

ment to drug abusers in certain circumstances is an essential part of planning a prevention strategy.” (Academy of Sciences)

- Surgeon General Koop and the CDC have given extraordinary and wonderful leadership to the nation. (Academy of Sciences and Watkins)

- The Surgeon General should be given special “emergency public health powers” to control and coordinate all AIDS programs and ensure that there is no discrimination practiced against the AIDS-infected. (Watkins)

- Fighting discrimination and protecting confidentiality is our national priority. (Watkins and Academy of Sciences)

- “The First Lady’s highly visible ‘Just Say No’ campaign, for example, has successfully drawn our nation’s attention to the devastation of drug abuse and called on America’s youth to reject drugs. Such efforts need to be strengthened and increased.” (Watkins)

- The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has recalculated the number of AIDS-infected and has come to the amazing conclusion that there are fewer people infected now than there were two years ago! In 1986, the CDC and national Public Health Service (PHS) estimated that there were between 1.0 and 1.5 million Americans infected. Now they estimate the number as having gone down to between 945,000 and 1.4 million infected. (Academy of Sciences and Watkins)

- Condom use should be encouraged. When condoms burst it is because of “user failure,” and not “product failure.” Will elementary schools now offer a course in condom use? (Academy of Sciences and Koop)

- There should be *no* mandatory testing of hospital patients, marriage license applicants, *nor even* of prostitutes. Voluntary testing is okay. (Academy of Sciences)

- The nation must vastly increase its AIDS education effort to counter the dangerous belief in the population that AIDS can be spread through casual transmission or through mosquitoes. (Academy of Sciences and Koop)

- There should be *no mandatory testing*, even in prisons. (Watkins)

The LaRouche call for victory

The LaRouche war plan challenges the “doom and gloom” approach of the health establishment and consists of: 1) not less than \$3 billion a year for an Apollo-style “crash program” of scientific research geared to the frontier area of nonlinear biological spectroscopy; 2) universal mass testing for the infection, combined with public health and outpatient medical services to all infected persons and their families; 3) a large-scale program of constructing hospital-bed capacity for handling the expected caseload of AIDS-infected. Three days after the LaRouche broadcast, California voters cast their ballots for Proposition 69, a traditional public health AIDS referendum virtually identical to the famous Proposition 64 of 1986. (See “End the low-budget Reagan-Bush folly on AIDS,” *EIR*, May 27, 1988, Vol. 15 No. 22.)

Moscow summit: a

by Webster G. Tarpley

“I will spit in your eye, and you will say that it is holy water,” goes the Russian proverb. Those intelligence professionals around Washington who are congratulating themselves on having gotten off with an almost-whole coat at the Moscow summit should look again. If they think this was a successful rearguard action and that Reagan didn’t sell out the proverbial store, they ought to think of Braxton Bragg, “victor” of Chickamauga, when he wrote, “One more like this and I am ruined.”

The Moscow damage report must start with the completed ratification and entry into force of the INF treaty, ratified for the summit deadline. Soon Soviet GRU inspection teams will appear at sites in the United States and Europe, including the Hercules plant in Magna, Utah, where no Pershing IIs are produced any more, but where MX and Trident D-5 missiles, the most modern in the U.S. inventory, are currently in production. Soon thereafter, the United States is required to begin the destruction of \$6 billion worth of modern INF missiles. Within 30 days of the entry into force of the INF treaty, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are mandated to exchange “updated data” on the numbers and positions of their medium-range missiles. What the Soviets will report is anybody’s guess. If they claim that numerous missiles have already been “eliminated” before the treaty came into force, it is a safe bet that these missiles have been put aside, and separated into their component stages—an option that the treaty leaves the Soviets free to carry out without the slightest violation.

Then there are the two arms control agreements signed during the summit. One provides for mutual notification of ICBM and SLBM test launches. The other is the Joint Verification Experiment Agreement, by which the two sides are to carry out verification tests at each other’s underground nuclear test sites. The goal here is to agree on verification measures that will allow the revival and eventual Senate ratification of two relics of the long-dead Nixon-Brezhnev détente, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976. Gorbachov is also proposing a three-phased pullout of 500,000 troops by each side in Central Europe, with the United States not yet biting. Regional issues were also discussed, but little information was made public about the haggling or possible secret protocols.

Defense Secretary Carlucci became the first defense sec-

damage report

retary ever to visit the U.S.S.R., and used the time to confer with Defense Minister Yazov and Marshal Akhromeyev. Out of these meetings, and out of the Nitze-Akhromeyev "working group" on arms control, has come some "progress" towards a U.S. capitulation on START. This includes the proposal that mobile ICBMs could be fenced into "garrisons" to allow better verification, and other discussions on how to count air-launched cruise missiles.

According to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement, the two sides have elaborated a Joint Draft Text of a Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which is kept in Geneva. This text is supplemented by joint draft texts of an Inspection Protocol, a Conversion or Elimination Protocol, and a Memorandum of Understanding on the data base. These texts record the areas of agreement reached so far, and also bracket areas where disagreements still exist. The "progress" achieved in Moscow will be duly recorded in the draft text in Geneva. It turns out that the provisions recorded in the text "are considered to be agreed, subject to the completion and ratification of the treaty." So, the United States is already locked in to all of the recorded provisions.

The Joint Draft Text provides that the "aggregate throw-weight" of each side will be reduced by 50%, with top limits of 1,600 offensive delivery systems and 6,000 warheads. The Protocols specify data exchanges, baseline inspections, on-site observation of elimination, on-site perimeter-portal monitoring, on-site inspections of various types, etc. More ironic provisions include "prohibition of the use of concealment" and a "ban on telemetry encryption"—both well-known Soviet tricks of the SALT era. We also find that "the two sides have begun to exchange data on their strategic forces."

The Geneva negotiations on this draft treaty will resume on July 12, governed by the instructions issued from the summit. It is "agreed as a matter of principle" that once an overall deal is reached, "the Treaty . . . will be signed without delay."

START is suicide

Much of this recapitulates earlier stages of the talks, but the point is clear: The sword of Damocles still hangs over the United States and the West in the form of these START talks. And according to Prime Minister Howard Baker, chief choreographer for the somnambulist of the White House, "The

odds of finishing a treaty in this term are probably no better than 50-50." Which is still a hell of a game of Russian roulette.

A START treaty with 50% cuts would permit the Russians to concentrate their ASW capacities on a much smaller number of U.S. ballistic missile submarines, increasing their chances of making kills at the critical time. In addition, the first-generation ABM system Moscow is deploying in the course of its ABM treaty breakout would be of far greater value if a possible U.S. retaliatory strike were weakened by half. START is suicide.

Gorbachov again made clear that the price for START is to abandon all hope of space tests and deployment for SDI. He is still trying for a START deal with Reagan, and if such a deal is reached, he is ready for a fifth summit during Reagan's term in office. When asked about a fifth summit to sign a treaty, even during the U.S. election campaign, Reagan's response was, "Go for it." For Reagan, a summit is possible even if there is no treaty: "Something else might come up that necessitates our getting together and settling something other than that particular treaty."

Senator Byrd's START watchword in Moscow was, "Make haste slowly," and he and Robert Dole agreed that even if the administration were to sign, the Senate could never finish work on a treaty this year. But these are slender reeds to lean on, while START marches on.

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