

The history of LaRouche's comprehensive SDI policy

by Michael Liebig

The author, director of the Executive Intelligence Review Nachrichtenagentur in Wiesbaden, West Germany, is a frequent contributor to this review on military and strategic matters. What follows is his address to a conference co-sponsored by the National Caucus of Labor Committees and the Schiller Institute in Crystal City, Virginia on May 27-29, 1989.

Within the United States and maybe more so outside the U.S.A., Lyndon LaRouche's name is being associated with SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative. That goes for his friends and equally so for his foes. The SDI uniquely encapsulates the essential issues that are determining the fate of the United States as a world power and with it the survival of the Atlantic Alliance and the Western world as a whole. For me—a German—trying to assess LaRouche's crucial contribution to the SDI may involve disadvantages, but it can also be rather helpful to look at the strategic complex of the SDI from a point of view that goes beyond the United States.

Obviously, LaRouche did not "invent" the technology of ballistic missile defense (BMD). As early as 1955, the United States began to develop anti-missile-missiles. In the early sixties the United States had precise plans for a nationwide BMD system—called "Sentinel"—with nuclear-tipped "Spartan" and "Sprint" anti-missile-missiles. Already in the summer of 1958 Eugen Sänger published a study, in which he discussed the shortfalls of kinetic missile defense and advocated the development of weapons using directed energy beams against ballistic missiles. Soviet plans to develop such directed energy weapons were made public in Marshal V.D.

Sokolovsky's *Soviet Military Strategy* in 1963. The 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty had effectively squashed the deployment of kinetic BMD systems, but allowed for R&D work in the field of BMD systems based on "new physical principles." And precisely this, the Soviets have been doing on a grand scale. The politico-military officialdom in Washington under Kissinger-Ford and Brzezinski-Carter not only ignored these Soviet advances, but effectively suppressed any attempt to make these most unpleasant facts about Soviet science and technology with its military-strategic implications known to a broader public. U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. George Keegan was to experience this, when he publicly voiced concern over Soviet directed energy work in 1977.

'Sputnik of the Seventies'


LaRouche's passionate interest in advanced physics had led him and a group of acquaintances with a background in physics to initiate the Fusion Energy Foundation (FEF) in 1974. The accumulating reports concerning Soviet advances in the field of plasma physics and directed energy technologies were intensively discussed among LaRouche and his acquaintances. LaRouche concluded that the scientific, technological, and military implications of these Russian advances represented a formidable challenge to the United States, that a new "Sputnik shock" was in the making. On May 31, 1977, the FEF published the brochure "Sputnik of the Seventies" on the Soviet breakthroughs in advanced physics. LaRouche demanded that the U.S. stand up to the Russian challenge and engage in a major national effort in these crucial areas of advanced physics. LaRouche wanted such a

national effort for scientific, technological, and military reasons, but he wanted it for cultural reasons as well. In May 1977—the first months of the Carter administration—Malthusianism was not only the “state doctrine” for the administration—that had been the case already for the previous administrations under Kissinger—but Malthusianism was to be made the “popular ideology” in the United States. That is why LaRouche did not want to just circulate some memoranda among political and military officials in Washington and elsewhere alerting them on the Russian challenge. LaRouche wanted the American people to know! LaRouche wanted the understanding and backing of the American people for a national science effort. That is why tens of thousands of copies of the FEF’s “Sputnik” brochure were circulated.

LaRouche can be a man of great discretion. You would be most astounded were the names made public of all the officials on an international scale with whom LaRouche met and discussed the vast complex—known after 1983 as the “Strategic Defense Initiative”—between 1977 and 1985. Yet to the profound dislike and anger of political and intelligence community “fixers,” LaRouche has the Lincoln-like quality of bringing genuinely important national and international matters to the people! The people must be informed and educated about the policies vis-à-vis “great affairs,” while the operational and technical specifics, of course, must remain secret. Standing up to the challenge of Soviet scientific breakthroughs and their military implications, therefore, became a central *political* issue for LaRouche! The LaRouche 1980 presidential campaign, therefore, prominently featured a national program for a beam weapons ballistic missile defense system. On Aug. 15, 1979, LaRouche published a presidential campaign statement on military policy, which says, “A LaRouche administration will have two leading points in military policy. First, commitment to the development of advanced-technology weapons able to ‘kill’ incoming missiles in the stratosphere.” I repeat, LaRouche said this on Aug. 15, 1979! That is three and a half years before President Reagan’s world famous March 23, 1983 television address on the SDI.

LaRouche’s fight against ‘MAD’

In order to understand how LaRouche was able to conceptualize the SDI, it is necessary to look at LaRouche’s work since the mid-1970s on statecraft and military strategy. LaRouche had grasped that advances in physics and applied technologies had matured to a level which provided a solid scientific-technological foundation for BMD systems based on directed energy. But beyond the scientific-technological dimension, LaRouche had, for years, systematically and ruthlessly dissected the U.S. military strategy of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) or “nuclear deterrence” and its offspring, the NATO doctrine of “flexible response.” The twin sister of “deterrence” is, of course, the edifice of “arms control and disarmament.” Through his work in these fields,



Nov. 11, 1974: LaRouche’s passionate interest in advanced physics led him and a group of acquaintances to initiate the Fusion Energy Foundation. Here he is shown, center background, at the founding meeting in New York.

LaRouche had in effect become the principal conceptual antipode to the “nuclear deterrence” school of McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger, Robert McNamara, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and James Schlesinger. The massive revival of the “deterrence school” and the comeback of its chief ideologues right now under the Bush regime gives additional significance to LaRouche’s work on military strategy in the second half of the 1970s.

The strategic system of nuclear deterrence makes the nuclear-tipped offensive missile of whatever range into an “absolute weapon.” That weapon system may get technologically refined by increments (MIRVing or cruise missiles), but can tolerate no qualitative technological attrition that would create weapons systems which possess defensive or offensive qualities that neutralize and supersede the offensive nuclear missile. The states with arsenals of offensive nuclear missiles are to engage in some sort of community of fate based on the capacity for mutual nuclear destruction. The “balance of nuclear terror” is to ensure the integrity of the superpowers’ sanctuaries while not necessarily that of allied or other third party territories. The axiomatic quality of mutually assured nuclear destruction must be upheld while its quantity may be reduced through “arms control” agreements. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 preserved the quality of the system of deterrence against technological attrition, while the SALT I and II treaties were meant to quantitatively restructure the superpowers’ nuclear offensive arsenals.



Nov. 23, 1982: The author (left) with Lyndon LaRouche at a seminar on beam weapons in Munich, West Germany. The international drive to get Reagan to adopt this new strategic doctrine, had been publicly launched by LaRouche in February of that year in Washington.

LaRouche assaulted the systems of nuclear deterrence by first of all pointing to the fact that the Soviet politico-military command had never truly subscribed to deterrence, but pursued a military strategy of war winning, by nuclear means if necessary but preferably by non- or post-nuclear means. LaRouche gave much attention to Marshal Sokolovsky's book *Soviet Military Strategy* and the then emerging, next-generation Soviet military doctrine shaped decisively by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov. LaRouche pointed to the steadily progressing marginal superiority in Soviet offensive nuclear capabilities, the Soviet strategic defense effort, their space warfare capacity, their civil defense program and their ruthless, so-called "conventional" buildup. In the so-called "conventional" field Ogarkov increasingly emphasized post-nuclear, advanced weaponry based on new physical principles and corresponding post-nuclear operational concepts focused on airborne and special forces. LaRouche vehemently warned that the U.S. may find itself in a situation where, either a path of ever-worsening backdowns and concessions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, or a desperate military "flight forward" were the only alternatives left for the United States.

Secondly, LaRouche pointed to the visible demoralization of the American military, which radiated into NATO. Under McNamara, Kissinger, and Carter's deterrence doctrine (just as under the Bush regime today), the United States' great strength, in terms of technological attrition and logistical depth, was systematically eroded. Again and again,

LaRouche, in his writings and in speeches, explained "how 'MADness' ruined the Pentagon." While a James Rodney Schlesinger proclaimed the "aura of power" of U.S. military capabilities, the reality was that the U.S. military strategy was reoriented towards "limited wars" in Europe and/or the Third World (again striking parallels to the Bush policies of today). All-embracing strategic stagnation produced a sequence of political-strategic disasters like the B-1 bomber cancellation, the neutron weapon cancelation, the bungling over the intermediate-range nuclear forces, "Euromissiles," with the "double track" scheme, Carter's Nicaragua policy, the dumping of the Shah of Iran and the hostage rescue fiasco in Iran, and finally the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Under today's Bush regime, Carter is back as the highly respected "elder statesman."

Thirdly, LaRouche knew, and said so, that under the rigidly stagnant system of nuclear deterrence not only the military but the people in the United States and the other NATO countries had to become increasingly demoralized. The indeed perverse logic of threatening a nuclear holocaust as the only means of avoiding war had to materialize into cultural pessimism and a growing sentiment toward appeasement. "Peace movements," like the "nuclear freeze" in the U.S. or the West European anti-Euromissiles movement, have expanded massively since the late 1970s. The Soviets got the Western peace movements of the 1970s and 1980s going—and then firmly controlled them—by most cleverly exploiting a very real dilemma, that of MAD. Deterrence does make appeasement look rather acceptable and even fashionable.

LaRouche's way out of MAD in a forward direction was a military strategy based on the military-technological revolution associated primarily with directed energy systems. In terms of fire power—i.e., the energy density of the beam—and mobility—i.e., speed of light or approximations of that—beam weapons go orders of magnitude beyond that of even the fastest nuclear missiles. In March 1982, LaRouche published a military policy Paper, which was based on a lecture to an *EIR* seminar in Washington a month earlier, which had the title, "Only Beam Weapons Could Bring to an End the Kissingerian Age of Mutual Thermonuclear Terror."

The history of military science

A directed energy BMD system means the strategic rehabilitation of defense. Such a system eliminates the seeming omnipotence of nuclear offense. Military strategy and genuine war avoidance is again founded on the dynamism of technological attrition and logistical depth. LaRouche's conceptual design of a military strategy for the United States based on a directed energy BMD system evolved out of his work on the history of military science that he had pursued since the mid 1970s. There is a real wealth of lectures and essays by LaRouche on military science. Contrary to ignorant and malign gossip, the *real* "sources" that LaRouche draws

on are primary sources.

LaRouche's strategic conceptions are based on intense intellectual labor with the works of Machiavelli, Carnot, Scharnhorst, and Clausewitz. LaRouche intensely studied the American War of Independence, the history of West Point, especially concerning the first half of the 19th century, and the American Civil War. He analyzed the Carnot reforms in France, Napoleon's conduct of war, and the strategic designs of Scharnhorst in the German Wars of Liberation. LaRouche developed a deep understanding of the Prussian general staff. He dissected the degenerated, bloody incompetence of military leadership on all sides in the conduct of World War I. And, LaRouche worked hard on Soviet Russian military thought from Tukhachevsky, the Russian World War II commanders, to Sokolovsky and Ogarkov. On the American conduct of war during World War II, LaRouche's studies focused on Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the outstanding strategist and military leader.

I think one can say that LaRouche's military thinking is most strongly influenced by Lazare Carnot and Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who adopted and developed the ideas of Carnot. On the latter, LaRouche wrote, "In sum, Carnot's reforms were based on the two central republican principles: the mobilization of the citizenry to arms, and reliance on deploying the science and technology of rapid economic progress to increase mobility and firepower in warfare."

From the vantage point of systematic study of the history of military science, LaRouche was able to conceptually rip apart the "utopian," anti-MacArthur school of Anglo-American military thinking which got codified in the system of "nuclear deterrence." LaRouche traced the intellectual history of the post-World War II deterrence school back to the oligarchical way of warfare, or "cabinet warfare." The archetype of cabinet warfare is the Duke of Marlborough (1650-1722). The strategic assumptions underlying "cabinet warfare" are stagnation, limitations, and rigid regulations in the conduct of war, with the people and the armed forces in a state of passivity and fatalism. In other words, the exact opposite of Carnot's way of war. While McGeorge Bundy, McNamara, or Kissinger have been on the "marketing" side of deterrence policies, the real originator of the deterrence school was Bertrand Russell. A man of evil talents, the arch-malthusian Russell institutionalized the deterrence school in the Pugwash organization. Russell and the Pugwash organization formulated, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the central features of the system of nuclear deterrence, nothing of importance has been added since. The great intellectual effort of LaRouche in combatting the school of nuclear deterrence is of vital importance in the present situation, when the Bush regime is celebrating the great revival of nuclear deterrence and his Russian counterpart Gorbachov seems to be playing so nicely along. Make no mistake, the Russian politico-military command thinks that a deterrence strategy is the right military policy for the West and Russian diplo-

mat, but certainly not for the Red Army.

By making Carnot—and Carnot's influence on Scharnhorst and West Point—his principal references in the history of military science, LaRouche's concept of strategy is obviously not a narrow, "military-technical" one. Instead for LaRouche, "War is not the sum-total of the results of individual battles; battles are but singularities of that total war which is the interdependent political, economic, cultural, and military policies and capabilities of the opposing military forces in depth." LaRouche's concept of strategy is one "grand strategy." Politics, economic performance, and culture are not only the indispensable components, nor even the foundations of strategy. For LaRouche rather, they have the qualitative priority and quantitative terms which make up his much-cited "90%" of strategy. And indeed in modern warfare not more than 10% of the total effort goes into actual and bloody fighting as such. If war breaks out or not, and once war has broken out, its course is fundamentally determined by politics, economic performance, and culture. This is, I think, the core feature of LaRouche's grand strategy. And this is a notion of strategy, that qualitatively supersedes the Clausewitz dictum of "war as the continuation of politics."

His "holistic" notion of strategy is equally important for



Dec. 1, 1982: a media uproar was created when a close associate of Lyndon LaRouche, Fiorella Operto, opened a conference on Leonardo da Vinci in Milan, Italy by telling the standing-room-only audience of 1,200 that the "beam weapons" concept is the only way to stop nuclear war.

grasping LaRouche's unique capacity to generate innovative concepts in the fields of military strategy and intelligence affairs. I know many military and intelligence experts, who respect and admire LaRouche, but who remain deeply puzzled about his—in their view—"improper mixing" of seemingly "separate" matters like culture and the economy with military and intelligence affairs. But they are even more puzzled about LaRouche's ability to create new ideas on military and intelligence matters, something that "experts" with extensive, specialized professional knowledge in these areas are mostly not capable of.

Strategy and morality

I think it is necessary here to look still a bit closer at the dimensions of "culture" and "politics" within LaRouche's concept of grand strategy. For LaRouche, "culture" means first of all theology and morality as defined by Augustinian Christianity. "Our first task is that of reaffirming and defending that precious spark of continuity we associate with the tradition of St. Augustine. We must do that, not only for ourselves, not only for our nations, for our posterity, but for the sake of all humanity. Imagine the fate of a world in which this spark were lost to humanity! That we could not tolerate at any price." Lyn said so in a presentation given at the *EIR* seminar, "Beam Weapons—The Strategic Implications for Western Europe" in Rome, Italy on Nov. 9, 1983.

Matters of strategy, warfare, statecraft, and intelligence are indeed matters of life and death. War is a brutish crime, utterly unjust, if it is not fought to defend the higher purpose of human life, the dignity of man as the *imago Dei* ["the image of God"]. How can there be a great strategist or a great military leader, if he or she has no morality, no soul, no higher purpose? A notion of strategy that is not anchored in morality thus defined must necessarily degenerate into crimes against humanity and ultimate defeat. World history, based on natural law, has been the judge, over and again, on that score.

In LaRouche's notion of grand strategy, there is no place for slogans like "My Country—Right or Wrong." Instead, for him grand strategy for a nation must be based on a moral purpose, a *mission* for that nation. For LaRouche a nation cannot just exist in and for itself, cannot be content with the material well-being of its population and otherwise stay away from internal or external trouble. A nation must not look the other way, when there is injustice within the nation and equally so when there is injustice beyond its boundaries. A nation with a moral purpose cannot but fight and overcome tyrannies, unjust wars, hunger, and the lack of culture and economic progress. For the United States and its moral mission LaRouche once said ten years ago, "We exist not for ourselves. . . . The best way for us in the United States to define our purpose in life as a nation and as individuals is to look at this hungry world, imperiled with famine and epidemic. . . . We have a mission . . . to use the great potential we

have to transform this world."

This powerful concept of moral purpose, of national mission as the basis for grand strategy must be understood as the framework in which LaRouche situated his military policy in general and his directed energy BMD policy specifically. LaRouche saw in a beam defense strategy not just the undoing of nuclear deterrence and the Soviet nuclear threat. For LaRouche a beam defense strategy meant an opening up of new scientific frontiers, especially space exploration. It meant also the undoing of malthusian cultural pessimism. And it meant the industrial rejuvenation of the eroding physical economy of the United States by introducing revolutionary production methods. Occasionally there were some echoes of LaRouche's ideas concerning the linkage of morality and strategy from official or semi-official quarters. Among interesting examples were Edward Teller's October 1982 remarks about a beam defense strategy as a stepping stone toward realizing the "common aims of mankind."

LaRouche's campaign for strategic defense, 1981-83

After Jimmy Carter was gone and Ronald Reagan had become President, LaRouche intensified his political campaign for a beam defense strategy to be adopted by the U.S. government. On July 20, 1981 LaRouche published another military policy paper, which discussed the specific requirements of a space-based beam defense system, namely the directed energy device as such, the power source, sensors for tracking and target acquisition, battle management, and space platforms. LaRouche's political friends and supporters as well as acquaintances from the FEF organized a growing number of public events in the U.S. which featured the beam defense system and which demanded that the Reagan administration adopt a military strategy based on such a system. The most important of these events was an *EIR* seminar in Washington, D.C. in February 1982, which was attended by a large number of political and military officials as well as a large number of representatives of foreign embassies and agencies. It was then that LaRouche made the crucially important lecture on beam weapons, which was published a month later under the title, "Only Beam Weapons Could Bring to an End the Kissingerian Age of Mutual Thermonuclear Terror."

LaRouche's beam defense campaign coincided with the steady escalation of political tension around the stationing of NATO's INF Euromissiles planned for 1983. The "nuclear freeze" and "no first use" campaigns in the United States and the mass activities of the Western European "peace movements" flourished. In late 1982 LaRouche traveled to Europe, where he and his associates addressed well-attended seminars on beam weapons in Bonn, Munich, Paris, Strasbourg, Milan, Brussels, Madrid, and Stockholm. Senior West European military and political figures requested briefings on beam defense by LaRouche and associates of his. Please note, that

we are still months away from March 1983.

When President Reagan made his famous TV address of March 23, 1983, in which he directed American scientists to develop the means to render nuclear missiles threatening the U.S. and her allies "impotent and obsolete," most of the political and military officialdom in Washington, just as elsewhere in the West and East, was profoundly shocked. Washington's governmental, congressional, and military apparatus was utterly unprepared for a presidential directive that, in effect, rendered the strategic regime of nuclear deterrence obsolete. The media did not know where to turn. They had to turn to the associates of LaRouche, because hardly anyone else could provide them with competent information.

LaRouche knew immediately that the Reagan speech of March 23, 1983 had the potential of a strategic *punctum saliens*. LaRouche knew that a beam defense system—from then on denominated SDI—as a comprehensive policy package with its scientific, technological, military, political, and cultural components, could signify a phase-change in the overall national policy orientation of the United States and the Western alliance as a whole.

The American liberal foreign policy establishment had been caught off guard. Moscow was caught off guard. With the knowledge of the U.S. government, LaRouche had conducted private and informal exchanges that included prominently his beam defense concept with Soviet government representatives in the period winter 1982 to spring 1983. In these discussions the Soviet side had readily conceded the strategic validity of LaRouche's beam defense strategy, but excluded the possibility that it would ever be adopted by the U.S. government. After March 1983, LaRouche for the Russians was no longer a nuisance with stimulating ideas, but a deadly enemy to be neutralized.

The Anglo-American-Soviet countermove

Already on March 27, 1983 Yuri Andropov violently attacked Reagan's SDI speech as "insane." In April 1983, the Soviet Russian politico-military command under Andropov and Ogarkov had its response to the SDI ready. Under no circumstances would the Soviet Union accept a transition to a strategic relationship with the United States in which the SDI played any major role. American proposals in the direction of "parallel deployment" of strategic defense on both sides or even the sharing of knowledge on beam technologies between the United States and Russia were categorically rejected. The Russians knew perfectly well, that beyond the field of military technology as such, the SDI would have a major impact in terms of U.S. politics and the U.S. economy. They knew the SDI could shatter the grip of the liberal Establishment over U.S. foreign and security policy. Henry Kissinger himself at the Trilateral Commission meeting in Rome, April 20, 1983, deplored the outflanking of the liberal Anglo-American Establishment through the SDI. New political forces had gained influence in the Reagan administration, forces

that were set to undo the traditionally established ideas of defense, i.e. nuclear deterrence.

The Russian command was determined to use every means of political and diplomatic pressure as well as military coercion. Every Soviet intelligence asset, "useful idiot," and appeaser in the U.S. and the West at large was to be activated against the backers of the SDI. Even more than "outside" political and military pressure, the Soviet command calculated on an "inside operation," an arrangement with their traditional, established partners within the American East Coast milieu, to strangle the SDI in the cradle so to speak. Such an arrangement might allow the liberal Anglo-American Establishment to reconsolidate and to regain the initiative lost for the moment.

We do not know what secret encounters took place in the April-May period between the Soviets and Eastern Establishment figures. What we do know is, that on April 27, 1983, Georgi Arbatov met with Brent Scowcroft in Denver, Colorado, and that on May 26, 1983, Averell Harriman met with Andropov in Moscow.

On April 24, 1983 Yuri Andropov gave an interview to *Der Spiegel*. In this interview, Andropov outlined the basic



April 13, 1983: Supporters of the National Democratic Policy Committee, representing the LaRouche wing of the Democratic Party, demonstrated on Capitol Hill in favor of the new strategic doctrine, announced by Reagan on March 23. The Russians had already attacked the plan.

ARMI A RAGGIO : LE IMPLICAZIONI PER L'EUROPA OCCIDENTALE



Nov. 9, 1983: LaRouche addressed a seminar on "Beam Weapons: Implications for Western Europe," in Rome, one of three major seminars in the capitals of Italy, France, and Germany in 1983-84, where he detailed how "flexible response" can be replaced by a European Tactical Defense Initiative complementing the American SDI. A long, vitriolic article on the conference was printed in Izvestia a few days later.

features of his proposal for an arrangement with the liberal Anglo-American Establishment against the SDI, which he called dangerous adventurism. In exchange for their inside sabotage against the SDI, the Soviet Union would be ready to "stabilize" the regime of nuclear deterrence through new, far-reaching nuclear arms control agreements. Beyond that, Soviet-American relations were to be upgraded towards a new type of "condominium"-arrangement allowing for geopolitical restructurings and regional crisis management. After all, said Andropov, the Soviet Union was a "continental power," which had obviously different strategic interests vis-à-vis Western Europe, but also in Afghanistan, from the United States as a "sea power." On the other side, he—Andropov—could perfectly well understand that the U.S. could not be "indifferent" to the "kind of government that exists in Nicaragua." Along these geopolitical and strategic lines, said Andropov, the Soviet Union was searching for a "common language with the American side."

The Central American 'monkey trap'

Central America was to become the crucial flanking move of the Soviet command in collusion with the liberal Eastern Establishment in their common war against the SDI. The Reagan administration had to be lured into the Central American "monkey trap." Once the Reagan administration had been caught in that monkey trap, it could be drawn away

from the SDI toward the condominium arrangement with Soviet Russia. The liberal Anglo-American Establishment went to work and delivered. On July 18, 1983, Henry Kissinger was named to head the Bipartisan Commission on Central America. As important as Kissinger's role was in wrecking a regional solution of the Central American crisis through the Contadora Group and dragging the United States ever deeper into the Nicaraguan quagmire, there were also senior figures of the liberal Establishment within the Reagan administration doing the same and more. The most important of them was—in my view—the vice president. Nicaragua became the primary obsession of the Reagan administration. In the media and in Congress, the political hysteria over Central America steadily escalated. The energies of the Reagan administration got more and more channeled into and absorbed in Central America. The combined efforts of the Soviets and the liberal Anglo-American Establishment vis-à-vis Central America did produce a classical case of "energy drain" away from the SDI. It is also a method of political warfare systematically used against LaRouche and his associates precisely because of his decisive role in bringing the SDI into existence. On Oct. 13, 1983, Reagan's National Security Adviser Bill Clark resigned. He and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger had been the key backers of the SDI in the Reagan administration. He was replaced by Robert McFarlane—whose wife incidentally worked for Kissinger Associates. Another employee of

Kissinger Associates and known enemy of the SDI, Lord Carrington, was named NATO secretary general on Dec. 8, 1983. What Kissinger had called the effort to “whittle away” the SDI had gained momentum by late 1983.

I have given you only a very rough and rather incomplete sketch of the multifaceted operation of sabotaging the SDI a) from within the administration; b) through every channel of political pressure of the liberal Establishment outside the administration; and c) through massive Russian political, intelligence, and military coercion. I cannot elaborate on what the Russians did in the Middle East at that time: the killing of the PLO’s Issam Sartawi, the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, and the Beirut bombing of the Marines barracks that killed nearly 300 Marines. The increased Soviet weapons deliveries to Nicaragua and the events in Grenada helped to keep up the hysteria over Central America. In September 1983, the Soviets shot down the KAL jetliner and the North Koreans killed four South Korean cabinet members in Rangoon, Burma. In October 1983, the Soviets organized the largest-ever anti-NATO demonstration in Bonn. In November, they broke off all arms control talks and deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles off the U.S. coasts. The barrage of Soviet military threats during that period was massive, just think of the KGB’s Fyodor Burlatsky writing then in the weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* that the SDI is a *casus belli* for the Soviet Union.

Again, this listing is incomplete. I think a lot more work ought to be done on point a), the sabotage of the SDI from within the Reagan administration. I believe the role of the vice president deserves special attention. In late summer 1983, the vice president made a tour through Eastern Europe and Austria. On Sept. 21, 1983, Bush delivered a peculiar speech in Vienna in which he pronounced a “bright future for central Europe.” The Yalta deal, Bush claimed, had been “misunderstood,” there had been no division of Europe into spheres of influence at Yalta. The true Yalta had meant a “joint responsibility” of the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans over the liberated territories. Stalin and the Soviets had abused the Yalta deal, this abuse of the “true Yalta” had to be rectified. This sounds to me strangely familiar. It seems to be strangely close to the Kissinger-Bush plan for the “re-ordering” of Europe as it has emerged since the beginning of this year.

SDI and the Atlantic Alliance

Yet in spite of the concerted sabotage efforts against the SDI, the SDI nevertheless was then, and is still, a most popular policy in the U.S. population. The efforts to sabotage the SDI did not succeed in preventing the creation of a basic SDI research and development infrastructure through the work of Gen. James Abrahamson’s Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. The efforts to sabotage the SDI failed to prevent extraordinary scientific and technological break-

throughs from being achieved since 1983 by scientists and engineers working on the SDI. The SDI funding as projected in 1983 has been cut significantly since then. A lot of resources were diverted into the kinetic side of the SDI program. Much strategically precious time was lost vis-à-vis the SDI. Still, a core structure of SDI research and development is in place. And the Russian command is still quite afraid of the SDI.

In the late summer of 1983 and the spring of 1984 LaRouche addressed three important seminars with the theme “Beam Weapons—The Strategic Implications for Western Europe” in Bonn, Rome, and Paris. In all three lectures LaRouche presented his design for the Atlantic Alliance. The NATO offspring of nuclear deterrence, “flexible response,” must be replaced by a strategy that defends Western Europe—especially Germany—without defense equaling self-destruction. This could only be done through a European Tactical Defense Initiative (TDI) program complementing the American SDI program. The survival of NATO was conditional on a new strategy stressing the broadest application of military technologies based on “new physical principles.” Besides directed energy systems in a counter-missile and counter-air role, ground warfare had to be reshaped by other, new electromagnetic weaponry. Since then we have learned a lot more about radio-frequency weapons.

Beyond military strategy, LaRouche presented his design for an Atlantic Alliance based on the “community of principle” of sovereign nation-states, in which the United States is the *primus inter pares* or “first among peers.” One may argue this is naive “idealism” and point to brutal and cynical facts of power and *realpolitik*. I don’t think that LaRouche’s concept of the “community of principle” of Christian civilization is in any way naive. Just think what the rejection and the denial of these values has produced in the West, in the United States and Europe. The denial of these values in statecraft and strategy produces, on the other side of the equation, degeneration, erosion of strength and power, and ultimately, self-destruction and defeat. Clever, amoral *realpolitik* is not so clever in the end. The recent events in China and within the Soviet empire prove this. The condominium between the Russian *Nomenklatura* and the Anglo-American liberal Establishment got badly shaken. Already in November 1983, the Russians did not at all think that LaRouche’s ideas of statecraft and strategy were naive. They sent *ten* Soviet intelligence operatives into the Nov. 9, 1983 EIR Rome conference on SDI, addressed by LaRouche, and on Nov. 15, 1983 *Izvestia* published a lengthy, vitriolic article against LaRouche. Then Russia was militarily strong, but not yet shaken by an open internal crisis. The Russian *Nomenklatura* will not idly lean back and see their empire cracking up. Their military power is still strong. I am convinced, that dramatic circumstances rather soon will force out into the open a dramatic comeback of LaRouche’s design of the SDI.