

fully armed Japanese troops in the region, none of whom had been defeated in battle, and hundreds of thousands of POWs and internees, whose whereabouts were mostly unknown. Worse, there was no intelligence on the actual political situation within the region, especially on the strength of the nationalist governments which had just proclaimed themselves in Indochina and Indonesia—and only a colonial policy for the future of these nations.

The colonial Netherlands and France, had been conquered nations in Europe, and with Britain, were ignominiously defeated by the Japanese in 1941-42. Toward the end of the war, the Japanese had encouraged the nationalist movements throughout the region, but the colonial nations had no policy, other than armed force, to deal with the nationalist governments. The desperation of the European nations to recover their empires, demonstrates the bankruptcy of Western policy coming out of World War II, especially after the death of President Roosevelt and the end of his “American Century” policy. Rather than a development policy for the southeast Asian nations that were to show such remarkable economic growth a few decades later, the colonial nations were determined to use whatever force necessary to retake power and salvage their own economies.

To do this, the European nations enlisted the enemy Japanese Army, to “maintain order” throughout the region, and until early 1946, months after surrender, armed Japanese soldiers were used against the nationalists—although many Japanese, of course, handed over their arms to the Viet Minh or Sukarno forces. The ultimate Dutch, French, and British defeat was assured.

The Potsdam summit in August 1945 was another Yalta for East Asia. The United States redrew the areas under the Southeast and Southwest (U.S.) Asian commands, handing over all of Indonesia (then the Netherlands East Indies) and Indochina, as well as Burma and Malaya, to the British under Mountbatten, and washing its hands of this problematic region. Indochina was divided north and south between SEAC and China. The “Europeanists” consolidated control in the U.S. State Department, selling out what should have been in U.S. interest in Southeast Asia, to allow the return—by military force—of the former colonial powers.

However, as Dennis presents in devastating detail, SEAC and the French and Dutch “limped” back into the region. Outside of MacArthur’s command, there was no policy for “winning the peace” in Asia. The Allies had agreed already in 1944 that British soldiers would be discharged as early as possible for reconstruction at home, leaving the SEAC with the choice of using well-trained Indian troops—a big political danger for Britain in India—the untrained and vicious French and Dutch colonial troops just released from detention camps, or the Japanese.

As their military situation deteriorated, the Japanese had initiated a quasi-independent Indonesia, and on Aug. 17, 1945, Sukarno and Muhammed Hatta proclaimed an Indo-

nesian republic. Unaware—and unwilling to learn—of the breadth of the nationalist movement, the Dutch refused utterly to allow any negotiations that would have given even de facto recognition to the nationalists. The British had only some 1,500 troops facing 100,000 Indonesians, some so fanatical they attacked tanks with bamboo spears, but refused to allow the Dutch to land, realizing this would send the situation over the edge.

In Indochina, another crisis point with just one British brigade under Maj. Gen. Douglas Gracey to take control from the 70,000 Japanese soldiers near Saigon alone, SEAC went over to the French. After widespread Vietnamese riots broke out in September, Gracey helped the French colonialists stage a coup against the provisional Viet Minh government, and made good the French shortcomings with Indian troops to the point of using air power against Vietnamese.

Mountbatten alone was not responsible for the policy failure, but certainly his tremendous political ambition conceded to the Dutch and French what they needed to force their way back into Southeast Asia. Mountbatten defied the Allied Joint Chiefs policy of repatriating all Japanese troops as fast as possible, and allowed the Dutch to keep some 22,500 Japanese troops in the Netherlands East Indies for labor. “Dickie” Mountbatten also sacrificed his N.E.I. commander, Lt. Gen. Sir Philip Christison, who had been appointed to “carry the can” in this nasty situation. Because Christison insisted, even for military reasons, on negotiating with the nationalists, Mountbatten forced him out as the Dutch asked, before cutting out himself in order to be back in London in time for the June 1946 victory parade.

Dr. Dennis’s book is well worth reading. The primary thing I would quarrel with is its price, which might restrict it to the technical, rather than general, reader.

Sophistry on behalf of Moscow’s troops

by Daniel Platt

Revolutionaries and Functionaries: The Dual Face of Terrorism

by Richard Falk

E.P. Dutton, New York, 1988

222 pages, \$17.95 hardbound

Professor Falk’s principal qualification to discuss the problem of terrorism is that he has been promoting it energetically for years. The ostensible thesis of this book is that to break

the cycle of terror and counterterror, we should attribute equal legitimacy to terrorist acts perpetrated by guerrilla organizations ("revolutionaries") and those acts perpetrated or sponsored by state organizations ("functionaries").

This argument was employed by the ideologues of the New Left during the 1960s, to assist the fledgling student revolutionaries to shed their scruples about political violence—"the state does it, so we can too." Professor Falk labors to convince us that this is not his intention, that he personally disapproves of both functionary *and* revolutionary terrorism, although toward the end of the book, he begins to let his guard down a little. At one point he asserts that when the African National Congress in South Africa "necklaces" suspected informers or collaborators, or perpetrates acts of sabotage against the economy, these may not be construed as terrorist actions because they are directed against "non-innocent" targets in a "legitimate armed struggle."

Elsewhere he rails against Pope Paul VI for publishing the following message to the Red Brigades following the Aldo Moro kidnaping of 1978: "Men of the Red Brigades, give me, the interpreter of many of your fellow citizens, the hope that a victorious sentiment of humanity still resides in your soul. I wait, praying, and always loving you, for the proof." Falk maintains that if the Pope really wanted to acknowledge the humanity of the guerrillas, he would have abandoned the Vatican's strong no-negotiation stand, which he did not.

Putting aside, however, the question of whether Falk's argument is sincere, he certainly did not need to write a 222-page book to make this rather simple point. What makes this book almost interesting are the unstated assumptions the argument is premised on, and the conclusions drawn, not from Falk's finicky discussion of the legitimate and illegitimate uses of political violence, but from those same unstated assumptions, which Falk hopes we have come to accept in the course of his tedious book.

The central sophistry in Falk's discussion of combat among contending political forces, is that he eliminates any discussion of the cultural bases of the conflict. He depicts a Hobbesian world of heteronomically contending parties, some stronger, some weaker, and thus having recourse to different means of imposing their will on one another. Falk proposes a nicer set of rules to regulate these seemingly inevitable conflicts. He thus neatly avoids addressing a fact central to any rigorous discussion of terrorism: The use of terror as a political or military tactic implicitly favors an oligarchical order over a republican one, strengthening tyrannies and weakening constitutional states, *regardless of whether it is employed by the state itself, or by insurgents.*

Falk anxiously dismisses the idea that the Soviets sponsor terrorism as global irregular warfare; he contends that they are merely opportunistically supporting a spontaneous "sociological phenomenon," and reminds us gleefully throughout the book that the Reagan administration has been recently

caught in similar behavior, i.e., the Iran-Contra scandal. The irony here is that it is the oligarchical elements in the United States, for example the Project Democracy crowd behind the Iran-Contra debacle, that historically have collaborated with the Soviets through the various Trust arrangements.

If the reader will buy Falk's assumption that all contending parties proceed from similar Hobbesian impulses to the conflict, perhaps he will buy the conclusion that Falk insinuates throughout this book: National sovereignty is the problem. He states (page 92): "The realist believes that states pursue their own interests by all means at their disposal, and that war is both a natural outcome of international conflict and an absolute contest of wills. Idealists do not disagree, but believe that global reform is feasible as well as desirable. Realists do not often doubt the desirability of reform, but they are skeptical of the willingness of states to diminish their sovereignty."

For a more candid statement of this ideology, I refer you to Arnold Toynbee, intellectual granddaddy of Falk and all his colleagues down at the Council on Foreign Relations. Toynbee wrote, "If we are to save ourselves, we shall certainly have to resign ourselves to submitting to a number of political and economic changes that will be highly unpalatable and disagreeable to most people. For instance, the sov-

In Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon


Modern Irregular Warfare

by Professor
Friedrich August
Frhr. von der Heydte

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ereign independence of this planet's 140 local states will have to be subordinated to a world government. . . . Can these necessary reforms be carried out by any regime that is not armed with dictatorial powers? I believe this is the really big political question that confronts us now." (*Surviving the Future*, 1971, pp. 111-114.)

For an insightful and productive discussion of the problem of terrorism and war, I suggest *Modern Irregular Warfare*, by Prof. Friedrich August Frhr. von der Heydte.

The human mind is not a computer

by Warren J. Hamerman

From Message to Mind: Directions in Neurobiology

edited by S.S. Easter, Jr., K.F. Barald, and B.M. Carlson

Sunderland: Sinauer Associates Inc., 1988
368 pages, paperbound \$35.00, hardbound \$55.00

Neuroelectric Systems

by Sid Deutsch and Evangelia Micheli-Tzanakov
New York: New York University Press, 1987
479 pages

These two books are part of the ongoing scientific publishing explosion on how the brain is supposed to work. While the scope and approach of the various books differ, the authors all live in the "artificial intelligence" computer age. They share the worst common bias of modern science—namely, that the brain and its supporting neurological system are a highly intricate "mechanical" device, a sort of super-sophisticated, linear computer complex. The circuitry conforms to a hyper-dense hardwired computer chip array.

The underlying fallacious assumption of such modern approaches to the brain and nervous system is not modern at all. The bias can be traced back to the grandfather of crude mechanism and reductionism in modern science, the French Jesuit René Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes was responsible both for the dictum that "man is a machine," and for the

notion that linear sense perceptions, transmitted as on-off signals through highly complicated "networking," are the dominant model of mental activity.

Neuroelectric Systems is a textbook which grew out of the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn's program in biomedical engineering, and approaches the mammalian nervous system through the eyes of an electrical engineer. The authors describe their intended audience as "people who are engaged in the marriage of biology and/or medicine and engineering." After a series of useful introductory chapters on the basic physiological systems that "gather, process and transmit information impinging upon them from the outside world, usually in the form of complex systems," the book then unsuccessfully tries to apply hardwired, linear engineering circuitry diagrams to non-linear biological processes, such as skeletal muscle activity, the auditory system, vision, and brain activity.

From Message to Mind is a comprehensive overview of the frontiers of developmental neurobiology, and presents a broad panorama of ongoing research. It covers such areas as molecular approaches to neural development, intercellular contacts, the molecular biology of the brain, axonal "path-finding," cell differentiation in the nervous system, and the mechanical aspects of "the turned-on brain." The underlying "marriage" which this book promotes is of the bride of molecular biology and modern genetics, to the traditional groom of the neurosciences.

Happily, the work emphasizes that the intricate neuronal connections that comprise the complex circuits of the brain are not established chaotically during development. Since there are many more synapses in the brain than genes in the genome, the intricacies of neuronal circuits cannot be based upon a "one gene-one synapse" formula. Thus, we get to explore areas of cell-to-cell communication, and intra-cell signals as well.

If genes don't regulate the signals, what does? Unfortunately, the regulation process proposed here is copied from one of modern molecular biology's other dogmas: Cell surface molecules that adhere to cell membranes are the signal "markers." The mechanisms presented are directly borrowed from the vocabulary of the antigen-antibody interactions of modern immunology. One wonders why such an otherwise interesting book would completely ignore the wealth of modern biophysics research spectroscopies which are mapping non-linear group interactions and "tunings" in the brain through such technologies as Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR), Positron Emission Tomography, and so forth.

Also, one searches in vain for insight by the authors into the fact that, each day, it is becoming more apparent that AIDS is primarily a neurological disease, and not merely an immunological disease. If the approach at the frontiers of research is not shifted, we fear that neurobiology will be as wickedly outsmarted by the AIDS virus as immunology and molecular genetics have been.