

New Harvard study: arms control a fraud

by Kathleen Klenetsky

A significant section of the arms-control mafia has finally conceded what has long been obvious to anyone not wearing self-imposed blinders: The Soviet Union has been exploiting arms-control negotiations and agreements to achieve its goal of military superiority over the West.

These are among the findings expressed in a recent report entitled *Learning from Experience with Arms Control*, written by a panel of arms-controllers from Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government—the same Harvard that created and promoted Henry Kissinger, and now finds that the arms-control “achievements” of Kissinger's career have turned out to be empty promises.

Sponsored by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Administration, and scheduled to be published in book form this summer, the report substantially confirms charges leveled by *EIR*, as well as Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, that Moscow's primary purpose in pursuing arms control is to disarm the West, while allowing Russia to build an unstoppable military machine.

Although the study, drafted by some of the most ardent devotees of arms control, including Ashton Carter, Joseph Nye, and Albert Carnesale, certainly does not go so far as to suggest that arms control be abandoned, it does make some remarkable concessions, especially given the authors' pro-disarmament outlook.

“What is most striking about the arms-control experience surveyed here is what it did not do,” the report asserts. “Those who hoped arms control would bring about major reductions in existing or planned weapons inventories or slow the introduction of new and more capable technologies have little grounds for satisfaction. Nor do those who looked to arms control as a means for constraining the emergence of a large, modern Soviet arsenal capable of destroying a significant proportion of U.S. strategic retaliatory forces.”

Among the study's most notable concessions is that Moscow has not been constrained by existing arms agreements. “The arms-control process and/or unilateral restraint have little impact on the Soviet [military] requirements process,” it says. “On the contrary, it appears that Soviet requirements are determining factors in their arms-control proposals and their acceptance of any final agreement.”

The report presents a gloomy assessment of the major U.S.-Soviet accords. SALT II failed to achieve its “major strategic objective” of “enhancing the survivability of both

sides' retaliatory forces” and did not “constrain survivability of both sides' retaliatory forces” and did not “constrain significantly many qualitative improvements that have had a major impact on force structure and strategic stability.”

While terming the 1972 ABM Treaty, “arms control's chief accomplishment,” the study laments that it “may merely have codified the postponement of a race in defensive systems until advancing technologies made effective defenses possible,” and further admits that “There is no evidence that the slow pace of U.S. ABM developments in the 1960s had an appreciable effect on the pace of Soviet efforts.”

The study also warns that “Soviet pattern of circumvention and apparent violation . . . has eroded confidence in and support for the arms-control process,” which could become a “perhaps insurmountable” barrier to future arms limitation progress.

Words—or action?

Presumably, the report's conclusions suggest that even some leading arms-control fanatics can no longer deny that Moscow is committed to institutionalizing its military superiority, and has cynically and deliberately used arms treaties to achieve this goal.

Whether it means that the authors will now support the steps the report implies are necessary—like ending the arms-control charade; mobilizing to stop the fools on Capitol Hill who are threatening to pass laws to force the U.S. to abide by SALT II; spending the money necessary to restore America's defense capabilities—is far more iffy.

Judging from a Feb. 2 *New York Times* op-ed by the report's two chief authors, Albert Carnesale and Richard Haass, the study's drafters are still clinging to the illusion that somewhere there exists the perfect formula which will magically produce “real” arms control.

Haass and Carnesale propose more of the same U.S. concessionary policy which their Harvard study has shown does not work, specifically, that President Reagan accept the Soviet proposal for applying the so-called “strict interpretation” of the ABM Treaty to the SDI for the next 10 years. As Weinberger, and even Secretary of State George Shultz have stressed recently, the “strict interpretation” not only would impede the SDI's progress, but also is not the legally-correct reading of the treaty.

Nevertheless, the Harvard report does serve a useful purpose. Having prominent members of the arms-control gang on record questioning some of the fundamental assumptions, and practical results, of the arms-control process, will make it a bit more difficult for Congress and presidential candidates to promote arms control as avidly as they might otherwise do. As the Dec. 22 *Wall Street Journal* noted in a lead editorial, the Harvard study “should be required reading . . . for those members of the 100th Congress who are urging President Reagan to return to the SALT II limits and cap his presidency with an arms-control treaty.”