

Inside the Pentagon by Tecumseh

Time for some midnight oil-burning

The Pentagon's latest publication of Soviet Military Power challenges "common knowledge" at the Army Staff Colleges.

The release of the Pentagon's annual publication *Soviet Military Power* provides the citizen an opportunity to look at two important processes: an excellent review, in a compact and handy format, of the latest developments in Soviet weaponry and tactics, and a direct look at the state of U.S. analysis of that threat.

For the past five years of its publication, *Soviet Military Power* has contributed immeasurably to the ability of the American and European citizen to understand, in a straightforward way, the magnitude of the military threat which the Soviets represent.

In the summer of 1985, *EIR* published a groundbreaking report, *Global Showdown: the Russian Imperial War Plan for 1988*, and added a shockwave to the cumulative pressure for reality-orientation created by the successive publications of *Soviet Military Power*, by providing irrefutable historical and epistemological evidence that the Soviet Union has a coherent plan to build the largest military machine in history—and to use it.

Without the analytical tools developed in *Global Showdown*, one cannot fully appreciate the implications of crucial material presented in this year's *Soviet Military Power*.

This is not a matter which has to do with security classification: Although one of the functions of *Soviet Military Power* is to declassify intelligence, very little of what is declassified involves national security issues

of "sources and methods." The real classification fights revolve around the political impact a given piece of information would have on things like arms-control negotiations.

Therefore, when information is released to the public which challenges certain areas of "common knowledge," you should look closely.

One of the most common strategic truisms in circulation holds that the overwhelming numerical superiority of Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO is offset by the technological edge held by allied forces. It is concluded, therefore, that it is possible to consider NATO ground forces an effective deterrent, able to battle Warsaw Pact invaders to a standstill for a period long enough to allow a political resolution of the conflict, or a final settling of accounts through the employment of strategic nuclear forces.

The conduct of that type of battle, primarily a European battle, is the subject of the study of the operational level of war, and, as an integral component of the current AirLand Battle doctrine of the U.S. Army, currently enjoys much attention at the Army Staff Colleges.

If the indications provided in this year's *Soviet Military Power* are studied, there will be midnight oil burning. The summation provided by a Defense Department background briefing, stated that the most disturbing feature of current Soviet military progress is the high level of technology available to their ground troops—

technology which is in every way comparable, and in some cases superior, to that employed by U.S. forces.

In other words, the "force multiplier" is fast disappearing on the ground. Soviet artillery and armored vehicles will dwarf U.S. units by a factor of five in the 1990s, and this will be new equipment. In certain categories of military equipment, they are employing technologies we have only begun to research.

In those areas where the Soviets have already achieved the desired numbers, such as fighter aircraft, there is a continual upgrading of capability to parity with Allied forces. The acquisition of look-down shoot-down radar technology for their interceptor fleet provides a defense against the threat of cruise missiles.

In this case, the technology was "stolen" from the West (one is reminded of the famous case of Henry Kissinger's "gift" of machine-tool technology which accelerated the Soviets' ability to MIRV their ICBMs). The "theft" provides the Soviets with a remedy to the "destabilizing effects of cruise missiles" so much lamented by the arms-control crowd.

This is all being accomplished with the aid of a thoroughly modern machine-tool industry, which is the basis of Gorbachov's ability to conduct an integrated economic mobilization of Soviet scientific, technical, and industrial capabilities.

The section of the book which describes the functions of the TVDs (Theaters of Military Operations) is a new addition, and puts Soviet theater operations in perspective. The consolidation of this command apparatus was a decisive step in the current war-footing of the Soviets.

The full implications of these and other aspects of *Soviet Military Power 1986* will be developed in a future issue of *EIR*.