

The 'Gorbachov myth' died at the Washington summit

by William Jones

Commenting on the conclusion of the May 31-June 3 summit meeting between Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachov, Virginia congressional candidate and political prisoner Lyndon LaRouche had this to say: "It became clear, as of Sunday, the third of June, that the six-year-long effort to 'eat the inedible' has failed. Since December 1984, when Mrs. Thatcher acquired her strange crush on then-prospective Soviet dictator Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachov, until the present, the United States, as well as Britain, and many other parts of the world, have been seized by a delusion: a delusion that a condominium, a new form of world rule established jointly by Moscow and the Anglo-American governments, could succeed. Everything was thrown into that. And now, as of Sunday, the third of June, all that is gone."

Whatever happens to Gorbachov personally, LaRouche said, the Gorbachov myth has died. The summit meeting itself was a colossal failure. *Bush got nothing, because Gorbachov is no longer in a position of power from which he could continue to deliver anything.* He has lost his potency.

After visits to the friends of Dwayne Andreas in Minnesota and to businessmen and to former President Ronald Reagan in California, Gorbachov returned to the Soviet capital, where one of his chief opponents, Boris Yeltsin, had made himself into a dominant figure. As Gorbachov was winning applause and praise from the U.S. liberal media and foundations in Washington, Yeltsin, having won the election to the post of president of the Russian Republic in spite of intense personal lobbying against him by Gorbachov, was calling for a declaration of the Russian Republic's sovereignty and for decentralizing authority in the U.S.S.R.

Discussing Yeltsin's power bid, LaRouche pointed out that the process of which Gorbachov is a part has somewhat overtaken the Soviet leader himself. Gorbachov is "trying to walk two or three different poles across a chasm at the same time, when the poles are diverging, and so Mr. Gorbachov is having great difficulty in spreading his seat on both poles simultaneously."

At the same time, in both the Soviet Union and the Anglo-

American domain, there is a collapse of the economic process, the financial process, which can no longer be denied.

So, LaRouche said, we have a collapse of the two pedestals of Anglo-American policy, of Thatcher-Bush policy.

The first is the delusion that Mrs. Thatcher's monetarism can be a substitute for a healthy economy; that you can kill a healthy body in order to save the cancer, and end up with a sound economy—a delusion which Mr. Bush has so far borrowed from Mrs. Thatcher.

The second is the delusion that a free-market policy can be extended to the Soviet empire, and that delusion was shot down at the Washington summit. "Mr. Gorbachov might survive," LaRouche said, "but he'll survive only because he's convenient to a transition away from the policies which Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Bush had at least pretended to represent Mr. Gorbachov as embodying. That is, Mr. Gorbachov might become a Stalin or something. But so far, he's looking like a transitional figure, and unless he becomes a vehicle of a new transition, away from what he was transiting to before, he is doomed."

As for Mrs. Thatcher, her response to Gorbachov's predicament and Bush's predicament, LaRouche noted, punctuates the current ironic situation. She announced that, during her upcoming trip to the Soviet Union, she will campaign among the Soviet people for them to continue to support Mr. Gorbachov. "Imagine that!" LaRouche said. "The old nanny is going off to Kiev and other such locations to instruct the Russian people that they absolutely must, they must, they *must*, continue to support that wonderful Mr. Gorbachov. How nice. What a spectacle! Mrs. Thatcher has placed herself in front rank in the contest for historic mention as the greatest fool of the 20th century."

And where does that leave George Bush?

Bush's appeasement policy

As *EIR* has emphasized, contrary to the conventional wisdom that Bush would use the summit to try and prop up Gorbachov, in fact the reverse is true: Bush needs the

appearance of successful U.S.-Soviet relations in order to prop *himself* up (see *EIR*, April 20, 1990, "Appeasement emboldens Moscow into new strategic offensive"). Because of the deepening U.S. economic crisis, we wrote, in order to get himself through next November's elections, Bush needs to hold out the prospect of massive future profits to be made in the Soviet market—even if these profits never materialize.

Events at the summit confirm this view, as the President comes under growing attack domestically.

The "George and Gorby Show" broke up after the official signing of all the agreements which Gorbachov came to Washington to bag, including a major trade agreement—an agreement which President Bush, up until the eve of the actual signing, was saying couldn't be signed.

"By golly, there's Korea all over again, there's SALT II all over again. . . . Here we are giving in to weakness and reversing it in a George Orwell sort of style: Because they're weak, we ought to make them strong and give in to them."—Amb. Edward Rowny

The most volatile reactions against the President's policy were heard over the issue of Lithuania, the most blatant of his groveling about-faces during the course of the summit. President Bush continually stated during the summit that there would be no possibility for signing any trade pact with the Soviets unless they change their policy with regard to Lithuania and also pass a law allowing unrestricted emigration of Soviet Jews, which is under consideration by the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies. In a letter that Bush wrote to the Soviet leader four weeks before the summit, Bush indicated that the trade treaty was a political land-mine that Congress was unlikely to approve without these two conditions being met. Just before Gorbachov arrived in Washington, White House officials had informed the new Soviet ambassador to Washington, Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, that the trade treaty would not be among the documents Mr. Bush was willing to approve at a signing ceremony with Gorbachov scheduled for June 1.

Nevertheless, acceding to the pleas and threats of the Soviet leader (Gorbachov had indicated that the Soviets would not sign a long-term grain agreement if they didn't get a trade treaty), Bush agreed to sign the treaty. In an effort to appease domestic criticism of the agreement, Bush said that he would not send the treaty to Congress until the Soviets pass their emigration law, but made no mention of Lithuania.

When questioned on this, Secretary of State James Baker III lied that there had never been "an expressed linkage" between Soviet actions in Lithuania and the signing of a trade treaty.

The other issue of importance for the Soviet President was German reunification. During the summit, Gorbachov presented a "surprise" proposal with regard to German reunification, a proposal which was left for further negotiations between the foreign ministers. Although details of the discussion were not released, the proposal seems to involve Germany belonging to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliances, or the dissolution of both pacts and the upgrading of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which comprises all the European nations, except Albania, as well as the United States, Canada, and the U.S.S.R. as a new "policeman" for Europe.

This proposal was based on the concept of the Holy Alliance, which was established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 as the overseer of Europe. Its aim was to protect the European monarchies against republican ideas and movements. Although President Bush made no public agreement with Gorbachov on this issue, the White House made clear that there were possibilities of upgrading the status and function of the CSCE group.

'Ill-advised' concessions on arms control

A growing crescendo of criticism was also raised against the envisioned strategic arms treaty, which the two Presidents pledged to complete this year. The joint statement expressing that pledge was subject to hectic last-minute negotiations in which Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze were called in to hastily paste some agreement together together in order to have something for the two leaders to sign.

The still-unresolved issues include the limitations on Moscow's modernization of its massive SS-18 missiles, a dispute over its Backfire bombers, and questions over U.S. cooperation with Britain on the Trident submarine missile project.

Even former arms control negotiator Amb. Edward L. Rowny, a special adviser to President Bush for arms control, called the U.S. concessions "ill-advised." The real lollapalooza was allowing the Soviets to continue modernizing their most powerful missile, the 10-warhead SS-18. In order to avoid a conflict over Soviet insistence that the Backfire bomber be excluded from a START agreement, Baker agreed to exclude the Backfire from START, but said that it should be limited in a side agreement.

"In my opinion," said Rowny, "we have adopted a number of compromises that we need not have adopted. I just sat there and I thought: By golly, there's Korea all over again, there's SALT II all over again. . . . Here we are giving in to weakness and reversing it in a George Orwell sort of style: Because they're weak, we ought to make them strong and give in to them."