

## Moscow's brutal answer to Reagan's SDI offer

by Criton Zoakos

Even though Mikhail Gorbachov, has not yet formally replied to President Reagan's letter of July 25, in which the United States offered to share with Russia its Strategic Defense Initiative technology, Moscow's moves around the globe, and certain official pronouncements accompanying these moves, have been shaped in an unmistakable pattern of determination to crush both the SDI and the political forces associated with it.

### 1) In

with enormous economic, military, and political ramifications, is proceeding with breathtaking speed, undoing, in a matter of weeks, the artificial fraud of "Sino-Soviet split" which had taken the painstaking posturing of decades to construct.

### 2) In the Indian

are rapidly proceeding, by means of ethnic insurgencies, professional terrorist campaigns, and political destabilizations, to implement the *sine qua non* of any Sino-Soviet condominium for Asia, namely the disintegration of the Republic of India (requirements) and the splitting of Pakistan (which accords with Soviet requirements for a "warm water port" on the Baluchistan coast).

3) In the Persian Gulf and Middle East area, there is a dramatic step-up of Libyan, Syrian, and Iranian inspired fundamentalist insurgency projects and terror campaigns, all coordinated directly from Moscow, and all explicitly aimed at the earliest possible collapse of the last remnants of U.S. influence there.

### 4) In

ror campaign, which, since last May, had reached the status of full-blown, classically defined irregular warfare, has now spread throughout the continent with such ferocity that the French government of Jacques Chirac announced that France is in a state of war, which obliges her government to adopt

appropriate-war measures. As in the Middle East, the flareup of Soviet-directed irregular warfare in Europe is aimed at targets which represent the institutional strong points of U.S.-European alliance and cooperation—to effect U.S.-European decoupling at the earliest possible time.

5) A similar intensification of terrorist campaigns in Ibero-America by Soviet assets has accompanied Moscow's new global posture in the post-July 25 period.

As for Moscow's response to President Reagan's letter on SDI cooperation, *per se*, a sequence of official Soviet pronouncements, taken together over a period of two weeks, compose a very specific response:

● Gorbachov's Sept. 8 interview to *Rude Pravo*. Most commentators observed, wrongly, that the Soviet leader spent so much time in that interview demanding the U.S.A. join his moratorium on nuclear tests, because he wanted to regain the propaganda initiative by changing the subject from SDI cooperation to the presumably popular theme of the "test ban."

### In

weapons tests being conducted by the United States is the creation of fundamentally new types of weapons. What does this mean? Here is what it means: New nuclear warheads, with greater yield and increasing accuracy are being developed. *Space-based nuclear weapons—x-ray lasers with so-called nuclear pumping—are being created in the course of these tests. Work is being done to prepare a completely new type of weapon capable of striking targets both on Earth and in space.* Under these circumstances it is hypocritical to say that a test ban would produce nothing to solve the problem of nuclear disarmament."

● Before Gorbachov's *Rude Pravo* interview, the Soviet military leadership made very specific announcements respecting SDI collaboration between the two countries. The Soviet Armed Forces' Chief of Staff, Marshal Sergei Akh-

romeyev, in an Aug. 25 press conference held specifically on the SDI, stated: “. . . If

ment its Star Wars plans, the Soviet Union will have to take appropriate measures. . . . We will find an answer, and this will not be the one the United States expects it to be. As a military man, I

a monopoly of scientific-technological progress in military matters. The development of science and technology in the military-technology field has reached a level where the eternal struggle between the sword and the shield, between defensive and offensive weapons, is today being solved not in one but in several directions. For every action, a reliable means of counteraction can be found. Strategic offensive weapons, too, can be perfected to such an extent as to make the program for the antimissile defense of U. S. territory a fabulously expensive and extremely difficult matter to accomplish. Other answers are also possible. In

the Soviet Union is forced to carry out fundamental research in many directions. Among those are those which envisage, with sufficient confidence, effective measures for counteracting the anti-missile defense. Moreover, these measures can be promptly implemented. If

deed deploy its in-depth system, the U.S.S.R. will select those methods of action that, to the utmost extent, meet the interests of its defense capabilities and in its turn will confront the United States with the need to seek an answer to this. Our measures will not be those to which Washington would like to incline us.”

● On Sept. 6, another Soviet military spokesman, Col. Vasily Morozov, elaborated on Marshal Akhromeyev's theme: “I

goal. The construction of a space defense system, the so-called impenetrable shield; the deployment of first strike offensive weapons in space; and, last but not least, the exhaustion of the Soviet Union's economic resources. The Americans would like us to try to create our own SDI because, in their view, this would put such a huge burden on the Soviet economy that it would collapse under the strain. . . . No matter how much the Americans would like us to create our own space shield, we will not do so. There will be no Soviet SDI. We will take countermeasures in two areas:

“1) We will neutralize every object of the U.S. space shield—the spacecraft carrying out the aerial survey and ensuring the links with the ground stations, as well as the weapons-carrying craft—by deploying so-called space mines in their orbits, space mines capable of halting and destroying them.

“2) We regard it as the most efficient and possibly cheapest solution to increase the arsenal of our existing strategic nuclear weapons and to perfect their technology.

“In stress will be on the further development of our strategic arms. Our missiles will be capable of penetrating the U.S. ‘shield’ and, by counterattacking them, of destroying the missiles of the other side. What is more, the implementation

of our plan will cost considerably less: According to our scientists, it will cost only 2% of the SDI cost.”

### **The message behind the rhetoric**

These Soviet formulations, taken together, constitute the most specific, explicit response to President Reagan's July 25 letter to Gorbachov. The Reagan letter, essentially, presented to the Soviets an offer to a) transfer U.S. SDI technology to the Soviet Union and b) coordinate a joint deployment of the system so that neither side gained any temporary advantage over the other. This exact proposal had been recommended by Lyndon LaRouche in April 1984, more than two years before Reagan's actual letter. This fact prompted the Soviet leadership to conclude that LaRouche was the inspirer, if not the author, of the July 25 letter. From this conclusion followed the next Soviet suspicion, namely that the offer to build a Soviet SDI, was, secretly, a sly LaRouchean trick against the Soviet economy. It suspicion which is reflected in Colonel Morozov's formulation, that “the Americans would like us to try to create our own SDI because, in their view, this would put such a huge burden on the Soviet economy that it would collapse under the strain.”

Both Morozov and his boss, Akhromeyev, are categorical that the Soviet Union shall neither accept Reagan's offer, nor try to develop a comparable SDI system of its own. We are not in a position to assess how much of this assertion is fact, and how much deceptive.

What emerges as certainty, however, from the Soviet statements is the explicit threat to destroy all U.S. space assets beginning with surveillance satellites, as soon as they believe that an effective SDI is about to be deployed. No other interpretation can be admitted to the Soviet military statements, but that they intend to launch nuclear war the instant they believe that the SDI program has moved into the ambiguous area between development and deployment.

In the current round of U.S. nuclear tests involves both x-ray laser development and more advanced nuclear charges, does not appear to be idle: Any responsible American planner committed to development of SDI, must seriously counter the Soviet threat to launch war before SDI comes into play. The present Soviet posture requires the United States to consider how Moscow is to be deterred prior to the SDI's ployment. The only such deterrence is a credible threat of retaliation capable of inflicting “unacceptable losses” to the Russian command.

A reading on the world map, of the totality of Soviet deployments—military, paramilitary, diplomatic, economic—and those of irregular warfare, confirms that the West is currently dealing with advanced, pre-general war activity. The Soviet command, clearly, committed itself to this course, because, for its own reasons, it concluded that Reagan's offer, was, in reality, an economic and cultural warfare trap, laid, not by Reagan, but by LaRouche.