

drafting the Treaty of Rapallo, by which Italy formally accepted the union of the South Slavs, in return for certain perquisites. Volpi's old friend and Apis's associate, former Serbian ambassador to Rome Dr. Milenko Vesnic, would soon emerge as the foreign minister of Yugoslavia. Volpi carried messages from Sforza to Vesnic, regarding the settlement of the Italo-Yugoslav border. His old Montenegrin friends denounced him, putting his picture on the cover of pamphlets that decried the sell-out of Montenegro.

The Sforza-Volpi concoction, Yugoslavia, was to become a main staging ground of the East-West intelligence nexus known as the Trust, since a good portion of the "White" Russian opposition, involved in that project, was based in Belgrade. Indeed, the Russian "Whites" took on delicate internal and, particularly, foreign intelligence missions for Serbia. "These are the special confidential agents of the central government." Antonio Baldacci described them in a 1943 article. None other than Artamonov, after his emigration from Russia, served in the 1920s and 1930s as an expert on the U.S.S.R., in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry!

Another curious and most instructive piece of the after-history to the Sarajevo events, related to Yugoslavia, was the aforementioned Salonika trial. In the spring of 1917, Prince Alexander Karageorgevic, the Serbian heir-apparent, had Apis and his associates put on trial in Salonika, Greece. Even though Apis and his men had authored the 1903 coup, which put the Karageorgevics in power, Alexander feared the great power of Apis in Serbia, which he would no doubt continue to command after Yugoslavia was established, with Alexander as its king. Therefore, he brought Apis and the Black Hand to trial on charges of plotting his assassination, as well as for conniving with Germany on a separate peace.

Despite the intervention of Apis's former funder and employer, Verkhovsky, now minister of war under Kerensky in Russia, the colonel was convicted. Apis was shot by the side of a ditch on June 14, 1917.

The retrial, mentioned above as the source of "Apis's confession," took place in May 1953, under the auspices of the Communist government of Serbia (part of Tito's Yugoslavia). The Serbian Academy of Sciences had just published a two-volume work on the Salonika trial, by a Yugoslav historian named Zivanovic, who identified Apis and *Ujed-injenje ili Smrt* as a "progressive" force in Serbia. Apis's group had been in contact with the Communists in 1917, asserted Zivanovic, and was under the influence of the Russian Revolution. According to Albertini, at least two members of the Black Hand became Communists. In the mid-1950s, Wayne Vucinich remarked in his *Serbia Between East and West*, "There is indication that the ghost of the 1903 conspiracy and its successor, the Black Hand, still hovers in the background of Yugoslav politics." If Slobodan Milosevic emerges, with Russian backing, as the overlord of the economically collapsing and strife-torn Balkans, that may prove to be still true in 1989.

Soviet troops still in Afghanistan?

by Ramtanu Maitra

As the Afghani rebels began to mobilize their manpower for a full-scale assault on Jalalabad, a key Afghan city and the capital of Nangarhar province bordering Pakistan, Moscow issued a terse warning to Islamabad: The Soviet Union will not turn a blind eye to Pakistan's increasing involvement in Afghanistan.

The Soviet threat came on the heels of Kabul President Najibullah's March 11 letters to U.N. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Najibullah said that Pakistan "continues to build up armed aggression and interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs." It is an echo of the Feb. 13 Soviet allegation against Pakistan.

On March 9, the Afghan News Agency (ANA) increased Kabul's volume against Pakistan, charging Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) with direct involvement in the rebels' Jalalabad campaign. Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, head of the ISI Directorate, recently visited the rebel-held Kunar province of Afghanistan, ANA charged.

The Soviet threat and Afghan allegations against Pakistan is in all likelihood aimed most immediately at influencing the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) foreign ministers' meeting, which began in Saudi Arabia March 14. The Soviet-Afghan campaign to create a permanent split between Iran and the other Islamic states over Afghanistan, and play the "Iran card" to their own advantage is in full swing.

The propaganda offensive may also be intended to steal the march on a potential bombshell leaked recently by Pakistani intelligence, namely, that in spite of its pious pronouncements on the Geneva Accords, Soviet troops remain in the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan. If proved true, this could have a far-reaching effect on the political geometry of the Afghan crisis.

Playing the 'Iran card'

The ongoing OIC meeting is being hosted by Saudi Arabia, whose prompt recognition of the Afghan Government-in-Exile headed by the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen (IUAM) has posed a challenge to a number of Islamic nations, Iran in particular. The Iran-based eight-party grouping of Afghan rebels (known as the "Iran Eight") have continued to hold out for their demanded 100 seats in the Shoora, or Afghan Consultative Council, and have even threatened to call their own Shoora. All of these rebels are Shia Muslims, and are loyal to Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini.

The Soviet Union, in its turn, succeeded in driving a wedge between Iran and the IUAM following Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Teheran and meeting with Khomeini.

Kabul President Najibullah is also manipulating the Shia Muslims. To fuel the conflict between the "Iran Eight" and "Peshawar Seven," Najibullah has reportedly offered the Shia rebels an autonomous region in central Afghanistan in return for an alliance with the Kabul regime. Najibullah's recent appointment of Sultan Ali Kishmand, a Shia, as prime minister is widely considered to be part of the same strategy; Kishmand replaces Mohammad Hasan Sharq, who is not a member of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

Troops in Wakhan?

Meanwhile, Pakistani newspapers, citing intelligence sources, claim that Soviet troops are still in Afghanistan, in blatant violation of the Geneva Accords, and that the Soviet Union has, in fact, annexed the tongue-shaped Wakhan Corridor in the northern-most part of Afghanistan. The Kremlin has denied such claims before, and Islamabad has so far not issued a formal charge to the this effect. The official word from Pakistan's foreign office is that the Wakhan Corridor situation will be clear only after the spring thaw melts the snowbound territory.

Military intelligence sources in Pakistan claim, as reported in *The Muslim* of March 2, that Moscow officially annexed the Wakhan Corridor—since the corridor borders Pakistan, China, and the U.S.S.R., its strategic value is obvious—back in 1983, with the help of President Babrak Karmal. Karmal, who had come "piggyback" with the invading Soviet army in 1979, was installed as President following the assassination of Afghan President Hafizullah Amin.

According to the same sources, the Wakhan Corridor has been converted into a military cantonment by the Soviet Union. Moscow has established a full-fledged cantonment and two sub-cantonments at different points in the Wakhan salient in the Pamir region. It is alleged that the Soviets expelled the local Kirghiz tribesmen from the Wakhan, and resettled the area with Nuristanis, who hail from the neighboring Asadabad province in eastern Afghanistan. The Kirghiz tribesmen passed through Pakistan following the 1983 annexation by Moscow, and were sheltered in Islamabad en route to Turkey where they have now settled.

The same report claims that the Soviets have also constructed a heavy-duty air base in Wakhan where MiG-27s can land, which is supported by two other airstrips at different points. To establish effective links with Wakhan, Moscow has reportedly built a Class-50 road in the area which is sufficient to ensure regular supplies to the local population.

Significantly, following the Feb. 15 Soviet troop withdrawal deadline, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan stated in the capital city of Islamabad that he hoped the

Soviets would also vacate the Corridor. It was a counterpoint to the "peace in our time is assured" mania of the media, and was not featured in international coverage of developments at the time. On Feb. 21, Soviet embassy spokesmen in Islamabad brushed off a question on whether they had also left Wakhan with a terse "When we say Afghanistan, it means Wakhan also."

Reason for concern

The current propaganda barrage against Pakistan from the Soviet-Afghan combine may well be part of an effort to build a case for Soviet reentry into Afghanistan in the event they are caught in Wakhan. No matter what, the aim is to isolate Pakistan completely on the Afghanistan issue, and in this, the recent success of Shevardnadze in Teheran has been followed with a resurgent campaign in new Delhi to vilify Pakistan. The departure of President Zia from the scene and the arrival of Mrs. Bhutto's duly elected government in Islamabad has, however, made the job a bit more difficult.

Now both Najibullah and the Kremlin are busy painting a picture of Benazir Bhutto as a weakling not in control of her military, being subverted by the pro-Zia junta. The recent fundamentalist-inspired mob scene in Islamabad, centering around *The Satanic Verses* and headed by the Moscow-returned Khomeini protégé, Maulana Kausar Niazi, was in all likelihood a Moscow-instigated effort to weaken the Bhutto regime.

Moscow is plainly uneasy over the military developments around Jalalabad. Equally important is the fact that most of Kabul's electrical power supply comes from Jalalabad. Already, reports from Kabul by visiting Indian newsmen indicate that certain parts of the capital are going without electricity for several days in any given week. The fall of Jalalabad may also create a panic among Kabul residents, making defense of that city an increasingly difficult prospect.

Not to be underestimated are two other factors. First, just as Najibullah has infiltrated the mujahideen based in Peshawar, Pakistan, the mujahideen and Afghan commanders also have a large number of people in Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. These people will be activated at the right time. Second, there are many fence-sitters in Kabul, who intensely hate the ruling PDPA for bringing in the Soviets and allowing these foreigners to kill fellow Afghans. These fence-sitters remained in Kabul, not by their own choice, but rather for lack of any choice, and would be ready to betray the PDPA whenever they see another opportunity.

That the Jalalabad situation is causing concern to the Kabul regime became evident when Mr. Najibullah floated a new "peace plan" on March 12, in which he proposed a special council which would be a forum to discuss the differences between Kabul and the opposition forces. The special council, Najibullah suggested, will consist of all factions, including the fundamentalists. In return the Kabul ruler has asked for a ceasefire.