

But the real Soviet aim came through during Shevardnadze's meeting with Philippines President Corazon Aquino. Shevardnadze delivered a letter of invitation to Aquino to visit Moscow, a request that has been accepted but without the setting of a date. "We have to take a first step toward building new relationships in the Asia-Pacific region, toward creating the necessary negotiation mechanism," Shevardnadze said, as if Soviet politeness were able to nullify the Russians' major military build-up in the Pacific over the last 10 years to become the dominant military power in the region. Shevardnadze called for a conference of Asian Foreign Ministers to "reduce tensions" in the region."

Aquino was at least publicly taken in by the new Russian face. "We view Mr. Shevardnadze's visit"—the first by a Russian foreign minister ever—"to this part of the world as a signal that Soviet Russia will now assume her place among us as an Asian country."

Will it fly in Pyongyang?

From Manila, Shevardnadze flew back to the north to meet with leaders in Pyongyang, the capital of the North Korean state of Kim Il-Sung. Undoubtedly, among Shevardnadze's purposes was an effort to affirm North Korea's agreement to the multi-party steps now being taken toward an entente on the Korean peninsula.

The negotiating agenda for extending the *Pax Sovietica* to the Koreans was outlined in the December issue of *Far Eastern Affairs*, the journal of the Institute of the Far East of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The journal printed the "joint proposals" of the Institute of the Far East and the International Strategic Institute at Stanford University, prepared by Soviet and American "specialists" over the course of 1987.

Under the subheading, "Short-term actions and the process of rapprochement," the proposals called for both superpowers encouraging "a program of confidence-building" in Korea, although recognizing that this must be accomplished in large part by the two Koreas themselves. The proposals also called for "a conference of foreign ministers of the governments concerned [that] could approve, take cognizance of, or put into effect measures agreed to as a result of various types of negotiations." These negotiations should soon proceed to the issue of military force reduction on the peninsula.

"The proposals outlined . . . are aimed at peaceful change leading to the resumption of normal and natural human and state relationships among all parts of Northeast Asia," the paper concludes. "The security of each of the two major powers also can be served by a carefully calculated sequence of steps as described in this report."

Clearly, such multi-party negotiations were the purpose of Shevardnadze's Yuletide trip to Asia. However, aside from talk, there is no indication—as the Japanese have so plainly stated—that there has been any "change in Moscow's objectives in any way."

CFR orders sell-out of El Salvador

by Gretchen Small

If the liberal Establishment's Council on Foreign Relations has its way, George Bush's government will hand all of Central America over to Moscow's terrorist allies, giving the terrorists the victory they have been unable to win on the battlefield for 10 years. The CFR further specifies, that El Salvador be made the first test case of this policy for the Bush administration.

The proposed strategy toward Central America is outlined in two articles published in the Winter 1988/1989 edition of *Foreign Affairs*, the CFR's quarterly magazine. The first article is written by James Chace, director of Columbia University's Program on International Affairs and the Media; the second, by Sol Linowitz, founder and co-chair of the Inter-American Dialogue.

Both men argue that any plans for military victory against the narco-terrorists must be written off; instead, the Bush administration must force governments and militaries of the region to negotiate "agreements" with their terrorist opponents. Likewise, Sandinista Nicaragua is declared to be no longer a threat in the Americas, but now a party with which to negotiate, more trusted than the military establishments of Central and South America.

One thing is made usefully clear by this CFR policy package, however. *Foreign Affairs* confirms in spades *EIR's* long-standing charge that the campaign of lies painting Panama's Gen. Manuel Noriega as a communist drug-dealer, was ordered by the liberal Establishment, because Noriega is an obstacle to the Establishment's sell-out of Central America.

James Chace begins his article, "Inescapable Entanglements," with the assertion that all foreign policy of the next administration must be subsumed by the need to appease the Soviet Union. "The American-Soviet relationship will dominate the foreign policy of the next administration," he writes. "The next President could well negotiate the terms of the post-cold war era."

What concerns Chace, is how to ensure that the "grave foreign political problems outside the East-West context," are settled before they blow apart that global deal. He singles out South Korea, the Philippines, Panama, Nicaragua, and El Salvador as "inescapable entanglements" which must be settled, because these countries "are seen by others and by themselves, for good or for ill, as falling within an American sphere of influence.

"If these involvements are properly handled, the White House will be free to pursue overarching foreign policy goals

with the Soviet Union and the other great powers,” says Chace. “If they are bungled, the Bush administration could emerge from its entanglements both dishonored and gravely weakened.”

His prescription for the Asian sphere is simple: U.S. bases in the Philippines and U.S. troops in South Korea are to be maintained, but only as long as necessary to be bargaining chips in the global U.S.-Soviet accord.

“The most important function [of U.S. bases in the Philippines] in the future . . . would be to provide a considerable U.S. presence in the Southern Pacific at a time when negotiations with the Soviet Union may be in the offing to reduce the number of naval battle groups that both superpowers now deploy in the region. Should such negotiations prove successful, then some reduction of forces in the Philippines might logically follow.” Chace also warns against any increase in Filipino defense spending, despite the acknowledged growth of the terrorist New People’s Army, because such increased spending will “strengthen the influence and power of the military.”

Likewise in South Korea, the foci of U.S. policy must be democratic reform (“a far surer basis for stability than a military-dominated regime”), and encouragement of the “warming trend in relations” between North and South Korea. Under this agenda, U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea can proceed, once the United States gets “something in return from North Korea.”

Breaking El Salvador

Chace then turns to Central America. Here, while he treats Panama as the most dangerous of U.S. “inescapable entanglements,” (see Panama Report, p. 47), Chace argues that the United States can be confident that the Soviets will hold Nicaragua in line. Conditions are set for the United States to negotiate a security accord with Sandinista Nicaragua, Chace says. “Russia is hardly likely to challenge the U.S. so directly in America’s sphere of influence, especially at a time when Gorbachov is seeking a variety of arms and economic agreements with the West.”

“Negotiating successfully with Nicaragua is now possible because there is a stable, if hostile, government in place.” But El Salvador “represents a far greater challenge to the next administration”—because its military is still too powerful. Chace claims that the primary U.S. policy error, is that “the U.S. has committed itself to military victory,” and because of that commitment, has made the mistake of attempting to use “the Salvadoran military as an engine of political reform.”

Chace does not even bother to mention the usual lies that it is alleged military “human rights abuses” which concern the liberals. The Reagan administration was not only wrong when it viewed the armed forces as the “closest thing to an effective national institution” in El Salvador, but more fundamentally wrong to attempt to “professionalize” the Salva-

doran military by “involving the army in civil action.”

Such civic action programs were seen in Panama, “when the Panamanian military under [Gen. Omar] Torrijos was encouraged to engage in civic action projects, such as building schools and hospitals, with apparently little thought given to the corruption that these projects would inevitably produce.”

Instead of such “corrupting” programs as building schools and hospitals, Chace proposes that the Salvadoran government and military be forced to negotiate with the guerrillas, as a conditionality for U.S. aid. He writes:

“At this stage of the war then, the best approach for the U.S. is to work for the demilitarization of El Salvador—and indeed all of Central America—which in this case means pressing for further negotiations between the rebel forces and the government.”

The U.S. Congress should “withhold a certain percentage of military aid and cash transfers each year until the administration reports to Congress on U.S. and Salvadoran efforts to settle the war,” he adds. The guerrillas will accept, because while they are “militarily strong, they are also politically weak, unable to lead a broad-based insurrection.”

A consensus policy

Sol Linowitz’s article, “Latin America: The President’s Agenda,” makes clear that Chace is no isolated voice. Linowitz heads one of the Establishment’s chief lobbies on Ibero-American policy, the Inter-American Dialogue. The time has come for Canada and Western Europe to join the United States and Latin America in enforcing the regional accord known as the Arias Plan, Linowitz insists. That plan, named after Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, calls upon the governments of the region to negotiate power-sharing with the terrorist opposition.

Linowitz specifies that the militaries are the target of this plan. “During the past five years, the military forces of El Salvador and Nicaragua have quadrupled in size and budget,” he complains. He adds that the problem in both El Salvador and Guatemala, is that “elected civilian governments remain weak and constrained by powerful military establishments. . . . Neither country is likely to achieve peace through military victory, and the U.S. must begin to use its considerable leverage actively to promote negotiated settlements . . . as the basis for the eventual reconciliation of the warring parties.”

Democratic advances have been “gratifying,” but “in too many places, military establishments escape civilian control and retain enormous power and influence.” “Not only in Central America, but also in such countries as Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina, the armed forces may once again openly challenge democratic rule.” If they do so, he threatens, the U.S. must adopt a policy of “denial of economic and military assistance” to all countries which adopts measures which “repress civil liberties” of the narco-terrorists.