by the eruption of Baltic, Georgian, Ukrainian, Turkic, and other nationalisms seeking freedom from the empire of misery.

Asked why there would be no resurgence of Great Russian nationalism, if the empire crumbled, Gudava stated that there had been a shift in the millennia-old "pagan Rus" cultural matrix, which meant that no new Stalinist-Great Russian nationalist combination could come to the fore, of the sort that mobilized "Mother Russia" to win World War II. But the only reasons he could ultimately muster were that external forces such as the United Nations would never tolerate it, while the internal growth of such groups as the Project Democracy-linked Democratic Union in the U.S.S.R. would block it.

Ludmila Thorne, director of Soviet Affairs for Freedom House, also denies that there will be a Great Russian nationalist revival, if the Soviet empire crumbles. Freedom House's honorary chairman is Leo Cherne, who had been a lifelong friend of the late Director of Central Intelligence William Casey and serves on PFIAB with Brzezinski. Again, Thorne said the reason why this revival would be blocked was the existence of the Democratic Union and thousands of likeminded groups.

Creatures of Project Democracy

Is it any wonder that such lunacy is being peddled by the Center for Democracy, Inc. and its principal funder, the National Endowment for Democracy and the affiliated Freedom House, since they are all part of the same Project Democracy secret government apparatus that the Iran-Contra scandal has proved to be such a dismal failure in Central America?

The NED is headed by Carl Gershman, a social democratic sidekick of Leo Cherne. The NED's board includes: Lane Kirkland and Albert Shanker of the AFL-CIO; Anglo-Soviet agent of influence Henry Kissinger, who today wears two hats as a member of PFIAB and as head of a network of global consulting firms whose clients always seem to profit from Kissinger's advice to the President; and Sally Shelton-Colby, the wife of former Director of Central Intelligence William Colby, who, like Kissinger, has represented Wall Street banks in their attempts at usurious debt collection from Ibero-American nations: all in the name of fostering "free enterprise" and "democracy."

Documents released from the NED under the Freedom of Information Act show the money trail from its own U.S. Congress-supplied budget to the Center for Democracy, Inc. for supporting operations like the Democratic Union and Armenian leader Sergei Grigoryant's *Glasnost* magazine in the U.S.S.R.

The head of the center, Yuri N. Yarim-Agaev, admits that the KGB had given him exceptional kid-glove treatment compared to other Soviet human rights dissidents before he came to the United States.

Some queries for the

by Argus

From Jan. 16 through Feb. 5, top U.S. military officials, including Joint Chiefs of Staff head Gen. Colin Powell, have been meeting in Vienna with leading military officials from the Soviet Union and over 30 other countries, for discussions on military doctrine. Guest columnist Argus offers some pointed suggestions as to what kinds of issues U.S. and other Western officials should be bringing up to their supposedly "peace loving" Soviet counterparts.

Any U.S. groups, official or unofficial, which have been or are expecting to go to the Soviet Union specifically to discuss military affairs with the Soviet military staff officers (and there have been a number of such groups during the past year) had better be armed with a number of pointed questions to get discussion on straight rails. Otherwise, such visitors are likely to be snowed under by Ministry of Defense and General Staff propaganda or a lavish show of hospitality that, to quote Shakespeare, "signify nothing."

Almost anyone tuned in on world affairs these days presumably knows that the Gorbachov regime has been promoting what it calls "new thinking" redounding to the military sphere qua "sufficient defense." Our own officials, including Generals Scowcroft and Powell in the present administration, and Admiral Crowe, former Chief of the Joint Chiefs, have discussed such matters with their Soviet counterparts, in fact, on U.S. or Soviet territory during summit visits or on special tours to military installations.

Unfortunately, seldom if ever do our people confront the Soviets with the kinds of queries that would make them realize that we have some worries about their intentions and their past record, that we know their latest military literature from cover to cover, that we want clarification and straight-from-the-shoulder-board responses. In a recent address about Soviet defense to one of our War Colleges, one of the above (Powell) did not even canvass Soviet military thinking or strategy as discussed in Soviet military literature.

One, then, is tempted to ask our own people, if you don't know or care what they're *thinking*, how can you guess what they might be *doing*?

Also, our side, distracted by glasnost and other baubles, seems hesitant to ponder whether the Soviets might be engaging in strategic deception as they disclaim any hostile intent

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Soviet strategists

and continue to "fabric-soften" the NATO West.

First, about what they're doing

The following questions are grist for some questions to be put by any U.S. delegations tasked seriously to inquire about current Soviet military activities:

• You say you wish to defuse regional tensions and violent hot spots in non-European parts of the world. Why, then, do you continue to deploy 627,500 troops abroad (your own figures), spend more than \$15 billion a year to prop up expansionist communist regimes or fight guerrilla groups in the Third World, and continue to be the world's number-one supplier of such arms as SS-1 Scud and SS-21 Scarab intermediate-range missiles to such countries as North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and of many other classes of ground, air, and infantry weapons, including small arms and AK-47s, to dozens of other places including Cuba, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, states in Southeast Asia, etc.? We're beginning to wonder, on the basis of hard intelligence, whether perhaps you're helping North Korea become nuclear. . . .

Above all, if you believe in peace, why do you continue to underwrite the war in Afghanistan? You know that the local population there has been virtually decimated and demoralized. You must be aware that Afghans obviously are fed up with Soviet interference—no less, say, than were or are the populations of Eastern Europe. . . .

- Moreover, why is it that your arms exports, in contrast to the less numerous Western shipments (of mostly defensive arms), are predominantly offensive in nature?
- You say that you now believe only in "adequate," not "preponderant" or "superior" military strength (which, by the way, is commended in your current required-reading Officer's Bookshelf-type military literature) in relation to possible enemies. However, your defense propaganda has always stoutly maintained that you do not seek military superiority but instead only what you call "parity." If true, why, then, do you continue to produce and deploy offensive weaponry in numbers that are so obviously superior to Western quantities? Does "parity" perhaps mean to you what "equality" meant to the pigs in George Orwell's Animal Farm—namely that "some pigs are more equal than others"?
 - You describe your civil defense measures, on which

you continue to spend billions of rubles, as a "strategic" necessity. How, then, can you accuse the West of such measures when, in fact, its civil defense expenditures, manuals, exercises, etc., are a tiny fraction of what your side does by way of civil defense? How do you square such accusations given your publication of a brand new civil defense manual, published in Minsk just two years ago, containing detailed measures for saving millions of citizens in a possible (you suggest "not improbable") Western nuclear attack? In fact, in the manual you describe Western defense policy as "aggressive."

- You say that your present defense measures are purely "defensist" (oboronitelny), not "offensist" (nastupatelny). Why, then, are you building and girding such types of strategic missile silos and deploying so many mobile missiles that are obviously designed to mount a first strike while the remainder are protected or concealed so as to survive a retaliatory strike? How can such missiles be described as "purely defensive" when their warheads are so numerous and powerful as to be designed to target (as counter-force and counter-value weapons) either or both "force" objectives (enemy silos or other military installations) as well as "value" objectives (cities with large populations and manufacturing assets)?
- You claim that your present and future military buildup is strictly "responsive," the result of Western armament one-upmanship and pursuit of "firsts." If true, how do you explain your own many "firsts" to date, going back to the first airdropped H-bomb, first artificial satellite, first submarine-launched missile, first multiple-warhead missile (MRV), etc., up to such latter-day "firsts" as your cold-launch missile capability (repeated use of the same launch pad in order to accommodate volleys of missiles fired in succession), presently orbiting anti-satellite vehicle (ASAT), laser-beam antimissile installations (Dushanbe), apparently unique research on "Star Wars" (admitted by your leader Gorbachov in December 1987), etc.?

One of your oldest proverbs says: "You can tell a bird by its flight." Your above-catalogued actions, as one of *our* own maxims says, would seem to "speak louder than words."

As to your thinking

You continue to publish far more military texts than the West and with far more "classical" war-fighting themes and formulas than your potential adversaries. In fact, despite your disclaimers (by both civilian and military spokespersons), your literature during the past five years, and more noticeably in the 1960s and 1970s, established a number of presumably permanent (or so the writers said) Soviet military strategic principles.

Meantime, some of your visitors to our shores (such as Gen. M. A. Milshtein, whose background and career are replete with functions in military counterintelligence and propaganda) have claimed in recent years that we should not take

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seriously such past volumes as Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky's multiple-edition *Military Strategy*. Instead, you insist, examine the text of, say, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* article on strategy (published in 1980) or see what's written in your monthly *Military Review*.

But the problem with this is the following. Some of your most up-to-date literature still presents principles that can only be called offensist and "traditional." Meanwhile, your allegedly "outdated" (Milshtein to the *New York Times*, Aug. 25, 1980) military literature, as exemplified by the Sokolovsky classic, is required reading for your officers and men according to some of your post-1980 military texts. We wonder if you are not trying to bamboozle us by softpedaling (after 1976 or so) some of your basic principles.

The latest example of positive referencing of Sokolovsky came in the Gorbachov-period book by your Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Gen. M. A. Gareyev. His volume won top honors by being awarded the 1986 Frunze Prize.

A series of questions thus grows out of a deep reading of this past and current literature. The problems revolve about the following "boilerplated" principles within your military science, military art, strategy, and doctrine.

Namely, you insist that:

• Offense is one side of the coin, defense the other. The two are inseparable, your military authors insist, for any type of operation—strategic (inter-continental), theater, or local (tactical). Ergo, at the strategic level, for instance, this means (as you have also written openly) that strategic-range nuclear missiles require both an offensive edge as well as an antiballistic missile (ABM) protection. (Hence, your modernized Moscow ABM radars and missiles, your apparent capability to mount national border-to-border ABM radar and missile protection as evidenced by your deployments of ABM-capable missiles throughout the Soviet Union, as discussed in the U.S. Department of Defense annual Soviet Military Power, etc.) Is this why the U.S. is protesting (quietly) your storing so much ordnance in the front facing NATO?

Your offensist thinking obviously has been backed up with offensist arms deployment in the past as well as up to the present in the central and eastern portion of the European theater.

• You continue to lay great stress on the crucial "opening phase" or even the "very eve" ("nakanunye") of a prospective war as ultimately "decisive" in attaining victory. In the prize-winning 1986 Gareyev text, for example, you openly anticipate a Third World crisis that might threaten to involve the two superpowers. In this very context you anticipate an enemy's (the U.S.?) revving up for war and the need for the Soviet side to nip such a putative surge in the bud so as not to be caught unawares. The need for such preemption, Gareyev suggests, was the prime lesson learned from the Soviet experience with Nazi Germany in June 1941. The Germans had launched a surprise attack. But such an attack could have been preempted, or if not totally so under condi-

tions of 1941, the "impending attack" (Gareyev) could be so preempted under conditions of the modern communications, readiness, and fast-flying missiles of the 1990s. Nuclear war may be "infeasible," but not what you call "active defense," pravilno?

Do you not continue to adhere to a Soviet "launch-on-warning" strategy as the safest, most effective one for your side? Once the secret Defense Council decides that an enemy military threat could become a reality, you are prepared to strike that enemy first in order to prevent your being struck first

In this regard, do you not continue to claim that it is the West that has a first-strike strategy? Such, in any case, is stated in Soviet military texts published as recently as 1987-88. Have you, then, really backed off from exhorting such basic military principles (in part, as you suggest, derived from Karl Clausewitz) as:

- Preparing deeply for war in peacetime? Viewing war as the continuation of peace and peace as the continuation of war (Lenin) with potential enemies, such as the Western "imperialists"—a war/peace continuum, in other words?
- Exploiting arms control in order to strengthen the Soviet Union and its allies militarily (which has been proffered by one of your military writers)?
- Utilizing surprise, stealth, concealment ("maskirova"), as you have on the battlefield so often in the past both before and during combat. Such methods seem bound up in Lenin's notion that attempts to stigmatize this or another side—whether a state or class—for having struck first are irrelevant. For proletarian class and inter-state warfare, your Leader indicated in one of his writings, labeling the "just side" (communist) an "aggressor" for having launched an offensive is silly. The ends justify the means, Lenin was fond of stressing.

Thus, given this mind-set, concealing, say, Soviet mobilization for war (which is overtly commended in the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*) or preparing to catch an enemy (such as Finland in 1939 or Afghanistan in 1979) unawares by (today) blinding his means of detecting your impending attack (which you are testing out for use in war) are logical undertakings by your side.

Final query: Was Nikita Khrushchov perhaps speaking the truth in January 1960 when he talked about such devious methods? Addressing the Supreme Soviet, your leader said at that time that your side would "conceal reserves of missiles" from the West—missiles that could thereby be safely used in successive attacks since enemy retaliation had not found or destroyed them. You may claim that that was "a long 30 years ago, much since has changed." But how can our side be sure? How hard is it to conceal a man-sized warhead or a freight car-length missile? Didn't you conceal whole factories, in some cases underground, in World War II? Does not your one-time Chief of the General Staff Sokolovsky recommend in his text that even electric power plants must be concealed?