

## How Kohl went with the LaRouche policy

Although the toppling of the Berlin Wall on Nov. 11 seemed to many like a bolt out of the blue, it was not so to those Western political and economic leaders not blinded to their zeal to bolster Mikhail Gorbachov's utterly failed perestroika restructuring program in the East bloc. Information is now turning up indicating that by mid-1989, a grouping around West German Helmut Kohl had paid careful attention to the recommendation issued by U.S. economist Lyndon LaRouche late in 1988, that the West offer Moscow substantial help in rebuilding the East European economies, in exchange for a Russian acquiescence to German reunification.

Chancellor Kohl reportedly first conveyed such a message to Gorbachov and the Soviet leaders at the peak of the refugee crisis in August-September 1989, and did so again in early December after the fall of the first transition government of the communists in East Berlin on Dec. 3.

Details of Kohl's communication with Gorbachov in 1989 are not known, but sources close to the chancellor leaked that he made an offer of the following kind: West Germany would provide substantial economic and financial assistance to reforms in the Soviet Union, for Eastern Europe and East Germany, on the condition that Moscow give the official go-ahead for German reunification and for a stabilization of the political reform process in all of the East European glacis. Kohl made the condition that a reunified Germany would remain in the Western alliance,

and that it be a nation living under the Western paradigm of values. The chancellor urged Gorbachov to meet with him on the German issue as soon as possible, to have the stabilization of the East German economy begin without any further delay.

Kohl's message was buried in the drawers of the Kremlin, the reason being, as sources close to the chancellor believe, that Gorbachov was opting for a major strategic breakthrough at his scheduled Dec. 2-3 summit with U.S. President Bush at Malta, such that Soviet concessions on the German question would be unnecessary. In other words, Gorbachov, who is closely tied to the Anglo-American financial circles known as the "Trust," chose to collaborate with the American establishment spokesman Bush, whose country, as the Soviets should have known, was certainly not in a favorable economic condition to come forth with anything attractive to help the Kremlin out of its economic convulsions. Moreover, given the wreck which the U.S. economy has become, Bush would not have been able to help Gorbachov, even if Bush had wanted to do so.

Meanwhile, throughout the summer and early autumn of 1989, official Soviet propaganda kept hammering on Kohl's policy as being "revanchistic" and a "threat to peace and stability in Europe," and the ruling East German communist party, the SED, launched a broad campaign against the alleged "threat of neo-fascism encouraged by West Germany."

Thus, although Kohl's first personal encounter in December in Dresden with Hans Modrow, East Germany's transitional prime minister, was not unsuccessful in that at least it paved the way toward future rapprochement between the two German governments, Kohl's initiative for broader East-West cooperation was blocked and neglected by Gorbachov throughout December and January.

for over a year, that unless Mr. Gorbachov can put food on the table of the Russian people, that he's doomed, and that whoever can put food on the Russian table, is the accepted leader of all the Russians. . . . Mr. Gorbachov has caught on to the principle of the golden goose. Now, this doesn't require any great amount of learning on Mr. Gorbachov's part, since everybody in Moscow knows that the G.D.R. and the Czech economies were the backbone of the Soviet economy, and without the Czech and G.D.R. economies, the whole Russian economy goes ge-flop!"

Gorbachov himself, in an interview published in the *Pravda* Feb. 21, praised Chancellor Kohl as a "man of peace," which is even the more remarkable, as Kohl was addressing a crowd of 150,000 East Germans at a campaign

event of the anti-socialist Alliance for Germany in the city of Erfurt.

Gorbachov went out of his way to stress that "the Germany of today is different. . . . There is no denying the German people have learned the lessons from Hitler's rule. . . . New generations matured in both German states. Their view of Germany's role in the world is different from the one that existed over the past 100 or so years and particularly in the period of Nazism."

Gorbachov pledged that the "Soviet Union will not stand in the way of German unity," claiming that the Soviet Union "has never stood in the way" of German unity in the past 40 years. Gorbachov gave a chronological rendition of past Soviet proposals for the creation of a united Germany, listing

## Gorbachov's overdue response

At the beginning of February, Gorbachov suddenly sent a message to Bonn that he would like to see Chancellor Kohl in Moscow Feb. 10-11. The request for a meeting was presented as having the status of "utmost urgency," according to sources around Kohl in Bonn. Apparently, this was the long-expected official response from Gorbachov to the Kohl initiative of early December. The only reasonable explanation for Gorbachov's move was that he realized he was in deep trouble and recalled Kohl's offer, and was possibly willing to grant concessions on the German reunification issue in return for substantial economic aid from West Germany.

Whether aspects of this high-level communication between Bonn and Moscow got leaked to some analysts, or whether it was "in the air" by accident—the new situation was reflected at the International Wehrkunde Conference in Munich Feb. 2-4. Here, at the annual, high-powered gathering of about 200 leading NATO politicians, military and strategic analysts, the German issue and Moscow's views on it had become the center of the entire discussion.

In the midst of the heated discussion at that gathering, several speakers pointed out that the crisis of the Soviet empire has reached a point of no return. Moscow had only two options: either go in the direction of a military strike abroad or crackdown internally, or both; or, grant concessions in exchange for economic help.

"The Red Army," said Karl Kaiser, president of the German Foreign Policy Institute in Bonn, "can't really be used anymore for the reconquest of Eastern Europe . . . the classic instrument of Kremlin power politics, the military, has lost its geographical base of operation because of the changes caused by the revolutionary developments of the recent past."

"There are democracies in all of Eastern Europe now," said Kaiser, "and this means their armies would fight against the Red Army, should it try to reconquer what was lost on the political level. Even the NVA [East German army] would defend the G.D.R. achievements against Moscow."

While Kaiser, like most of the conference attendees, warned that the volatility of the situation in the Soviet Union meant immense dangers to peace, the former Dutch minister of defense, Willem van Eekelen, made an effort to spread confidence that Gorbachov's internal weakness would force him to make substantial concessions to the West. Van Eekelen said there was no time anymore for unconditional, Malta-style arms control concessions of the West to Moscow: "The West should not pay any price for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. . . . The Soviets actually have only few options left, so I think that in the context of discussing troop level cuts, we should not pay any price when there is no need to pay a price."

Van Eekelen said that with "some good deal of certainty, the Warsaw Pact military organization will disintegrate, the Soviets will withdraw all their troops from Eastern Europe, and I am very certain that German reunification will come anyway. So why pay a price for something that is going to happen anyway?"

As for the confusion in the West about Gorbachov's strength, van Eekelen declared, "Gorbachov is a great prober. He tries something, to see if it works, and when it doesn't work, he'll come up with something else. So we should wait until he comes up with something else."

As the developments around Gorbachov's meeting with Kohl in Moscow documented, van Eekelen's evaluation was quite accurate. The Soviet leader made concessions.—*Rainer Apel*

March 1952 (the Stalin Note proposing a reunified but demilitarized Germany), the 1955 meeting of the Four Power foreign ministers, 1957, 1958, and finally again in 1959. He blamed the West for having prevented all these past chances for German unity from having materialized.

"The Germans themselves should decide on the state forms, the timing, and conditions for realizing their unity," Gorbachov said. But having said this, he proceeded to list as conditions the inviolability of European borders, including special guarantees for Poland's borders, and measures to preserve the "security" and "stability" in Europe. He did not cite neutrality of Germany as a condition. Gorbachov did reiterate what formed the centerpiece of the demands he put forward to Kohl in Moscow,

namely economic conditions. Gorbachov stressed that German unification must not mean "moral, political or economic damage" for the U.S.S.R.

The reunification of Germany will cause no damage; indeed, it will help to repair the damage left behind by 70 years (in the Soviet case) or 45 years (in the case of Eastern Europe and the eastern part of Germany) of ruinous socialist policies. LaRouche's proposal for a productive triangle of industrial activity from Paris to Vienna to Berlin, thereby combining and developing the vast potentials of a reunified German nation with those of its most important neighbor and ally in the West, France, and of the neighbors in the East like Poland and Czechoslovakia, would work like an assembly line for laying "golden eggs."