

EIR Strategic Studies

Henry Kissinger warns of impact of INF accord

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Kissinger opened his Atlantic Commission address on the Reagan-Gorbachov summit agreement, with the following citation from the famous Prince Metternich:

Policy is like a play in many acts, which is inevitable once the curtain is up. To debate the merits of the play is an absurdity. The important question was whether the curtain should have been raised to begin with; because, once the curtain is raised, the play will be completed either by the actors or the spectators who mount the stage.

To which Kissinger added: "This is my concern about where we are after this INF agreement."

It is typical of the differences between Kissinger and me, on the subject of the proposed "summit agreement," as many other matters, that he cites his beloved Metternich where I would cite the Schiller whose influence Metternich adopted as foe. The gist of the argument which Kissinger makes by aid of his quotation, is accurate as far as it goes; the error appears in due course. Kissinger argues that his earlier support for the deployment of the "Euromissiles" was "psychological" rather than military.

My support for the INF accord . . . was never predicated on the technical question of where the missiles would be located to reach the Soviet Union. My support was predicated on this supposition: The Soviet Union, looking at a deployment that could reach the Soviet Union under NATO command, could not be sure that the NATO commander would not have the authority to use it before they [NATO] could be over-

run. Therefore, it [the Euromissiles] created an additional psychological decision. Nor could they attack only those weapons, because if they did, even the small advantage would be wiped out, if the United States decided to retaliate and do unacceptable damage.

He represents that INF policy as "coupling" the United States to the defense of Western Europe. He argues that the withdrawal of those weapons means that the U.S. is decoupling itself from Europe's defense. Apart from the important fallacy in his argument of "psychological . . . not military," his warning against the proposed summit agreement is sound.

He also adds a useful warning to persons who appear enamored of the personality of Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov. Prior to World War II, he observes, Europeans were more realistic about the Soviets, since the end of that war they have been "more and more attracted by . . . psychiatric analysis of Soviet leaders." Kissinger stabs the Western defenders of Gorbachov by referencing the case of President Franklin Roosevelt's adviser, Harry Hopkins, at Yalta, arguing that Stalin is reasonable, can be trusted, and is not interested in world revolution, but voicing fears about other Soviet leaders who might come after him. Kissinger references similarly naive observations once made about Khrushchov.

He emphasizes that Soviet expansionism has nothing to do with Communism, but, rather, that Moscow has been expansionist for 500 years, an impulse in "their blood" for centuries. Of Gorbachov, he reminds the audience that that

gentleman is not, after all, a "member of the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament," but is a protégé of Suslov and Andropov, "neither of whom was a closet dove."

He concludes his address with observations on the subject of Western economic cooperation with Moscow. Not only is the West buying the rope that Moscow will use to hang the capitalist; the capitalist is giving Moscow the credit to manufacture that rope.

For a number of weeks, Kissinger has been a prominent voice for a special form of opposition to the proposed Reagan-Gorbachov "summit agreement." He warns that probably the Reagan administration's commitment to the summit is set in concrete, and can not be stopped; yet, at the same time, he warns that such an agreement will be a strategic disaster. This places Kissinger in a middle position, between my opposition to that "summit," and the majority of the U.S. establishment, which is fanatically committed to going ahead with it.

Now, while his opposition to the agreement is featured in major news media and at events such as the recent Atlantic Commission event, Kissinger has been echoed by social-democrat and prospective Republican presidential candidate Jeane Kirkpatrick, and others. Kissinger, who not only emphasizes he is not speaking for any part of the Reagan administration, represents himself now as speaking for what is in fact a large and growing hostility to the proposed summit in West Germany, as well as France and Britain. Notably, Kissinger's Atlantic Commission address occurred during the time Europeans were voicing disgust with the performance of presidential candidate George Bush. Powerful blocs of European influentials are telling their friends among U.S. influentials, "We don't like the 'summit agreement,' and we dislike George Bush." Kissinger is pre-positioning himself to become a key adviser to someone soon to replace Bush as the leading Republican candidate.

The 'psychology' of defense

Kissinger's explanation of the "psychology" of placing nuclear "Euromissiles" in Western Europe is a slippery one. Since it is persons, not weapons, who prepare and launch war, naturally there is a psychological aspect to every element of strategy and tactics. Kissinger's cited explanation of the psychology of the "Euromissiles" deployment, is acceptable as far as it goes. However, when he goes further than that, to argue that the strategy involved is "not military," but only "psychological," he is fundamentally wrong.

It is relevant, that Kissinger carried his mid-1960s work with the Pugwash Conference over into becoming the leading representative of the cause of "arms control" under Presidents Nixon and Ford. "Arms control" has a wretched record as a way toward peace throughout history. During the early 1920s, "arms control" negotiations over naval parities nearly brought Britain and Japan, as allies, to war against the United States. The silly Kellogg-Briand treaty-effort to "outlaw aggressive

war," and the sundry attempts at arms control during the interwar period did nothing but pave the way for World War II. In modern history, all "friendship" treaties, and "non-aggression" pacts, have done nothing but make the arrangements for fighting the next war. Appeasement, whether in the form of Bertrand Russell's Peace Pledge Movement of the late 1930s, or Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's 1938 Munich Pact with Hitler, has always been a stepping-stone to war.

The essence of the point is, that it is people, not weapons, which make war. For such reasons, "arms control" is one of the greatest hoaxes yet invented, a fantasy which could appeal only to the infantile mind. Notably, Kissinger has not yet repudiated his own earlier role in pushing "arms control" as a leading component of strategy.

It is the conflict of perceived interests which leads to war. It is the show of peacefulness and disarmament by the intended victim of attack, which lures the aggressor into making the attack. In that sense, Kissinger's emphasis on the psychological element in strategy can not be entirely brushed aside; in that degree, strategy is permeated with a psychological element.

However, if strategy could be based upon psychological, rather than military considerations, we should close down West Point and Annapolis, and recruit our generals and admirals from the ranks of successful used-car salesmen.

The best modern summation of strategic doctrine is the famous von Schlieffen's book, *Cannae: The Principle of The Flank*. *Cannae* is otherwise known as the theoretical work shaping the design of what was known as the "Schlieffen Plan" of the German General Staff, a plan which would have won World War I for Germany within weeks, but for the wet-fingered tampering with the specifications of that plan by von Schlieffen's successor, young Molke. The book deals thematically with Hannibal's rout of the Roman army which outnumbered his own forces, and continues with rigorous examination of numerous other historical battles in which the same principle of the "flank" is illustrated.

Flanks have two aspects, geometrical and psychological. By geometry, we mean the constructive geometry of defense and offense as illustrated by the work of such 18th-century military scientists as Vauban and Monge. We mean essentially, the application of the geometry of fields of fire and firepower, with mobility, to the terrain. At Cannae, the Roman commanders configured their forces in such a way, that the combined firepowers and mobilities of the Roman forces were made effectively inferior to the lesser aggregate firepower of Hannibal's forces. Hannibal exploited that error of the Roman generals, and ground the Roman forces into bloody dust.

Had the stubbornly foolish Field Marshal Montgomery understood the principle of flanking, he would have taken Rommel's forces entirely before the latter could have reached Tunisia, and the war in Western Europe could have been

Atlantic Commission: Will NATO survive?

by Dean Andromidas

Oct. 9 and 10 saw the Netherlands' Atlantic Commission and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis of Washington hold their "Third International Roundtable Conference on East West Relations in the 1990s: Politics and Technology." The conference brought to the Hague political figures, security experts, and government spokesmen from throughout Western Europe and the United States, including NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, U.S. Rep. Dave McCurdy (D-Okla.), and others. The conference demonstrated the dangerous "New Yalta" drift precipitated by the Reagan administration's dash for a summit and arms control agreement with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachov.

Echoing the fears of leading European political figures and security experts seated before him, Kissinger declared that the signing of the INF agreement would signal "the end of nuclear coupling" between Europe and the United States. Going one step further than any of the official American spokesmen present, he asserted that the Reagan administration *had already agreed* to a 10-year moratorium on SDI deployment: "Under START negotiations, strategic warheads will be reduced by 50%. . . . We have already deferred deployment of SDI for at least 10 years."

Kissinger then added, regarding the ABM morato-

rium, "There is no record of any moratorium that the U.S. has ever entered into, being abandoned by the U.S."

Kissinger's comments, not without a little self-serving calculation, captured the attention of many of the European Atlanticists present at Knights Hall in the Netherlands Parliament complex. They were still reeling from earlier presentations by U.S. State Department and congressional spokesmen. Although apparently intended to mollify Western European doubts, official U.S. statements only served to transform concern into desperation among conservative circles present.

Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at his dinner speech, went so far as to chastise his audience for not admitting that "we won" by forcing the Soviets to withdraw their SS-20s. Although Adelman resorted to quotes from no less than nine personages, ranging from Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to his own 10-year-old daughter, he only strengthened the conviction of many that the Reagan administration has lost all comprehension of the political and military realities facing Western Europe.

Lord Carrington not only encouraged NATO nations to say "yes" to the INF agreement, but spoke of "unprecedented prospects for genuine reductions in nuclear arsenals." In a swipe at the Strategic Defense Initiative, he declared that he was "suspicious of those who see a technological fix just around the corner." Carrington asserted that the leading problem facing NATO was "the perception in public opinion that NATO is becoming merely reactive and is losing the initiative in arms control and East-West relations to a more imaginative Soviet leadership." Note his concern for perception, not reality.

His "business as usual" tone was broken by one participant who charged that "by taking out the only missiles that can strike at the Soviet Union, we are telling them they can strike at Europe with impunity."

Despite Kissinger's polemics against the INF agree-

shortened by months. Clearly, either Montgomery had not studied his von Schlieffen, or failed to understand it.

By psychology, we mean the discovery of some political-cultural flaw in the mind set of the opposing commanders and the forces under their command, a flaw which we may exploit by deploying and applying our forces in such a manner as to achieve a flanking and enveloping position.

Military technology partakes of the nature of both. It was the stubborn technological backwardness of the French command under Napoleon III which assisted the Prussian forces greatly in defeating France. It was the efficient use of superior French industrial technology, by Lazare Carnot, which is featured in Carnot's revolutionizing the design of the combat

forces of France, to create a force against which no opposing power could stand until the brilliant exploitation of Napoleon's strategic blundering by Scharnhorst, vom Stein, et al. in the Russian campaign of 1812-13.

The advance in technology can always be translated into gains in firepower, mobility, and depth of combatants. Whichever party neglects this, or refuses to adjust the order of battle to such new realities, loses. Thus, the technological aspects of military science partake of both physical geometry and psychology.

The engrained weakness of the Russian strategists, is their culturally determined commitment to the doctrine of the "offensive." France's World War I commander, Joffre, was

ment and the idea that the Gorbachov reforms hold any hope for peace in Western Europe, he posed no alternative. Rather, his fatalistic tone and assertion that the agreement was already a foregone conclusion, leaving Europe to its own devices, had a calculated demoralizing effect on the European leadership.

One leading conservative Dutch parliamentarian told this correspondent, "Listen, President Reagan is considered a right-wing politician. When he extols the same line as the peace movement, how are we expected to mobilize public opinion for the additional 500 million guilders we need for defense?" Another leading Dutch political figure expressed a more direct form of rage, labeling Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek "a coward" for delivering a conciliatory opening conference speech.

'Strengthen the forces of détente'

The hard cop/soft cop routine posed by Dr. Kissinger, on the one hand, and Adelman, Lord Carrington, et al., on the other, merely set the stage for the airing of real "New Yalta" policies. Dr. K. von Dohnanyi, Lord Mayor of Hamburg and a leading German Social Democrat, reminded people of the "better times" of 1972 when the *Ostpolitik* policies of Willy Brandt prevailed. While welcoming the INF agreement, he predicted that the next 15 years would see a United States preoccupied with its economic problems, facing "the dangers of isolationism." While admitting that the U.S. contribution to NATO could never be replaced by resources within Europe, he encouraged his audience to "strengthen the forces of détente," since the Gorbachov reforms have the sole purpose of "making the Soviet economy competitive in the world economy."

Dr. von Dohnanyi surprised his audience by concluding that the Soviets have all the advantages in Europe. He denied that German reunification and neutralization was being seriously entertained. But, he then declared, "If the

Stalin Note of 1952," proposing German reunification and "neutrality," "were placed again on the desk of a German Chancellor today, one thing is for sure, it would not be answered within 24 hours following consultation with the French High Commissioner. If we really want to change the situation in Central Europe, the playing cards are in the pockets of the Soviet Union."

Dr. von Dohnanyi's appeasement was echoed by Prof. Wisse Dekker, chairman of the supervisory board of the huge Dutch electronics multinational, Phillips. Dekker quoted van den Broek: "Détente between East and West will not be possible if the Soviet economy does not see some chance of further expansion." He not only welcomed the opportunities for "joint ventures," but called for the easing of CoCom rules on technology transfer to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Dekker in later discussions welcomed a proposal by Italian industrialist Carlo De Benedetti for a "Marshall Plan" for the Soviet bloc.

SDI: the only real alternative

Clearly out of step with other speakers was Dr. Allen T. Mense, chief scientist for the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. Side-stepping the INF issue, he delivered a pointed presentation of the concept and progress of the SDI program, systematically refuting those who ridicule it as some sort of "technology fix."

Mense asserted that the only guarantee for any arms control process is the deployment of SDI, which represents a program that has already developed "technologies which are here now, that have the capabilities now for better ensuring the security of the Alliance." Since its purpose is to "devalue" Soviet missiles in the minds of Soviet offensive-mission planners, SDI shifts the bases of deterrence from one that "is based on swift uncontrolled offensive nuclear missiles to one which is based on non-nuclear defensive anti-weapons. By anti-weapons, I mean weapons that kill weapons, not people."

a military giant matching the quality of the German commanders, but this excellence was not pervasive among other leading French commanders. After World War I, a half-baked dogma known as the "theory of the offensive" became popular among circles around Marshal Foch, a dogma which naturally enraptured admiring Soviet war-planners at the Frunze Academy and Marshal Tukachevsky.

In consequence, even after Stalin shot Tukachevsky, the Tukachevsky doctrine of the offensive prevailed in the Soviet command. Potentialities of Soviet tactical defense were stripped to build up still more the offensive force which Stalin intended to overrun continental Europe as soon as the Wehrmacht might be bogged down in the invasion of Britain. The

Wehrmacht command recognized both the Soviet military threat to central Europe and the fatal flaw in Soviet deployment. A Wehrmacht attack, before Stalin was prepared to launch his attack, would catch the Soviet forces without a tactical defense capability.

The Wehrmacht had the strategic misfortune known as Adolf Hitler. Hitler vetoed Wehrmacht sponsorship of independence of the Ukraine, and forced German troops to force the Soviets to realize a very powerful tactical defensive potential, the cities of Moscow and Leningrad. Wehrmacht attrition there set the stage for the Stalingrad scenario. At the battle of Kursk, Marshal Zhukov et al. had a free hand to conduct the war according to the Soviet doctrine of the offen-

sive, including the *spetsnaz*-like usage of guerrilla forces.

Essentially, it was the Nazis' racism toward, especially, the Poles and Ukrainians which ensured that Germany would be defeated in the war as a whole. This is not to suggest that the Nazis could have been reformed to such effect; this was the penalty which the Wehrmacht and others paid for allowing the Nazi beast to come to power. Nonetheless, if we focus upon the German nation, without the Nazis, and its Wehrmacht, the point we make is a valid, and necessary one. This is important to note, since by taking those facts into consideration, we need have no doubts that the Russian "offensive" dogma was a grave flaw, creating both a geometric and a psychological flank to be decisively exploited.

The applicable point to be made to Kissinger's argument, is that a tactical defense without a strategic offense, is as great a folly as a strategic offense without an adequate capability of tactical defense. It is a balanced, integrated capability of that sort which must be the foremost concern of strategic military planning.

The Persian Gulf case

At present, the U.S. military arms, in cooperation with those of other nations, are deployed in the Persian Gulf to operate under peacetime military rules of engagement. When placed under attack or threat of attack, the forces react to thwart the attack itself, and take adequate action of hot pursuit against the supporting echelons of the attacking forces. This is lethal peacetime action against acts of piracy, well below the threshold of war-fighting. (The babbling about the invoking of the unconstitutional provisions of the War Powers Act from some parts of the Congress is just that.)

The political objective of this peacetime military deployment, is to demonstrate that the Khomeiniacs are impotent—that Allah has turned his face from them for such probable reasons as their blasphemous desecration of Mecca. The magic of the Khomeiniac will is no more. Once this effect is clear enough, the present Teheran regime will begin a process of self-disintegration, a process which by now has already begun.

It is impossible to foretell what regime might next replace the present one. This should not affect our policy. Sooner or later, in the succession of vacuums created in Teheran, the historical cultural imperatives embedded in the people of Iran generally will assert themselves, at which point we may hope to assist them in arranging the reconstruction of the Khomeini-ruined nation.

The worry in some quarters, is that Moscow will react to this by invading Iran. There is no doubt that Moscow could do so; it has a longstanding military operations plan, which we may presume is suitably updated, and has in place the number of Soviet divisions waiting for the receipt of marching orders to such effect.

The genius of the allied Persian Gulf operation, is that Moscow, by invading Iran, would promptly incur three

weighty penalties: 1) an Iranian resistance; 2) the scrapping to a large degree of its investment in penetration of Sunni forces among approximately 1 billion of the world's Muslims; 3) the ruin of its strategic operations against Western Europe. Is Moscow willing to risk those three combined penalties?

In other words, the United States, France, and their collaborators, are enjoying the freedom of action in the Persian Gulf defined by the fact that if Moscow intervenes forcibly, Moscow loses more than it loses by doing almost nothing more than it is already. One might call this a "psychological" basis for the U.S.'s Persian Gulf policy, but this term would be as misleading as Kissinger's characterization of the original "Euromissiles" doctrine.

Solving the riddle

Is Kissinger's use of "psychological" merely a fuzziness of thought, or is there an error of grave practical importance involved in his choice of language? There is, and Kissinger admits the nature of the error frankly enough at the outset of his remarks. His thinking is as "Metternichean" as he himself avowed it to be in his *A World Restored*.

Even in a general war, of the total effort deployed to secure victory, approximately 20% of that effort is the application of lethal military force; the remainder is cultural, economic, and political. To restate Clausewitz, war is but the conversion of about 20% of the total effort deployed for a strategic conflict to military means. In war, that military effort is indispensable, but the 80% of combined cultural, economic, and political exertions remains. War is the combined, coordinated deployment of culture, economic, political, and military means to secure victory.

The psychological aspect of strategy, is little more than a predicated feature of the cultural and political aspect of the combined effort, if also in part a predicated feature of the economic and military exertions. However, in no case does the "psychological" factor exist by itself.

For example, in contrasting the Muscovites with the Khomeiniacs, it is most important to recognize that the Muscovites are bullies, who will never place the existence of the "Holy Blood and Soil" of Mother Russia in jeopardy recklessly, except under actual or imminent attack. The Red Army bosses will calculate to the last decimal point what they are willing to accept as penalties of warfare, and will not risk much more than that willfully. With the Khomeiniacs, it is different; they are psychotic killers, pure satanic evil, willing to live and die, and to send their entire nation to death, for the sake of pure evil.

So, in the case of the Khomeiniacs, by frustrating their freedom of piratical action in the Gulf, we are, in effect, subjecting an already psychotic monophysite to acute "sensory deprivation," a cultural-psychological effect which tends to induce him to "self-destruct." One would never do that with Moscow, since we do not wish to bring about the lawful

change in the Soviet command's psychology which would result.

However, in both cases, we apply the force of conflict—the force of combined cultural, economic, political, and military potentials—to induce a perception, and a choice among available courses of actions. The resulting state of the Soviet mind might be described, in one of its aspects, as “psychological,” but the means of action taken to bring about such a perception is never “purely psychological.”

It must be remembered, that Clement Prince Metternich was the instrument of a policy steered chiefly by a cabal of monstrously wealthy Venetian financier interests, and that the immediate direction of Metternich's actions at the 1815 Congress of Vienna was supplied by a Venetian count, John Capodistria, who had been imposed upon Czar Alexander I as his foreign minister plenipotentiary. The specific commitment and objective of the 1815 Treaty of Vienna and Holy Alliance, was to eradicate the American Revolution and its influence from the face of this planet, and the pages of history as well. So said Metternich, and Kissinger cited him on this point.

It happens that the special potency of the culture and nations of Western Europe and the Americas is derived broadly from the Christian doctrines of culture and statecraft elaborated as replacement for Roman law and culture by St. Augustine. Our Western European Judeo-Christian civilization is premised upon the conception of God, the individual personality, and laws of nature reflected in the *Filioque* of the Latin Creed.

The character of the Western European personality at its best is the belief that that aspect of the person which is made in the image of the living God, is that feature of the mental processes which associate simultaneously with *agapē* and the individual's powers for rendering the lawful ordering of the universe intelligible through creative reasoning's power of lawful discovery.

Thus, for us a society based upon scientific and technological progress is as indispensable to our moral natures as to the advancement of mankind's material well-being. Since all peoples of this planet are human in this same respect, there is in all of them that which hungers for a form of society in which the practiced conception of the dignity of the human individual is that adopted by Augustinian civilization. This is the source of our material and moral strength.

The conflict with the Muscovites' empire is historically a conflict between those peoples Christianized by Roman missionaries such as Cyril and Methodius, and the heathen opposition centered in the anti-Roman state and monasteries of Muscovy. It is a conflict between two irreconcilable views of the human individual, a conflict inflamed by the Muscovites' centuries-old passion for conquering us and eradicating all traces of our Augustinian heritage.

The root of our capacity to resist Muscovite imperial aggression is our Augustinian culture. To the extent we pro-

mote that cultural heritage, and shape our practice of scientific and technological progress accordingly, the average person of our culture is vastly superior in every way to the average Muscovite. Our potential for military strength is but a product of that cultural resource.

Kissinger has made a career as a feudalistic sort of *Hofrat* counselor and messenger for a cabal of powerful rentier families of the West, who generally share the same hostility to the American Revolution's tradition as did the circles of Metternich's Holy Alliance. Thus, their traditional hostility to the principled features of our Augustinian heritage prevents them from calling forth that source of our cultural, economic, political, and military strength.

For that reason, as Metternich's “Holy Alliance” did, Kissinger and the circles which have adopted him revert to the kinds of power politics which dominated 18th-century Europe. the politics of “cabinet warfare,” the politics of the famous, and infamous Duke of Marlborough. It is a politics of “limited warfare,” of inconclusive battles fought as part of the negotiating posture of the diplomats, of recurring and prolonged wars of attrition fought under such auspices.

In this Metternichean view of the arts of “balance of power,” military capabilities are like chess pieces, while the emphasis is upon the skills of one set of diplomats in psychologically browbeating the other.

I do not suspect Kissinger of insincerity when he says that the proposed INF agreement with Moscow is a strategic disaster. From the standpoint of a modern Metternich, it is a disaster; it is a dumb way to play the balance of power game; it is, to a modern Metternich, amateur night in global diplomacy. In some respects, Kissinger sees the proposed “new Munich” deal's tragic consequences as I do.

The difference is, that I proceed from the standpoint of defense of the United States as our Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the Constitution defined us: as a fruit of the upward surge of Augustinian culture from the Golden Renaissance, and as, on that account a beacon of hope and temple of liberty for all mankind. It is our culture on which I call to mobilize the combined cultural, economic, and political resources which make us strong, and see the work of military science as a necessary expression of that mobilization.

Kissinger wishes to secure the future negotiating position of both the U.S. and our European alliance. How could I disagree with that objective? However, I am determined to mobilize the strength of our culture to secure the means of our adequate defense, using means, such as a return to natural law and commitments to generalized scientific and technological progress, to accomplish that. He is not. I am committed to strengthening the economic development and morale of the developing nations; Kissinger's faction is not.

So, despite the coincidence in some of our views on the Moscow question, we see the remedy for the crisis differently.