

The Chinese Communists' 'tyrant worse than Satan'

by Mark Burdman

The Chinese Secret Service

by Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer, translated by Christine Donougher

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524 pages (with index), £14.95.

Although seriously flawed in certain crucial respects, Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer's *The Chinese Secret Service* is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the background to the atrocities now unfolding in Communist China. The main protagonist of the book is Kang Sheng, a name not often seen these days in the Western media, although he was the chief of the secret services—the (Tewu)—of the Chinese Communists for a half-century, from the mid-1920s until the period leading up to his death in 1975.

From the evidence presented, Kang Sheng was perhaps the chief conceptual architect and political executor of some of the main events of Communist Chinese history, events that have guaranteed that Communist China has become the prototype Orwellian totalitarian state. These episodes include the ugly 1930s “rectification” campaign, in which massive numbers of cadre were “re-educated” or purged, and which was intimately linked to the manufacture and launching of the original “Chairman Mao” personality cult; and the later “Cultural Revolution” and worship of the “Little Red Book” containing the “Teachings of Chairman Mao.”

Faligot and Kauffer write: “It is not too dramatic to say that the head of the secret services was also the secret master of the Cultural Revolution.” They characterize Kang Sheng in one chapter as “The Grand Inquisitor,” elsewhere as the

“*éminence grise*” behind crucial political developments in China. “The mere mention of Kang Sheng’s name made the blood of hundreds of millions of Chinese run cold with fear.”

Kang Sheng was the quintessential totalitarian. Intelligence, for him, was the means to control society in all respects, through so-called invisible means of influence. His method subsumed cultural warfare, ideological indoctrination, and the striving for unlimited political power. The authors write: “Kang Sheng took pleasure in establishing what he called ‘invisible relations’ (*Touming Guanxi*), which meant winning the personal loyalties of men and women within the communist apparatus, either by means of seduction or blackmail. It was sometimes said he did not hesitate to recruit female spies in the beds of their husbands away on missions in the White zone. His aim was to spin a ‘divine web,’ to quote the expression of the father of Chinese espionage, Sun Zi; a network of agents who would lie dormant sometimes for whole decades before being activated.”

Toward the end of the book, there is a brief hint that Kang Sheng modeled his intelligence work on that of the Mongols, who “had created the first global secret service, setting up an intelligence exchange with the Venetians.”

The most Orwellian aspect of his activities was his ability to build up alliances and political friendships with close comrades, and then to turn them into “enemies of the state,” “enemies of the people,” and “enemies of the party,” seemingly overnight. One’s ally of the moment, becomes one’s enemy of the next, fit for being purged, ruthlessly suppressed, tortured, and most importantly, humiliated (and, most often, executed). Communist China emerges, truly, as a bottomless pit of endless political horrors, of stabbing and back-stabbing, lies and counter-lies. One of the more effective images drawn up by Faligot and Kauffer, towards the

conclusion of the book, is that of the dying Kang Sheng, sick of cancer, unable to sleep because he is unceasingly pursued by nightmares about all the crimes he has committed, particularly his cynical and power-hungry betrayal of former friends and comrades.

From the standpoint of the events in China leading up to, and since, the massacre in Tiananmen Square, some of the accounts in *The Chinese Secret Service* are eerie. Take the case of Hu Yaobang, who became a mid-to-late-1980s favorite of the pro-reform/democracy students on the Chinese mainland, and whose death in April was the formal triggering-point for the Chinese pro-democracy student demonstrators. Earlier, during the Cultural Revolution, Hu Yaobang had been one of the main victims of the "Gang of Four." As Faligot and Kauffer document, Kang Sheng was one of the prime motivators and controllers of the Gang of Four's activities, particularly because of his very close relations to Madame Mao (Jiang Qing), since the days they were friends and lovers in Shandong Province.

Kang Sheng died in 1975. On Nov. 9, 1978, the authors report, Hu Yaobang, the future general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, made a violently worded statement, documenting the crimes of Kang Sheng, declaring that he had committed "all kinds of evil." Kang Sheng was a "demon," "a tyrant worse than Satan," "not a man, but a monster," Hu exclaimed. Soon thereafter, the post-Cultural Revolution propaganda apparatus began referring to this "thug without equal." This propaganda continued, until the point that the posthumous attacks on Kang Sheng began to be used by the nascent "Chinese democracy movement." Once this democratic process began to gather some momentum, its leaders were summarily thrown into jail!

Happily, Faligot and Kauffer are not naive about creatures like Deng Xiaoping, who is emerging as today's "Grand Inquisitor" of Chinese Communism. It is forgotten today, in the rewriting of history by the likes of Henry Kissinger and Helmut Schmidt, who proclaim Deng Xiaoping as a hero, that Deng has, for decades, been one of the most entrenched and diehard Communist ideologues, from his earliest days in the nascent Chinese Communist Party apparat in Paris. It was Deng, for example, who allied with Kang Sheng and ideologue Peng Zhen, as the "holy trinity" who organized the famous split with Moscow, accusing Khrushchov of having led the socialist camp to "capitulate in the face of imperialism." Whether or not the Chinese-Soviet split is seen as real, or as a monumentally clever deception to fool a gullible West, either way Deng Xiaoping emerges as bitterly hostile to Western interests.

Of course, in the post-Cultural Revolution era (at least up to the June 3-4 Tiananmen Square massacre), yesterday's victims of the Red Guards, like Deng, have been portrayed as today's heroes. And hasn't Deng, after all, been the proponent of "reform"? But, as Faligot and Kauffer point out, that "reform" is extremely limited: it was Deng and his fac-

tional allies who established, in 1983, a Ministry of State Security, modeled on the Soviet KGB, known as the *Guojia anquanbu*. Beyond that, Deng's policy of "four modernizations," they stress, has meant "open season for hunting Western manufacturing secrets." They write: "In Deng Xiaoping's China, as previously in Mao's, there is a 'crime' that is dealt with very severely: *Li tongwaiguo*—communicating with the outside world, which, according to the logic of the regime, means communicating with the enemy." Deng's only substantive difference with Kang Sheng, is that he has preferred to create a multiplicity of secret service agencies, so that the ultimate power does not lie in the hands of any one intelligence chief, but rather in his own!

Today, they report, Deng's "preferred colleague" is Qiao Shi, "the supreme coordinator of the Chinese security services," who "provides the link between two generations of special services cadres." The authors call Qiao Shi "the rising star of Chinese communism. . . . In Hong Kong and Tokyo, experts began predicting a fine future for him—to the point of seeing him one day becoming number one in the Party." Like his predecessor and model Kang Sheng, Qiao Shi is responsible for "rectification," having been appointed, in 1986, to set up a new body, the "Group in Charge of the Rectification of the Work Style." He is also responsible for "self-criticisms, purges, expulsions, liquidations." As the authors note, "this has an ominous and all too familiar ring to it." (The role of Qiao Shi's political police and controlled judicial courts, in the past weeks' massacres and executions, cannot be overstated.)

In sum, Faligot and Kauffer present images better fit for a horror movie than for the most populous nation on earth. Indeed, the toll has been enormous: "In the early years, leaving aside the inevitable effect on the economy of all the revolutionary turmoil, there were at least 5 million executions. At the same time, the *Laogai*, 'reform through labor', was instituted, in other words the Chinese gulag: 15 million Chinese were soon interned in some 200 camps and State farms." Also in the early years, an estimated 600,000 Christians "disappeared."

A strange obsession

As stated at the outset, however, the book has certain damaging flaws. The worst of these is the obsessively, at times fanatically, hostile attitude toward Taiwan. From the authors' presentation, the Nationalists' Kuomintang Party appears, for all intents and purposes, as nothing more than an effluence of the criminal and secretive Chinese "Green Gang," and of Chinese and international (predominantly CIA-linked) drug-trafficking interests. The Kuomintang's stated commitment to the principles of the Chinese republican nationalist Sun Yat-sen is characterized as nothing more than a fraudulent cover for carrying out illegal activities.

At best, the Taiwanese emerge as raw competitors with the Communists, two evil gangs ever at war. That perspective

is strange, at best, in the “post-Tiananmen massacre” era. Taiwan, after all, is a prosperous modern nation, and is certainly not guilty of murdering tens of thousands of its own citizens in cold blood. The obsession is even more peculiar, in view of Faligot and Kauffer’s revelations of the persecution of Christians by the Communists. Most of the important Nationalist leaders, including Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, were devout Christians, and Taiwan became a refuge for Christians escaping from the mainland. The reader of *The Chinese Secret Service* would never know this.

There is not even the pretense of objectivity in how they approach Taiwan. For example, in the chapter dealing with the Communist victory in the Civil War, they portray the Kuomintang as corrupt, inept, and cowardly. But of the March-June 1946 period, they write: “Equipped with more than enough American materiel, the Generalissimo’s troops began to drive back their enemy. After three months’ hostilities Zhou Enlai [Chou En-lai], promoted to grandmaster in relations with the Kuomintang, suddenly surrendered: The Reds were losing. He asked for a new ceasefire, which an angry Chiang Kai-shek had to concede *under pressure from his American allies* in June 1946” (emphasis added).

That is the extent of the authors’ dealing with a most critical fact in the post-World War II era: the treacherous nature of the policies of the majority faction of the American Establishment toward China. They never even mention the deals on China made at the sequence of conferences that planned the postwar era-Yalta and Teheran- and except for a few superficial references to the role of the likes of the treacherous Owen Lattimore and John Service, and to the pro-Mao sympathies of OSS head William Donovan, the Anglo-American policy determinants of certain “internal” Chinese fights are ignored.

The problem is fundamentally methodological, perhaps with a curious tinge of racism thrown in. A reader of *The Chinese Secret Service* could finish the book with quite negative views of Chinese people in general. The positive features of recent Chinese history associated with the great Sun Yat-sen, and the continuance of his traditions in Taiwan and in overseas Chinese communities, as well as the potentials for that influence to reemerge on the mainland, are a non-subject.

Communists and drugs

A related, and serious, flaw, is the cursory and casual way in which the question of Chinese Communist involvement in international drug-trafficking is handled. Of course, the authors have not set out to write a book on this subject, and have bibliographical references to other material on the subject. But a book focusing on the Chinese secret services is flawed, if it doesn’t place this matter at the center of attention.

The paradox is that, as we have seen earlier, Faligot and Kauffer are absolutely not “fellow travelers” of the Com-

munist. Quite the reverse. Also, they do *identify* the issue of Chinese Communist drugtrafficking, but this almost *en passant*.

What they do establish, in three or fourpages of discussion of the subject, is the following: 1) The Communist drug trade has been under the direct control of the Chinese secret services since the late 1920s. “In 1928, the Communists had carried out an experiment that was to prove very successful: cultivating a field of poppies, making opium from them, and using it to debilitate the Kuomintang army in the White zones. The future military leader of South Fujian, Tang Zhenlin, was put in charge of this secret mission, and his men cultivated fields in the Jingganshan area in Jiangxi. Ten years later, trading in ‘special products’ was devolved upon the Social Affairs Department set up by Kang Sheng in Yan’an.”

Two men who were critical for Kang Sheng’s drug-trafficking apparatus were his deputy, Li Kenong, and the “Drugs Baron” Wang Xiaoyu, head of the Qingdao network, in the province of Shandong, Kang Sheng’s birthplace and political home base. After developing Communist China’s opium trade, Wang Xiaoyu “was to enjoy a spectacular rise, during the Cultural Revolution, to become President of the Shandong Revolutionary Committee, still under the protective wing of Kang Sheng.” 2) The Communist drugtrafficking was developed by Gen. Chen Geng, who “supervises the opium traffic of the Yunnan.” Elsewhere in the book, this Chen Geng is identified as a key China connection to the Soviets’ “Richard Sorge network.” But they don’t develop this into any hypothesis of what the Sorge network might have meant for the global drug trade, as a matter of *Chinese-Soviet*, or “*Comintern*” grand strategy. 3) Pro-Communist seamen’s unions were used to transport the drugs. 4) In the early 1950s, it was estimated that production of opium in China increased within five years from 2,000 tons to 10,000 tons. In 1951, the commander-in-chief of American forces in Japan published a report giving an account of the spread of drugtrafficking from Red China into Japan, which was alarming. 5) They quote from a 1963 report from U.S. Narcotics Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger: “Thorough investigations into several seizures of heroin amounting to a total of 3,413 grams of narcotics had all proved that the goods came from Red China, in particular from Horai, between Qingdao and Tientsin. . . . Moreover, large quantities of heroin from Red China have entered the United States.”

As useful as such few leads might be, Kauffer and Faligot let their obsession against Taiwan get the better of them. By and large, most of the references to Chinese involvement in drugtrafficking point to Taiwan (with or without CIA cooperation, which is another kettle of fish) or to the “Green Gang” and the “Triad” secret societies. The brief references to the Communist Chinese involvement in drugtrafficking ends on page 270, and nothing more on the subject is mentioned. As far as they briefly take this question, their history does not extend beyond the 1950s.

As a sin of omission, the book never even mentions the Chinese drugtrafficking policies developed during the Vietnam War, although the story of Chou En-lai's grand strategy to use drugs to undermine American society via the soldiers in Vietnam is well-known and generally available in the public domain through the revelations of Mohammed Heikal, a close adviser to the late Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. The strategic thinking behind Chou's strategy is implied in the "debilitate the Kuomintang army" concept mentioned above. (Overall, this reviewer gets the impression that Faligot and Kauffer are, on balance, sympathetic to Chou, as a "moderate" and "diplomatic" counterweight to Kang Sheng and others.)

There are many books that one can read documenting Chinese Communist involvement in international drugtrafficking, but it is sad that a book on the Chinese Tewu misses the boat. Richard Deacon's *The Chinese Secret Service* (1974; republished 1989 by Grafton Books, London), which also deals with the drug issue cursorily, at least establishes the point that the Chinese Communists use drugs for political and strategic intelligence goals. By contrast, Faligot and Kauffer, while establishing the fact that certain historical, cultural, and political links exist between Kang Sheng and Peru's Shining Path terrorists, write an entire chapter on the Tewu's operations in Ibero-America, but never even moot how the Chinese might have played a role in cultivating that continent's "narco-terrorist" capability.

Worse than that, and this gets to the core of the problem of the book: In its totality, Chinese involvement in drugtrafficking is portrayed, historically and up to the present, as a kind of joint-stock venture of Kuomintang, secret societies and secret society-related gangs like the Green Gang, and the Communists, with the CIA thrown in on the Kuomintang side. A naive reader of the book would somehow assume this problem is endemic to certain Chinese groups per se. Yet they never even mention the question of China's "Opium Wars," the flooding of China with drugs by the British.

It should be stated in conclusion, that the book has a wealth of raw data, including a 32-page glossary. It also contains a number of tantalizing leads, including reporting Soviet agent Guy Burgess's important role in advising British policymakers on China in the period leading into the Korean War; former British MI-5 chief Roger Hollis's links to both Soviet and Chinese intelligence networks; and the origins of the Chinese atomic bomb capability in the old networks of Agnes Smedley, Richard Sorge, the "Red Orchestra," and the international "peace movement."

Note: (*The Chinese Secret Service* was originally published in French, in Paris 1987, by Editions Robert Laffont. In 1988, it was published in German, by Ehrenwirth Verlags GmbH, Munich, under the title, *Meister der Schatten: Kang Sheng u. der Chinesischen Geheimdienst, 1927-1987*, 712 pages with index, 49.80 deutschmarks.)

Chairman Mao was a dirty old man

Visitors returning from mainland China report that one of Mao Zedong's palatial summer villas in the area of Hangchow, in the western lakes, has been opened to tourists. The anecdotes related by the tour guides leave no doubt that Chairman Mao was a sex maniac and satyr, with his erotic furor increasing as he grew older. The guides show visitors a private movie theater on the estate which was used by Mao, and which was found stocked with the most exotic, triple-X rated blue movies, all from the corrupt centers of the decadent capitalist world. Apparently, Mao's recreation was to bathe in these corrosive bourgeois influences.

Mao is known to have had a wife, the infamous Qiang Qing of the Gang of Four, who had emerged in the chairman's final decade as a political power in her own right, with a large public following. Mao also kept several mistresses. Beyond these, the Great Helmsman of the Revolution, imitating the tradition of some Chinese emperors, had a voracious appetite for one-night stands with female Red Guard playmates in his final decade. Mao constantly scheduled command performances of his personal female ballet troupe, which amounted in practice to an opulent harem of chosen beauties between 18 and 25 years of age. Perhaps the chairman's insatiable libido had something to do with the choice of the "Revolutionary Detachment of Women," the ballet that was shown to Nixon and Kissinger during their 1972 state visit, since this work would have given Mao the most ample choice of post-performance partners.

Mao's widow, Qiang Qing, has now been released from jail and is seriously ill with cancer. Her three cohorts from the Gang of Four remain in prison. The guides in Hangchow report that Qiang Qing was a formidable nymphomaniac in her days of power, and that she used Mao's pornographic movie theater almost as much as the chairman himself. Qiang Qing is reported to have carried on with Mao's bodyguards, as well as with her athletic colleague in the Gang of Four, the Sports Minister Wang Hung Wen.

—Webster Tarpley