilateral talks have functioned as the means by which

the rules have been set to avoid superpower confrontation, under conditions in which both parties are destabilizing targeted nation-states of the underdeveloped sector. In the details of what New Yalta would actually look like in the "regions," the truth of this deal emerges in its full starkness: New Yalta is another name for Russian imperial domination of the globe.

The Israeli-Soviet deal

The first of these bilateral talks took place on Feb. 25 on the Middle East, between Richard Murphy and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Polyakov. The date for the talks, which had been mooted for over two months before, was rapidly set as soon as Saudi Arabia's King Fahd came to Washington in early February, bringing a unified Arab proposal for peace involving a joint Jordanian-PLO representation in negotiations.

The State Department, including Murphy, opposed an affirmative U.S. answer to Fahd's proposal, which had the backing of Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt. Murphy has argued that the United States should recognize that Syria—not America's Arab allies—is the power the United States must deal with in the Middle East. He has demanded that the Congress extend to remove Syria, the command center for Islamic terrorism, from the American list of terrorist states.

According to the official reports of the Murphy-Polyakov meeting, the purpose was "to contribute to our own mutual understanding of those problems" in the Mideast. State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb gave assurances that the meeting "should not be seen as negotiations and we do not anticipate any agreements. They are merely an exchange of views. They do not represent any change in the U.S. position regarding issues affecting the region." But, according to diplomatic sources in Vienna observing the meeting, the "exchange of views" included an exchange of assets. These diplomatic sources say that Murphy told Polyakov point-blank: "If you want Lebanon, take it. We don't want it."

In the immediate months afterward, the continuing conflict in Lebanon escalated with the Shi'ite Amal militia's Syrian-sponsored slaughter of Palestinians in Beirut. The Israelis withdrew, perhaps under the deal that Syria could have its Greater Syrian empire encompassing Lebanon, in exchange for continued Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. By setting up the Arafat wing of the PLO for slaughter, the Moscow-State Department partners were attempting to knock out the only possible Palestinian negotiating partner for the Middle East—a process nearly brought to completion in the last weeks with the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunisia and the Achille Lauro incident. While the State Department diddled with King Fahd's proposal, seconded in early March by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Yevgenii Primakov, head of the Soviet Oriental Institute, the counterpart of the CSIS for Asia and Africa, denounced the agreement between King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser Arafat and attacked Arafat personally.

By August the content of the Polyakov-Murphy deal was apparent even to the PLO chief, who stated Aug. 1 that the convening of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. conference on the Middle East was a major point raised in the U.S.-Soviet talks. "The immediate objective for the PLO," Arafat said, "is not be left out of this New Yalta."

On May 30, the State Department announced its conditions for such a conference—which conditions represented the very contents of the deal now emerging as the conditions for an Israeli-Soviet rapprochement. For a conference to go through as Moscow desires, the State Department said, the Soviets must recognize Israel; the Soviets must end mistreatment of Jewish minority groups inside the Soviet Union and permit Jewish emigration . . . to Israel's West Bank; end officially sanctioned anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union; and end the supply of arms to Iran and terrorists in Lebanon.

As Sullivan stated in his recent interview, the New Yalta for the Mideast will depend upon whether "there is an Israeli-Soviet rapprochement and what is worked out between them." Israeli sources indicate that the Soviet-Israeli deal rebounds back to the United States, as a stepping stone for American unilateral surrender. Shlomo Avineri, former director general of the Israeli foreign ministry, told UPI Oct. 21 that "Once the Soviets are ready to open up the gates [of emigration to Israel] again, Israel can certainly see to it that some of the anti-Soviet propaganda in the United States is diminished." The upshot of the New Yalta in the Middle East, is the withdrawal of the United States from the region, and the emergence of a Greater Israel and Greater Syria under Soviet sponsorship.

Target Indian subcontinent

In June 18, Murphy sat down in Washington with Oleg Sokolov, number-two man in the Soviet embassy, and Yuli Alekseyev, chief of the Mideast Department of the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry, to "exchange views" on Afghanistan. Reportedly, Murphy offered a deal in which the Soviet Union would be permitted to "Finlandize" Afghanistan, in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. However, there is little to discuss about Afghanistan, where the Soviets are solidly entrenched and have nothing to gain by leaving. Afghanistan is critical to future Soviet military moves, and the Soviets have turned their presence in Afghanistan into a forward base for operations into Iran and Pakistan and the fulfillment of the Russian dream of a warm-water port. In addition, Afghanistan is a crucial section in the Soviet encirclement and containment of China.

The actual subject of discussions was escalation of the Soviet pressure on and U.S. withdrawal from Pakistan. Since the June discussions, the Soviet pressure—both militarily and with insurgencies inside—has mushroomed in Pakistan, to the point that Soviet Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa declared last week that "Pakistan is at war with the Soviet Union." The Soviets have also increased their support for the separatist movements in Sind, Baluchistan, and the North-

west Frontier Province against Pakistan. Kapitsa menaced Pakistan: "The 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan are a problem for you. They are Pathans. Don't forget Pushtunistan."

U.S. sacrifice of Pakistan is the motivation for the new-found love of India expressed by Henry A. Kissinger at an Indo-American Chamber of Commerce meeting Oct. 15. It was Kissinger who in 1971 executed the U.S. "Pakistani tilt" as part of his China card policy, telling the Indian foreign minister then that Washington did not mind if India "went with" the Soviets. But once a disintegrated Pakistan has succumbed to Soviet pressures, then there is no buffer standing in the way of total Soviet domination over India. The Russians made clear, especially in the months before the Oct. 31, 1984 murder of Indira Gandhi, that they had become irritated with India's stance of independence and non-alignment.

Southern Africa, Far East

The early July talks between Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker and his Soviet counterparts, as the crisis in the Republic of South Africa was escalating, centered on a regional package as described by Freedom House's McCole. Led by New Yalta hustler Rep. Stephen Solarz, who has made several solo trips to Moscow, the United States has come to recognize the African National Congress, a self-avowed communist organization directed from Moscow, as the primary negotiating partner for the South African government. This is a formula for, at best, a continuing cycle of violence in southern Africa.

From Crocker's point of view, the major objective has been to quell South African military interventions against Soviet regional operations, being directed by East German and North Korean cadre.

In the first week of September, Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz took off for Moscow to meet with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa on issues concerning the Far East. As with the other bilateral discussions, this meeting was arranged as an "exchange of views" and "official positions." Wolfowitz, it is said, was going to bring up U.S. concerns over the Soviet build-up of its Pacific fleet, the delivery of MiG 23s to North Korea, and the Indochina conflict.

But although only "official views" were discussed, Wolfowitz informed Japanese and South Korean leaders, with whom he met afterwards in Tokyo and Seoul, that his talks with Kapitsa were "confidential." That is, the State Department now gives greater deference to the Soviet Union, than to its own closest allies.

On Oct. 31-Nov. 1, Soviet and State Department officials will meet on issues of mutual concern in Central and South America.

On Nov. 10, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachov will meet. Will they pen their names to a New Yalta deal for the destruction of the United States and its allies?