

Kennan, Shultz, and the Gnostic cult of the American foreign service

The oracle of the American foreign policy Establishment has spoken, and Secretary of State George Shultz, the executor of the Establishment's policy, has jumped into the fray. George F. Kennan, in the just-published Winter 1985/86 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, the journal of New York's Council on Foreign Relations, declares that the world faces two great, even "apocalyptic" dangers: nuclear war and "the devastating effect of modern industrialization and overpopulation on the world's natural environment." This, he proclaims, defines more than just a moral principle which must underly the conduct of policy; it is a *religious* question.

What kind of strange religion is this, which rejects God's commandment to man to "be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it"? Not Christianity certainly, but the ancient Gnostic cult of Abraxas, resurrected by Carl Gustaf Jung, who used to pray to a figurine of the hermaphroditic Egyptian god which he carried about in his briefcase. It was Jung who, in 1940, as the Nazis rolled into France, proclaimed that the world was entering the "Age of Aquarius"; this later became the rallying cry of the rock-drug counterculture whose anti-industry ideology Kennan spouts

in his current *Foreign Affairs* piece, and George Shultz trumpets before the Pilgrims' Society in London. Kennan is currently professor emeritus at Princeton University, the base of the Bollingen Foundation, publisher of the works of Jung.

Kennan's plunge into mysticism can be better understood by considering the career of William H. Sullivan, president of New York's American Assembly think tank and former ambassador to Iran and the Philippines. A protégé of Averell Harriman, Sullivan was the ambassador who oversaw the collapse of U.S. influence in Iran and the delivery of the country into the hands of Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalists. In his autobiography, Sullivan boasts that, throughout his career as a foreign service officer, he has been part of a tightly knit "cult," consisting of at most several thousand foreign service officers, military officers, government officials, and members of think tanks and the press, which has shaped foreign policy since World War II.

From the documents we present below, you can see just what insane policy this cult of traitors is pushing: deindustrialization of the West and a "new Yalta" deal of "crisis management" with the Soviet Union.

Documentation

Excerpts from "Morality and Foreign Policy," by George F. Kennan, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1985/86:

... Except perhaps in some sectors of American government and opinion, there are few thoughtful people who would not agree that our world is at present faced with two unprecedented and supreme dangers. One is the danger not just of nuclear war but of any major war at all among great industrial powers—an exercise which modern technology has now made suicidal, all around. The other is the devastating effect of modern industrialization and overpopulation on the world's natural environment. The one threatens the destruction of civilization through the recklessness and selfishness of its military rivalries, the other through the massive abuse of its natural habitat. . . .

The need for giving priority to the averting of these two

overriding dangers has a purely rational basis—a basis in national interest—quite aside from morality. For short of a nuclear war, the worst that our Soviet rivals could do to us, even in our wildest worst-case imaginings, would be a far smaller tragedy than that which would assuredly confront us (and if not us, then our children) if we failed to face up to these two apocalyptic dangers in good time. But is there not also a moral component to this necessity?

Of all the multitudinous celestial bodies of which we have knowledge, our own earth seems to be the only one even remotely so richly endowed with the resources that make possible human life—not only make it possible but surround it with so much natural beauty and healthfulness and magnificence. And to the degree that man has distanced himself from the other animals in such things as self-knowledge, historical awareness and the capacity for creating great beau-

ty (along, alas, with great ugliness), we have to recognize a further mystery, similar to that of the unique endowment of the planet—a mystery that seems to surpass the possibilities of the purely accidental. Is there not, whatever the nature of one's particular God, an element of sacrilege involved in the placing of all this at stake just for the sake of the comforts, the fears and the national rivalries of a single generation? Is there not a moral obligation to recognize in this very uniqueness of the habitat and nature of man the greatest of our moral responsibilities, and to make of ourselves, in our national personification, its guardians and protectors rather than its destroyers?

This, it may be objected, is a religious question, not a moral-political one. True enough, if one will. But the objection invites the further question as to whether there is any such thing as morality that does not rest, consciously or otherwise, on some foundation of religious faith, for the renunciation of self-interest, which is what all morality implies, can never be rationalized by purely secular and materialistic considerations.

Excerpts from speech by Secretary of State Shultz before the Pilgrims' Society, London, Dec. 10:

... Among the ideas that have been decisively altered in the postwar era is our conception of the balance of power. British audience knows, the classical conception served well as a functional description of international order. The idea of national sovereignty was born in Europe, and thus the problem of peace was to nurture some kind of equilibrium among sovereign states. Sometimes the balance was stable; sometimes not. When some continental power seemed bent on dominance, Britain would join others in restoring the balance.

Today, the classical conception still serves, to a degree. When faced with Soviet expansionism after World War II, for example, the West had no choice but to unite to deter and resist Soviet ambitions.

But the strategic realities of the postwar era demanded new modes of resistance and deterrence. In the classical or European model, the balance of power tended to be one-dimensional; its objective was the maintenance of equilibrium between the states in question. The balance of power in the contemporary world is by contrast multidimensional. . . .

In the 1980s and beyond, most likely we will never see a world in a total state of peace—or a state of total war. The West is relatively well prepared to deter an all-out war or a Soviet attack on Western Europe or Japan; that's why these are the least likely contingencies. But day in and day out, we will continue to see a wide range of conflicts in a gray area between major war and millennial peace. Some of them—not all—will affect Western interests. Terrorism, particularly state-sponsored terrorism, is already a weapon increasingly resorted to by those seeking to undermine Western nations and friends of the West in the developing world. We

must be equally well prepared and organized for this intermediate range of challenges. . . .

Finally, I want to speak of another kind of revolution that is altering the world balance of forces—a reawakening of economic thought and a new era in the technology of communication. . . .

Economic problems are not new in history. What is new in recent history is the intellectual shift taking place about how to remedy these problems. Lord Keynes's point about practical men being in thrall to some defunct economist may be less true now than in the past. Or perhaps the wise perceptions of Adam Smith two centuries ago are once again gaining practical prominence. At any rate, reality is intruding on some long-held notions about economic policy.

There is a new skepticism about statist solutions, central planning, and government control. Perhaps the extraordinary vigor of the American recovery has made the point: Ten million new jobs created in three years, with low inflation and declining interest rates. . . .

The industrial age is coming to an end. In some places it is over. The economy of the future will be based more and more on information technologies. And the flow of information requires freedom. . . . Ideology has nothing to do with this: It's just a fact of life. . . .

And this economic wisdom isn't culture-bound either. We see on every continent—Western Europe, East Asia, Latin America, and Africa—movement to decentralize, to deregulate, to denationalize, to reduce rigidities in labor markets, to enlarge the scope for individual producers and consumers to interact freely in open markets. At the Bonn Economic Summit last May, the leaders of the industrial democracies stressed the importance of moving in that direction. . . .

This reawakening in economic thinking itself coincides with a revolution in the technological base of the global economy. Microchip computers, advanced telecommunications, and an accelerating process of innovation are transforming the world we live in. . . .

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