
Indian Subcontinent

New Yalta planners shuffle 'cards' to enact U.S. withdrawal from Asia

by Linda de Hoyos

In January of 1985, during his visit to New Delhi, Henry Kissinger declared that he now considered India the most crucial power in South Asia and one that is crucial to American national security. Of course, it could not be forgotten in New Delhi that Henry Kissinger was the architect of the "Pakistan tilt," a policy by which the United States broke any remaining positive ties to India, in order to build its bridge to Beijing through Pakistan. But Kissinger and his epigones in the State Department are now bending over backwards to present themselves

even talk of an "India card" for the United States, the same way that Kissinger et al. used to talk about the "China card." It was under the policy umbrella of the "China card," an alleged U.S. strategic alliance with China against the Soviet Union for which Washington was prepared to pay any price, that Soviet agent-of-influence Kissinger launched the current U.S. policy of strategic withdrawal from American allies in Asia. An "India card" now is to function in much the same way.

The content of this policy was laid out in the spring 1986 issue of *Foreign Policy*, a journal spawned out of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, a notorious back channel to Moscow. *Foreign Policy* has a heavy overlay of the Trilateral Commission, sporting on its editorial board Samuel P. Huntington, who wrote the 1980 Trilateral Commission blueprint for the end of democracy in the United States. In the latest issue, alongside the article penned by economist Francine Frankel—"Play the India Card"—is an overall perspective for U.S. policy toward the region by Carnegie Endowment fellow Selig Harrison, who, unlike Kissinger, has long been considered a "friend of India." Harrison's outline begs the question: With friends such as these, who needs enemies?

For Harrison, the India card is but one step in a process that is to bring about a joint agreement between Moscow and the United States, or more correctly the oligarchs of the West, for dominion over the strategically crucial region of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India—the arena of the empire's "Great Game."

Harrison's article is unambiguously titled "Cut a Region-

al Deal." Beginning with the necessity of the United States to recognize India as a naval power in the Indian Ocean, Harrison lays out a twisted logic of deals laid upon deals by which the New Yalta is to be imposed on the Indian subcontinent.

The first phase is what Harrison calls "a detached American posture toward South Asia." Under this idea, the United States would recognize India's preeminence in the region, but "India should be prepared to provide a *quid pro quo* in the form of unambiguous recognition of the legitimacy of the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean"—specifically the U.S. naval base at Diego Garcia.

The administration should take the following steps to achieve "a detached posture":

- 1) The United States should redefine its commitments to Pakistan under the 1959 agreement, to limit U.S. military intervention on Pakistan's behalf in the event of aggression from the Soviet Union and/or Afghanistan.

- 2) The administration should reorient its military assistance to Pakistan, halting delivery of weapons that could be used against India. "The new policy would rule out further sales of F-16s, and new sales of other long-range fighter-bombers, or heavy tanks and 155-millimeter howitzers designed for plains warfare."

- 3) The U.S. should increase aid to India, and decrease the portion of aid to Pakistan.

- 4) "The United States should offer to reopen regional arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. . . . Washington should seek to occupy the diplomatic high ground in dealing with India by offering to discuss a ban on the establishment of nuclear bases by regional or global powers alike in all or part of the Indian Ocean, including Diego Garcia."

- 5) The United States will continue its anti-nuclear policy toward both India and Pakistan, neither of which has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. "Even if India should now accept some nuclear limitations in order to get a reduction of the superpower presence in its vicinity, it would no doubt continue to reject the NPT. . . . Instead the United States should intensify efforts to stop the flow of nuclear-

related technology to both countries." This means a continuation of the Carter administration's policy to deny refueling and parts to the Indian Tarapura nuclear plant, a policy which sent Indo-American relations skidding downwards.

An actual reversal of the Kissinger-dominated anti-India policy of the United States, which has at no point served American security or other interests, would be based on the exact opposite: American aid in developing nuclear energy for this region, where lack of energy is the primary bottleneck to achieving industrialization. Without this, more and more millions of the Indian subcontinent are doomed to partial or total unemployment and below-subsistence standards of living, which 20 years down the line will threaten to a total breakdown crisis. But mobilization for infrastructural and industrial development, which would counter the ethnic and separatists centrifugal forces toward disintegration in the region, is not in Harrison's deck of cards.

Down the blind alley

But the "India card" won't work, unless another deal is cut—on Afghanistan. Harrison, who was in Kabul in 1984, implies that the United States must bite the bullet and accept the United Nations negotiating process now ongoing among Moscow, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq is under increasing pressure to achieve a settlement on Afghanistan. These pressures include Soviet threats of military incursion into Pakistan, Soviet-fomented separatism among the Pushtun and Baluch tribes, and the economic strains posed by 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

Harrison declares that "the United States and other non-communist countries should not prejudge whether the Soviets could or would withdraw their forces under the U.N. scenario, but should focus instead on the *quid pro quos* that would make such a scenario acceptable." Harrison believes the United States should fight for the principle that the Soviets withdraw without adding strategic bases in Afghanistan. After all, he says, "Moscow says flatly that it does not need bases in Afghanistan."

This overlooks the fact that the Soviet Union has already built up Afghanistan into a forward base for actions into both Iran and Pakistan, which would finally bring the Russian Empire down to the sea. The Soviets have already placed 10 big military airbases in Afghanistan. There are three airfields near the southern city of Kandahar, north of the Baluchi area of Pakistan. From these bases, a plane such as the MiG-25 ("Foxbat"), which can fly 900 kilometers before returning home, can reach over all of Pakistan, or across Iran to the Persian Gulf. The Soviets have also installed missiles in Afghanistan. Persistent reports say that these include nuclear-tipped rockets, like the 1,000-km range SS-22. The intermediate range ballistic missile SS-20, which is road-mobile, with a range of 5,000 km, was also reported by Iranian and Afghan mujaheddin sources to have been installed at Shindand. The British publication *Jane's Defence Weekly*, in its May 13 issue, noted that SS-20s located at Shindand could

target the American naval and air base at Diego Garcia.

Harrison's one-worldist obsessions override any other considerations, such as actual Soviet military strength and purpose in the region. Nevertheless, with a settlement to the Afghanistan conflict under his belt, the great appeaser goes on to conquer new ground: "Against the background of a relaxation of tensions of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, the United States and Soviet Union could begin to confront the overarching long-term challenge of regional arms control." In fact, says Harrison merrily, an Afghan settlement would be the first step in such a pact, "since Moscow would be likely to condition any concessions relating to Soviet bases in Afghanistan on a U.S. *quid pro quo* concerning one or more of its bases in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean."

Harrison's model for this is the discussion for a draft treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1977 and 1978, led by then Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. This was the attempt by the Trilateral Commission to induce the Soviets to agree to a freeze on technological development, as the United States was plunging into its post-industrial collapse, and to form a pact to deny nuclear power to the underdeveloped countries. On the second point, there is effective agreement.

For South Asia, the sticking point for Moscow was the deployment of U.S. nuclear submarines into the Indian Ocean. Now Harrison states that "although the U.S. should not foreclose its option of deploying nuclear-missile submarines in times of crisis, it should go as far as possible in limiting its nuclear presence in the Indian Ocean." This proposal assumes that the 1979 overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the destruction of Iran as a U.S. ally; and the Soviet takeover of Cam Ranh Bay naval base and Danang air base in Vietnam; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, all never took place. Harrison has completely mistaken the character of the Soviet Union, in the same self-serving way that Neville Chamberlain appeared not to understand the intentions of Adolf Hitler.

Furthermore, Harrison's call for the United States to "offer to discuss a ban on the establishment of nuclear bases by regional or global powers alike" in the region, echoes the Soviets' own renewed call for a "collective security pact" for Asia—without the United States. As *Pravda* commentator Vsevolod Ovchinnikov explained the "formula for common Asian security," it called for a pledge by the non-nuclear countries of the region not to have or produce nuclear weapons, or allow them to be stationed on their territory; complete cessation of nuclear testing in Asia, the Pacific and Indian oceans; refusal of Asian and Pacific nations to participate in the militarization of space; liquidation of foreign bases in the region. The Soviet call has been rejected by the nations of the region, including India, because the underlying assumption of such an agreement is its policing by the superpowers and the abrogation of the sovereignty of the Asian countries.

Hence, Harrison's rush for appeasement has little basis in the realities of the region; it is useful, however, for exposing the incompetence of the New Yalta players in the West.