

## Why the West should not help Gorbachov


by Paul-Albert Scherer

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*In April 1989 General Scherer appeared at the National Press Club in Washington, at a conference sponsored by EIR, and predicted a bloody civil war inside the Soviet Empire. Last Oct. 18, again at the National Press Club, General Scherer ventured the prediction that Mikhail Gorbachov is not likely to survive the spring and summer of 1990. With all of these forecasts far advanced toward being realized, General Scherer made the presentation below at his latest EIR press conference at the National Press Club, which occurred on Jan. 24. He spoke in German; what follows is the translation of his remarks, by Webster Tarpley:*

The analysis that I would like to offer today proceeds without any exaggeration or dramatization, from the idea that the populations of the Soviet sphere of power are now making world history themselves without any censorship. The year 1917 has a greater significance in world history than simply the Bolshevik Revolution. It was also the year in which American troops appeared in the trenches of the First World War. What began in 1917 was therefore a new phase of dualism in world history: the domination of two centers or concentrations of power in the world. And this condition that we've seen since 1917—either the existence of two superpowers, or the tendency toward the development of two superpowers—that kind of a system in world politics will come to an end during this decade.

I am attempting a sober estimate of this situation, and I come to the conclusion that one cannot be sure whether the governments in Washington and in Moscow



January: East Germans in one of the famous mass Monday-night rallies in Leipzig call for the end of the communist SED's rule—regardless of its recent name change to PDS—with posters bearing political puns such as “Better Kohl [West German Chancellor's name, means “cabbage”] than red beets!” and “SED-PDS = Pack Your Bags.” Inset: Gen. Paul-Albert Scherer speaking at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.

Pietro Cicconi

Stuart Lewis

are politically prepared to accept the fact that the period of dualism in world affairs is now coming to an end.

In this framework, Gorbachov is a fascinating leadership personality, but Gorbachov has attempted to launch a revolution or revolutionary reform from above for the collapsing Soviet Empire, and that revolutionary reform has not been accepted by the masses in the Soviet Empire.

The most significant question that we in the West must answer is: From Moscow today, from today's Kremlin, is there still a Soviet threat? Is that threat still of the same dimensions, or has it become a lesser threat than it was in the past? I would like to answer that question about the Soviet threat very concretely somewhat later on, but in the meantime I would like to treat the question of Lenin.

Lenin is a great figure of world history, although he is a great figure of a very destructive type. Lenin's remarks made in 1905-07 about the nature of a revolutionary period in world history are now very essential for us. The measure that Lenin suggests in these remarks is: What happens when the people up there can't obtain what they want, and what happens when the people on the bottom, the oppressed, don't want to go along with the will of those up there? Then you've got a revolutionary situation. The question today is: Can we say that the people up there and the people down there no longer agree, that their desires go in opposite directions? Could there be any more obvious proof of that than what we have today? It could hardly be more obvious than what we see before our eyes.

## Should the West help Gorbachov?

We now have a revolutionary situation inside the Soviet Empire, for both the elite and the masses, and the question to the West is therefore posed: Should we attempt to help Gorbachov or should we not?

If my analysis is correct, and this analysis is based on a detailed view of the situation, I have come to the conclusion that any help offered to Gorbachov and the Soviet Union is now too late. It is too late to save the Soviet power structure, because the masses are no longer willing to go along. The masses are no longer willing to go along, because of the collapse of living standards on the one hand, and because of the ferment of the nationalities on the other.

I am in touch with a number of think tanks in the Western world, I remain in touch with various intelligence agencies, and from these sources I have derived a number of scenarios. Those scenarios would point in one of the following directions: that you will shortly have the emergence inside the Soviet Union, either of a neo-Stalinist group, or of a group of dogmatic conservatives, or of a group of national chauvinists, or possibly a group of Russophile racists taking power, of fascistic type. Within that framework, there are also very interesting scenarios, about the assumption of power by the military caste directly. Gorbachov is to blame for all this, and Gorbachov of course saw it coming, because Gorbachov has repeatedly launched these messages to the West, saying that the Red Army marshals are trying to take away his post.

In the course of these scenarios, there is one person that

we should not forget, and that is Boris Yeltsin, who is a kind of left-wing extremist. The KGB does not exactly like him. He represents a kind of extreme left-wing position which says there should be more reforms, and faster reforms, than what is going on. You will have to understand if I decline to try to read in the tea leaves of these scenarios and try to decide among them.

The most important common denominator of all of these groups, is that all of them are extremely angry about the fact that Gorbachov as they see it, has fallen on his knees before the Western world. And then, we come with that to the analytical question of why indeed did Gorbachov carry out this symbolic kneeling, why did he go down on his knees, before the West? It's not because Gorbachov is a nice guy, it's not because of his commitment to reforms. It is that he is acting under the irresistible pressure of the situation and of events.

I have expressed this in the past, with the idea that the Soviet Empire is now wandering through a valley of exhaustion. The Soviets are wandering, they're forced to run a gauntlet of internal crisis. This explains many things that Gorbachov does.

My information indicates that what is going on in the Soviet Union today, reflects a decomposition in the economic sense, and a decomposition in the ideological sense.

### **Why revolution now?**

Now we come to the question, why do we have a revolutionary change inside this framework of the attempted revolutionary reform from above.

My information is that the crisis in the economy of the Soviet Union came into the awareness of the Soviet leadership, not even in 1980, but since 1966, the Soviet leadership has been aware of a very, very negative economic development inside the country, as far as the overall economic potential is concerned, and they were at pains to hide these results.

So this all started only two years after Khrushchov had left power. The Soviets then launched into a gigantic military development program, with the demands of Admiral Gorchkov and the Soviet Navy being included in that, and this made things significantly worse.

We should also remember that only four days after Khrushchov was removed from power, the People's Republic of China exploded its nuclear bomb, and this was a shock for the Kremlin leadership.

We have to start from the idea that already early in the 1970s, the Soviet Empire was under significant strategic pressure. The Soviet Empire then attempted to solve the question of its anxiety about its borders, with the Helsinki Accords of 1975.

Then the interlude of Chernenko, the fact that the Soviets lost one year and four months during the time that Chernenko was in power, was also a very significant loss for them.

After 1979, after the decision to invade Afghanistan, and

then through the beginning of the 1980s, the difficulties for the Soviets were getting worse and worse.

Gorbachov came in in 1985 and attempted to go full speed ahead, and obtain certain results very quickly. In the beginning, Gorbachov enjoyed a wide confidence among the Soviet masses. They thought, this is our man, but that only lasted till about 1987. And what you have then, starting in 1987, is a kind of collapse of confidence down into the valley.

There were three monopolies of the Soviet state power that Gorbachov found when he came in but he had to give up two of them. He kept the monopoly on state property but he had to give up the information monopoly that the Soviet state had enjoyed, and also the power monopoly of the party.

As the majority of the Soviet Nomenklatura began to sabotage him and began to interfere with his policies, he began to attack them and insult them in public, and this series of public attacks on the party and on the Nomenklatura, by Gorbachov, went on for two years. The number of people now in the Soviet Union who refuse to be loyal to Gorbachov is very large and is growing very rapidly. That applies both to the elites and to the masses.

We're looking at the death of this failed theory of Marxism-Leninism, the theory of socialism, the theory of the withering away of the state. All of that, of course is dying, and Gorbachov is contributing to this by attributing the negative sides to Stalin, to Brezhnev, to all of his predecessors. These are presented in a very negative light, and Gorbachov tries to use the fact that they were bad to make his own regime look good.

One problem that Gorbachov has is that he talks too much, and people are beginning to lose confidence in him for that reason. There's also a total crisis of belief. And we see, of course, the details of this crisis of belief, that now the invasion of Afghanistan is condemned, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is condemned, lots of other things are exposed, Gorbachov is even forced, really against his will, to concede there was a Hitler-Stalin Pact, because the German Foreign Ministry has a copy, others have a copy, the Soviets have a copy, so they had to admit it. Glasnost is an attempt to win over the intelligentsia to work with Gorbachov by giving up the state or party monopoly of information to entice the intellectuals to do this. Of course that, from the point of view of maintaining power, has been a very serious mistake by Gorbachov.

The biggest mistake, perhaps of them all, that Gorbachov has made is the total misestimate of the nationalities question. This involves 130 separate nationalities in the Soviet Union. This process of decomposition is now unfolding before our eyes in breathtaking speed. We have to note that after some 58 months of Gorbachov's regime, all the reforms that he has proposed have now been abrogated and rescinded. Not one of them remains in force. The big reforms, the question of property reforms, allowing private property, the question of a broad economic recovery, none of this has been accom-

plished. It could not even be fully debated. Gorbachov is now pulling back on all of these fronts.

The question of price reform, price increases, would have been absolutely essential for the kind of thing that Gorbachov wanted to do, but this is not on the agenda now. This has been officially delayed until 1993, simply because the regime is too weak, and they know that if they go with price reforms now, the masses will not accept it: Then they have a general revolution exploding in their faces immediately.

Another important element in the decomposition in the Soviet Union is that Gorbachov and his group have gone out of their way to praise Hungary, to praise Poland, to even praise the German Democratic Republic to some extent, and especially singling out for praise the fact that these countries have tended to get rid of their Communist parties and push them out of power.

One thing that had a tremendous impact inside the Soviet Union, I would like to mention this again, is that Gorbachov sent a telegram of congratulations to the leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party, congratulating them on the fact that they had abolished themselves, they had more or less self-destructed. The impact of that inside the Soviet Union was immense and the Nomenklatura said, "How can he do such a thing, when we in this country must have the domination of the Communist Party and its leadership?"

You have to know that every Soviet leader, every Russian political leader knows that the corset of this empire is not the idea of the Soviet Union as such. The corset is the idea of a police state and of the domination of the party to hold all of the subject nationalities in place. So you can appreciate why I come to these very grim conclusions about the Soviet Union.

### **The actual economic situation**

I would like now to share with you some aspects of information from sources that I have obtained about the actual economic situation inside the Soviet Union today.

The state deficit of the Soviet Union for the year 1989 is over 100 billion rubles. And that is more than 11% of the gross national product of the country. The second thing is that there are basically no factories that are in a position to carry out the function of light industry, that is to serve light industry and allow light industry to produce consumer goods for the population.

The Soviets had obtained a line of credit of approximately 4 billion deutschemarks from Germany and the point of that was supposed to be to invest in the production of consumer goods inside the Soviet Union. What the Soviets have now done is, at a very late point in the game, they have now drawn DM3 billion out of that line of credit and what they are doing with that is attempting to buy consumer goods directly on the Western European market—not produce them themselves, but simply import them. It's very late.

Then we have the question of sugar. The sugar consumption inside the Soviet Union has gone up astronomically and

I am suggesting that this is because of illegal stills, that the people are brewing their own. This means on the one hand the Soviet state has lost 10 billion rubles in tax revenues that would have come through the legal production of this vodka. Because of a need to buy more sugar on the world market, they've also had to spend 10 billion on that.

There are, out of all the factories in the Soviet Union, only 13% that make a profit. The Soviets never admitted before that they had unemployment, but it would now appear that the jobless rate in the Soviet Union is at least 8% of the workforce. The Soviets have now admitted that the Chernobyl reactor disaster cost them approximately 10 billion rubles. I think that in reality the costs were much higher. The Armenian earthquake, slightly more than a year ago, cost them more than 10 billion rubles. The subsidies that they pay to keep the prices of food and other such goods down cost them approximately 100 billion rubles per year.

The accusation against Gorbachov that you hear both among the elite and among the masses is that you've got more millionaires who have made money under Gorbachov than under Brezhnev. Out of 280 million Soviet citizens, my estimate is that 46 million live under the survival minimum which is estimated to be 77 rubles per month. So 46 million are below 77 rubles per month. You have 50 million pensioners who seem to be expected to get along with a miserable pension of 58 rubles per month.

If you put these figures together, you will see that this is an empire of economic misery unequaled in world history. Thus, in the past year of 1989, in order to try and head off the internal revolution, the regime has raised the wages of teachers by 40%, they have raised the wages of medical doctors by 30%, they have raised the wages of nurses in the hospitals by 50%.

If you put this all together you will see that the wage increases that have now been granted make up about 14% across the board and no country is really in a position to do that, and certainly not the Soviet Union under these crisis circumstances.

By the end of 1989, there were about 30 billion rubles worth of construction projects, buildings that had been initiated that had not been completed. And because for technical reasons in these old building projects, projects that had been initiated earlier, the wages for the construction workers were lower, what the companies did was to simply walk away from the projects that they had begun and started new projects, with the idea you could get a better wage on the new project than you could on the old one.

### **Foreign policy**

Gorbachov has created an inflationary market of disarmament proposals—he has launched 42 disarmament proposals toward the West. Naturally, what he wants to do is to take away from us the idea that we're threatened. And of course he wants to propose that it's time to save money. But the

Soviet defense budget has not diminished. The real, or secret Soviet defense budget, the actual Soviet defense budget, except for a couple of percent here and there, in certain areas, has increased, not decreased. What is going on there is that the modernization of the military establishment continues and the old rusty junk is being gotten rid of and is being replaced with modern equipment.

I am not saying that Gorbachov is mainly, or alone, responsible for this. There are, after all, four principal pillars of power in the Soviet Union and although they're subordinated to the general secretary of the party, they nevertheless have a great deal of power, and a great deal of decision-making clout. You can see something similar today in East Germany, in Poland, in Hungary. You can see, for example, that the political police in all these countries, despite the fact that they've been disturbed, are continuing their activity, quite stubbornly.

In the Soviet Union, it's even easier, because of the tremendous territorial distances involved. It's possible to use that essentially, for certain factions to do what they want. What that means, in effect, is that along that path where Gorbachov wanted to advance rapidly, tremendous boulders are being put into his path, so that he cannot make the kind of forward progress that he wanted. But there is one accusation against Gorbachov which is correct. Gorbachov, it is certainly accurate for us to say, continues to conduct a two-faced policy, a double policy, which involves on the one hand a facade of certain kinds of proposals, and then underneath that, underground, destabilization of the Western world.

The activity of Soviet agents has not decreased. They have not been stopped. The Soviet help for terrorist organizations has become more cautious but it still exists. Take the example of the Philippines. This is an important question for the United States. In the Philippines, what we saw is a very important kind of link with the Communist world, with the Soviet Union in particular, which is to maintain that underground guerrilla army in the Philippines and to allow it to take offensive actions at various times.

### **The history of today's revolutions**

I would like now to ask for you to follow me into a brief historical analysis, which is designed to show you that it is correct to say that we are now, in the Soviet Union, at the end of a revolutionary process of insurrection by the masses.

We have to start by recognizing that the entire 19th century in the Russian and Soviet area was one big revolutionary period. Recall that the officers of the Czarist Army in that period of 1813-15 or 1816, had been through Western Europe, they had seen Western Europe, and they brought back to Russia, their experiences of the wars against Napoleon. This experience, the exposure to the West during the Napoleonic Wars, led to the insurrectionary movement of the Decembrists, the attempted Decembrist Revolution of 1825. At the same time, you have the beginnings of the underground

insurrectionary movement, the Narodniki, the "friends of the people," who were attempting to launch an agrarian revolution against the Czarist state. The Czar was forced in 1861 to liberate the serfs, at least to liberate them on paper, with a paper decree. So from about 1870 till 1910 or 1912, you have this wave of terrorism, waves of political assassination, conducted by the Narodniki and similar groups. During that time you've got the assassination of two czars, of prime ministers, of interior ministers, of untold numbers of grand dukes and other aristocrats, and all this was conducted under the cry of freedom, liberation from the Czars. So this is an experience that goes on, and is the background for the 1904-06 Revolution.

In 1902, you have the foundation of the Social Revolutionary Party; in 1905, the big Revolution itself, in Leningrad and elsewhere; in 1907, a coup d'état to carry out a change in the election law; and in 1917, as you know, the Kerensky Revolution of February to April. And, by October, or November, depending on which calendar you use, Lenin's putsch, which was really just a change in the elite, not much more. By 1928, you've got the mass liquidation and slaughter of kulaks, the rich peasants or well-off peasants, who were opposing the idea that their property was going to be taken away from them. And the kind of underground insurrectionary movement that you saw then, kept going in the Soviet Union until the time of the Second World War. This probably explains why the Ukrainians came forward smiling, with white flags, with gifts of food and other things, when the Wehrmacht came into Ukraine, they were greeted by the Ukrainians. That was naturally a terrible, horrible mistake that the Ukrainians were making. But what it shows is that the kind of revolutionary waves that I have been indicating in the 19th century, continued to roll through the 20th century. They continued to roll and they roll today. You don't really have to exercise too much imagination to see that historical background continues to influence decisively the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and now our own time.

There are various Stalinist explanations of what all that represented. The Stalinist justifications are that all of these were feudal residues who were fighting for their survival, but of course that's not true. These were actual popular insurrections, carried out by the people, with perhaps the help of a small part of the elites at various times. What they were fighting against, were the oppressive conditions inside a colonial empire of a thousand years.

### **Gorbymania**

Now I would like to treat for a second the personal situation of Gorbachov. It would be good to be able to see a little bit more—we may have to wait until the dust settles—but there are already some things we can see.

I would like to talk about Gorbymania and Gorby's magic. I would like to recall for you the opinion that was offered by Mikhail Suslov, the previous chief of cadre formation for

the Soviet Communist Party. He was of course the ideological pope of the Communist Party. Suslov said some years back that Gorbachov was an absolutely reliable man of the party who would never leave the straight and narrow path of the Communist Party. Remember that in 1971, when he was only 39 years old, Gorbachov became a member of the Central Committee, which at that time was an extraordinary promotion. He's now 59. He's been in politics for 34 years, from the time he was in the Young Communists, or Komsomol, to general secretary of the party. We should remember what his goals are. Also, as he shows what his goals are.

The first is that the Soviet Union must survive. That's fundamental for him. And it must survive as an empire, an imperial construct. The idea is that the Soviet Union has got to recover, and has got to resume its previous course. And the third step is to maintain this kind of double domination of the world, worldwide political dualism, U.S.-Soviet Union, but with the Soviets increasing their domination.

In Soviet leadership circles, inside their think tanks, they think that they can get back on the track let's say by 2015, or 2020. Gorbachov is therefore a man of the system. He seeks to preserve the system. The illusions that are cultivated in the West that he is some kind of a Westernizing liberal, are absurd. A couple of quotes that can show this: On June 19, 1986, in a secret speech to Soviet writers, Gorbachov said: "Our enemy knows who we are. They do not fear our nuclear power. They will not begin war." What Gorbachov then said was: "If we in the Soviet Union can create democracy, then we will win. That is decisive." The second quote is now from a secret speech to a closed session of the Central Committee on Jan. 27, 1987, and here he's explaining to the Central Committee what perestroika is designed to do: "It is not a question of destroying our political system, but it is a question of a better and more effective exploitation of its potentials."

Therefore, I think that it is a sober judgment, it's not an insult at all, it's amply justified by the facts, to say that what Gorbachov and his group want to do, what their positive goal is, is to save the system, and to save the imperial construct of the Soviet Union in all its forms. It's not a gratuitous insult to say that this system is the world champion of deception since 1917. I have examined my own conscience on this issue over the years, and have asked myself, "Aren't you really being unfair to Gorbachov, by putting him in the same category with all these other Soviet leaders?" and my conclusion is no, that's what he deserves; he is in that tradition.

The point is, that what Gorbachov is trying to do, is to obtain what he needs, i.e., the good will of the West, in this valley of exhaustion of the Soviet Empire. This can only be accomplished through this psychological manipulation, what you could call "Gorby's magic." And if you see Gorbachov's appearance on TV, we have to concede he has a remarkable talent for this kind of operation. I have also observed with consternation and a good deal of shame, the fact

that back last summer the Germans were some of the most taken by this Gorbymania. But that is now part of the past, because of three experiences that have taken place which have changed the situation decisively.

The first was the massacre in Tiananmen, the Square of Heavenly Peace in Beijing. The second was the opening up of the Hungarian border, and the third was the flight of approximately 350,000 East German refugees into the Federal Republic, people who were risking everything, bringing their small children and their families with them to come to freedom.

Today, the psychological scene in Central Europe has changed completely. The Germans have now heard from all their relatives out of the G.D.R. what the situation there is, how bad it is, and people can now, even in the last couple of weeks, go over and see with their own eyes what kind of misery communism has brought in the last 40 years. Now you have a situation in Germany, where even the average man in the street, who reads about these things in the newspapers every day, has a clear idea that the Gorbachov group is going to collapse, and the Gorbachov is going to collapse because of their incapacity to solve the main problems of their country.

### **The issue of German unity**

The most important experience that has come in the middle of that, is the attempt to deny German reunification in the context of freedom in the immediate future. Some may still think that the "German problem," the "German question," does not have this central position in world politics of today. But I would say, that the question of world peace in our time depends directly on our ability to solve or not to solve the national question of 80 million Germans in Europe. I am happy that even in Great Britain there are circles of insiders who see these things in a somewhat more sober way than they had in previous years.

I cannot hide the fact here that the visit by Secretary of State Baker to East Berlin, conducted in the spirit of Malta-Yalta or Myalta, has created a tremendous loss of friendship for the United States in Germany. Please understand: The Germans, for the first time in their history, and for the first time in European history, are attempting to conduct a revolution without violence in the Eastern part of the German population. In the middle of that, the American foreign minister shows up and meets with [East German Communist Prime Minister Hans] Modrow, and expresses his desire to strengthen Modrow, and his regime.

A second thing to note is French President Mitterrand. Mitterrand, obviously shocked by the rapid pace of events in Hungary, in Romania, in East Germany, in Poland, and so forth, also went to East Berlin and was willing to review an honor guard, the so-called Dzerzhinsky Regiment of the National People's Army of East Germany, despite the fact that this National People's Army of East Germany is a dead



## Bush troop cut plan would keep Red Army in East Germany

In President George Bush's State of the Union Address on Jan. 31, the President announced that he intended to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Western Europe to 195,000, and that he expected the Soviet Union to do the same in Eastern Europe, a topic he had already discussed with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachov. What does this mean for the security of the Federal Republic of Germany? And what does it mean for the process of German unity?

First, it should be noted that the presence of U.S. troops in the Federal Republic in the previous quantity and quality was an absolute necessity, and will continue to be so as long as the Soviet "Western Group of Forces" remains in East Germany with their capacity for *blitzkrieg* operations. But how long will the Soviet leadership be in the position to maintain this massive offensive military presence on the Elbe?

This has nothing to do with "peace policy" or "disarmament." Rather, it has to do with the rapidly progressing life-and-death crisis of the Soviet empire. The Soviet leadership—with or without Gorbachov—is faced with such an enormous "energy loss" and deterioration of forces as a result of the crisis, that the postwar *status quo* in Central Europe cannot be maintained. The Soviet leadership well knows that, ultimately, the attempt to rigidly maintain *all* strategic positions in an objectively weakened condition will lead to a further dissipation of the already-shrinking forces and thus possibly, the loss of all positions. Moscow's strategy consists of winning time to regenerate its own crisis-shaken position.

Therefore, Moscow is ready to make concessions on strategic "space." But this strategic "exchange," of time for space, is being completed under the most difficult of conditions, and there will not be any generous "prepayments." They will seek to disguise their own weakness, to bluff, and will only pull back if important considerations are given in return or their own position actually becomes fully untenable.

Cause and effect must not be confused. The actual dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the communist system in Central Europe is the result of revolutionary convulsions that can no longer be contained, not of Gorbachov's "reform policy." Gorbachov's portentous statement on Jan. 30, that he accepted German unity "in principle," means, first, that he recognizes that the situation in East Germany cannot economically and politically be maintained, and, second, that he will attempt to play for time while he "allows" the economic rehabilitation of East Germany by the Federal Republic.

Concretely and practically, the Soviet position means that German unity must not be forced by the pressure of the "street"—Gorbachov's understanding of the right of self-determining Germans—but that the victorious powers of the Second World War must have the final say. This was formulated with illuminating clarity by Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov in Gorbachov's presence.

### Thatcher, Bush echo Russians

Even the casual observer must be struck with the astonishing similarity of Gorbachov's statements on German unity, following his passionate embrace of East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow, to the statements made by British Prime Minister Thatcher and the Bush administration on the German question. German unity has never been contested "in principle" in London or Washington either—only it takes second priority to "stability," to "balance," and the rights of the superpowers, and

duck. But I am happy to note, that since then, Mitterrand and the government in France, have taken some very important steps for rapprochement to the West German position. This increased French understanding of the needs of the situation is reflected perhaps best in the decision of the president of the European Community Jacques Delors, who will allow East Germany to become the 13th member of the European Community, without any particular administrative and technical process. These are political steps that reflect the attempts of the people in the streets to define revolutionary-political solutions to these questions.

Because of the pressure of time, I cannot go into the

details of the various countries in the former Soviet glaxis in Eastern Europe. But I would like to sum up. First, there is total disagreement between the elites and the masses inside the Soviet Union. Second, we are witnessing a collapse of the authority of the Soviet state, and of course the proof of that is what you've seen last year in Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, this year in the Baltic region, in Lithuania especially, in the Transcaucasus. And then we have the crippling of the collective consciousness which necessarily leads to a failure and a collapse. The fact that the Gorbachov people have tried to put an end to the extreme hostility against the West, have tried to open up to the West, will not be enough

there is no reason to hurry. Mrs. Thatcher typically refers to the third millennium.

When President Bush announced that he intended to limit U.S. and Soviet troops in Europe to 195,000 each, he did not forget to add that he anticipated no further troop reduction. The "upper limit" is thus simultaneously a "lower limit" for superpower troops in Europe. Five years ago, against the background of the Strategic Defense Initiative plans for NATO overall at the time and a still-functioning Warsaw Pact, that would have been worth discussing. But now, Bush's proposal means the imposition of the presence of 195,000—unwanted—Soviet soldiers in Central Europe!

On closer examination of Bush's proposal, it emerges additionally that the space in which the 195,000 troops of the Soviets and the United States will be stationed, essentially merges together in West and East Germany. Given the present condition of the Soviet Union, it is in no position to maintain its troop presence in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The pressure from those peoples against the troops is simply too great. Also, the Soviet troop presence in Poland will obviously be reduced, so that in the foreseeable future there will only be Soviet logistical groups stationed there.

Thus, the Bush proposal aims, in its end result, at a continuing massive troop presence of the Soviet Western Group in East Germany. Conversely, it is now obvious that, in comparison with the Federal Republic, the small U.S. military presence in Great Britain, the Benelux states, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, as well as on the Iberian peninsula, will be further reduced. The mass of U.S. forces in Europe will stay in Germany.

The Bush proposal is in blatant contradiction to three foreseeable and in no way speculative strategic trends: 1) the further drain on Soviet forces that is to be expected through the intensifying economic and political crisis within the Soviet Union, which will make its forward military presence in East Germany increasingly difficult

but not mechanically impossible; 2) the expected rejection of further Soviet military occupation of East Germany by the population there; and, finally, 3) the process of German unity.

### To keep the Russians in?

We cannot escape the impression that Bush's proposal fundamentally alters the character of the U.S. troop presence in Germany. The Bush plan seems to have turned the previous NATO goal, "to keep the Russians out," into its opposite. Indeed, we might think that the dictum expressing Lord Ismay's goal for NATO, "to keep the Germans down," has been completely adopted by Bush. Unfortunately, all this indicates that Bush and Gorbachov came to the understanding at Malta to deploy, in the absence of any political and economic possibilities for influence and organization, their military presence in both parts of Germany in order to assert their power interests against the process of German unity and the coming into existence of a pan-European economic space from "Portugal to Poland."

Heretofore, the U.S. troop presence in the Federal Republic was commensurate with the objective and massive threat to Western Europe by the military power of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This threat is now in a process of change, but certainly hasn't ceased. The potential of Soviet military power, especially of the Western Group of Forces, is essentially intact. In harmony with the three strategic trends mentioned above—with regard to the Soviet Union, East Germany, and the process of German unity—Western security policy must aim, not at maintaining the Soviet military presence in east Central Europe, and especially in East Germany, but rather at ending that presence outside the borders of the Soviet Union.

Then, the Soviet Union can, as Lyndon LaRouche proposed in 1988, expect economic cooperation from West and Central Europe that will allow it to find a way out of its present life-and-death crisis.—*Michael Liebig*

to avoid this collapse.

We have in the Russian population, very important residues of messianic outlooks. Those messianic outlooks are still there. The question is that these messianic outlooks could lead the Soviet Union back to the path of military confrontation, especially under circumstances in which the military caste would assume power, or the state security apparatus. Up to now Gorbachov of course has been acting in close coordination with the state security apparatus but that could change and then you'd get the messianic element of that also becoming the dominant one.

Why don't we just take a look for a moment at the classi-

cal strategic factors, and see which way they point, negatively or positively. First is that the conditions of domination in the political structures have now been massively called into question. Secondly, again, there is no agreement between the masses and the elites. The human potential is no longer loyal, everybody wants to leave the sinking ship. The question of morale, the psychological factor, is at an absolute zero point. There's no spirit of self-sacrifice as in the Great Patriotic War, the Second World War. The level of psychology overall is depressive.

The third question is strategic potential. There we have to see that the Soviet available strategic potential is completely



inadequate for the tasks that the empire is trying to solve. The supply situation has collapsed; that really goes back to the Armenian earthquake. The biggest private fear of the Soviet leadership is the fear of a general strike by the coal miners and/or the railroad workers. The fact that they cannot solve their economic problems within the available time, the time for them to exist has run out.

The fourth question is space and the availability of the strategic potential. The transportation is not adequate today, it really wasn't adequate yesterday. This transportation system is now about to break down totally, especially if the winter gets a little bit more severe. And that means the availability of energy, of food supply, of producers' goods, all of that is put into question by the looming collapse of the transportation system.

The fifth question is strategic factor of time and acceleration. The time that the Soviets now have available is also down to zero. I would say, and I would agree with a number of other experts on this, that if the Soviets had started the so-called reforms back in 1975, they might have succeeded, but now it's too late. To put it in a medical or a hospital metaphor, we would have to say that this terminal disease has now gone so far that no medical care or doctors' attention is going to make any difference. Therefore, I simply cannot understand why people go around yelling, "Help Gorby! Help his group!" Without wanting to exaggerate my judgment, I simply think that anybody who bases a policy on that is committing a very severe error of leadership in our time.

We have a historical compulsion here, and nobody escapes this historical compulsion. If your name is Gorbachov, you don't escape this historical compulsion. If your name is Zaikov, if your name is Ryzhkov, if your name is Ligachov, if you're part of the Leningrad opposition group, all of those people are going to be forced into the track determined by historical compulsion. What is that? Simply, that the populations of the Soviet Union will no longer accept the old line. They want out. They won't go back to the previous system. Take the question of Ukraine. Remember there, what is the tradition? Between 1945 and 1950, for five long years, there was an underground army of 50,000 partisans who were fighting against Stalin until they were wiped out and bled to death. That tradition is not gone; that is the tradition that is coming again. The Ukrainians have their own language, they have their own feeling of nationality. In the case of Shcherbitsky, the old head of the Kiev mafia in Ukraine, he's been thrown out. But that will not stop this development of the Ukrainian national consciousness. This is the kind of situation any Soviet leadership would now have to deal with.

The next question, the fundamental one: Is the reform process irreversible? That means under conditions when Gorbachov remains in power, or could remain in power. This is, of course, the big question that busies all the foreign ministries of the Western world. I would say up to now that nothing is irreversible. So Gorbachov may stay in power for a little

bit longer, but the process of destruction and the decomposition has now gone so far, the psychological attitudes of the masses and the elites are now so negative, Gorbachov now has no chance to accomplish anything, and whatever he attempts will get out of hand and will boomerang. We have to see with a very sober judgment, that historically there's nothing more to be had, from this development. We've had this tremendous imperial apparatus confronting us in history, and it has now reached this level.

### **A process of catharsis**

So we would have to say that nothing is irreversible, and all of these so-called reforms, are not irreversible. That's going to be the case no matter who may be in power. What I see as inevitable, is that we're going to go through what the Greeks called a catharsis: The entire contemporary world is going to participate in or witness the catharsis of this tremendous empire. The problem is that we've had this huge imperial body that has been poisoned over a period of 100, 200, 300, 500 years if you will, back to 1480, since the time that the Russians succeeded in freeing themselves from the Mongols. These negative tendencies have been with them, particularly the tendency of rejective Westernizing, modernizing reforms. The pro-Western forces have always been defeated—Peter the Great is an example of this. You can see it in the 17th century, and today you see it on the part of very strong forces who reject anything that has to do with Westernizing or what they call capitalist influences.

Another important question that we've got to mention, is, is the United States a paper tiger in the Soviet view or not? You recall that Mao Zedong, starting from his Leninist-Stalinist outlook, always ridiculed the U.S. as a paper tiger. It is a life or death question for all of us today to see how that question is seen inside the military leadership of the Soviet Union. Do they think the U.S. is a paper tiger or not?

I'm expressing this with a certain caution, but I would say that the developments on the part of the U.S. government over the most recent period—bearing in mind that these things used to be somewhat better—do not create a positive framework for this question. Please recall that I consider myself to be an Atlanticist; my basic strategic starting-point is that the two coasts of the Atlantic and the 6,000 kilometers of sea lanes in the middle are the vital transport and communication artery of the Western world. This has got to be held, the two sides have got to stay together.

But I also think that it is my responsibility, as someone who perhaps knows a little bit more through the information I am able to assemble, if I know a bit more on these questions I am also obligated to speak out. I would say it in the following way: If the Red Army marshals—that is to say, the marshals of the Red Army as a leadership of this military caste or military elite—come to the conclusion that by threats they can force the U.S. to their knees, then we will have a military confrontation in the coming year, perhaps next year, but

it could also come this year. You just have to look at the Azerbaijan question. Look at the south part of the Transcaucasus. If you want to solve your internal problems by an external adventure, and if you are convinced that the dominant power of the Western world is a paper tiger that won't shoot back, then you have important opportunities.

To put the Israeli question on the agenda, the Turkish question, all of these questions, posed as the Soviets would pose them, to put them on the agenda becomes an ongoing concern. I have not mentioned the Iranians. I don't want to forget the Iranians because that is also very important. History shows us, that if you have a power which is positioned with its back to the wall, with no alternative and no way out, then that can lead to anything, and we cannot exclude anything.

I at the age of 71, travel around the world, give press conferences, speak to university audiences and so forth, and what do I want to obtain with this? What I'm interested in doing is fighting the blinding of the Western world by Gorbachov and by his operation. The last couple of months have seen these tremendous, popular revolutions from below in Eastern Europe, and I conclude that under these circumstances, former directors of intelligence agencies like myself and also the active ones have a lot to say and are obligated to come forward with it.

Before, I said that the "German question" is the key question of world peace, and that is no exaggeration. Remember 1922. After the Versailles Treaty, after Germany had lost the first World War, the victorious powers undertook a very ill-advised policy that forced Germany into fascism. Recall that in 1922 at Rapallo, Lenin's diplomacy, on the part of the revolutionary Soviet Union, attempted to say that the Germans have been defeated, the Russians have been defeated, let's go in together in an alliance. If my information is correct, if we have a situation where the national aspirations of unity for the German population are blocked, then something similar could happen. This is, of course, what Gorbachov is interested in. Gorbachov is opposed to German reunification. He is talking about the denuclearization of Germany, the neutralization of Germany, and so forth. The Russians are attempting to make friends in Europe with this, because the Germans are perhaps not popular in Europe, I understand this. But in order to express this I would go back to the Bible and say that you don't want to sell your heritage for a mess of pottage.

I would say, as I have been taught, that politics is a way of meeting strategic challenges and strategic compulsions. I would say that the "German question" ought to be solved in the context of European unification. Leadership, as I also learned, is first of all a question of setting priorities. So I would say that in order to look at the priorities today, the compulsions, you've got to let the Germans live together in peace and freedom and not engage in a policy of balance of power against the Germans. One last word

## LaRouche, not Reagan put Russians to the wall

In a private discussion with strategic analysts in the United States, General Scherer made the following observation: "We have to remember that in many ways it has been the SDI, or at least the threat of the SDI, that has driven the Russians to the wall. The SDI, even as a perspective, terrified the Russians. I saw a letter to the editor of *Time* magazine, commenting on the issue that had Gorby on the cover. The letter pointed out that the changes in Eastern Europe and elsewhere were not Gorbachov's achievement, but rather Reagan's achievement. There is something to that, but the adequate way to put the matter is to say that it was really not so much Reagan who can take credit, but [Lyndon] LaRouche, since it was LaRouche who actually designed the SDI as a policy. LaRouche—maybe along with Reagan—but LaRouche was the one who has now got the Soviets with their backs to the wall. This is something that we ought to hammer on, to get the media to begin to reflect it."

on the quest for domination by mankind on this blue planet of ours. It's likely that there will always be a quest or a search for dominance among the powers, the big ones, the medium ones, the little ones, it's sort of like the chicken coop where these things go on. You cannot roll back a military-technological revolution once it's happened, and therefore a denuclearization, the idea of getting nuclear weapons out of the world, is a utopia.

This is one of the attempts of the Kremlin to blind the Western world. They're trying to make us think that if we get rid of nuclear weapons, then you've got guaranteed peace. It's not true. We have the anthropological fact that there will be this continued struggle for domination but what we've got to make sure is that this militant aggressivity of the Soviet Union, be contained, especially if in the revolutionary vortex that the Soviets are now experiencing should come a renewed impulse toward military domination, we have got to be in a position to contain that in a military way. In the last days of World War II, as a young officer, I saw that there is some raw material of the beast in each one of us.

My parting word today is: "Keep your powder dry!" This is not an exaggeration or a dramatization. This is simply a sober estimate of the strategic situation.