

## How Shultz and Gorbachov connived to bury the SDI

by Criton Zoakos

The characterization, in Washington, of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachov's latest arms-control proposals as "constructive," and "unexpected," is the result of treason, especially in the State Department and Congress, and widespread folly which might soon produce the collapse of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, the West's last remaining, workable response to the continuing buildup of Soviet strategic superiority.

As is known, the latest Soviet proposals, first made privately to the negotiating teams in Geneva June 10, and later publicized by Gorbachov in Moscow June 16, set as their absolute precondition an extension of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty up to the year 2000. Provided this precondition is met, Moscow will, afterward, be willing to discuss reduction of nuclear warheads to 8,000 for each side and of ballistic missiles to 1,600. Moscow also, according to the proposals, is willing to not raise the issue of "forward based" U.S. nuclear weapons, such as those on aircraft stationed in countries near the Soviet Union or on aircraft carriers.

Immediately upon publication of these Soviet proposals, Shultz's State Department and the major liberal media launched a campaign to present them as "surprising," "unexpected," and, of course, "positive." Senate and House leaders, both Democrats and Republicans, made statements to the press indicating that Gorbachov's latest moves are "signals," indicating a "new willingness" by Moscow to "return to arms control."

The Soviet proposals were nothing of the sort, and what the public is being subjected to is a public sham, a charade, a "con job" orchestrated between Gorbachov and Shultz, with the mediation of Central Committee Secretary Anatolii Dobrynin, who now coordinates all Soviet policies respecting the United States.

According to Western circles close to developments at the Geneva strategic arms-control negotiations, nothing is new in these latest Soviet proposals. They are a rehash of

what has been discussed for two years now, namely, in Shultz's and Max Kampelman's favorite expression, to "use the President's Strategic Defense Initiative as a bargaining chip."

According to the same sources, the Soviets' absolutely minimal objective at the Geneva talks is to create the political/diplomatic conditions in which congressional dupes and traitors will be enabled

budget cuts. Moscow has been advised by Dobrynin that, in the current budget-cutting hysteria in Washington, no congressman will vote any money for the SDI, a program which would be prohibited from being used until the year 2000, if the latest Soviet negotiating offer is taken up.

So, when Shultz's State Department proclaimed these latest proposals "unexpected" and "positive," an eye was winking in the direction of Congress. And lo and behold, within days, namely on June 20, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted to cut \$1.45 billion from the SDI budget, reducing it to \$3.95 billion. The House Armed Services Committee had already cut it down to \$3.7 billion. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger had requested a minimum of \$5.4 billion for FY 1987, were the program to meet its assigned deadline for deployment decisions by 1990. If these cuts are implemented by October of this year, and if no other compensating action is taken, then, for all practical purposes, the SDI could be pronounced dead.

Should this prove to be the case, Moscow will enter the year 1987 with the satisfaction of knowing that the last remaining impediment to its overwhelming, and still growing strategic superiority, is forever removed.

The following interesting feature should be noted of the collaboration between Moscow and fools and traitors in Washington: The Senate Armed Services Committee, when it voted to cut the SDI budget, was told by the chief sponsors of the cut, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Sen. William Cohen

(R-Maine), that the SDI is "in trouble," because "the President's program is vague and confusing. . . . Confused descriptions of the SDI's goals are leading Congress to make deep cuts in the program."

Why confused descriptions? A few samples from the past: President Reagan said that the SDI is *not* a "bargaining chip." Shultz said that he "supports the SDI because it is such a wonderful bargaining chip." Weinberger has insisted that the SDI is not a "bargaining chip." Chief arms-control negotiator Max Kampelman has insisted that the SDI is only a "bargaining chip."

Moreover, the President, Caspar Weinberger, and Gen. James Abrahamson, the SDI's director, have insisted, on every public occasion, that the SDI is designed for general defense against the launching of Soviet missiles, regardless of whether these missiles are ultimately trained at U.S., European, or any other targets, as the program is designed to intercept launched missiles in their "boost phase," before they exit the atmosphere. However, traitors inside both the State and Defense departments, such as Undersecretaries of Defense Richard Perle and Fred Iklé, and their friends, Max Kampelman, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the Georgetown/CSIS crowd, have insisted that the SDI will be for "point defense," only protecting U.S. land-based ICBM missiles.

Since 1983, this publication has warned that persons such as Perle and Kampelman were acting as traitors and saboteurs on the matter of the SDI in particular. The rationalization given by Sam Nunn in cutting the SDI budget on June 20, demonstrated in exactly what fashion these persons in the Reagan administration act as traitors: They supplied to the public nonsensical, irresponsible, and contrary-to-policy statements on the SDI, whose sole function was to enable Nunn and others to argue that the "SDI is too vague and confusing," and that "confused descriptions of the SDI's goals are leading Congress to make deep cuts."

In short: Unless President Reagan fires those, such as Perle, Iklé, Kampelman, Shultz, et al., who are responsible for "confused descriptions," there will be no SDI by the fall of 1986.

### **Current Soviet ploys**

In terms of the Geneva negotiations, the State Department's Soviet partners' immediate objective is to both derail the SDI and weaken the position of Defense Secretary Weinberger—an objective shared by Shultz.

During an "extraordinary" session on June 10, in Geneva, Soviet chief-negotiator Victor Karpov, following a quick, unscheduled trip to Moscow for consultations with Dobrynin and Gorbachov, reformulated the standing Soviet demand for the scrapping of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative.

Since the reconvening of the so-called "third round" of the Geneva arms-control negotiations early this spring, Secretary of State Shultz and arms-negotiator Kampelman have, according to Western circles, been endeavoring to strike up

a formula for abandoning the SDI in a way that both satisfies Soviet demands and allows a "face saving" way out for President Reagan. The rehashed proposals made by Mr. Gorbachov at the June 16 Central Committee meeting are, according to Western sources, identical with those discussed in Geneva in recent months.

Between June 10, the day of the "extraordinary session" in which Karpov formally presented these proposals, and June 16, when Gorbachov made them public through Tass, George Shultz's State Department, the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, and other liberal establishment media have been working overtime to cultivate the impression that Gorbachov's proposals "caught the administration by surprise."

To summarize the considerations shaping the arms control talks at present:

The Soviets are proceeding, as they have since 1983, from the single-minded objective of eliminating President Reagan's SDI. They shall not move an inch at the negotiations, unless the SDI's destruction is guaranteed.

The Soviets are already in possession of a devastating, absolute strategic superiority in offensive nuclear weapons and are increasing their advantage.

The State Department and its chiefs are committed to a policy of United States retrenchment to approximately 25% of the post-war American sphere of influence and view President Reagan's SDI as an obstacle to this perspective.

The State Department has adopted the self-appointed role of promoting, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, reformulations of the Soviet demands which would give President Reagan a face-saving way out of the SDI.

According to the same Western sources, the appearance of a certain flexibility in Soviet proposals on the matter of "reductions" in offensive weapons, is based on certain major developments in the capabilities and deployments of the Soviet Navy. According to these sources, the Politburo, prior to the latest spate of activity at Geneva, received "absolute guarantees" from the Soviet naval chiefs that their nuclear missile submarine fleet now has the fully developed capability of a) expanding the number of silos in each submarine, from which ballistic missiles can be launched; b) reloading submarine missile silos after they have fired; c) resupplying submarines with nuclear missiles after they have fired their initial load; and d) maintaining an SLBM resupply system, by means of pre-positioned mini-submarines, especially in the Atlantic Ocean.

Much of this intelligence has been either ignored or avoided by the State Department's arms-control negotiators. It may or may not have received adequate attention at the Defense Department. The fact of the matter is, that if there is any "new element" at all in the latest Soviet proposals at Geneva, it may be this: Could it be the case that after two decades of relentless Soviet naval buildup, the Soviet nuclear submarine navy may be moving into modes of ballistic missile deployment matching the awesome Soviet land-based ICBM force?