

Gramm-Rudman, will make it impossible for the United States to maintain a military presence in either Western Europe or in the Pacific, and that therefore, an "orderly withdrawal" should be planned.

Shultz's Mediterranean trip

Prior to Shultz's departure for his recent Mediterranean junket, an extensive effort was launched, involving House and Senate leaders of the Armed Services Committees, to "fundamentally redefine" United States military commitments and strategic objectives around the world, "in light of the Gramm-Rudman legislation." Many of the participants in this effort told reporters of this news service, that the United States, under its present financial circumstances, will have to dramatically cut its defense programs, probably by \$70 billion for fiscal 1987 alone, and much more later, reducing its military personnel by 250,000 to begin with, and, in the midst of these drastic cuts, rethink the entirety of its military objectives, and accept, however reluctantly, a minor world role—perhaps as a policeman of the Western hemisphere. On the whole, a perspective virtually identical with Yuri Andropov 1983 *Der Spiegel* proposal.

Shultz's trip to the Mediterranean countries was timed in anticipation of these defense budget debates, which are to begin soon before Congress begins to vote on the next year's budget. The intended purpose of the trip was to bolster up

policies and factions in the Mediterranean nations, which would facilitate an American withdrawal from there. It was only a partial success.

When Shultz arrived in Paris on March 24, a new republican-conservative government under Jacques Chirac had been sworn in, to replace the Socialist International government on which Shultz had counted in the past. The French electorate's vote during the general elections of the previous week, was a long-anticipated repudiation of the policies of appeasement and philo-Sovietism of the previous government; this French vote, in turn, was a continuation of a new phenomenon in Europe, which began with the Spanish referendum at the beginning of March, in which the Spanish people voted overwhelmingly in favor of joining NATO.

These turns in the tide of European public sentiment occurred amid other events which make Shultz's prospects more difficult. NATO's Nuclear Planning Group meeting unanimously endorsed the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative and the (Weinberger-dictated) American response to Moscow's disarmament proposals, thus nearly burying Shultz's hopes for a 1986 superpower summit. Finally, despite serious shortcomings in the accord, the Federal Republic of Germany became the second U.S. ally to sign an agreement of cooperation on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Shultz can anticipate serious difficulties ahead for his program of national sellout.

U.S. action on Libya—a strategic shift?

Following the March 24 and 25 actions at the Gulf of Sidra, the major question to be answered was whether the terrorist Colonel Qaddafi's regime would survive or not. The answer to this question, in part, lies in Washington: The State Department insists that the Qaddafi regime must be preserved. Indeed, after the U.S. Sixth Fleet defended itself against Libya attacks on its maneuvers, Shultz and his co-thinkers, who were horrified at the Pentagon's decision to hold the maneuvers, won out when the maneuvers were ended several days before the scheduled date of April 2.

Sources inside Libya report that the Colonel's domestic prestige plummeted since the beginning of these U.S. naval exercises, during which Qaddafi's attempts to enforce his arbitrary "line of death," resulted in repeated humiliations of his forces—and of his Russian allies' SA-5 anti-aircraft missile batteries.

In the political coterie surrounding Qaddafi, "humiliation" is such a potent political factor, that many opposition Libyan leaders, both inside and outside Libya, stress that a mere continuation of the U.S. Sixth Fleet maneu-

vers, conducted in the same spirit of resolve, would have been enough to topple Qaddafi's regime. The effectiveness of the U.S. deployment lay in its simplicity: The Sixth Fleet was instructed to conduct routine maneuvers inside international waters—a standard international practice pursued by all navies in the world; the Sixth Fleet was also instructed to automatically and without prior consultation fire to defend itself if attacked—also a standard international practice.

What has destabilized Qaddafi's regime is its inability to enforce its irrational claims of exclusive control over waters considered by all, even the Soviets, as international waters.

It appears that the world is moving toward a major strategic shift, defined by a serious American determination to sweep aside those political cliques which have preserved Qaddafi since 1969, when he came to power in Libya under protection of then-National Security Council Adviser Henry Kissinger and a little cabal in the State Department and the CIA best described as "Colby's faction in the CIA."