

of financial support they receive from Libya. Abu Nidal, Ahmed Jibril, Abu Musa, and others of lesser stature as murderers, expressed outrage, and began worrying about their bank-accounts.

Most worried was Sadiq al Mahdi of Sudan, whose party, al Umma, had just won an election with heavy Libyan financing. He immediately organized several tens of thousands to demonstrate against the United States in Khartoum—demonstrations which served as a cover for deployment of a Libyan hit team to shoot an American diplomat there on April 16.

Demonstrations and rallies in several Arab and European capitals were sponsored by the organizations that attended the "World Guerrilla Conference" in Tripoli from March 14 to 18. Several acts of terrorism unfolded. Intelligence sources pointed out, however, that these were not the result of the April 15 raid, but the earlier, March 25 confrontation in the Gulf of Sidra. Qaddafi had given the green light to his teams to act at that time; two to three weeks later, they were operational.

Most of the more serious terrorist plans were aborted. Early in April, Libyan teams plotted the assassination of the U.S. ambassador in Paris; others plotted massacres at the U.S. consulates in Paris and Lyon. On April 16, two Tunisians were arrested in Istanbul. They were plotting the assassination of the U.S. consul. Bomb alerts spread in all capitals. U.S. military authorities in West Germany imposed a 1200 to 0500-hour curfew in military and civilian quarters in at least three cities.

Then, on April 17, three British hostages in Lebanon were executed by the "Arab Revolutionary Cells," the same organization which had plotted the April 2 bombing of a TWA flight with Mei Elias Mansour of the Syrian National Socialist Party. Under her maiden-name of Mei Shahadeh, she was a leading participant in the April 1985 Arab People's Congress in Libya.

Beginning of the end

The American raid was a turning point. A military rebellion erupted inside Libya. Clearly, Washington's intervention was welcome by at least part of the army and the population. As it happened, Qaddafi's East German guards stepped in in his defense. For the moment, he retains power, but the myth of his invulnerability is destroyed. The army, frequently the scapegoat for Qaddafi's domestic failures, now knows that it has friends abroad, whereas before, the U.S. State Department itself could be counted on to protect Qaddafi.

As sporadic fighting continued on April 17 and 18, it grew increasingly clear that this is the beginning of the end for the mad Libyan. This mutiny may be quelled, but there will be others—and in the end, no one associated the 17 years of Qaddafi's reign will survive. West of the Iron Curtain, that is very good news.

Weinberger reassures U.S. allies in Asia

by Linda de Hoyos

It is unlikely that U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's five-nation trip to Asia April 2-14 fully restored the United States in the eyes of its Asian allies as a reliable protector against the Soviet Union, but it did begin that process. In South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand, Secretary Weinberger was unequivocal in his declarations of U.S. support for their governments and military. This assurance was all the more urgent, given the fact that, although most Asian allies went on record as supporting the Feb. 22-25 overthrow of Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos, privately the leadership of these nations sees the U.S.-orchestrated coup against Marcos as the United States stabbing a long-time friend in the back. The message coming out of Manila to U.S. allies in the region was: Don't count on the United States—don't trust the U.S.A.

Weinberger left for Asia shortly after the Pentagon's release of its *Soviet Military Power 1986*, which incorporated in its analysis significant features of the June 1985 *EIR Special Report*, "Global Showdown." Particularly in the Far East, the Soviets have engaged in a massive military buildup, concentrating on 1) the South China Sea area, adding the building of a base at Kompong Son in Kampuchea to the Soviet bases already established at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam; 2) expansion of the Soviet fleet and a buildup of Soviet bases and forces on the four Kurile islands directly north of Japan; and 3) cultivation of North Korea, with its 800,000-man armed forces, as an asset in the region under Moscow hegemony.

Whereas the so-called Reagan doctrine—better called "Shultz doctrine"—ignores this strategic reality in its bid to foment a "wave of democracy"—Weinberger indicated that the security of American allies—not their ordering of internal affairs—was his priority.

Weinberger lost no time in setting the tone for his trip, with his first stop in South Korea. There is no comparison between the situation in the Philippines and that in the Republic of Korea, Weinberger said in his Seoul press conference April 3, in a direct counter to Korean opposition leaders who claim that the "spring winds" of the February revolution in the Philippines are "blowing northward to South Korea." The statement also challenges the State Department, which has encouraged the opposition in its drive for direct presiden-

tial elections and overthrow of the Chun Doo Hwan government.

Weinberger told the press corps that, in contrast to the Philippines, South Korea has a stable economy, faces a direct military threat from North Korea backed by the Soviet Union, and is already taking steps for greater democracy in the country.

When asked about the human-rights record in South Korea, the U.S. defense secretary replied: "I am not very good at any discussion of anything that involves the internal affairs of the Republic of Korea."

Weinberger's mission to Seoul was to investigate how best the United States can support the South Korean military under conditions of growing tensions on the peninsula. Weinberger reported: "[The] Soviet Union's assistance to North Korea is increasing . . . providing them with very sophisticated modern systems that require the United States, South Korean, and combined forces to increase their defense and deterrent capability."

He participated in the annual security talks between the two allies, stating, "It is particularly important that the signals we send from this meeting will enhance the deterrence and enable us to keep peace." The resulting communiqué officially reversed the policy toward South Korea of the Carter administration, which was preparing to withdraw the 40,000 U.S. troops from South Korea and had dropped South Korea from the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The communiqué affirmed: "United States is to render prompt and effective assistance to repel any armed attack against the Republic of Korea in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954."

The communiqué further specified that additional Stinger and Redeye ground-to-air missiles would be deployed in South Korea, and the early warning system of the country improved, especially given that North Korea has moved 65% of its armed forces to a forward position. It also confirmed that the joint military exercises, such as the annual Team Spirit '86 maneuvers, will continue—despite violent North Korean protests—and that stockpiles of military equipment should be augmented.

Japan and strategic defense

In Japan, Weinberger praised Japan's efforts to increase its military strength. In a speech to the National Press Club, Weinberger reported that the Soviets have installed nuclear-capable missiles on the four Kurile islands that the Soviets seized after World War II. Aides said he was referring to Scud missiles with a 180-mile range capable of hitting deep into Hokkaido, Japan's northern most island. The Soviets, in fact, have a war plan for the takeover of Hokkaido, which would give the Soviet fleet a break-out capability from Vladivostok.

Weinberger's other objective was to secure Japanese commitment to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative. While Prime Minister Nakasone has stated that he believes the SDI is crucial to Japan's security, other factions are not

as eager for participation.

In his National Press Club speech, Weinberger explained that the United States abandoned strategic defense in the late 1960s, but Moscow kept up its efforts in that field. "Now we are exerting ourselves to secure a thoroughly reliable defense against the Soviets' nuclear missiles," he said. Calls for compromise on the SDI with the Soviets, he said, amount to an appeal to give the Soviet Union a monopoly on strategic defense—"and that we will not do." On the view that the West should reduce its defenses in order to reassure Moscow, Weinberger replied: "One must wonder what real military threat Moscow faces here in Asia," he said. Moscow has built a "clearly offensive arsenal" in the Pacific, Weinberger said. Japan and the United States must maintain the defense momentum of the 1980s, "because if we do and only if we do, the combination of better technology, better spirit, our superior access to the Pacific Basin, and our devotion to freedom should keep the Soviets at bay."

But no sooner had Weinberger left Tokyo, than Undersecretary of Defense Richard Perle, along with Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology William Schneider, arrived in Japan, to undercut Weinberger's efforts. To Japanese queries on whether the United States has a long-term strategic commitment to the SDI, or whether the program will be stopped in 1988, Perle replied that he could not answer that question. This agnostic approach will reduce Japanese commitment to a mere commercial deal—without the required strategic commitment between allies.

Going next to Manila, Weinberger affirmed American support for the Philippines military reforms and indicated that the United States would be increasing its security assistance to the islands. The Philippines military is vastly under-equipped and undertrained, with a military budget that has been cut by 30% in the last two years' austerity regimen imposed by the International Monetary Fund. Weinberger's top priority in this visit was to gauge the Aquino government's commitment to the U.S. bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay, and also to ascertain exactly what the Armed Forces require in order to effectively combat the guerrilla New People's Army.

In Thailand, the Defense Secretary reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to this long-time friend, which played a crucial aiding role during the Vietnam War. The United States is considering giving Thailand an arms stockpile, for use in case of aggression, a provision made only for South Korea and West Germany.

In Thailand, Weinberger received the Soviet reply to his trip. A bomb exploded outside of a hotel only an hour and a half before Weinberger was scheduled to arrive with Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond. Although Thai authorities say the bomb was aimed at embarrassing Prem and was an internal matter, police admitted the bombing had been claimed by a Mideast-linked grouping. Qaddafi's Libya funnels funds to Islamic groups in Thailand.