

# A strategic shift afoot in Britain

by Konstantin George

The May 19 move by the British government to expel 11 Soviet GRU and KGB spies, 8 diplomats, and 3 journalists, is merely the surface reflection of a fundamental shift in the Thatcher government's policy toward the Soviet Union, a shift in response to the urgent danger presented by the U.S.S.R.'s 1987-91 five-year war plan, being conducted behind the fraudulent mask of the "Gorbachov image."

An in-depth analysis of Soviet global war preparations has convinced leading elements of the British Establishment that unless drastic steps are taken, starting now, in about three years' time Moscow will be in a position of sufficient military superiority to dictate terms to the West.

To cite but a few highlights: The Soviets are well on the road to securing their goal of control over space, and control of access to outer space; and the Soviets are already deploying on a small scale the first generation of radio frequency weapons.

The same British Establishment grouping has come to the conclusion that the INF and post-INF appeasement process has brought West Germany dangerously close to becoming an appendage of the Soviet sphere. In contrast and in opposition to the "total insanity" of the "Kissinger Plan," as one figure told *EIR*, to deliver a "neutral" Central Europe to Moscow, these circles view with horror the loss of West Germany—and thus the European continent—to the Russian Empire.

The ongoing shift in Britain is analogous to the process that matured during 1938 and 1939, when the hard military-strategic reality of Nazi Germany's program to develop and deploy nuclear weapons, jet aircraft and missiles forced a British post-Munich shift to a policy of confronting Nazi Germany.

## The May turning point

The Thatcher government's decision to expel the Soviet spies was taken no later than May 12, not coincidentally the same day that Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arrived in Bonn to finalize preparations for Mikhail Gorbachov's June visit to West Germany. According to sources, Thatcher had taken stock of the facts, and came to the conclusion that Gorbachov was no longer "a man she could trust," and in reality has the attributes of a con man.

The expulsion move occurred on May 19, just after Gor-

bachov returned home from his dismal China visit. Within hours, the Soviet leadership was confronted with a "British shock" on top of the China shock. Moscow was taken by surprise. The enraged Soviet response to the expulsions proved this.

Britain had made no public announcement concerning the expulsions. The world first learned of what had happened through Moscow's virulent denunciation of the British decision, and the Soviet counter-expulsion of eight British diplomats and three journalists. Only after this Soviet tantrum did the British government make matters public and, in turn, in the strongest terms denounce the Soviet action.

The Soviet counter-expulsions were only Moscow's first move. The depth of the shock in Moscow precipitated by the British shift was made clear on May 22, when, following the Soviet Central Committee Plenum, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov announced that Moscow would set a ceiling of 205 Britons, including diplomats, journalists, and businessmen, allowed to work in Moscow. This would mean a reduction of 170 from the current level of 375 Britons in Moscow. Gerasimov added that, in addition, Russians working for the British in Moscow would be pulled off their jobs.

Gerasimov's announcement followed three days of secret Soviet leadership policy deliberations, with heavy emphasis on policy towards China, Britain, and West Germany. This commenced with a Politburo meeting on the weekend, and continued into the May 22 Central Committee Plenum. Notably, two of the speakers who addressed that Plenum, from which no news whatsoever was released, were Leonid Zamiatin, Soviet ambassador to Britain, and Valentin Falin, the Central Committee's Germany expert.

The end of Thatcher's patience on the strategic deception games of Gorbachov emerged emphatically in her response to the Gerasimov announcement. Thatcher declared that Gorbachov and the Soviet leaders had "revealed their true nature." She had conducted the expulsion move in secret to give them "a chance not to retaliate. They chose not to take that chance. . . . Were they going to show that things were different? Or were they going to prove by what they did that things really have not changed very much at all? They chose the latter."

But again, the expulsions are not the primary thing. A Soviet announcement of May 24 lifting the seven-day deadline for Britain to draw up a list of the 170 who would have to leave could signal a hasty Soviet scramble to reach a "compromise" on this question. In front, the fundamental realities associated with the Soviet war plan remain.

Will the British policy shift be consolidated and made irreversible? If so, the gates are open for the end of Western illusions concerning the Soviet Union, which could demolish the policy controls over the Bush administration set by the New Yalta sellout schemes for Europe.