

Crucial Soviet military book now in English

by Rachel Douglas

M.V. Frunze, Military Theorist

by Col. Gen. Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev
Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988
\$44.00, £31.50, hardbound, 402 pages.

Every U.S. senator's office should rush right out and get a copy of the book by Gen. Col. M.A. Gareyev (Gareev), *M.V. Frunze, Military Theorist*, issued in Russian in early 1985 and now available in English from Pergamon-Brassey's. We recommend it despite the extraordinary sloppiness of this edition, because of the importance of an undistorted look at Soviet military thinking, during debates over ratification of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) treaty and other strategic matters.

Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev (b. 1922) has been one of the deputy chiefs of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff since 1985, before which he headed its Military Science Directorate for 10 years. He was centrally involved in the transformation of military technology and of command and control in the Soviet Armed Forces, overseen by Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, over the past decade and a half. The French specialist in Soviet military affairs, Alexandre Adler, has called Gareyev "an Ogarkovian of the first rank."

That is, Gareyev is identified with the programs for radio frequency weapons and other improvements in the Soviet Order of Battle, by means of which Moscow would more than compensate for weapons sacrificed (if indeed they were eliminated, and not just concealed) under arms reduction agreements.

What's more, 1987 saw Gareyev emerge from the usually secretive General Staff, as a highly visible spokesman. On June 3, his half-page letter was printed in the weekly *Litera-*

turnaya Gazeta, whose editors he took to task for neglect of "moral substance, patriotism, or civic duty," and warned them against any tendency to sweep under the rug the Soviet Constitution's definition of "the strengthening of the country's defense and ensuring state security, as one of the most important functions of the Soviet state." On June 22, Gareyev appeared at a press conference to unveil a new formulation, for public consumption, of Warsaw Pact military doctrine. The next month, he presided over a seminar of military historians, which the Defense Ministry daily *Krasnaya Zvezda* said was aimed at "raising the efficiency" of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Meanwhile in the West, Gareyev's book on the early Red Army leader Mikhail Frunze had been seized upon by numerous commentators, as marking not only a watershed in Soviet military thinking, but even an abandonment of the famous *Military Strategy* book, written by Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky and others during the 1960s—since Gareyev states that, "over more than 20 years not all the provisions of this book have been confirmed."

In *The Washington Quarterly*, Fall 1986, Philip A. Petersen, John G. Hines, and Notra Trulock wrote: "That the Soviets anticipate a long war conducted with only conventional weapons, or perhaps a limited use of nuclear weapons, is indicated by Gareyev's belief that 'general victory' would be achieved by sequential 'partial victories' of combined-arms forces. No longer do the Soviets believe that general victory is to be achieved by massive strategic nuclear strikes at the outset of the war, as envisaged in *Military Strategy*. . . ." Theirs was one of the more sober assessments of Gareyev by specialists. In a 1985 article, Albert Wohlstetter, more recently famous as the author of a report on U.S. long-term strategy, adduced Gareyev's book as evidence that "Soviet military authorities have recognized the stake of both sides in exercising caution." Still other analysts, as one skeptical observer put it, "have begun to stress the possibility of the U.S.S.R. developing a 'conventional-only option' for conflict in Europe."

Such confusion is all the more reason to read Gareyev's own words, alongside the 1982 and 1985 books by Ogarkov (both are excerpted in *EIR*'s special reports, *Global Showdown* and *Global Showdown Escalates*). The book does reflect the watershed of Ogarkov's military reforms: not the abandonment of nuclear contingencies, but an advance into the new potentialities of weapons "based on new physical principles."

Main goal: victory

The brief introduction by Dr. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., in this English edition of Gareyev's book, usefully highlights its continuity with Sokolovsky: "The importance of the first strike in nuclear war is stressed. The logic is the same as set forth in V.D. Sokolovsky's landmark text." Concerning the

matter of "limited goals" or "partial victories," which Douglass notes is "a popular topic among Western national security analysts," he points to where Gareyev says plainly, "When things reach the point of a major, serious war between the U.S.S.R. and an alliance of major bourgeois states, then there will not be any limited goals in a war." The only goal, as Sokolovsky also had it, would be victory: "true military art," according to Gareyev, "should be unconditionally planned for victory over a strong and skillful enemy."

Taking off from a review of Frunze's work, Gareyev expounds all the major areas of Soviet military thought. Readers who are not familiar with Soviet military terminology will find a summary in his last chapter, of the strict Soviet definitions of military doctrine, military science, military art, military strategy, operational art, and tactics, all of which Gareyev has treated in detail prior to that point in the text.

Matters of emphasis that make Gareyev's book required reading for anyone who wants to face what the Soviets are really up to militarily include, besides the above-cited passages on victory, the following.

The offensive. References to Frunze's demand for "active, offensive zeal" and advocacy of "our own 'strategy of lightning attacks'" to preempt an opponent's, serve as build-up for Gareyev's own conclusion, that World War II "demonstrated that a combination of the offensive as the main type of military action and the defensive is an objective pattern of warfare and . . . operates with the strength of necessity, and it is very dangerous to disregard it."

Even as he explores the possibility of "a comparatively long war employing conventional weapons and, above all, new types of high-precision weapons," Gareyev stresses that in the modern era, "The role of the initial period of the war will increase further and this may be the main and decisive period which largely determines the outcome of the entire war." Gareyev writes not only about the putative "surprise attack" that "the imperialist states are betting on in a war against the socialist states," but emphatically about Soviet offensive actions.

Gareyev alludes to the Ogarkov battle plan for employing spetsnaz and air assault commando units for preemptive elimination of NATO nuclear missiles and other vital targets in Europe: "A modern offensive is a combination of fire strikes, the rapid advance of tanks and armored infantry, supported by aviation and helicopter gunships, and bold actions of airborne troops deep in the defenses and on the flanks of the opposing groupings. . . . This will not be a successive advance of the troops from line to line, but a more decisive simultaneous strike against the enemy over the entire depth of his configuration. . . . Of enormous significance is the priority hitting of the enemy nuclear missile weapons and high-precision weapons, even before the movement of the main groups of one's own troops into the staging areas for the offensive and for launching counterstrikes."

New weaponry. Frunze's words, that "any major invention or discovery in the area of military equipment can immediately create colossal advantages for the warring sides," have "a particularly timely ring," for Gareyev. Writing about NATO, he says, "the main emphasis has been put on the development of high-precision guided weapons, which in terms of effectiveness are close to low-power nuclear weapons." From one of the key movers of the Soviet program for radio frequency weapons and other new technologies, this is meant to apply also to the U.S.S.R., as Gareyev spells out in a lengthy section on the need for "military-scientific" work to effect "a new qualitative jump" in weaponry.

Training. Chapter 5, "Military Instruction and Indoctrination," is entirely devoted to "a more advanced and flexible system for the combat training of our Armed Forces." It resummaries the principles and practices, including the drive to make combat training as realistic as possible (Gareyev only omits to mention the live "training" Soviet forces have experienced in Afghanistan), elaborated elsewhere by Ogarkov and Gen. Col. V.A. Merimsky, who became chief of the Ground Forces Main Combat Training Directorate in 1985.

The war economy. The theme of a war economy in motion before the outbreak of war, more explicitly developed in Ogarkov's writings, is woven throughout Gareyev's book, which contains several passages on the role of "the rear" in war-fighting. "The importance of economic and moral factors has risen immeasurably under present-day conditions," he asserts, in a passage on the preparation of an entire society for war-fighting. The "economic and moral-political capabilities of one's own country and the enemy's" are an integral element of strategy, in the view of the Soviet General Staff.

It is regrettable, that for such an important project, the publisher did not find it necessary to hire competent proof-readers. Starting with two typographical errors on the first page of Chapter 1, the text is a mess. Psychedelic standards of spelling are applied, as we are treated to "insipient" new methods of combat and an appeal from Marshal S.L. Sokolov, for Soviet officers to shun "feintheartedness"! The editors don't know how to spell the surname of British Soviet affairs specialist John Erickson, while the famous 18th century Russian commander, Suvorov, appears repeatedly as "Suvurov," only to regain his proper spelling on page 285.

More serious are the habits of the translator, who is not identified in the book. He fails to use standard English translations of certain military terms, makes questionable choices of words (the "alliance of major bourgeois states," cited above, comes out as "union of major bourgeois states"; "change" is written when "replacement" would be more accurate; etc.), and produces the awkward prose of someone who hasn't fully mastered English (e.g., "It was shown that under the impact of new weapons the World War II would . . . necessitate the mobilizing of all the state's forces"). The editors should have noticed.