

Strategic impact of INF: The debate has been absurd

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

The analysis which follows was released in Boston on Dec. 12, 1987, under the full title, "Why the debate on the INF agreement's strategic impact has been absurd thus far."

So far, almost the entirety of the debate within the United States, on the subject of the Gorbachov-Reagan INF agreements, has been axiomatically and otherwise absurd. The most conspicuous of the fallacies contributing to this general folly has been the prefixing of the term "strategic" to matters which by their nature are essentially merely tactical.

In this debate, those who insist that President Reagan has effected a "sell-out" are chiefly in the right. The Soviets have "sacrificed" weapons which they had intended to replace as obsolete, in any case; we gave up capabilities for which we, unlike Moscow, have no back-up, and none in sight. The net effect of the agreement, is to increase greatly Soviet military superiority, while decreasing our own substantially.

The attempt to see a silver lining to this part of the business, presumes the deployment of new U.S. capabilities, in different parts of the weapons catalogues, which are represented as actually or potentially offsetting the most disastrous features of President Reagan's concessions to Moscow under INF rubrics. It is to be noted, that all or nearly all of these mooted offsetting capabilities are now either to be scrapped, or their deployment so curtailed and hamstrung that it were as if they did not exist at all.

In these parts of the discussions, no consideration is included of the new order of battle which Soviet forces intend to have in place by about 1991-92, an omission which marks all qualified apologies for the tactical side of the United States' INF concessions with a damning irrelevance.

At the same time, there is a wishful exaggeration of the

qualities of an excellent, recently retired U.S. Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger. One should have high regard for Mr. Weinberger's tested qualities, and one should not underestimate actions taken under his shrewd perception of the ways of the Washington bureaucracy and matters of dealings with the Congress. However, in the former Defense Secretary's commendable accomplishments, there are certain omissions. Whether he intended those omissions to exist or not, is moot; the omissions, in fact, do exist, and they are strategically crucial.

'Strategy' defined

In earlier reports, I have stressed repeatedly, that in general warfare military means represent not more than approximately 20% of the total allotment of effort of combined defense and offense required for victory; the remaining 80%, or more, is represented by efforts of defense and offense in the domains of culture, economy, and politics. I have also stressed, that the relationship among these four elements—cultural, economic, political, and military—is not a linear, additive one. Each element interacts with the other three, and each pairwise interaction interacts with all other pairwise interactions.

For example, in the case at hand, President Reagan, visibly affected by the influences of Comrade Armand Hammer on the cronies of his personal household, has visibly undergone an extensive behavioral modification. He has repudiated his earlier "empire of evil" belief, substituting assertion of Mikhail Gorbachov's peace-seeking passions. It is this top-down, Genscher-like cultural shift in the posture of the United States government, more than any arsenal factor, which defines the recent agreement, indelibly, as a "new

Munich" appeasement.

It is argued that he is sticking to the SDI. It is even suggested that he might have wrought some concessions from Mikhail Gorbachov on this issue. Even at the best, assuming there might be some half-truth in all this hopeful chatter, the President's indicated behavioral modification is the overriding fact.

The SDI was conceived and adopted as effecting a shift from "Mutually Assured Destruction" to the effect of making effective defense in general warfare feasible, in a circumstance in which Soviet build-up toward the capability of launching a war-winning attack was in progress. The crucial test which I personally built into the design of that SDI policy, was that if Moscow desired war-avoidance, it would accept as immediately as any Soviet regime might do, the kind of offer which both the President and Secretary Weinberger made during and immediately following the President's initial public announcement of March 23, 1983. If the Soviets attacked the offer violently, as they did, this was proof that Moscow was committed to a war-winning capability during not less than the medium-term.

The violent Soviet rejection of the President's SDI offer, from April 1983, through and beyond the end of 1983, and including the willful shooting down of what Moscow knew to be a civilian Boeing 747 KAL 007 airliner, defined SDI as a new approach to strategic deterrence against escalating Soviet aggression.

Hence, presuming that contrary to Henry Kissinger's repeated insistence that the President is precommitted to trading off deployment for the SDI, the President's defense of SDI is not largely political cosmetics, the behavioral modification of the President is already sufficient grounds for alarm. Whereas, earlier, SDI was defined as a new approach to deterrence against growing Soviet aggression, now it is defined as something with an altogether different purpose.

Concretely, my proposal was, that the deployment of SDI created the preconditions for eliminating elements of the nuclear arsenal. Now, the President's summit policy is, the reduction of U.S. nuclear arsenals begins long prior to a still-uncertain date of deployment of the SDI. Thus, the President may be defending continued research and testing of an SDI programmed chiefly on a level of technology which is hopelessly inadequate, but he is not committed to a date and scale of deployment justifying the missile reductions. Such "adjustments" in the policy represent a fundamental reversal of the policy, a scrapping of the credibility of U.S. defense.

It is a matter of dates. If an effective SDI were to be deployed by 1991-92, and the INF agreements to be implemented no earlier than that date, the INF agreements would be subject to one military assessment: barely tolerable. If the INF implementation is to occur by as early as 1992, and the SDI not deployed until a significantly later date, then the INF implementation is an outright military sell-out.

Thus, the manner in which the summit agreements have

been approached, represents, culturally, a strategic disaster flowing from the visible behavioral modification of the President. Moreover, the impact of that behavioral modification upon military factors has been to reshape the SDI policy in a way which effects a virtual and massive military sell-out.

The fundamental, the axiomatic issue of defense, is whether or not the United States and its allies are committed to defending Western civilization against the cultural and related impact of a Soviet "finlandization" of Western Europe, beginning with West Germany? If this axiomatic issue is compromised, as the President's behavioral modification has, for the moment, accomplished just such a change, then the whole doctrine and capability of U.S. strategic defense begins to topple like a house of cards.

Since most people, including U.S. strategic analysts and related folk generally, have today almost a zero grasp of cultural processes and the efficiency of their dynamics, the most important feature of the recent "new Munich" appeasement may be obscured to them. The second feature of the summit, the economics of strategic defense, should be less obscured even to them.

Moscow's approach to the current summit negotiations, the timing and pace of its summitry, is based on the assumption that President Reagan is personally and politically gravely weakened, and that it is urgent that Moscow play its "Reagan Card" to the fullest advantage at this moment, not waiting for the somewhat uncertain outcome of the 1988 elections in Western Europe and the United States. Moscow sees that the influence of Armand Hammer's cronies upon the President's household is nearly at its peak, and sees the President as personally weakened in will on this account. More important to Moscow than the President's weakening of personal will to resist Soviet pressures, is the economic situation.

Moscow's approach to summit negotiations is shaped almost entirely by its strategic estimates of economic and related developments in the West. This decision was reached in Moscow during the spring and summer of 1982, as I warned the Reagan administration, through channels of my consultation with it on the future SDI, during that period. Then, I made reference to the implications of the debt-crisis then about to erupt in Mexico and South America. The preselection of Yuri Andropov, during that period, to replace the dying Leonid Brezhnev, was based upon the Soviet *nomenklatura* majority's acceptance of the Andropov-Ogarkov Warplan, in which plan the factor of a "final breakdown crisis of capitalism" was key to the proposed lines of military and other strategic actions. During this period, U.S. intelligence broke down to the effect that this aspect of the Andropov-Ogarkov Plan was either overlooked—which, by itself, is an astonishing failure of U.S. spies inside Moscow—or was simply filtered out of the strategic assessments composed in Washington.

This feature of U.S. strategic intelligence failures during that period and later reflects Washington's astonishing ca-



Gorbachov during his interview on NBC-TV before the summit. The head of what President Reagan used to call "the empire of evil" is now welcomed in the White House as the bearer of "peace in our time."

capacity to ignore any facts which are contrary to prevailing Washington policy-perceptions. If a report is transmitted from a source, reporting facts contrary to current Washington policy-guidelines, someone at a higher echelon in the filtering process will write words such as "crap," "nonsense," "pure Soviet propaganda," etc., in the margin next to the offending fact reported. The unwanted fact will be filtered out of the intelligence compilations forwarded up the line, and suitable demerit marks will be placed in the records next to the offending source's code-name.

That was the official practice on reports warning of the consequences of the coup d'état bringing Cory Aquino's family into power in the Philippines. That was official practice on strategic intelligence reports from Western Europe. That was official practice on strategic intelligence respecting the growing debt-crisis. Under the "amateur night" performance which the late Bill Casey made of U.S. intelligence on these higher levels of consideration, such practice was rampant, as surfacing CIA and other files from that period attest beyond doubt.

I was there in much of this, and was targeted by elements of the Reagan administration for 1984-87 operations against me by the Justice Department to date, because of precisely these strategic issues, despite the administration's substantial debt to me on the SDI and some other matters. Surfacing reports indicate how often words like "crap" were written in the margin of reports on my reporting of strategic developments, and the facts of today show I was right on each of these points marked with words such as "crap." Thus, as an

outsider, a well-informed citizen merely attempting to assist our government without compensation, I came to know very well the standard practice of our official intelligence services, and appreciate most clearly the situation—of both censorship and career-minded self-censorship—of the U.S. government employee totally under the control of such services.

What promotes Moscow's confidence in summitry with the President is not merely the impact of the ongoing international financial collapse. Moscow is relying upon the consequences of the way in which the President and leadership of the Congress are reacting, so far, to the patterns of growing federal budget deficits and other problems caused by this financial mess. Moscow has prediscouted the strategic effect of U.S. budget-cutting and eruption of trade wars by the U.S. against its allies.

This economic situation, including the Hoover-like follies of the President and leaders of the Congress, are the most important military aspect of the INF summitry. Whatever military offsets some wishful fellows might imagine exist, to compensate for the massive appeasement within the INF agreement itself, those offsets are about to be swept away by the economic policies of the Reagan administration and the congressional leadership.

At the same time, the sheer lunacy of Treasury Secretary Baker and Commerce Secretary Verity, in conducting tradewars and financial warfare against Japan and western Europe, ensures what Moscow regards as an accelerating "centrifugal" tendency within the Western alliance, giving Moscow great opportunities to buy from Western Europe and Japan what Moscow desires, at Moscow's prices, on Western credit, on Moscow's terms of payment. If that continues, the "Finlandization" of central Europe is more or less an immediate prospect, and the similar relations with the rest of Western Europe and Japan merely a matter of time.

Since the economy of Western Europe as a whole exceeds the potential of the United States, U.S. economic policy, combined with an accelerating process of U.S. budget-crisis-driven detachment of nuclear and then other military forces from emplacement in Western Europe, means that the economic depth of strategic capabilities shifts absolutely and more or less irrevocably to Moscow's global favor.

In short, any strategic assessment of the INF summitry is absurd, unless it includes the cultural and economic factors interacting with the INF and related agreements that are the subject of the "memorandum of understanding." This summitry is an absolutely strategic disaster for the United States and the Western alliance. All discussion of data on military hardware as such, is wildly incompetent fallacy of composition.

Moscow's 'LaRouche probe'

In all of this, I am personally the fly in Moscow's ointment. The way in which the full text of my April 12, 1987

letter to Soviet *International Affairs* was featured in both the September Russian edition and October foreign-language editions of that publication, is symptomatic. Two factions in Moscow were responsible for the publication of that letter, with the attached commentaries. Both factions state clearly, that I am a Soviet adversary, but the faction which compelled the editors to publish the letter states emphatically: "He touches on some fundamental realities of today, and therefore we print the full text of that letter and our answer to it."

This issue of *International Affairs*, the official journal of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, was devoted to military policy, and the combination of three other featured articles and the treatment of my months-old letter was part of this character of the editions. In Moscow, such a treatment of a letter, in such a context, is a clear signal of a Soviet strategic line set by the majority at the highest level of the Moscow command. This is not propaganda; it is a set of instructions on strategic policy to all relevant Soviet officials and their relevant agents and assets inside Russia and in foreign nations.

Obviously, the decision to publish the letter in this way was made at the highest level during some part of July or August, not later than August, during the period Gorbachov was on his extended retreat. Why? The content of the letter itself tells why; the character of the editions in which it is featured leaves no doubt of the motives.

Since the Soviets know, from developments of the 1982-83 period, that I was a principal author of what became known as the SDI, the Soviet government and its assets in other nations have been openly panic-stricken about my presumed connections, either to the Reagan administration as such, or some other potent connections inside the U.S.A. power-structure. This was Moscow's publicly expressed view, in its publications, from approximately May 1983 through March 1984. This was again Moscow's expressed view, from the very highest level of its government, during the period from early August 1986 through October 1986, and, again, in several leading Soviet attacks upon me during recent months.

Moscow is now deployed in a full-scale probe, to attempt to discover exactly what my influence might be, and to gather information which might tell them how to assess the practical significance of the points which I made in the April 12, 1987 letter published in *International Affairs*.

Their concerns in this matter are chiefly two:

1) The possible strategic significance of my economic policies. What are the possibilities my policies might be adopted by the U.S. government under conditions of a grave financial crisis?

2) If so, what would be the military and other implications of such a policy-change?

As Moscow stated clearly during late March 1983, the SDI policy then announced by President Reagan—if that policy were mine, as it seemed to Moscow was the case—

meant that Moscow would be obliged to scrap "the life's work of Comrade Andropov." The reasons had been stated to me clearly by Soviet representatives some weeks earlier, in the course of back-channel discussions on possible adoption of the SDI which I was conducting for the Reagan administration at that time.

That Soviet official, conveying what he represented as Moscow's official view, rather than his personal view, stated, in so many words: "What you propose will work. You are right about the economic spill-overs. However, if you launch a crash program, as you propose, then we can not keep up with you. That is a situation we can never tolerate. Therefore, we will reject such a proposal. If your country launches such a program, we shall deploy such weapons before you do."

As I reported this exchange back to the Reagan administration then, that expressed Soviet view I believed to be an accurate statement of Moscow's assessment then. For one thing, it was scientifically and factually accurate; it was not Moscow propaganda. If our SDI were implemented as a crash program, according to the doctrine of technological attrition I had prescribed, over the medium-term the U.S. would more than match Moscow in net strategic capability, and Moscow would come to live in peace under conditions of U.S. forbearance, our inclination to avoid a new general war, even were we able to win it decisively.

Moscow did not believe in our forbearance under such conditions, and, as I discovered soon after that conversation, even assuming that the U.S. achieved no more than strategic parity in such modes of defense against missiles, the adoption of such a U.S. policy meant that the Andropov-Ogarkov war-plan would have to be scrapped by Moscow.

Moscow has been my avowed adversary for years. They set operations into motion intended to kill me as early as February 1973, and have conducted other, most hostile operations since, even prior to the Soviet 1981 "walk-in," which led to the U.S. government's requesting me to proceed with the back-channel discussions of January 1982 to April 1983. However, the Soviets are Soviets, and pride themselves on realistic dealings with adversaries. So, we had the "walk-in" of 1981, and the back-channel discussions which followed that.

One of the reasons the back-channel discussion of 1982-1983 proceeded as long as they did, was that even after Dr. Edward Teller had publicly joined the cause for what became known as SDI, in October 1982, my Soviet channels informed me that Moscow had assurances from "the highest levels of the Democratic Party" that there was no chance that my policy would reach the desk of President Reagan for signature. In other words, the cronies of Armand Hammer in the government had blocked, they thought successfully, all relevant channels.

Thus, the President's televised address of March 23, 1983,

hit Moscow—and the Democratic National Committee—like a tidal wave. Moscow reacted by deciding that I represented a much more potent influence than they had estimated earlier. Promptly, circles associated with Leo Cherne and others, including Roy Godson, deployed into the National Security Council and other spots, setting into motion an operation intended to obliterate me politically. By October 1983, an operation, initially centered around NBC-TV News, was projected, aimed at prearranging a federal indictment of me to be set into motion immediately after the November 1984 general election.

The results of that October 1983 projection are now well-known through the national news-media's reporting of sundry legal cases today. This is strategically relevant only as it exposes the depth of penetration of Soviet influences into our government today, as Michael Deaver has recently suggested, in excerpts from a projected book published in *The Washington Times*. The crucial fact here is the way in which Moscow views me personally.

Moscow believes, and fears, that my economic policies might succeed. This means that my strategic doctrine—the original specifications for an SDI policy—would be set fully into motion. As a result of 1982-1983 developments, and the fact that Moscow's influences around the Democratic National Committee and Charles Wick's circles have not yet obliterated me politically, Moscow is not prepared to exclude the possibility that I might even become President in January 1989, or at least exert a great influence on the next presidency.

Hence, the signal through *International Affairs*. The order is out to all Soviet agents in relevant positions: Probe this man's influence yet once again, more exhaustively than before, and find out what he would do, more precisely, should he, by some mischance happen to become the next President.

If I fail, Moscow wins its global objectives. If I do not fail, then Moscow must change its policies radically. Whether I succeed or fail, is not up to me. It is up to many persons inside the United States, including especially circles very highly placed behind the scenes. Does the United States still have the sense to select a new leadership capable of defeating the Andropov-Ogarkov Plan for world conquest, the plan on whose behalf Mikhail Gorbachov is deployed? That is the question which *International Affairs* has posed to all of its sources of information.

That is the only hard assessment worth discussing, on the significance of the recent summitry. Many opponents of the "new Munich" appeasement will dislike very much the proposition, that their fate, and our nation's, depend in any significant degree upon the outcome of my presidential campaign. Nonetheless, so future history will judge their roles—as well as President Reagan's—in the grave crisis at hand. No different view of the matter is a practical one, and therefore no different view is a competent framing of the discussion of the issues involved in this INF agreement.

German military is disgusted with INF

by Luba George and Rainer Apel

Just beneath the surface, a revolt is brewing in high ranks of the West German military, against the Intermediate Nuclear Force treaty to withdraw U.S. nuclear missiles from Europe. While Chancellor Helmut Kohl boasts that "without the essential contribution of the German government, this agreement would not have been possible," the point has not been lost upon the German military, that the deal will dramatically increase Soviet military supremacy in Europe. In the weeks preceding the Dec. 7 Reagan-Gorbachov summit, Vice Adm. Dieter Wellershoff, inspector general of the German Armed Forces, sounded the alarm that "parallel to Gorbachov's rhetoric, there has been an increase in the capability of the Soviet Armed Forces for invasion against Western Europe."

A number of strategic seminars which *EIR* correspondents were invited to in recent weeks made clear that informed military officers perceive as the central threat, the ongoing restructuring (*perestroika*) of the Soviet forces, the streamlining of command-structures, and the enhanced special role of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, commander of the Western Theater of War.

This view represents in part the extensive circulation in Europe of *EIR*'s analysis of Ogarkov, including in the 1985 edition of our Special Report "Global Showdown." Alone among the Western media, we insisted that Ogarkov was the mastermind of Soviet military strategy, that his war plan for irregular warfare against the West was the operative doctrine of the General Staff, and that his concept of streamlining the Soviet economy for war production formed the real basis of Gorbachov's famous *perestroika*.

At a seminar on the relation between *glasnost* and the Soviet military, which took place Dec. 4-6 near the city of Muenster, representatives of the German military and the Ministry of Defense were clear about the fact that "Ogarkov is the best military brain in the Soviet Union," and that he "played a key role in Gorbachov's rise to the post of general secretary."

At this seminar, a senior officer of the First German Army Corps stated: "The INF accord will give the Soviets a devastating superiority, which they will use for blackmail against Europe. Again and again in the postwar period, they've tried to blackmail Europe by flexing their military muscle. So far,