

## Editorial

### *The dangers of the summit obsession*

Despite the increasingly overt pro-Soviet machinations by Secretary of State George Shultz, at the present time the Reagan administration outlook for the superpower summit looks good. The President has taken the offensive on the Strategic Defense Initiative, and won a general statement of support from the European allies at the Nuclear Planning Group meeting the last week in October. His interview with BBC radio was an extraordinary reiteration of the need for *both* superpowers to have a defensive weapons system, so extraordinary that the British and other would-be saboteurs could scarcely contain their chagrin.

But, in terms of the larger game of grand strategy, one would have to conclude that the President, for all his good intentions, is losing the war. He has become so fixated on defending the SDI issue at the summit, that he has let the State Department proceed with policy decisions that are well on their way to losing the United States every ally it might wish to defend.

First, we have the situation in the Philippines, where the State Department is virtually campaigning to give the islands to Moscow. The major source of complaints about "human rights" in that island nation is now the same circle of U.S. senators, newspapers, and State Department bureaucrats who were responsible for bringing down the Shah of Iran. Should the Philippines be lost, the United States will have to withdraw its nuclear forces all the way to Hawaii. Japan and other U.S. allies in the region will have been handed over to the Soviets, who have already beefed up their forces in the Pacific to an alarming degree.

Second, and equally alarming, is the situation in Ibero-America. Even before Paul Volcker's review board decided to declare Peru's debt non-performing in late October, the actions of the administration had created a near-Malvinas type situation to the south of the United States. This was accomplished by Reagan's announcement that the United States would deal with hotspots like Central America through demanding local negotiations, and then sitting down with the Soviet Union, to work out a longer-term deal in the various regions.

This announcement by Reagan finally made offi-

cial, what the State Department had been doing all along, in relation to the efforts of the Contadora nations to bring about a peace process in Central America. The Reagan administration had been pledging its official support for Contadora up until the President's U.N. speech. Now, the President had ripped up his promises, and told Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela that the "big boys" were going to take over the process.

This is not quite the same as the U.S. backing England's military intervention into Argentina, as in the Malvinas war, but it presages a similar kind of development. Contadora, from its outset, has demanded that peace was only possible if both superpowers stopped meddling in the region. And now, Reagan was pushing hard in just the opposite direction.

The State Department, with its insistence upon IMF conditionalities throughout Ibero-America, had already alienated Ibero-America. Now, this statement of intent has virtually lost it.

The third area where the State Department has been allowed to carry out its wrecking operations against the allies, is the Middle East. What has prevented the Mediterranean from becoming a Soviet lake, up until now, has been the friendship of certain North African nations, as well as Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, with the United States. Yet, one by one, the State Department has proceeded to insult and betray those nations, leaving the United States identified solely with Israel, at the time when Israel itself is rushing into the arms of the Soviets!

The postponement of arms sales to Jordan, the refusal to meet necessary economic demands from Turkey, and the cut-off of millions of dollars of aid to Egypt—all carried out during the last days of October—have stabbed all of our allies in the back.

The quality of commitment which the President has applied to the SDI, needs urgently to be applied to the concept of principled alliances with our neighbors and friends. The commitment to share the benefits of the SDI, must be extended to the commitment to create actual conditions for economic growth for our allies. Let's not win a victory at the summit—but lose the world.