

## Moscow's 'arms control' game nearly over

by Konstantin George

A dramatic transformation took place in the overall U. S. posture toward the subject of arms control, one which was called, rather epigrammatically, by the April 10 issue of the *Washington Post*, "a defeat for the State Department and a victory for the Defense Department." Key elements making up this transformation, are: first, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's visit to Moscow, which bluntly presented to the Russians Great Britain, France, and West Germany's rejection of the entire package of the so-called Reykjavik proposals, especially the INF "zero option"; second, the rout suffered by the entire State Department arms-control mafia, as a result of the growing espionage and bugging scandals at the U.S. embassy in Moscow; and third, Moscow's continuing strategic intelligence failure in understanding the underlying political process guiding what is called "Irangate" in Washington politics.

As reported in the April 10 *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, at a White House meeting held on the evening of April 9, President Reagan rejected Secretary of State Shultz's proposals for his April 13-16 Moscow talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and agreed with Defense Secretary Weinberger's objections. Reagan ordered Shultz to communicate the following points to Moscow.

1) The United States will only wait 5 years before deploying the SDI, and not the 7-10 years as proposed at Reykjavik.

2) The United States will no longer agree to a 50% cut in strategic nuclear weapons by 1991, as agreed to at Reykjavik. "More time is needed," said Reagan.

3) The United States will adhere to a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

4) The United States will continue to reject Soviet proposals to limit nuclear tests.

5) Reagan rejected a Shultz proposal to "open a second channel for INF talks," presumably referring to medium-range weapons of shorter range.

The latest round of polemics between Moscow and Washington over embassy bugging scandals, is merely an expression of the fact that the intended 1987 signing of a U.S.-Soviet INF agreement, removing all U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles from the European continent, is all but dead. U.S. intelligence services which have uncovered the Marine guards' sex-for-secrets security breaches and the bugging of the new U.S. embassy building in Moscow, have pointed out that as a result of the massive compromising of security, the Russians now know enough of the U.S.'s "national technical means of verification," to be able to systematically deceive them in all matters of strategic weapons deployments. The argument is now made: All agree that without adequate verification, there should be no agreements with Moscow; the penetration of U.S. security by spies makes verification by "national technical means" now impossible. Therefore, no agreements with Moscow.

President Reagan, in an April 7 televised statement, denounced Soviet bugging and elimination of security at both the existing U.S. embassy and the new one under construction in Moscow. Reagan told the Russians that the now-completed, new Soviet embassy building in Washington could not be occupied until U.S. diplomatic premises in Moscow were again secure from KGB eavesdropping. Moscow's hasty and angry response betrayed the Kremlin's real concern, that the INF deal, due to massive Pentagon-led opposition within the U.S. government, and Franco-British-led European opposition, is now, officially, on the rocks.

Before the U.S. embassy security scandal became headlines, rumors were circulating of a crisis in the Kremlin leadership over Gorbachov's failure to win over British Prime

Minister Margaret Thatcher to the zero option perspective, and, that this failure, together with heightened Anglo-French opposition to the INF zero option were key factors behind the sudden postponement of Gorbachov's trip to Prague. To Moscow's troubles around the postponed Prague visit, can now be added the Kremlin's woes over the coming talks with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz.

### **Collapse of the Shultz card**

On April 8, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky, at a Foreign Ministry press conference, stated that Reagan's remarks had caused "indignation and regret inside the Soviet Union," and were "attempts to poison the atmosphere on the eve of a major event," i.e., the April 13 arrival of Secretary of State Shultz in Moscow for three days of INF and related arms-control talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and, probably also with Mikhail Gorbachov himself. Petrovsky, in a tone of resigned disappointment, added, he hoped that Shultz "would not arrive in Moscow empty-handed . . . and that solutions could be found."

When analyzed, the Petrovsky statements emerge as unprecedented in Soviet Foreign Ministry history. Moscow is publicly accusing the U.S. President of undermining a deal that Moscow thought it had worked out with U.S. Secretary of State Shultz. Petrovsky's April 8 spectacle directly caused a George Shultz spectacle, later during the same day, in response to Petrovsky.

Shultz, at a Washington press conference, gave a denunciation of Soviet espionage activities, which verbally rivaled the strength of Reagan's statements. Shultz characterized Soviet actions as "tantamount to actual invasion of sovereign U.S. territory," said he was "deeply upset," and then, in yet another stunning example of the ongoing power shift in Washington to the detriment of the State Department's appeasement faction, declared that he "takes full, personal responsibility for the entire affair which has compromised the security of the embassy."

Shultz will be going to Moscow, but how long he remains as secretary of state is an open question, with rumors of an early resignation now sweeping Washington.

### **France and Britain lead resistance**

The Western media failed to notice that the Kremlin's April 8 blasts against Reagan, were buttressed by very harsh attacks against French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. The ostensible reason was the French expulsion of three Soviet diplomats caught red-handed helping to run the "Ariane" spy network into the French space and missile program. The spy case was not the reason for the very harsh attacks; after all, France acted very moderately by expelling only three diplomats, and leaving six others alone, who had also been caught in the affair. The real reason is that France is leading West European resistance to the proposed INF zero option that would sell out America's European allies.

The April 8 Radio Moscow commentary attacking France

proved that the real anger is directed against Chirac for his defense policies. The commentary threatened that Chirac's May visit to Moscow could be canceled: "These unfriendly actions by the French authorities don't contribute in any positive way to the visit of French Prime Minister Chirac to the U.S.S.R."

France will not be intimidated by such blatant threats. The next day, April 9, the French parliament approved a 10% increase in the funding of France's nuclear defense program, including that for Tactical Defense Initiative R&D, with a further 6% increase to follow. The same day, French Defense Minister André Giraud announced that France and Britain will step up defense cooperation through a joint study of problems facing their respective national nuclear forces. France has also proposed to Britain that both countries jointly develop a long-range nuclear cruise missile. Last but not least, Giraud announced that France now "has the capability" to construct and deploy neutron weapons. Giraud asserted that France will keep its enemies guessing whether or not France will be building and deploying them, but hinted rather strongly in the deployment direction, by stating that neutron weapons are as cheap as standard nuclear weapons, that would otherwise be built.

Under such an array of rebuffs, Mikhail Gorbachov finally arrived on April 9 in Prague. According to an announcement in Stockholm given by Soviet Central Committee member Vadim Zagladin, Gorbachov will be making a "major foreign policy" announcement during his Prague visit. Whatever new propaganda "arms control" trick Gorbachov now develops, the problem of disappearing "cards"—"Reagan card," "Shultz card," etc.—in the West to play, will not go away. Nor will problems on his own side of the fence, the East bloc.

Symbolic of this were the potshots taken by leading East German and Czech figures at Gorbachov and his heavily publicized *glasnost* and "reforms." During a recent visit to Yugoslavia, Czech Central Committee Secretary, Jan Fojtik, was asked whether Czechoslovakia would follow Gorbachov's *glasnost*. He replied: "Just because it's raining in Moscow, doesn't mean we have to open our umbrellas in Prague."

Equally striking were the remarks made by East German Politburo member Kurt Hager, in *Stern* magazine: "Just because a neighbor is using a certain kind of wallpaper, doesn't mean we have to do the same." Hager was emphatic on two points: 1) East Germany is and will remain a loyal ally of the U.S.S.R.; 2) East Germany will not adopt Gorbachov's reforms. "We believe it would be wrong to force the Soviet system on Germany, because it does not correspond to the conditions of development in Germany."

Regardless of what Gorbachov does or does not do in Prague, apropos of the Soviet bloc, the interesting behind-closed-doors meeting will be on May 28 in East Berlin. Moscow has decided to hold the next Warsaw Pact Summit of party chiefs in the East German capital on that date.