

SDI spinoffs: need for a 'science driver' approach

by Carol White

SDI and Industrial Technology Policy, Threat or Opportunity

by Walter Zegveld and Christien Enzing
St. Martin's Press, New York
186 pages, hardbound, \$32.50.

This book should be of ironic interest for those of our readers who have kept abreast of *EIR*'s coverage of the Strategic Defense Initiative, and in particular the potential spinoffs from its development. I say ironic, because while the book is obviously a polemic directed against Lyndon H. LaRouche's policy—and various studies on the subject, which have appeared in the *EIR* and in *Fusion* magazine—nothing published by LaRouche or any of his associates is openly referenced in the book.

The book is not only dishonest in its purpose, but incompetent in execution. The authors juxtapose what they admit to be spinoffs of SDI technology, to a hypothetical case in which the same or greater advances in technology would be made in a civilian economy.

The problem is that they take as a model the presently depressed condition of the world economy, and the slow-paced development of the SDI. Thus they contend that in a stagnating economy the SDI would commandeer resources, particularly scientists and engineers, who would be attracted to the better salaries offered by government-supported contract work and leave industry.

In other words, they accept the present cultural and economic matrix in which American young people are discouraged from investing their efforts to prepare for careers in science. On the one hand, they are inundated with malthusian

and environmentalist propaganda, by their schools and by the media in general. On the other hand, they are encouraged to accept hedonistic values which are antithetical to the kind of sustained, concentrated effort demanded by the sciences.

At the same time, they see an increasingly stagnant economy, in which there is less and less assimilation of high technology into production, as basic industry is shut down. This was not the case even before the Apollo program was introduced by President Kennedy. Under the goad of the Soviet launch of Sputnik, the National Defense Education Act offered university scholarships to potential scientists and engineers, and encouraged candidates for these on the high school level.

In order to strengthen their specious case, that the SDI will not be a science driver for the economy, the authors of this book try to debunk the evidence that the Apollo program brought about an incredible transformation in industry—not excluding semiconductors, transistor radios, computers, and satellite communications. The bankruptcy of the book is typified by the following "evidence" offered to refute the significance of the above. The authors cite that: "Of the 328 patents which resulted from the NASA research programs up to 1963, only 16% had commercial potential."

In 1982, LaRouche issued a number documents and spoke at public forums, outlining the policy which became the Strategic Defense Initiative. This effort was seconded by a number of his associates (among them myself) who toured the country urging the implementation of "beam defense." The essential question answered by LaRouche—aside from the question of the technological feasibility of a layered missile defense system based upon directed-energy—was the affordability of the system.

It was LaRouche's contention, amply documented, that the SDI would more than pay for itself, by its contribution to raising the productivity of the U.S. economy. To substantiate this claim, he referred to the historical examples of war production during the Second World War, and to the over 10-to-1 payback of the Apollo program. In the present case, gains could be expected by cheapening the cost of lasers and improving their capabilities—particularly as they were made tunable.

LaRouche made a further point, which has been well understood, albeit in a distorted form, by the Soviets. The Soviets have bitterly complained that one purpose of the SDI is to bankrupt the Soviet economy. What LaRouche pointed out was that, for cultural reasons, the Soviet economy would have great difficulties in assimilating technological spinoffs from their own SDI program at the rate easily achievable in the West. While it is obviously essential that credit and tax policies support such an effort—as was the case in the Kennedy administration, which offered credit and tax incentives for high technology investment—what LaRouche had in mind was the way in which Western civilization shaped the potential for innovation in the culture, even down to the level of the worker on the shop floor who would participate in the program via the suggestion box.

The culturally embedded notion—taken from the Judeo-Christian tradition—of the divine spark within every human soul, is in contrast to the collective spirit—the *mir*—of Russian culture. Such collectivism pre-dates the Bolshevik revolution by a thousand years, and was the central feature which separated and still separates Roman Catholicism from the Russian Orthodox Church. The specific theological form of the dispute centers on the question of whether or not Christ is divine in his own right, as Augustinian Christianity contends and the Russians reject.

The authors of this book are Dutch. Zegveld is a director of the TNO Policy Research and Information Division in the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research; Enzing is a research fellow at the TNO-Centre for Technology and Policy Studies. Does the fact that this is a European book perhaps explain why the authors overlook us? I think not, since they heavily cite U.S. sources.

Furthermore, American associates of LaRouche have published the award winning *Beam Defense, an Alternative to Nuclear Destruction*, originally published by Aero Publishers, Inc., but reprinted since—and translated into Japanese for sale there. (The book won the prestigious Aviation Space Writers top award in 1984.) A German book on the same subject was published in 1985 in Germany by Verlag Für Wehrwissenschaften in Munich. This book, *Strahlen Waffen Militär Strategie im Umbruch*, whose English title would be, *Beam Weapons, a Military Strategy in Change*, deals with strategic issues more broadly, but both have an in-depth treatment of the question of spinoffs into the civilian technology.

Lord Mountbatten and the Anglo-Soviet Trust

by Rachel Douglas

The Khrushchev Objective

by Christopher Creighton and Noel Hynd
Doubleday & Company, 1987
333 pp., hardbound, \$17.95.

The Khrushchev Objective inhabits a shadowy zone between “scenario book” and chronicle-memoir. The pseudonymous Christopher Creighton, we are told, is a real British intelligence officer, who “was recruited by Churchill before World War II (at the age of 15) to be an agent behind enemy lines and continued his espionage career into the 1950s,” so that “the broad base of this story is true.”

It concerns the visit of Premier Nikita Khrushchov and Foreign Minister Nikolai Bulganin to Britain in April 1956, the first by a Soviet party chief or head of government to a Western country. Khrushchov's charge, that the British sent frogmen to spy on the hulls of the delegation's ships, the battle cruiser Ordzhonikidze and the destroyer Smotryashchy, as they lay at anchor in Portsmouth Harbor, is well known. So, at the time, was the fact that the body of a retired diver, Royal Navy Commander Lionel Crabb, washed ashore over a year later.

According to Creighton and Hynd, the story that ties those fragments together was a complicated assassination plot against Khrushchov and Bulganin, by which they would have been blown up at Portsmouth. They say the late First Sea Lord Louis Mountbatten, great-uncle of Prince Charles, foiled the plot, acting with the Queen's approval, above and against the orders of Prime Minister Anthony Eden not to send divers around the Russian ships. “Christopher Creighton” himself, he reports, was the officer in command of Mountbatten's project.

Protecting the Trust

What makes this plotline of interest, especially in view of the evidence that something untoward did happen in Ports-