

# New ambassador to oust Pakistan's Zia?

by Allen Douglas

As the riots in Teheran approached a crescendo in late 1978, the Shah of Iran turned to U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan to ask if the United States and Soviet Union had agreed upon his overthrow. As Sullivan recounts in his autobiography, *Obbligato: Notes on a Foreign Service Career*, the Shah asked, "Had we and the Soviets reached some grand design to divide up Iran between ourselves as part of an overall division of power throughout the world?" Too late, the Shah had put his finger on the "New Yalta" deal to which he was, in fact, sacrificed.

From all indications—leaks from the U.S. intelligence community, the orchestrated flap over Pakistan's nuclear program, congressional moves to cut off U.S. aid to Pakistan, and the intensifying drumbeat in the U.S. media—Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq and his nation are being set up for the "Iran treatment." It is not surprising, therefore, that the new U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Arnold Raphel, was a key figure in the State Department Policy Planning Group's Iran and Persian Gulf section during late 1978, which provided the political/logistical support for the operation Sullivan ran.

In *Obbligato*, Sullivan emphasized that this overthrow of a longtime U.S. ally, and similar actions elsewhere were being conducted by a "cadre of centurions," concerned "to find and develop worthy heirs to handle those elements of our hegemony we no longer wished to dominate." Chief among the centurions, said Sullivan, were the "career foreign service officers" such as himself. All available evidence marks the new U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Arnold Raphel, as one of Sullivan's centurions. As one of his cronies who has just left the State Department emphasized, when questioned on Raphel's outlook during and after the Iran years, "He was in the policy loop during the whole period. Our policy was his policy, and his policy was our policy."

Born in New York in 1943, Raphel graduated from the Syracuse, New York, Maxwell School of Diplomacy in 1966 and immediately joined the State Department. He served in 1967-71 in Iran, spent the years 1972-75 at the State Department, and was already marked then, according to another colleague's recent account, as "one of the best and the brightest." After several years spent as political officer at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, Raphel, now a highly touted "area specialist" with expertise in Shi'ism, in the second half of 1978, took up his post in the State Department unit overseeing the Iranian revolution.

In January 1979, as the Carter administration delivered an ultimatum to the Shah to leave Iran, Raphel was appointed senior special assistant to the Secretary of State. In 1982 he was named number two in the Bureau for Political-Military Affairs. In May 1984, he became number two in the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs to Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, a leading figure in State's New Yalta deals.

On Jan. 21, 1987 Murphy's protégé Raphel was nominated as the new ambassador to Pakistan, a nomination held up for several months by Senators Gordon Humphrey (R-Vt.) and Jesse Helms (R-N.C.). Congressional sources report this was due to Raphel's "softness on Afghanistan," i.e., his catering to Soviet demands that Pakistan stop supporting the Afghan rebels. The nomination was finally pushed through, reportedly with help from the organized crime-linked American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

## The 'Shultz doctrine'

The State Department's attitude toward Pakistan is not exactly a secret. The previous U.S. ambassador in Islamabad, Deane Hinton, last fall astounded knowledgeable Pakistan watchers when he proclaimed that Benazir Bhutto, the Soviet and Chinese-tied co-chairman of the opposition Pakistan People's Party, had a "very good chance" to take power in the country. A Pakistan expert at a top U.S. university, with extensive opposition contacts, commented, "Those of us who talk to people in Pakistan hadn't gotten that from anybody. . . . I asked some of her people about this and they all feel that she has no hope of coming to power, even if there would be elections."

Hinton was predicting nothing but State Department intentions, which intelligence sources now stress are operational. State and its AIPAC friends in Congress, such as Rep. Stephen Solarz, Sen. Alan Cranston and others, are attempting to use the issue of alleged Pakistani smuggling of nuclear-related material as an excuse to suspend or cut off aid. In the predictable ensuing outburst of anti-Americanism, the pro-U.S. Zia government would be dramatically weakened.

State's real intentions—eliminating the Zia government—were hinted at in an Aug. 19 Evans and Novak column, "The 'Shultz Doctrine?'" Shultz's grand plan, said the columnists, was for an INF missile agreement in Europe linked to a series of "regional matters" accords between the U.S. and the Soviets. It was State's desire for a deal with Moscow over Afghanistan, they said, not "non-proliferation" issues, which motivated the attacks on Zia.

Some fools in the CIA and Pentagon have reportedly agreed to the plan to replace Zia with a Bhutto-led coalition, with the remarkable logic that since "the KGB is picking off the opposition," we should put the opposition in power. Such actions will lead, not to a stable opposition government, but to the near-term splintering of Pakistan into tribal entities, with which the Soviets' ethnologists are also deeply involved.