

Soviet anti-SDI warfare: German high-tech specialist killed by RAF

The director of the German Siemens Corporation's R&D department, Prof. Karl Heinz Beckurts, was killed on July 9 in a brutal bomb attack that was claimed by the notorious terrorist *Rote Armee Fraktion* (Red Army Faction, or Baader-Meinhof Gang).

Shortly after leaving his home in the town of Strasslach, 12 miles south of Munich, Beckurts's car was ripped apart by an explosive device that was attached to the base of a tree and triggered manually by the terrorists, who were hiding in the woods.

According to police estimates, the bomb was composed of more than 20 pounds of commercial or military explosive mixed with steel scrap and filled into steel pipes to focus the blast wave onto the vehicle. Mr. Beckurts unfortunately had refused to use an armored vehicle and preferred to use several different cars, hoping that terrorists would have problems finding out which car he was traveling in—obviously underestimating the skill of professional terrorists like those of the RAF.

Mr. Beckurts's driver, Eckart Groppler (42), also died in the attack. The explosion was timed so well that the security car with two private guards following the Beckurts car was only slightly damaged.

An outstanding industrialist

Karl-Heinz Beckurts was an outstanding promoter of the use of nuclear energy and the development of fusion energy and computer technology. As director of the Siemens R&D department, he was also on top of all developments relating to the Strategic Defense Initiative and the European high-tech promotion program Eureka. Before becoming a Siemens executive, where he was in charge of the 36,000 personnel engaged in the research and development department of the German multinational, he was the director of the Jülich Nuclear Research Center.

The assassination is but the latest step in an escalating campaign against every person and institution resisting Soviet threats and intimidation against President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The Soviets have repeatedly warned that they will not allow the West to develop a defense

system which would render their overwhelming strategic attack capability impotent.

Indeed, on the day of the murder, July 9, the Soviet army daily *Krasnaya Zvezda* said the U.S.A. would never achieve the goals of the SDI because Moscow would take all measures needed to counter it. The military paper noted, "Many scientists and military specialists of different countries hold that such an anti-missile system cannot be effective," and added, "This is all the more so since the Soviet Union will not idly watch space weapons being created across the ocean." To restore the balance, it said, "the Soviet Union will have to take necessary measures to neutralize the 'Star Wars' electronic space machine. . . ."

Soviet complicity

Specialists in German security agencies do not hesitate to point out the Soviet hand behind the wave of terrorist attacks in Western Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular as long as they talk off the record. As one specialist put it, "It is only the cowardice of politicians in Bonn that keeps us from revealing all the proof of Soviet terrorist involvement in public."

In this case, though, some of the Soviet steering of so-called anarchist terrorism was revealed by Federal Prosecutor Kurt Rebmann in his press conference and a TV interview. Rebmann said that it was the student organization of the German Communist Party, which had published in its magazine, *Rote Blätter*, the list of participants in a secret meeting of high-ranking German military personnel and industrialists with a delegation of U.S. SDI specialists under Gen. James Abrahamson. The meeting took place in July 1985, and the list of participants can have been obtained only through professional espionage capabilities. This very list, as published in *Rote Blätter*, was found in January 1986 in a terrorist safehouse in Hanover used by two terrorist suspects, who have since been released "for lack of proof of their terrorist involvement."

But Beckurts's name had been found as early as 1984 in a terrorist safehouse in Frankfurt—where six terrorists were arrested—among about 10,000 names, more than 1,000 of

which police believed to be likely terrorist targets. In January 1985, another high ranking German manager, Dr. Ernst Zimmermann of the MTU-corporation in Munich, was assassinated by RAF-terrorists, six months after his name was found on the Frankfurt terrorist list.

A European-wide meeting of terrorists and their supporters, held in Frankfurt in February of this year, passed the word to the terrorist scene that the "military-industrial-complex," namely, the SDI, is the focus of all terrorist activities for the foreseeable future. A dossier of 18 pages was circulated on that occasion outlining the terrorist strategy to strike against as many "high tech" targets as possible. The assassination of key industrial and military leaders is only the tip of this iceberg. During 1985, in West Germany, 1,604 terrorist attacks were carried out, ranging from minor arson against police cars up to outright executions and mass murder.

This is the reason that one has to conceive the terrorist attacks as what German military strategist Brigadier F. A. von der Heydte (see *EIR*, July 4, 1986, pp. 26-31) described as a Soviet strategy of "low-intensity warfare." This low-intensity warfare is by no means limited to West Germany, but is carried out all over Western Europe and beyond. But in West Germany, since the violent "demonstrations" against nuclear plant sites at Wackersdorf and Brokdorf in May-June, it has escalated to a particularly intense level. There is now a transition in progress among the hard-core strata, from improvised killer-weapons, such as deadly slingshots, to limited use of conventional weapons and accumulation of pre-positioned and other military-weapons caches.

Specifically anti-SDI

Leaving aside the earlier assassination attempts against General Kroesen and former NATO Commander Alexander Haig, and the assassination of Gen. Leamon Hunt in Italy, the terrorist hits since 1985 have had a specific anti-SDI orientation. One week after the killing of Zimmerman in January 1985, the SDI-linked Gen. René Audran in Paris was killed by the terrorist Direct Action, which closely collaborates with the RAF. At the same time, in a militarily planned fashion, the NATO-pipeline network in Europe was under constant terrorist attack. The series of assassination attempts continued against the French General Blandin (failed), against the leader of the French industrialists association CNPF, Brana (failed), and then on July 9, against Mr. Beckurts.

According to the best estimates of German security specialists, the RAF is expected to try two more major hits against high-ranking military or industrial leaders before retiring to regroup for several months. This strategy has also proven to be very successful in France and would give the Soviet threat against German SDI involvement the necessary emphasis. As a military security specialist put it: "As long as our politicians are lining up in Moscow to hand over the latest technologies, while the leaders of the companies developing these technologies are killed by Soviet-directed terrorists in their homeland, we are in a bad position."

Interview: Gen. García Conde Cenal

The defense of West is the duty of all the

General García Conde Cenal, former Chief of General Staff of the Spanish Air Force, spoke with our correspondent Leonardo Servadio, in Madrid at the beginning of June.

EIR: Spain occupies a strategic position of great importance for the defense of the Mediterranean and all Europe. There are military threats to Spain. Can you give us your evaluation of these threats, and where they come from?

Conde: There is a lot of talk of the threat from the south, an imaginable threat, but this threat has two aspects. There is a possible direct threat to Spain for reasons of territorial disputes, as in the case of Ceuta or Melilla, but this bilateral threat is not very probable, at least in the short term. And there is another, much more serious threat, also from the south, which from the point of view of defending Europe is very important: the threat that an invasion from the East would try to envelope Europe by the south.

The first threat is not very probable; the relation of force between the possible aggressor and Spain is relatively reassuring. This is not the case of the threat of the encirclement of Europe from the south, and naturally, from the north. On this terrain, the policy of the government [of Felipe González] in the joint strategic plan, is a policy we would call shamefaced. It cannot be said, as has been said when we were called to the referendum on NATO, that Spain's military non-integration into NATO has as its objective that our soldiers may not go outside our borders.

In short, let us consider what aggression from the East would look like, this famous aggression which they say would arrive in Burdeos in eight days. If the absurdity were put forward that the Ukraine Republic is going to declare war on West Germany, and Poland is going to declare war on Holland, and that some other socialist Soviet republic is going to declare war on France, in this absurd scenario it would seem natural that the German soldiers defend themselves against the Ukraine, that Holland defend itself against Poland, and that the French defend themselves against their aggressor. But in reality the scenario is not this.

The scenario is that the armies of all the socialist Soviet republics and their allies of the East are going to attack all the states of Europe. And therefore, to say that Spain integrated into NATO is only going to defend its soil when the enemy arrives at our frontiers—which is what is implied by the idea that our soldiers will not move outside our borders—is, from