

who were already sending their stories back to their editors, as the words were spilling out of Shultz's mouth.

Shultz droned on about "potential agreements," but then revealed the Soviets' rejection of the President's offer to extend the ABM Treaty, while eliminating all offensive weapons, and the President's unwillingness to submit to their uncompromising demand that SDI research be confined to the laboratory.

The manic typing began to slow down.

Shultz brought the room to a dead silence when he said, "And so, in the end, with great reluctance, the President, having worked so hard, creatively and constructively for these potentially tremendous achievements, simply had to refuse to compromise the security of the U.S., of our allies and freedom by abandoning the shield that has held in front of freedom. So, in the end, we are deeply disappointed at this outcome."

As Shultz asked for questions, the room was stunned. Quicker-witted reporters started asking for clarification. One desperately tried to signal his editors to kill the story he had already sent, reporting an historic arms control agreement. But it was too late; the story had already gone out over his wire service throughout Europe.

Shultz tried to avoid calling on me, but as he stepped down from the podium to leave, I shouted out, "What about the Soviets' SDI program? We know they have one. What are we to make of this, in light of that?" Shultz glared—he could not avoid the question. The entire press corps knew, as he did, that it was coming from the only journal that had been on target on this issue at Reykjavik.

He walked slowly back to the podium, but said only, "I know I've hit these things in a very broad way necessarily. But we'll be prepared to go into more detail as the time goes on."

Shultz ducked the issue, but President Reagan did not. The President proceeded to Keflavic Airport, and at the U.S. air base, before departing, delivered a brief address to the troops stationed there, in an upbeat tone opposite to Shultz's down-in-the-mouth performance. Reagan told the troops and their families: "The Soviet Union insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me and to future Presidents for 10 years the right to develop, test, and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the free world. This, we could not and will not do." The crowd drowned out his next words with a deafening cheer; I knew then that Reagan would go home a victor in the eyes of the U.S. population.

The Soviet 'SDI'

But this was contingent, I thought, on how he handled his speech to the nation Monday night, Oct. 13, which, according to White House spokesman Larry Speakes, Reagan wrote himself. Reagan mentioned for the first time the Soviet SDI: "The Soviets," he said, answering my question which Shultz avoided in Reykjavik, "have devoted far more

resources for a lot longer time than we, to their own SDI. Why are the Soviets so adamant that America remain forever vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of today, all free nations are utterly defenseless against Soviet missiles—fired either by accident or design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain so, forever?"

The next day, at the White House press briefing, I asked Larry Speakes if it were not the case that the Soviets' refusal to admit to their own SDI program, while seeking to stop ours, did not have "ominous implications" concerning Soviet designs to create a first-strike nuclear capability. He agreed it did.

The press, meanwhile, was struggling to regroup. They listened carefully to what Gorbachov said at his press conference in Reykjavik (the Soviets screened all journalists attending, and excluded me from their list). The new "line" emerged: "The summit was a failure. . . . Reagan had the greatest arms control package in history in his hands, and let it go because of his stubborn fixation on 'Star Wars.'" Some European media coined the term "Black Sunday" to characterize the final day of the summit.

But despite the media attempts to dictate reality, the American population had its own ideas. The first sign came on Oct. 14, when Reagan called Republican and Democratic congressional leaders to the White House to brief them on the summit. The Democrats came out of the meeting refusing to criticize the President's handling of the summit. Button-holing Rep. Dante Fascell (D-Fla.) after the meeting, ABC loudmouth Sam Donaldson prefaced a question by saying, "Given, Congressman, that the summit was a failure. . . ."

This reporter interrupted, asking Fascell, "Some media say the summit was a failure. Do you think that is a correct characterization?" When Fascell replied, "No, I do not think it was a failure," Donaldson gestured violently and cursed in front of his own TV cameras.

Interview: Yuri Dubinin

Separate arms control deals? 'Not a chance'

by Nicholas F. Benton

Following are excerpts from an exclusive interview with Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Yuri Dubinin made on the plane returning from Reykjavik to the United States Monday, Oct. 13. It is the first Western interview with a leading Soviet official after the Iceland meeting.

EIR: Ambassador Dubinin, can you tell me whether it is the Soviet view that any arms agreements can be reached with the U.S., given President Reagan's refusal to abandon the Strategic Defense Initiative?

Dubinin: In my view there cannot be. One of your Presidents [John Kennedy—ed.] once said, "He who rules space rules the Earth." Therefore, if the United States insists upon trying to rule space, then how can there be any possibility of an agreement on any arms reduction on Earth?

EIR: Then there is no chance of separate agreements on some of the arms control issues raised at the summit?

Dubinin: Not as long as the U.S. insists on Star Wars. Absolutely not.

EIR: What about the Soviet Strategic Defense program. Isn't it true that you have a program at least as advanced as that of the U.S., but are not willing to admit it?

Dubinin: No. We have no program.

EIR: You claim you have no research or testing of lasers or directed-energy systems?

Dubinin: Well, we have certainly done research in lasers. We have a couple of Nobel Prize winners in this. But it is only in laboratories.

EIR: What will the Soviet Union do, then, if President Reagan persists with the U.S. SDI program?

Dubinin: As the General Secretary said at his press conference, we will respond "asymmetrically."

EIR: What does that mean?

Dubinin: I cannot tell you at this time. But we will respond differently.

EIR: There are many rumors that Mr. Gorbachov is having a difficult time getting parts of the Soviet bureaucracy to accept the reforms he is trying to implement. Is this true?

Dubinin: Of course, there are some who do not understand fully what it is that Gorbachov is trying to do. But, no, there is no problem. Everyone is in support of his efforts.

EIR: What about the removal of [Foreign Minister] Gromyko?

Dubinin: Mr. Gromyko now enjoys a very high position within the party, after over 20 years in a very difficult job.

EIR: But he is no longer directly influencing Soviet policy.

Dubinin: He is now more involved with internal matters of the party.

EIR: And what of the role of Marshal Ogarkov?

Dubinin: Marshal Ogarkov is a very important and loyal part of Mr. Gorbachov's team.

Weinberger answers Soviets in Asia

by Susan Maitra in New Delhi and
Linda de Hoyos in Washington

While the eyes of the world in the second week of October were riveted on Reykjavik, Iceland, and the Reagan-Gorbachov pre-summit of Oct. 11-12, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was in China, India, and Pakistan, as part of a three-week tour that also takes him to Western Europe. With President Reagan taking the point with the Soviets on the Strategic Defense Initiative, Weinberger traveled to Asia to counter the high-powered Soviet diplomatic drive in the region, launched with the July 28 speech delivered by Mikhail Gorbachov in Vladivostok.

In that speech, Gorbachov had unveiled a policy of Soviet concessions toward China in the hopes of achieving the full normalization of relations with Beijing and a Chinese acquiescence in a Soviet-dominated collective security pact for Asia. Weinberger's alternative for Beijing is not a replay of Henry Kissinger's "China card"—which functioned as a cover through the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations for U.S. withdrawal from the region.

Policy toward China

As Weinberger stated in New Delhi: "We believe a secure, modernizing, and friendly China, with an independent foreign policy and developing economic system, is an essential part of international policy."

Weinberger was in Beijing Oct. 7-11, simultaneous with the arrival of Soviet chief negotiator and deputy foreign minister Ivan Rogachev, for the ninth round of "normalization talks" with Moscow. Against this backdrop, Weinberger was accorded the highest-level treatment, including a 20-minute discussion with leader Deng Xiao Ping, who met with Weinberger in his official capacity as Central Military Commission Chairman. He also met with Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping for nearly four hours.

Soviet designs on Asia were a major point of discussion. With Reagan and Gorbachov in Iceland debating decreases