

The Reagan-Gorbachov summit: 'Peace in our time'?

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Much as this fact may have displeased a Secretary of State George Shultz returning from the recent Geneva "summit," President Reagan had no intention of playing the role of a modern "Neville Chamberlain" at a Munich Peace Conference. Until the President has checked the contents of his wallet, it appears that the President lost nothing of importance during his meeting with the Soviet general secretary.

There was a popular gag going around after World War II. It went like this. Each day, a certain employee at a defense plant would arrive at the check-out gate pushing a wheelbarrow filled with sand. Each time, the suspicious guards would examine the sand most diligently, and finding nothing, would wave the employee out. Years later, after the defense plant had been closed down, a retired guard challenged the former employee: "Come on, you can tell me now. What were you stealing?" The former employee grinned back: "Wheelbarrows."

The summit reminds us of that story. Perhaps the political analysts are being very silly in giving so much attention to the events within the summit meeting itself. Perhaps the whole summit—the hoopla, the agenda, and the final releases—were all a meaningless charade as far as General Secretary Gorbachov was concerned. Perhaps, Mr. Gorbachov's only purpose was to buy time.

There is one rumor coming out of the summit, which tends to confirm the suspicion that the only thing which really interested General Secretary Gorbachov, was buying time. The President should check out the rumor; if the President discovers that there is any substance to the rumor, that, by itself, would be conclusive proof that the entire summit was a hoax as far as Mr. Gorbachov was concerned.

The LaRouche question

One version of the rumor has it, that Gorbachov mentioned the name of "LaRouche" on the short list of Soviet

complaints against the United States. Another version has it, that unpleasant references to the name "LaRouche" came up only in the "back-channel" discussions between the U.S. and Soviet sides, rather than between Reagan and Gorbachov. If either version of the rumor is essentially true, as President Reagan should be able to discover, then the summit, with all its hoopla, was just one big Soviet hoax.

It's more than a rumor. In a featured article, in the Oct. 30, 1985 issue of the authoritative Soviet weekly, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, there was a sharp attack on me by name. [*Literaturnaya Gazeta* is well-known as an outlet for KGB messages; its editor-in-chief, Aleksandr Chakovskii, is a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party—ed.] Then, in the pre-summit issue of the same Soviet organ, there was a second featured article, signed by the entire editorial board, condemning the Western news-media for failing to cover the Oct. 30 article in which I was denounced.

The significance of the Oct. 30 piece from Moscow, is that this was the first major attack on me, by name, in the leading Soviet press since the March 28, 1984 issue of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. From May 23, 1983 until March 28, 1984, there were regular attacks on me, by name, in leading Soviet publications. The reason those public attacks had stopped, after March 28, 1984, was that the Reagan administration had bowed to Soviet public demands that the administration take demonstrative action signaling a break with me. Suddenly, after 18 months' official silence, on the eve of the summit, I am again the subject of a major attack, by name, in the Soviet KGB's chosen outlet journal, with a follow-up statement signed by the entire editorial board, during the week of the summit itself.

Moscow had me very much on its collective mind as General Secretary Gorbachov went into the meeting with President Reagan. It would be astonishing if the Soviet delegation did not bring up my name with the U.S. delegation,

and likely that Gorbachov might bring up my name directly with the President. For the time being, let the President, or "Bud" McFarlane and the CIA, sort out exactly what did happen.

Why Moscow must buy time

There are several reasons, it is in the vital strategic interests of Moscow to buy time. The most important of these reasons, is that the Soviets' pre-war mobilization has not yet peaked, and probably won't for a year or two, sometime during 1987 or early 1988. If the U.S.A. can be lulled into keeping defense expenditures down for another year or so, the objectives of Soviet pre-war mobilization can probably be reached by the time the next U.S. presidential campaign gets into full swing.

General Secretary Gorbachov has a less important, but significant reason for buying time over the months to come. The massive purge now ongoing in the Soviet leadership will not be completed until the 27th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, next year. It is probable that that Soviet Congress will do about everything short of actually crowning General Secretary Gorbachov "Czar Michael V," perhaps bringing in Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov as Soviet Defense Minister. After all, the massive purge which Gorbachov began as soon as he became General Secretary, was exactly the purge Marshal Ogarkov demanded as part of the pre-war mobilization, back when Ogarkov was still Soviet Chief of Staff. All Soviet military build-up over the past two years has followed exactly the Ogarkov War Plan, for winning a potential thermonuclear war against the United States.

The Soviets need a year or two longer, to bring their pre-war mobilization up to peak. Although the Yuri Andropov dynasty, which both Ogarkov and Gorbachov represent, is firmly in the saddle in Moscow today, Gorbachov must have a solid leadership, fully cleansed of tired old bureaucratic dead-wood, before he dares get as tough with the Soviet population—and the United States—as he intends to do. Those are the two most important reasons General Secretary Gorbachov needed the hoopla of a rather meaningless summit.

Some of Moscow's other considerations

There were other reasons for buying time. Gorbachov had no reason to let his unresolvable differences with President Reagan push the summit into an open break. Over the next 12 months, Moscow expects the U.S. strategic position to deteriorate rapidly. For one thing, a toppling of the Kohl government of West Germany could be pulled off by Foreign Minister Genscher at almost any time, and is presently very likely after the coming state elections in Lower Saxony next year. That would mean, probably, a Genscher-Vogel government, and a rapid process of West German decoupling from the alliance with the U.S.A. Meanwhile, the new cooperation

among Israel, Syria, Libya, and Moscow is progressing rapidly, which means that the United States, which is already all but out of the Eastern Mediterranean, will probably be out of both the Middle East and North Africa by some time next year. The United States, with its insane scheme for destabilizing Thailand and toppling the Philippines government, is doing an excellent job of pulling U.S. strategic influence out of Asia.

Also, Moscow expects the U.S. banking system to reach the level of a full-scale collapse by sometime next year, and expects Moscow's narco-terrorist insurgents to take over most of Central and South America, with help of U.S. official bungling, before the end of 1986. Since the Reagan admin-

Perhaps the political analysts are being very silly in giving so much attention to the events within the summit meeting itself. Perhaps the whole summit—the hoopla, the agenda, and the final releases—were all a meaningless charade as far as General Secretary Gorbachov was concerned. Perhaps, Mr. Gorbachov's only purpose was to buy time.

istration, so far, refuses to attack the drug-money laundering in which major U.S. financial institutions are involved, the narco-terrorists of Central and South America, cheered on by the New York Times and Washington Post, will tend to grow stronger over the months ahead. Meanwhile, with help from the notorious Jesse Jackson, and also the New York Times and Washington Post, Moscow expects the Western world's source of strategic minerals, southern Africa, to be shut down in a general bloodbath during the period ahead.

So, if you were Moscow, what would you do? You would avoid doing anything to alarm the U.S. Congress out of its confidence in "arms control" and impulses of the Soviet empire. Stall, keep up the appearances of willingness to negotiate, while not actually negotiating anything of real importance. Buy time. Let the well-meaning Robert Novak debate the "issues of the summit" with a Congressman Moakley who gets his advice second-hand from the Washington Soviet Embassy, advice passed on by way of the likes of lobbyist Carol Rosin.

So, with that thought in mind, a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to you all.