

Ignore Bush-league optimism on summit deal

Typically, some Washington circles which formerly worried about the disastrous implications of the proposed U.S.-Soviet "INF" summit agreement, are now scampering to dream up pretexts for assuring all credulous enough to listen, that the agreement is something less than a strategic catastrophe.

The reason for this wishful thinking is elementary. Although most insiders around Washington agree, that Vice President George Bush's support is a shrinking millimeter deep, they believe that Bush is still, for the moment, top dog. Bush has not only his own cabal from the intelligence community backing him; another major spook crowd is working to assist Bush's cause, as least temporarily. For the moment, Secretary of State George Shultz's deal with Moscow the last week of November is seen as a political disaster for the President's remaining months in office, but a political triumph for Bush's cause. For the moment, the desire among many outside the ranks of Bush's supporters, is to be seen as not going directly against the man who just might become the next President.

All of this sort of opportunistic effort hangs on the assumption, that the really big financial crash might be postponed until after November 1988. That is Bush's only chance for winning election as the next President.

If the big crash occurs by next spring—as most leading European financial circles believe it will—Bush's chances of winning the November election are zero; his association with the Reagan administration's economic disasters and his image as an "Eastern Establishment liberal" would be more than all but an Alf Landon-sized minority would be able to swallow under such circumstances. There might still be a slim chance that another Republican candidate, with a populist image, could win in November 1988, if the Democratic choice is awful enough; otherwise, not even a populist Re-

publican could win.

So, the Washington insider's reactions to the summit deal are not based on the arms-control deal itself. They are based on the wishful assumption that "Bush's friends just might" be able to hold off the really big crash until the 1988 election. Nearly all of the idiocy around Washington, most notably the strategic folly currently exhibited among many of those who are normally sensible sorts of well-informed patriots, is premised upon such wishful delusions about the economic prospects for 1988.

The arms agreement

So far, most of the desperate efforts to "learn to live with" the outlined summit arms-control agreement, are based upon three supposed, offsetting gains by the United States: 1) That U.S. "smart weapons" will offset the massive military gains which the Soviets will realize from the proposed agreement; 2) That the United States will gain more than Moscow does from agreements on deployment of inspection teams into the arms factories and weapons sites of the other; 3) That Western Europe will be forced to increase its potential to levels which offset massive Soviet "conventional" superiority. All three suggestions are factually absurd.

These three are in addition to the usual cautious positioning of oneself in the outgoing administration to ensure one is an "insider" when greeting the next.

On point one, former West Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his British crony David Owen are on the same track. Get the United States out of Europe—including U.S. conventional forces, so that European defense can be "Europeanized." If fact, all Western European defense establishments excepting France's will be cut severely, not increased.

On point two, the proponents are substituting Mc-

Namara-type inspection of catalogues of weapons systems, and calling this "forward strategic estimates." Under present policies, either a Bush administration, or that of any visible or likely Democratic candidate apart from Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., not only will most of the new U.S. systems not be deployed, but net U.S. capabilities will be cut way below present force-levels, a prospect on which Moscow is counting as it pushes to consolidate the new arms-control agreements.

On point three, one must retort: "You fools! The real point of the Soviet's unprecedented apparent capitulation to inspection, is to set a pattern for a 'New Yalta' arrangement. This inspection gimmick is a political-strategic Trojan Horse—not against the Soviet police-state, but against our open society."

The 'International Affairs' connection

The key to the reality of the Soviet actions is Moscow's featuring of publication of the LaRouche letter of April 12, 1987 to Moscow's *International Affairs*, in the September (Russian) and October-November (foreign language) editions of that publication (see below, page 46-50). In the light of the decisions of the October plenary session of the Soviet leadership, and the other featured items in the relevant edition of *International Affairs*, every witting Russian reader will seize upon the following passages from the letter:

"[I]t will soon be clear to the Soviet government, that its recent and current foreign and strategic policies toward the U.S. and Western European powers are based in part on serious errors of intelligence and strategic estimates. Some influential Soviet authorities have concentrated too much on calculating manifest U.S. strategic capabilities, to the point of overlooking massive U.S. strategic potentialities. These Soviet estimates have relied excessively upon opinions of certain, admittedly very influential, but miscalculating Western sources. . . . In the language of Leninists, the nature of the current 'historical period' has been misjudged. . . . current Soviet estimates are too consistent with a Bukharin-like form of reductionism, emphasis upon merely formal logic. You have erred with projected estimates which slide linearly through what physicists would term a 'singularity' of the historical process, overlooking the fact, the period opening up now [AIDS, global financial crash] represents a 'phase shift,' in which the laws apparently peculiar to the preceding period are overthrown, in which new dynamic relations prevail."

The relevance of this aspect of the letter to the Soviet authorities responsible for ordering *International Affairs* to publish it, is made explicit by the prefatory note: "Mr. LaRouche . . . touches upon some fundamental realities of today." The other featured items in the same edition leave no doubt that these are the points in the letter which are considered "some fundamental realities of today." The motives of those who ordered the letter's publication, and the motives

of those who composed the editor's reply, are directly opposite, as the letter intersects a factional struggle inside the Soviet leadership, in which those who ordered the letter's publication are obviously on top, and those who composed the editors' reply in the inferior factional position. The cited points of the LaRouche letter are among the most crucial issues settled in the course of a raging factional affray which raged within the Soviet leadership from the June through October plenary sessions.

The Soviet mind reads LaRouche's strategic thinking as representing Moscow's only credible adversary in the West, whereas they regard varieties of Bush-league thinking as their strategic patsy.

Strategic thinking

It is well known, but often, unfortunately overlooked, that, even in full-scale war, the military proportion of the total effort required to realize victory does not exceed approximately twenty percent. The remainder is composed of cultural, economic, and political measures of defense and offense. The study of the proposed arms-control agreement from the standpoint of military considerations alone would be absurd even in the best purely military thinking were employed. The military thinking to which most of Washington has become accustomed, the intelligence community as such most notably, falls abysmally below even competent military practice, into the most pathetic revivals of 18th-century or Metternichean "cabinet warfare" scenarios.

In strategic planning for victory (or defeat), it is the actions of the military policy upon the cultural, economic, and political facets of total strategy, and vice versa, which must always be the foremost consideration. Any reduction of this matter to one of compartmentalized subdivisions, each considered apart from the other before attempting to combine them, is the utmost folly. This is precisely the characteristic of most of the discussion of the summit arrangements which prevail in Washington today. The Pollyannas' rationalizations of the deal lately heard carry such folly to the most pathetic extremes. Military means are an extension of a victory achieved principally through combined cultural, economic, and political measures of defense and offense. It is in this connection, rather than the military weapons systems as such, that the summit deal is a catastrophe worse than the 1938 Munich sell-out to Adolf Hitler. The political, economic, and cultural impact of this summit swindle upon Western Europe—and elsewhere—tends to ensure the rapid process of Soviet "Finlandization" of Western Europe, and a Soviet strategic and economic political subjugation of the United States even before the end of this century.

Soviet military inspectors on U.S. soil, with sudden sweeps on factories and military installations, is the vanguard of a Soviet military overrunning of the U.S.A. Culturally and politically, that is what the "verification" proposal means; that is the gut of the matter. That is what must be rejected.