

Castro himself told reporters on Aug. 4, 1985. Calling Vesco a persecuted "family man," Castro asked, "Is it just to hunt down a man who no longer has even a place to hide, as if he were a beast? I have told Vesco, 'If you want to live here, live here,'" Castro said.

The advantages to the Cuban intelligence services' own drug-running networks, of hosting a major Cartel director, are obvious. But it is Vesco's still-live access to Western financial and business interests, which makes him most valuable to the Castro regime, including for helping set up illegal trading networks to bring embargoed U.S. technology into Cuba.

Vesco's frequent trips to Costa Rica, and his extensive networks there, are an open secret in that country, as Costa Rica's *La Nación* reported on Nov. 30, 1986. Why have Costa Rican authorities not moved against the drug-runner's operations? Here again, the answer lies in the protection provided the Medellín Cartel by the corrupted U.S. intelligence networks controlling AIFLD. It was to Costa Rica that Vesco first fled when he was wanted by U.S. authorities in 1972, and he was welcomed by no less a man than the country's then President, José "Pepe" Figueres. Today, if you

want to see Vesco in Cuba, it is to Pepe Figueres that you must turn for clearance, Vesco-promotor Arthur Herzog reported in *Fortune* magazine last November.

Figueres was a founder of the Caribbean Legion, a Nazi network in the Caribbean turned over to Soviet control after World War II, according to U.S. military intelligence documents of the period. If that history has long since been buried, it is because Cord Meyer, the World Federalist turned CIA official who founded AIFLD, used Figueres to carry out many "U.S." political operations in South and Central America. In 1967, Figueres publicly described himself as a "CIA agent."

The revelation that Vesco's Swiss-based financial lieutenant, Willard Zucker, was the mastermind for the arms and money supply network set up by John Poindexter's National Security Council for the Nicaraguan Contras (see *EIR*, Dec. 19, 1986 and Jan. 23, 1987), confirms the mounting evidence that Vesco's access to the West has been protected by a network within U.S. intelligence itself. Here, the track to be pursued remains Vesco's relationship to his former lawyer, Kenneth Bialkin of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

LaRouche: How to run the war on drugs

In a statement prepared for congressional hearings on the Department of Justice's budget on Feb. 3, 1987, Lyndon LaRouche outlined the crucial points for a "battle-plan against the international drug-trafficking," excerpted here:

There are six points, at each and all of which the international drug traffic must be crushed, if we are to be effective. 1) In the nation in which the substances are originally produced. 2) In movements of substances across national borders. 3) Through intensive inspection of all vessels and aircraft entering the United States. 4) Through tracing the flow of revenues from the drug-traffic through financial institutions, and through administering crushing penalties to institutions whose negligence fosters the existence of channels of laundering of drug-revenues. 5) Through sweeping the drug-pushers from the streets. 6) Through strict and vigorous law-enforcement action, with severe penalties, against the users who represent the market on which the existence of the drug-traffickers depends.

Although appropriate types of military aircraft, helicopters, and electronic equipment, are indispensable for dealing with the production and bulk transport of such

substances, no amount of equipment would produce success without improvement in the system of human intelligence affecting all six layers of interdiction.

Friendly nations are crippled by lack of proper radar, and shortages of aerial flotillas which combine gunship planes and helicopters. With adequate equipment military arms of nations below our Rio Grande border can be very effective in doing their part. We must be more consistent in aiding these governments with access to current satellite and AWACS-type information, to assist in selecting and planning military and similar operations. We do not need to send in U.S. Green Berets, except as civilians assigned to liaison with relevant agencies of those governments.

Apart from this modest amount of assistance to cooperating foreign governments, the most massive problem today, is a shortage of qualified anti-drug intelligence personnel in federal, state, and local U.S. agencies. Although law-enforcement is an integral part of this, effective law-enforcement by itself is not the answer. The key is the use of high-quality methods of intelligence detection, tracking, and operations, in pinpointing targets for appropriately military or law-enforcement action. . . .

We must increase the allotments for the War on Drugs in two categories. 1) We must increase allotments of materiel required as assistance to cooperating governments. 2) We must increase substantially the number of anti-drug intelligence officers in every responsible agency. If we do not find the will to do these two things, we can not be said to be serious about fighting a War on Drugs to win.