

## Weinberger fights against Trilateral defense sell-out

by Webster G. Tarpley

These days Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) is very fond of repeating a dictum which he ascribes to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower in the early 1950s, when Eisenhower was the NATO Supreme Commander. The quote is that if U.S. troops are still in Europe after 10 years, then we will have to conclude that NATO has been a failure. Nunn means that a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Western Europe is now long overdue. It is Nunn's willingness to harness the chariot of his consuming presidential ambition to the treason of decoupling the Atlantic and Pacific alliances of the United States that has made him the most dangerous man in Washington.

In mid-January the forces of the Trilateral Commission, emboldened by the continued tenure of Don Regan at the White House and of George Shultz at the State Department, advanced their bid to reassert total dominance over Washington's strategic policies. The Trilaterals seek to make the next six months the worst disaster in the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with large-scale withdrawals of U.S. soldiers from Europe and the collapse of Alliance solidarity into mutual recriminations and betrayal. Nunn and the Trilaterals proceed from the "fiscal facts" of growing U.S. economic weakness to posit the need for drastic cuts in the Pentagon budget, and for radical revamping of the structure of military forces. If this gang of madmen and traitors get their way, then, in the words of Omar Bradley, the only thing that the Russians will need to reach the English Channel is—shoes.

Starting on Jan. 12, Nunn made his Senate Armed Services Committee the forum for an extended discussion of U.S. national strategy. These hearings, which are an innovation by Nunn, were deliberately devised to expose the Washington bureaucracy to the ideas of an array of "geopoliticians," many of them suffering from the obvious occupational hazards of mental disturbance. Zbigniew Brzezinski came forward with a call to cut the U.S. presence in Europe

by 100,000 troops, to be redistributed into an enlarged Rapid Deployment Force and airlifted into the Persian Gulf or Central America. Brzezinski, obviously not happy with the clean-out of the National Security Council, called for the creation of a "top-level, civil-military geostrategic planning staff" to make long-term policy there. That might include such "technetronic" brainstormings of Zbigniew's as fighting Soviet domination of Eastern Europe with videocassettes and word processors, which are of course much cheaper than seasoned combat infantrymen.

James Rodney Schlesinger was also of the opinion that the Persian Gulf is the vital front, with U.S. oil dependency on that region soon to reach the levels of the early 1970s, before the oil crisis. Schlesinger recommended stationing a U.S. brigade in the Persian Gulf on a permanent basis, which he said would alter the entire military situation there. Turning to matters of strategic theory, Schlesinger argued that the peace-loving United States can't have a war-winning plan like the Schlieffen Plan, because that would be "offensive," whereas the defensive is always "responsive," "flexible," and "intuitive." "It's like football," summed up this noted geopolitician. When asked by Nunn just what the goal of U.S. strategy might be, Schlesinger stated that our goal must be to defend our "symbols."

These rantings are now being staffed as options for dealing with a world of "expanding demands and limited resources." The argument is that the Soviet threat is multiplying while U.S. capabilities to meet it are dwindling, which therefore dictates some kind of troop reshuffle or redeployment to end the permanent stationing of 4 to 5 divisions in central Europe, and of other forces in South Korea. The airlift mobility of some of these forces would be increased in order to be able to respond to emergencies outside of the NATO area, such as the Gulf or Central America.

Highly-placed military sources on both sides of the At-

lantic have confirmed that these options are indeed in the works. One such source stressed that the decision for troop pull-outs has already been made, and that it is no longer a matter of if, but only of how, and in what dimensions it will be executed. Another source predicted a troop pull-out this year, although it will cost far more to move troops than to leave them where they are.

In reality, paramount United States national interest and overriding strategic and military imperatives dictate that not one American soldier be called away from his post in Europe. The defection of any American forces from the European theater, the area of maximum Soviet threat, is fraught with the most devastating political and military consequences, and must not be permitted on any account.

Caspar Weinberger has waged a valiant and grueling rearguard struggle against this Trilateral strategy of treason. Weinberger appeared as the lead-off witness at the Nunn committee to deliver an impassioned plea for the defense of the Free West against the growing Soviet threat and against those who seek to "scale back U.S. interests." Weinberger's premise was that a free and prosperous Europe is vital to the United States, and that this country "could not live in a world where the Soviets have overrun Europe." Weinberger presented the U.S. Alliance structure as a "security perimeter" which we cannot allow to be pierced in any point, lest the whole be overrun. Weinberger fought against the petty philistinism and ignorance of the senators, whose frequent hostility nevertheless left no doubt that, barring a political earthquake, the defense budget would be savagely cut for the third year in a row.

Later in the week, Weinberger spoke to the National Press Club to warn against isolationism, retrenchment, and withdrawal. "We can be our own worst enemy," he said. "We have ample historical evidence of that."

The Trilaterals hope to add an arms-control and strategic-defense debacle to their decoupling efforts. Their starting point is aptly summed up in the words of one European observer: "It is wrong to say that Reykjavik was a disaster. Reykjavik is a disaster. There has been no deviation from Reykjavik by the President." Some weeks ago on the Johnny Carson Show, chief Trust spokesman Armand Hammer suggested that a U.S.-U.S.S.R. summit might not be so far off, and that Gorbachov had expressed interest to him about technology sharing in this regard. William Colby appeared on a network evening news program to opine that if President Reagan wants to be rid of Irangate, he need only come up with a sweeping arms-control agreement to put the odor of scandal behind him.

In response to the Soviet naming of First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov to head the Soviet team at the Geneva talks, the White House gave the status of State Department Counselor to Ambassador Max Kampelman. Before leaving for a new round of talks in Geneva, Kampelman told the White House press corps that he had a "rather positive

reaction" to the appointment of Vorontsov, who he said had "more clout." A presidential statement issued to announce Kampelman's appointment showed that remedial efforts by Weinberger and Thatcher in October-November had not achieved lasting effect, and that Reagan was once again perilously close to the Reykjavik precipice. The statement spoke of U.S. willingness to refrain from deploying "advanced strategic defenses through 1996" while all strategic offensive arms "would be reduced by 50%" during the first five years followed by the elimination of all "offensive ballistic missiles of all ranges and armaments." Among areas where U.S.-Soviet agreement has already been accomplished the statement listed a limit of 100 warheads on long-range INF missiles, "with no such missiles in Europe"—the zero option. The Soviets are accused of "backtracking" from Reykjavik. With this, the President is once again on the edge of the abyss.

The Pentagon marked the opening of the new Geneva talks with the first test of the D-5 (Trident II) missile. The indefatigable Weinberger had warned on Jan. 11 that there had been no Soviet concessions or other signs that Moscow was going to be more tractable in negotiations, and that their Iceland agenda had been to "block" and "kill" the SDI so as to keep their own "monopoly on strategic defense." Weinberger pointed out that the other Soviet reason for a summit would be "international propaganda effect" and that a new summit would therefore be "not a good idea."

Nevertheless, the Trilateral drive for a new summit is evident, and Weinberger and his military associates know that a static defense without counterattack cannot win. There are now signs that Weinberger may be preparing to parlay his greatest asset, the LaRouche SDI policy, into a turning movement against the Trilaterals. According to widely published reports, on Dec. 17, Weinberger, accompanied by Admiral William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Gen. James Abrahamson, the SDI Director, went to the White House to advise the President that, because of the progress of research, the deployment of a space-based defense against Soviet ICBMs has become a concrete option for the United States in the near future. This would preempt all previous pronouncements relegating final deployment decisions to the 1990s. According to other reports, the President was "enthusiastic" about the meeting. Other press accounts say that the Army's anti-tactical ballistic missile program is advancing even more rapidly than the SDI itself, with plans under discussion for defense of Western Europe, Japan, Israel, and other points in the Middle East. A series of six underground nuclear tests in Nevada that will start Feb. 5 are presumably not unrelated to these efforts.

Weinberger had stressed earlier, "We have to bring [the SDI] on line as soon as we can." He told Senator Exon that the SDI must defend "people and continents," and not just weapons systems. At the National Press Club, he added that all off-the-shelf technologies have been studied, and that

none of them would work. Only effective components of the future system should be deployed. These remarks refute newspaper accounts describing a system based on kinetic-kill vehicles only.

A decision to deploy SDI would rule out, once and for all, any return to the 10-year moratorium on such deployment discussed in Iceland, and would make the old-style arms control a dead letter. In addition, a presidential decision in favor of deployment would make the system irreversible under his successors.

The President is reported to be considering a \$100 billion plan to begin SDI deployment, and has been urged to make this the centerpiece of his State of the Union message on Jan. 27. For that to happen, a monumental bureaucratic battle will have to be won. George Shultz and Paul Nitze are mobilizing the State Department to hold off the SDI until it can be bargained away. Weinberger's trump may turn out to be Frank Carlucci, since advising the President on SDI deployment is precisely the policy function of the National Security Council. For convincing the Congress, and for making the program a reality, the touchstone will be a Hamiltonian program of national economic mobilization, as advocated by Democratic presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche.

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## Documentation

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### We cannot scale back U.S. world interests

*Testimony of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger before the Senate Armed Services Committee, on Monday, Jan. 12, 1987. Excerpts:*

. . . The goal in our discussions is to bolster our national consensus and to recognize the great benefits for America of bipartisan solidarity in foreign and defense matters.

. . . First, we have to identify our national security interests, and . . . these interests encompass both broad ideals, freedom and human rights, economic prosperity, as well as specific geographic concerns as they have to. That is the territorial integrity of our country and our allies, and unencumbered American access to world markets and to sources of strategic resources that are in many cases thousands of miles from our shore. . . .

. . . Finally, we have to determine the military capabilities that are needed to carry out this strategy. These needed

capabilities, forces, weapons, manpower, and so on, become our defense programs and, therefore, determine our budget, and this process is a dynamic one.

. . . There are several options for reducing our security risks. The best, and of course the slowest-working, the least certain of the options, would be to diminish the threats to our interests. . . . But it's the least certain because its success depends on factors wholly outside our control. . . .

Well, then, another option that we can do to improve the matching of our interests, our strategy and our capabilities is to scale back our interests. And there have been many suggestions that this is really what we ought to do. . . . I am convinced that this is not a possible option if we want to keep our freedom. To those who say we should scale back United States' interests, I would ask, What mutual defense treaty should we repudiate, which allies or friends should we abandon, which of our commitments that you refer to in your statement, Mr. Chairman [Nunn], as growing, should we abandon? Which are unrealistic? Which are not forced on us by the Soviet threat? What American interests should we give up? I know of no answers that would enable America to continue on the road that American Presidents and Congresses have followed, at least since 1945. American interests worldwide form a security perimeter for our values and our future prosperity. And a breach or a weak spot in that perimeter endangers the whole . . . and would call into question America's resolve as a leader of the world's democracies and make our allies question whether they should remain allies any longer.

. . . Within those reluctant to increase America's military strength, to provide more reassuring security, and to reduce the risk, sometimes they charge that this administration's strategy is to fight everywhere around the world it wants. That is not our strategy. Our strategy is to deter aggression against the United States and our allies and our interests so we'll never have to fight anywhere in the world. . . . We can't ignore the fact that Soviet military power could enable it to attack in more than one place at the same time. . . .

Just a few years ago, Mr. Chairman, our weakness and our announced intentions did tempt our adversaries, and that was in Korea where the United States announced, many years ago, that Korea lay outside our defense perimeter, and it did for about six months. And after that we recognized, because of the aggression of North Korea supported by others, that we were not able to consider it outside our defensive perimeter, and we had to scramble very rapidly to get the forces in place that were needed to repel aggression. . . .

Those that propose to reduce that [defense] budget, I think, need to acknowledge in doing so that such a reduction would increase our security risks, and that those who wish to reduce our budget are willing for the nation to incur such risks. . . . Those who would arbitrarily dismiss our long-term security interests as secondary to short-term fiscal goals, those who demand new taxes before they will consider the

nation's security, should at least acknowledge some responsibility for the increased risks that they would force on the nation. . . .

## Commitment to Western Europe

. . . We should recognize the difficulty . . . of arguing for greater responses by others to their growing security threats and to ours, when at the same time we are perceived to be cutting defense spending. So, as we work to get our allies to do more, I think we should not be tempted, out of frustration, to do less ourselves. . . . It would . . . play directly into Soviet hands, by aiding various Western European factions advocating dangerous security policy. . . . We couldn't live in a world where the Soviets have overrun Europe. The Soviets would like nothing better than for us to reduce our NATO support.

. . . The Mutual Assured Destruction concept has been becoming obsolete and . . . does not recognize and cope with the deterioration in the global military situation. Something new is needed, and something new has been added. And that is, of course, the Strategic Defense Initiative—one of the President's very highest priorities—which could bring us and to the world perhaps the most hopeful strategic concept in at least 40 years, if it can be realized. . . . The President . . . is not afraid to challenge the conventional wisdom. . . .

. . . The Soviets . . . have done nothing but increase their military strength, increase their ability to project power, increase their ability to conduct war in various parts of the world simultaneously. And we cannot say that, because we think that means too expensive a response is required, we have to cut back and change our commitments and narrow them to fit some idea of our reduced capabilities.

## Zbig: Pull 100,000 troops from Europe

*Introductory remarks by Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S. national security adviser, to Senate Armed Services Committee on Jan. 12. Excerpts, emphasis in original:*

1. The American-Soviet rivalry is a long term contest. It is a classic historical conflict between two major powers and is not susceptible to a broad and quick resolution, either through a victory by one side or through a grand act of reconciliation.

2. The American-Soviet contest is global in scope, but its central focus is the struggle for Eurasia . . . here are three central strategic fronts [Europe, the Far East, Southwest Asia]. . . .

There is a danger that a fourth central strategic front may soon emerge in Central America. . . .

The Soviet Union is unique because it is a one dimensional power. . . . In the light of the above, the objective of U.S. strategic policy must be *mutual strategic security*. U.S. strategic offensive forces must be modernized, but their configuration and numbers should be contrived not to pose a threat of a disarming first strike to Soviet strategic forces . . . but in light of Moscow's modernization plans. . . . *It is also necessary to deploy a limited strategic defense.*

The alternate means of seeking Mutual Strategic Security, the proliferation of mobile strategic systems, is in my view, less desirable. . . . On the conventional level, the United States must address a perilous strategic paradox: U.S. conventional forces are weakest where the United States is most vulnerable, along the southwestern Eurasian strategic front, and strongest where its allies have the greatest capacity for doing more on their own behalf and where the risk of a U.S. Soviet clash is lowest, along the far western Eurasian strategic front.

Consequently, *the United States should undertake a gradual—and certainly only partial—reduction in the level of American forces in Europe.* A total of perhaps 100,000 troops could be gradually withdrawn. . . . *Budgetary savings from these reductions should be allocated to a significant expansion of U.S. airlift capability. Manpower withdrawn from Europe should be absorbed into an enlarged rapid deployment force through the creation of additional light divisions for potential use on the southwest Asian central strategic front or in Central America.* . . .

In Europe, the United States should encourage the development of a politically and militarily integrated Western Europe, less dependent on the United States but still tied to it by a strategic alliance. NATO should become increasingly a European regional alliance, though with an active and major U.S. presence in it. . . .

*Japan should be encouraged not to increase its defense spending greatly, but rather to increase its economic assistance to developing countries in which Japan shares a security interest with the other industrialized democracies.*

. . . *the most important priority for the United States is to step up the political and military pressure on the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. . . . It should advance a diplomatic formula that calls for the external neutralization and the internal self-determination of the country.* . . .

In addition, *the United States must seek to reinforce the resilience of Iran and Pakistan to Soviet advances where possible.*

*The United States should promote the development of an independent-minded and increasingly assertive East European public opinion, not only through radio broadcasts, but also through new communications and information technology, such as videocassettes, miniaturized printers, and world [sic] processors.* . . .