

Secretary Weinberger takes on the decouplers

As EIR reported last week, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has launched a campaign to make the Soviet threat and the early deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) the central theme of administration policy. The speeches which we excerpt here, delivered over a two-day period, constitute an extraordinarily profound and incisive intervention into the national discussion of these issues.

No troop withdrawal from Europe!

The following are excerpts from a speech to the Denver Rotary Club, Denver, Colorado on Jan. 22, titled "U.S. European Troop Withdrawals: Counterproductive and Dangerous."

Since our founding, America's geography has made isolationist foreign policies seem the wisest course to some, but fortunately not to all. Until this century, that isolationist formula seemed to carry tolerable risks. But it took two devastating world wars to convince our citizens that the security of America begins well beyond our shores. . . .

It is critical to remember that U.S. and European security are inextricably linked. Western Europe is freedom's front line and by far the greatest attraction for Soviet ambitions. We station troops in Europe because it is in *our* interest to do so. The United States could not live in a world in which Western Europe was overrun by the Soviet hordes.

NATO has served as an essential guarantor of our freedom for two generations. It was and is our principal hope for preserving the basic shared values of Western civilization. Any proposal to alter NATO's extraordinarily successful for-

mula must be considered only if it would improve NATO's ability to do what it has accomplished so well for 40 years. . . .

Any major U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe would harm America's security and the cause of freedom. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have a massive quantitative advantage over NATO and are rapidly improving the quality of their forces. To meet this growing threat and to ensure deterrence, all NATO nations including the United States must seek to *improve* all our defenses, and all our defensive forces. A U.S. troop withdrawal from NATO would gravely weaken the security of the free world.

The Soviets have some 70% of their conventional forces available for operations in Europe. While we continue to make very significant progress in improving our capabilities for dealing with problems in other regions, our first requirement is fielding the forces to prevent Western Europe from falling under the Soviet heel. Moreover, our presence is a political signal to the Soviets that intimidation will not work. This remains the reason why we concentrate our forward-deployed forces there. We have helped prevent war and Soviet political encroachments in Europe precisely because of our determination to maintain strong military forces there, in concert with our NATO allies.

We must recognize that our allies, individually and collectively, are making a greater contribution to the common defense than many people realize. In fact, their defense contributions exceed our own in a number of key categories. For example, the non-U.S. NATO members maintain three and one-half million personnel on active duty, compared to a little over two million for the United States. In ground combat

strength and tactical air power, non-U.S. alliance members would contribute roughly 60% of NATO's total force if war were to occur. During the 1970s, defense spending of our NATO allies rose at a rate of 2% per year in real terms. In contrast, U.S. defense spending declined in real terms by 20% during that decade.

Rather than prompting a surge in allied burden-sharing, major U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe likely would have the *opposite* effect. Our pullout could convey a message that the United States is either no longer concerned about the Soviet threat, or has lost the will to maintain an effective deterrent against the threat. Either impression would only strengthen the hand of those in Europe who argue for major cutbacks in defense or political accommodation with the Soviet Union. If we do less, the Europeans would likely do less, and we *all* will be less secure. The result over time could well be an unraveling of the Atlantic alliance, and the neutralization of some of our strongest allies, with all that implies for America's vital interests.

Also, the notion that we could save a lot of money by withdrawing from NATO and use those savings for other things, is as wildly erroneous as the other parts of the withdrawal thesis. Troop withdrawals from Europe actually would entail heavy costs in the near term, while generating only limited savings in the long term. A withdrawal of 100,000 U.S. personnel from Europe would incur one-time costs of \$500 million for transporting the forces home. Renovating or constructing new facilities for them in the United States would cost another \$4.7 billion. And while eventual reduced operating and support costs for the forces here, versus in Europe, are estimated at around \$600 million per year, we could not begin to generate net savings for about eight or nine years. Nor are we sure there would even be any net savings, because our European hosts bear some of these support costs now. . . .

If we were to withdraw a force of 100,000 from Europe, we would, under our current rapid-reinforcement policy, need the capability to return it there in 10 days or less. The least expensive way to do this would be to buy a second set of equipment for prepositioning and enough airlift to move residual equipment. This would cost about \$20 to \$25 billion, including over 100 additional wide-bodied cargo aircraft. Alternatively, returning the entire force and its equipment by air would require over 1,000 additional aircraft at a cost of around \$100 billion. But, we probably could not operate such a large number of additional aircraft on already overcrowded European airfields.

Thus, if it is an attempt to save money, every cost argument favors *staying* in Europe, not pulling out. But this is not a matter to be settled by green-eye-shaded accountants. . . . Far from enhancing our overall deterrent strength, withdrawal of any substantial number of U.S. troops from Europe would signal to our allies and adversaries alike that we are backing away from our commitments. . . .

In sum, even the hint that the United States would seri-

ously consider major unilateral troop withdrawals from Europe is potentially damaging to the leadership we are committed to provide in the defense of freedom and deterrence of aggression. Now is the time for *reasserting* our resolve to stand by our allies and protect our interests. A U.S. retreat from our commitments abroad would undermine the unity and strength of free nations. And unity and strength are our first defenses against hostile powers whose preeminent aim is to split and dominate free nations. . . .

The SDI and exploration of space

From a speech on Jan. 22 before a meeting of the National Space Foundation in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

. . . For three decades now, increasingly lethal generations of Soviet nuclear missiles have been produced. Fostered by a professional Soviet technocracy and their successful acquisition of vast amounts of Western technology, five generations of ever more capable Soviet missiles have been deployed to support Moscow's global ambitions. Shaped over 30 years, that force is characterized by such large-yield warheads and increased accuracies that we have concluded Soviet missiles are designed unmistakably as first-strike weapons. Further, the deep philosophical and political hostility between the United States and Soviet Union, exacerbated by the unrelenting global ambitions of the Soviet leadership, have forced the West to arm itself with a powerful arsenal of retaliatory weapons.

The world has changed as a result of these events. And it is on the verge of changing again. The Soviet Union's military strategy does not comprehend or accept the notion of deterrence that prevailed in the West. Mutual destruction was such a terrifying prospect to peace-loving democracies that nuclear war was considered unthinkable. Thus, efforts to defend against nuclear missiles were deemed unnecessary, unworthy of study, and worse—it would be “provocative”—the worst word in the appeaser's vocabulary. The Soviets, however, never accepted this notion. They pressed forward with a broad, though largely secret program to build strategic defenses against nuclear weapons. They have been very successful.

Today, the Kremlin enjoys the world's only deployed operational antiballistic-missile system, the only operational anti-satellite system, the most comprehensive, in-depth, and capable air defense system ever invented, and an organization for passive defense of its shelters for 175,000 party and government leaders.

The Soviets have invested nearly four decades in strategic defense, including defense against ballistic missiles, and two decades in the potential application of new technologies to ballistic missile defense.

In the last 10 years, the Soviets have spent 15 times as much on strategic defense as the United States. They are thoroughly modernizing their ABM system around Moscow. Further, they are constructing nine new large phased-array

radars to add new capabilities to the network of 11 ballistic-missile warning and tracking radars already in use. . . .

Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have been pursuing the same advanced technologies that they have attempted to delay in the U.S. by propaganda attacks on the SDI program. In laser research alone, for example, their \$1 billion per year effort dwarfs our own. They have 10,000 scientists and engineers at work on such research.

In some areas, the Soviets have progressed well beyond the research stage. They already have ground-based lasers that could interfere with our satellites; they could have a prototype space-based anti-satellite laser, which could be available by the end of the decade; and we expect them to test ground-based lasers for defense against ballistic missiles in the next three years. They also could begin testing components for large-scale deployment of a laser ABM system in the early 1990s.

Although less well developed, the Soviets have a particle beam weapons program under way. It may yield a prototype weapon capable of disrupting satellite electronics in the 1990s. Their research on microwave weapons is also progressing. In fact, their capability to develop microwave weapons is at least as good as ours. . . .

We must conclude that the Soviets are developing a capability for rapid and comprehensive ABM deployments. Several of the major components are already in place for an ABM system well in excess of any treaty limits. The cumulative effect of the Soviet effort clearly suggests preparation for large-scale ABM defense of the Soviet Union. And the large phased-array radar network around the Soviet Union . . . includes the radar of Krasnoyarsk, which is a violation of the ABM Treaty. We believe that this radar network could support a nationwide ABM defense. . . .

Our SDI efforts have drawn great criticism from seemingly well-intentioned and well-informed corners. But have you noticed some reduction in the decibel level of so-called technical critics? I have. And I am not surprised, because some elements of our research have proved successful beyond the expectations of the most optimistic scientists and engineers. In fact, our research has progressed so well that we now have an unprecedented degree of confidence in the feasibility of defense against Soviet missiles—for ourselves and our allies.

Let me give you a couple of examples of how far we have come in recent months.

The first is the result of our Delta-180 experiments. . . . Among the successes of this mission was a needed comparison and evaluation of different types of sensors and detectors that produced encouraging results. Forty-two detectors were used, employing various wave lengths—from infrared to ultraviolet. . . . The information gained in this experiment shows us that we can find and track objects in space.

Another Delta-180 experiment also produced remarkable results. This experiment investigated a space kinetic kill vehicle. We put together functionally the components that would

represent a space intercept of an object being boosted out of the atmosphere. This experiment was so successful that it established firmly the principle that a moving target can be hit with a kinetic weapon from space. . . .

We perceive opportunities to begin describing technologies and concepts for a first phase of protection against Soviet nuclear missiles. This phase could include both ground and space-based components operating to detect, track, and destroy ballistic missiles in the boost and late mid-course phases of flight. It would be the first element in the evolution of the full system. It would not be a point defense, as some have urged, to protect missile fields. It would be an integral first phase of our whole tiered defense.

We have no intention of developing any strategic defenses, unless we are confident that they will be elements of the entire defensive system. Thus, phase one must look forward to phase two, three, and beyond. Some would have us deploy so-called off-the-shelf technologies now. This we reject because, I am sorry to say, there are no technologies on the shelf that can do the job we want and need. An early deployment of defensive components that protected only some military assets and was not a part of a global defense, would weaken our SDI program and rob us of limited resources. Phase one, whatever form it takes, must be one piece of the entire system that provides a thoroughly reliable defense for the free world. . . .

The Soviet role in terrorism

From a speech to the International Conference on Terrorism, Jan. 21:

. . . Terrorism is a crime. Terrorists are criminals to be dealt with whenever possible by the police forces and legal system of the nation concerned. But, when terrorism is sponsored or abetted by sovereign states, it becomes a matter of *international* conflict, which must be dealt with by the full range of political, economic, and, if necessary, military instruments available to sovereign states.

We see in state-sponsored terrorism significantly different levels of involvement, support, and accountability. These levels might be called, first, the *policy* level; second, the *logistical* level; and, finally, the *operational* level.

The Soviet Union supports terrorism at the *policy* level by actively encouraging and helping client states. The Soviets do not engage in terrorism directly. Rather, they provide political and military support from a distance. Thus, Moscow can rely on surrogates and clients to provide the operational arm of terrorism and, most importantly, the political insulation that has enabled the Soviets to threaten the West while retaining the illusion of plausible denial.

In practice, the Soviets embrace a duplicitous policy toward terrorism. In order to maintain respectability and legitimacy, Moscow overtly pursues a conventional diplomatic course while, at the same time, covertly engaging in subversion and destabilization—and this includes the equipment,

expertise, and support that fuels many of the world's terrorist groups. This practice is not an aberration, but an important, long-term policy.

At the second level of involvement in terrorism, the *logistical* level, we find Soviet allies, clients, and surrogates like Bulgaria, East Germany, and Cuba providing weapons, training, and material support to terrorism. For instance, the Italian investigation into the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II revealed the clear complicity of the Bulgarian secret service.

Finally, at the third level of involvement, the *operational* level, we find three states directly engaged in terrorism in pursuit of their own national goals—Syria, Libya, and Iran. Public trials in London and Berlin have conclusively demonstrated direct Syrian involvement in terrorist actions. Yet, despite the collective actions of the West, there appears to be no substantial modification of Syria's overall support to terrorist groups or its use of terrorism to support Syrian political goals; nor have we seen any change in the terrorist policies of Libya and Iran.

Libya's Muammar Qaddafi remains the most notorious proponent of terrorism. . . .

And then we have the case of Iran. Everyone knows the current government of Iran actively supports and engages in terrorism. When discussing Iran and our entire strategy against terrorism, it is important to keep in mind, as the vice-president made clear last night, that our policy has been, and will continue to be, no concessions to terrorists. That policy is correct. Nothing has happened to convince us that we should alter that policy. . . .

An effective strategy against terrorism must embrace the entire range of options open to us, including, as a last resort, the military option. Indeed, political and economic actions are all the more effective when the terrorist state understands clearly that behind these other measures stands effective military power, capable of an appropriate and timely response. . . .

We have always had the military forces, structure, and ordnance for nuclear and conventional deterrence; but until recently we lacked the precision required for more precise military action in a terrorist situation. We have made progress in developing these anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist capabilities. But we still need greater flexibility. We need more options. In addition to the broadsword, we need the stiletto.

We are therefore in the process of reorganizing our special operations forces by establishing both a U.S. Special Operations Command and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Inherent in this reorganization is increased emphasis on our counter-terrorist capabilities. . . .

Socrates and the defense of freedom

From a speech at the University of Colorado at Boulder on Jan. 22, titled "The Role of the University in the Defense of a Free Society."

. . . I do not see any conflict between the aims of the Academy, and the defense of freedom in the United States and our allies. Indeed, I see a great harmony, and even a fulfillment of those aims. I believe that aiding in the construction of SDI is only a part of a larger obligation and a major opportunity for the Academy to help defend this republic and our freedom. . . .

It is perhaps no coincidence that free government as we know it took shape in the same ancient world that saw the rise of western academies. Especially in Athens, the ideal of a society of self-governing citizens shone brightest, if often imperfectly. The freedom of Athens was inseparably bound up with the rule of law, public deliberation, and devotion to procedure. . . .

Free societies are *always* imperiled, either from within or without. From within come those forces of forgetfulness, or self-indulgence or fear, which make a citizenry lose touch with the worthiness of its institutions of self-rule and which make unpreparedness seem so much more potentially attractive than preparedness. From without come the organized onslaughts of war or aggression on the part of nations which tend to be more eager and able to exploit the elements of force and fraud always present in international affairs. . . .

One of the principal goals of this nation is to defend ourselves and our friends against the many threats facing us. The university has an essential role in this defense. We must always recall a harsh truth about our adversaries. If we stand devoted to the university of free inquiry and the republic of free citizenship, we must remember that the governing principles of the Soviet Union declare both to be a sham. The policy of its leaders is to undermine the existence of free inquiry and free government wherever possible. . . .

Given the real world in which we live, it is not only consistent with the purposes of the university to assist in the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative; it is a fulfillment of its real purpose, which is to defend the soul of free society through discovery, debate, and learning.

If I were to search for a model of that man who best embodied the love of free inquiry and the love of free citizenship, it would be Socrates. He said in the *Apology* that Athens was committing a grave injustice against him by condemning him to death. Defiantly, Socrates vowed never to cease from examining the grounds of the well-lived life. Yet, he always fought his city's battles and was known for his great courage in her defense. He claimed that both his questioning of Athens and his willingness to defend his city stemmed from his love of knowledge. Moreover, in the *Crito*, the sequel to the *Apology*, Socrates refused to leave Athens for another city, even to save his life. Where else could he go, he asked, where he would be as free to philosophize?

Like her modern descendant, America, Athens was not a perfect society. But also like America, Athens was a free society—a society that was free to perfect its imperfections. As such, she won the allegiance of the man who was free to know, and knew best how to be free.