

Shultz-Shevardnadze meet advances New Yalta plot

by Kathleen Klenetsky

The meetings between Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, which took place in Washington March 20-23, resulted in several startling developments, which show how rapidly the two governments are moving toward a "New Yalta" agreement, to carve the world into two new spheres of influence, and police them jointly. Under this plan, spelled out by the late Soviet leader Yuri Andropov in a 1983 interview, the United States gets control over the Western Hemisphere, and Moscow gets everything else.

The results of the Washington meetings show that it is Moscow which is holding all the cards. As *EIR* has long maintained, in the "New Yalta" agreement—as in the 1945 Yalta pact—the Russians intend to cheat.

Here is what Shultz agreed to deliver to the Kremlin:

- He reversed the U.S. position on the Strategic Defense Initiative, and agreed to put SDI on the negotiating table at the strategic arms limitation (START) talks. President Reagan has long maintained that the SDI, which is crucial for the national defense, would never be a bargaining chip in broader arms talks.

- He agreed to Moscow's demands concerning the conditions for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and even reportedly began handing over to Moscow U.S. intelligence concerning the activities of anti-Soviet Afghan guerrilla resistance factions.

The way was opened for these concessions with the Dec. 8, 1987 signing of the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), by Reagan and Gorbachov. With that decision to begin withdrawing U.S. protection from Western Europe, the Reagan administration took its most dangerous step down the slippery slope of appeasement.

Now, with the announcement on March 23 that President Reagan will travel to Moscow on Memorial Day weekend in

late May for another summit with General Secretary Gorbachov, we can expect further manifestations of such willingness to surrender to every Soviet demand. As Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said, summing up the results of the meetings at a March 23 press conference, "This is a good time of year for the next radical step in renewing Soviet-American relations on the basis of dialogue and constructive cooperation."

SDI down the tubes

Shultz, who has wanted to strangle the SDI all along, revealed that the administration was putting it on the negotiating table, at a press briefing March 23—the fifth anniversary of Reagan's speech announcing the change in military doctrine that became the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviets have insisted that U.S. agreement to honor the so-called "narrow interpretation" of the ABM Treaty, a demand which would kill the program, be part of any accord on strategic nuclear arms. The administration had countered that it would never agree to such terms, and that the START negotiations should be completely separate from negotiations on space defense.

But the official U.S. position did not deter Shultz from working out a rotten compromise with Shevardnadze to get around this problem. Shultz, with a grinning senior arms adviser, Paul Nitze, at his side, boasted to reporters March 23 that the Soviet foreign minister and he had managed to work out a "new methodology" that would resolve the "ambiguities" contained in a joint text agreed upon at last December's summit, concerning what specific kinds of SDI testing Moscow would allow the United States to conduct.

This "new methodology" involves establishing a separate negotiating track, based on working with a draft joint text, that would be technically separate from START, but would

parallel those negotiations and operate on the same timetable. According to the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the talks, the two ministers "directed their negotiators in Geneva to expedite preparation of a joint draft text of a separate agreement building on the language of the December 10, 1987, joint statement" issued by Reagan and Gorbachov, "allowing consideration of any unresolved issues" when Shultz meets with Shevardnadze in Moscow in April.

Despite Shultz's insistence that this represented an achievement for the U.S. side, a top administration negotiator told *EIR* afterward that the Soviets "have not changed their position one inch" on demanding the so-called "narrow interpretation" of the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze himself bluntly informed the press, "There will be no treaty on the 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms if there is no observance of the [strict interpretation] of the ABM Treaty. . . . [T]here is a link between SDI and the ABM treaty, and we insist that the ABM treaty should be preserved, and hence our attitude to SDI." Thus, the U.S. proposal for a "procedural mechanism" to "overcome ambiguities" was, in fact, a massive concession to the Soviets, agreeing to a framework for negotiating with their non-negotiable position.

The March 25 *New York Times* gloated about what it called the U.S. "reversal on 'Star Wars,'" and reported that, according to administration officials, the new position "reflects a grudging recognition that the Russians are likely to continue insisting that they have a right to back out of any new strategic arms agreement if the United States goes beyond Moscow's definition of what anti-missile testing is permitted" by the ABM Treaty.

What makes these concessions even more grotesque, is the fact that the Soviets are still playing coy about whether they'll even be willing to consider the START agreement at the summit. Both sides admitted that very little progress was made on the outstanding obstacles to a strategic arms pact.

Treachery against Afghanistan

Washington's initial negotiating position on Afghanistan had been that the United States would terminate all aid to the Afghani resistance movement, the minute the Soviets began to withdraw their occupying troops from the country. But when even the U.S. Senate raised a stink about this betrayal, pointing out the obvious fact that cutting off military assistance would leave the Afghani opposition defenseless, and give the Soviet Army a perfect opportunity to mop up the resistance during the period of its purported phased withdrawal, the administration hardened its line slightly, telling the Soviets they would have to stop arming the puppet regime in Kabul as well.

According to official sources, Shevardnadze reiterated Moscow's opposition to this proposal, and also rebuffed a new offer proffered by Shultz calling for both the Soviets and the United States to impose a three-month moratorium on aid to both sides.

But U.S. news leaks just before the Shultz-Shevardnadze talks opened, indicated that the U.S. secretary of state was preparing to offer another rotten compromise on the Afghanistan issue. The March 20 *New York Times* reported that Washington planned to propose that Moscow agree only to an informal, nonbinding understanding that it would terminate aid to Kabul, whereas the formal agreement would simply include a pledge by both sides to treat Afghanistan as a neutral and non-aligned nation.

According to another report, this one from UPI, the United States has begun handing over to Moscow information concerning certain radical Afghani guerrilla factions which are viewed as a threat to the sell-out deal on Afghanistan which Washington and Moscow are now negotiating. "We are not making a deal behind anyone's back, nor are we exploiting differences between the mujahadeen, but we are talking" with the Soviets about the rebels, a U.S. government source told UPI.

The news wire quoted another official to the effect that the Reagan administration's first priority is to ensure a Soviet pullout, and that it places less importance on what a future Afghanistan government will look like. A CIA source confirmed to UPI that the United States is shifting position on the resistance, saying: "We want to see some groups fed to other groups."

Afghanistan was just one of the hot spots that came up for discussion at the meetings, under the rubric of "regional matters." The Iran-Iraq war and Central America were also featured on the agenda. According to initial reports, the two men also planned to discuss the situation in Panama, where the United States is trying to oust Gen. Manuel Noriega, a move which would create yet another political vacuum in Ibero-America which the Soviets could then fill. However, neither the United States nor the Soviets would confirm that Panama was indeed discussed.

INF treaty advances

Shevardnadze's trip to Washington was made all the more pleasing to the Kremlin's rulers by the actions of the U.S. Senate, which chose the occasion of his visit to push the INF treaty a giant step closer to ratification.

On March 22, both the Senate Armed Services and Intelligence Committees recommended that the agreement be ratified, even though the chairman of the latter, Sen. David Boren (D-Okla.), admitted that the panel has "grave concerns about the ability to monitor even the INF agreement if a [strategic arms treaty] is superimposed on it," because the value of any Soviet cheating would be far greater after substantial cuts in Moscow's nuclear arsenal. The next day, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the panel primarily responsible for treaty ratification, vetoed every amendment to the treaty proposed by critics Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) Larry Pressler (R-N.D.), setting the stage for a full committee vote on March 30, and a Senate floor vote in mid-April.