

The hoax of 'nuclear non-proliferation'

Rosemarie Schauerhammer traces the history of the treaty to limit the spread of nuclear technology—"a new Morgenthau Plan," as Germany's Chancellor Adenauer called it.

The current scandal in the Federal Republic of Germany over allegations that Germany was violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by producing weapons-grade nuclear materials, has moved the issue of the NPT into the political spotlight. As *EIR* reported (Feb. 5, 1988, "Atomic waste 'scandal' threatens West German nuclear industry"), rumors are flying to the effect that weapons-grade material was also shipped illegally by the Nukem firm near Frankfurt, to Pakistan and Libya.

What is the NPT, and why did West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer fight so hard to prevent its adoption, 20 years ago?

"Europe is in the greatest danger!" Adenauer declared at that time. "In danger of being enslaved, only with modern means, a colonization in the modern manner." The NPT, painted by its enthusiasts as a way to "prevent war" by preventing the spread of nuclear bombs to "unscrupulous regimes," was in fact a continuation of the Yalta treaty, an agreement between leading circles of the United States and the Soviet Union to deny other nations the benefits of nuclear energy, and the rights of national sovereignty.

The same kind of thinking lies behind the INF treaty today, signed between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachov, to withdraw medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe. Far from guaranteeing "peace" in Europe, it holds Europe hostage to the superpowers. But under conditions of U.S. economic collapse and political paralysis, that means only one thing: Soviet domination of Europe.

The view that the NPT made the world "safer" is totally unjustified. It is precisely in the regions of greatest tension that the NPT *cannot* prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. A world in which the free countries of the West seek to promote economic development and prosperity and the resolution of conflicts through technology transfer (including the transfer of nuclear technology), is a safer world than one in which two superpowers exist surrounded by starving countries and regional conflicts.

Konrad Adenauer, who from 1945 as chancellor of the Federal Republic, fought at every turn for sovereignty for his

part of divided Germany, characterized the NPT as "the Morgenthau Plan raised to the second power" and "a new Yalta treaty." The Morgenthau Plan was a scheme for demolishing German industry, cooked up by U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and Soviet agent Henry Dexter White.

French President Charles de Gaulle considered the treaty a monstrous interference with national sovereignty, and refused to sign it.

U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, on the other hand, praised the treaty as an "important step" toward international peace; it would bring closer the day "on which the world steps out of the night of war into the light of reason and security."

A question of sovereignty

In the summer of 1965, first the Americans and then, shortly thereafter, the Soviets, made proposals concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. After three years of negotiations and heated international debates, the nuclear states—the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Great Britain—signed the treaty on July 1, 1968 in Washington, Moscow, and London. It was to go into effect when at least 40 states without nuclear weapons agreed. Up to April 1, 1969, eighty-six such nations had signed.

In the Federal Republic, the newly elected coalition government of the Social Democratic Party and the Free Democratic Party, under Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, decided on Nov. 28, 1969 to sign, and on Feb. 20, 1974, the Bundestag ratified the treaty. Not signing were, among others, France, the People's Republic of China, Israel, India, Argentina, and Brazil.

The NPT froze the status quo and thus the hegemony of the nuclear powers. Whoever had nuclear weapons kept them, and whoever did not, would not get them in the future. The treaty provided for strict international controls on the nuclear-free nations—in both the military and civilian sectors—while the nuclear powers were exempted from those controls.

According to Article II of the NPT, "Every nuclear-weapon-free state . . . is obligated to accept security controls . . . for the purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its duties

from this treaty, to prevent the diversion of peaceful use of nuclear energy to application for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." The nuclear powers did not incur any such obligation.

In February 1967, Adenauer warned, in one of his last speeches, of the consequences of such a treaty: "In Europe's interests, it is . . . absurd that the non-nuclear powers are to be controlled and the nuclear powers not. We cannot become controlled objects of the dominant nuclear states."

The military significance

At the beginning of the 1960s, a reform of the NATO alliance was inevitable, because of the altered strategic situation. The Soviets were equipped with intercontinental missiles and could thus reach America with nuclear weapons. Doubt arose whether the United States, in light of this new threat to its own territory, would unconditionally respond to an attack on Europe, as the doctrine of "massive retaliation" demanded. France set off its first nuclear bomb in February 1960, and built its own nuclear defenses and its first atomic bomb. In the center of the discussion of a NATO reform, which was demanded by Adenauer as well as de Gaulle, was Europe's participation in nuclear decisions. Europe was to be built up as a nuclear power alongside of the United States, England, and the Soviet Union, and the Atlantic Alliance was to be built up into a bridge with two nuclear pillars.

"The Europeans want binding assurances that American weapons, if necessary, will actually be deployed for their defense, and they would like to have a right to participate in the decision in the deployment insofar as that deployment concerns Europe," as a Pentagon staffer told the *Washington Post* on Dec. 20, 1965.

Adenauer drew the conclusions of what the NPT would mean for the military situation facing the Federal Republic. He had stated in an election speech on Aug. 19, 1965 in Munster: "The American plan to limit the circle of nuclear powers to three, is monstrous! It is so terrifying because Europe is delivered by it to the Russians. . . . I am deeply disappointed by the Americans' proposal. They want to forbid us from joining forces for protection. We have not and Europe has not deserved that."

Adenauer was not the only one in Germany who saw the dangers. "Geneva cliquishness," "conspiracy," "Dispossession of the have-nots," and—as Bavarian powerbroker Franz Josef Strauss put it—"Versailles on a cosmic scale," were some of the characterizations used.

But this opposition was gradually reduced to silence. In 1974, the Bundestag ratified the treaty by a vote of 355 to 90.

The most commonly used reproach against the opponents of the NPT was, "We must not hurt our American friends' feelings." Nonsense, Adenauer said, "The Americans need us and we need the Americans." "I hope the Americans wake up in time." (An echo of the same argument is heard today, in the debate over ratification of the INF treaty.)

Although President John Kennedy had spoken of a "Europe as a fully valid world power with equal rights," the plans for Europe as a nuclear power were quickly defused. In 1962, NATO Supreme Commander Gen. Lauris Norstad, who had decisively intervened for such a reform, was dismissed.

From the beginning, the Soviets made proposals for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty against a European nuclear power and, above all, against participation by the Federal Republic. In a press conference on July 26, 1965, the head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna disarmament talks stated that the Soviet Union would agree to any such arrangement, only if the Western powers would renounce a partnership-like control of nuclear strategy, since "it would be directed against the Soviet Union and the socialist states, in that it would furnish the Federal Republic with nuclear weapons."

Article II of the NPT shows that the Soviets were successful in frustrating development of Europe as a nuclear power. "Every nuclear-weapon-free nation . . . is obliged to accept from no one, either directly or indirectly, the transfer of nuclear weapons, any nuclear explosive devices, or the control of such weapons or explosive devices." Thus, "control" was excluded, which the Europeans considered necessary and through which the intended "partnership-like control" was intended to be attained.

Supposedly, President Johnson won a free hand in the American conflict in Vietnam when he cut back American interest in Europe. In 1967, "flexible response" became the official NATO strategy, and Europe was forbidden an independent defense strategy.

The economic significance

There was no doubt for Adenauer that the Soviet interest in any participation of the Federal Republic in the treaty would also lead to economic controls. "Soviet Russia intends to control the entire nuclear area in Germany . . . and thus achieve control to the highest degree over the German economy," he said.

Today, the ambitious plans that once existed to meet West Germany's energy requirements with nuclear energy and to aid industrial construction in the Third World with the export of nuclear installations, have been smashed. Nuclear exports to Brazil were abandoned under Soviet and U.S. pressure, and, internally, the Moscow-directed anti-nuclear peace movement has managed to "criminalize" nuclear energy. In place of a policy of "Atoms for Peace," which President Eisenhower formulated in 1953 and which the Federal Republic adopted at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, a policy of withholding technology has been introduced toward the developing nations.

If we look at the shape of the world today, it is obvious that Adenauer's warnings that the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty corresponded to a global "Morgenthau Plan raised to the second power," have been substantiated.