

U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade (1981-85). The proposals were covered in an opinion column he wrote for the German daily *Tageszeitung*. Anderson called for the stationing of NATO ground and air forces in Hungary and Slovenia, plus NATO forces in the Republic of Makedonija, all linked to a military intervention in Bosnia. The goal of this intervention, in Anderson's own words, "sounds brutal . . . and indeed it is brutal," but allegedly the "only" feasible solution, would be to police "forced exchanges of populations" and "territories." Ethnic cleansing from above!

Signalling that an intervention along these lines is being planned, on Feb. 15, U.S. Gen. John Shalikashvili, NATO Commander-in-Chief, arrived in the Hungarian capital of Budapest for two days of consultations.

As Lyndon LaRouche warned, the result of such an intervention with the wrong war goals will be that "a widening of the war in the Balkans will soon follow." As he was writing, the pieces were continuing to fall into place. Meetings and diplomacy were cementing the "classic" Balkan war axes, formed by Albania and Bulgaria prodded by Turkey on one side, and Greece, Romania, and Serbia on the other.

Greece's irrationally hostile stance against the Republic of Makedonija has deprived Athens of one possibility to break up this fatal geometry, by using Greece's geography and economic leverage to forge a stable Slavic Makedonian neighbor.

On Feb. 15, Turkish President Turgut Özal began an unprecedented tour by a Turkish head of state of Bulgaria, Makedonija, Albania, and Croatia. Özal's trip was discussed with the Clinton administration during his prolonged early February stay in Washington. In Bulgaria, Özal reiterated demands that Bulgaria allow the Turkish Army to pass through Bulgarian territory to former Yugoslavia. In Skopje, the capital of Makedonija, Özal did not confine his attacks on Greece to the issue of recognizing the Slavic Makedonian republic, but launched an inflammatory diatribe against alleged Greek mishandling of the 120,000 Turkish minority in western Thrace.

On Feb. 13, the Turkish President addressed a crowd of 10,000 in Istanbul, who were rallying to demand that the Turkish army intervene in the Balkans. Özal demanded an immediate end to the bloodshed in Bosnia, and called for international military intervention. Then there was a two-day meeting in the Albanian capital of Tirana between Albanian President Sali Berisha and Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zheliev, which led to the signing of a Bulgarian-Albanian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. It is not known whether this treaty contains any hidden military clauses. On the same weekend, Greek Foreign Minister Michael Papaconstantinou arrived in Bucharest for talks with Romanian President Ion Iliescu. The talks produced a Greek-Romanian joint declaration rejecting any form of military intervention in former Yugoslavia.

## Croatian journalist: How appeasement of Serbia led to war

*Srecko Jurdana is a Croatian journalist currently on tour in the United States. He visited political prisoner Lyndon LaRouche in Rochester, Minnesota on Feb. 8, and has been conducting lectures and private meetings in various cities, including Washington, D.C., where he has met with numerous congressional officials.*

*He was the founder and editor of the magazine Film, which was published in Zagreb between 1975 and 1980, and was seen as an opposition magazine by the post-Tito government. He worked as a film critic and cultural essayist for Radio Zagreb, and was constantly attacked during the early 1980s for being an anti-communist and ultra-conservative. By the middle of the 1980s he was unable to remain inside Yugoslavia, and therefore lived in Germany between 1985 and 1989. He went back to Zagreb in 1989 and began his present activity as a journalist. He has contributed frequently to the newspaper Vjesnik in Zagreb and Vecernji List. In recent months, he has been an eyewitness to some of the sieges and other military operations in former Yugoslavia. He was present at the siege of Vukovar in the fall of 1991, and he covered the war in central Bosnia in 1992.*

*The following speech was delivered to the Schiller Institute in Leesburg, Virginia on Feb. 10:*

Let me give you a review of the principal events in the war against Croatia and Bosnia. In order to understand how this war might end, we must know what preceded it. In 1988 or 1989, one of the leading generals of the federal Yugoslav Army, Branko Mamula, who was minister of defense, visited London, and there he met with some key people who influenced British policy, among them, of course, Mr. Fitzroy Maclean, all Tito's friends during the course of World War II. At this meeting, Mr. Mamula said clearly, that the only way to stop the expansion of Germany would be through Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is the principal obstacle to German influence. That is the intention of these people—and it didn't take much intelligence to predict that this was a clear indication of an imminent war in Yugoslavia.

It was also very clear how this war would start: a Serbian rebellion in the Croatian provinces, where Serbs make up a significant part of the population. According to some estimates, 20% is the limit, over which Serbs tend to show an inclination to rebel. The center of this was Knin, a Serbian

stronghold in Croatia. In 1989-90, people put first barricades on the roads in order to stop the traffic between the northern part and southern part of Croatia. This happened during the Mediterranean Games, drawing the attention of the world's media. Many tourists were on their way back home to Europe and had to pass through the barricades, and this was an opportunity for them to attract as much attention as they could.

At this time I wrote an article for *Vecernji List*, in which I rather sharply attacked the hesitation of [President Franjo] Tujman's cabinet. I said: It won't get you anywhere to do nothing. What you should do is to create a re-blockade of the Serbs, to encircle Knin and the places with barricades, with Croatia militia forces, and to establish a 20-kilometer cordon, a kind of no man's land, in between.

In this way, the connection with Serbia would be broken, but it wouldn't cause a direct confrontation between Croatians and Serbs. It would demonstrate Croatian strength toward the Serbs, a determination not to allow the rebellion, without direct confrontation. Instead of this, the Croatian government did nothing, waiting for something to happen next.

Very predictably, the next thing was Banja. These are all well-known places from World War II. The principal demand from the Serbian side after the general Serbian attack on Croatia became obvious, was that the territory of the Republic of Croatia must be reduced to the line Karlobag-Virovitica. Karlobag is on the Adriatic coast, and Virovitica is a small city near the Hungarian border. This line, according to Serbian pretensions, would be the border of reduced Croatia.

The rest of the territory—that is, western Slavonia and eastern Slavonia, the coastal and interior regions of Croatia—would become Greater Serbia. This was the principal aim of the war.

But the war did not come instantly; it was well planned a long time ago. And I will tell you how it was planned.

### **A long-term Serbian strategy**

The federal Yugoslav Army, in its strategic plans, developed a so-called defensive line of very strong military facilities—barracks, underground storage facilities—and accumulated huge quantities of weapons, ammunition, and anything else that would be needed for a huge war, against anybody, exactly on this line. The principal barracks of the federal Yugoslav Army were lined up at Virovitica, Bjelovar, Petrinja, Karlovac, and Knin, of course. This area was covered with military facilities of the federal Yugoslav Army, on the pretext that this would be the main defensive line against a presupposed attack from the *Austrian* side! Very interesting. Very clever. The name of the game was to create a Serbian stronghold, for when the time would become ripe for a general Serbian attack on Croatia. This also means that the Serbs did not have any illusions about "Yugoslavia," whatsoever. They knew very well what "Yugoslavia" was.

So, it all started at Knin. In World War II, some of the most brutal Chetnik groups came from the region of Knin. They committed terrible war crimes against civilians in this area, the interior of Dalmatia, principally against Croatians, but also against Serbs who wouldn't cooperate with them. This was the Chetniks' so-called Dinara Division—Dinara is the name of a mountain here—which was led by an Orthodox priest, Momcilo Juic, who called himself a Chetnik duke. Momcilo Juic, now in his late 80s, is living in California. He has a big ranch at San Marcos, where he managed to build an Orthodox church. He has, in the meantime, 1989-90, initiated Mr. Vojislav Seselj [the present-day leader of the Chetniks] into the Chetnik order, and proclaimed him his successor, a duke. When Mr. Seselj returned to Serbia, to start the war brutality, he had the blessing of Momcilo Juic personally, which added to his charisma, so to speak.

In spite of many demands from the former Tito government, Momcilo Juic was never extradited to Yugoslavia as a war criminal, although he was generally recognized as this; unlike Andrija Artukovic, the former Croatian minister of justice in the Croatian independent state during World War II, who also lived in California, who was extradited and sentenced to death in a Zagreb court, and who died in prison there.

This was the history of Knin. It was quite natural that the modern rebellion would start here. But along the above-mentioned military line from Karlobag to Virovitica, the rebellion very quickly spread into Kordun and Banja, and western Slavonia. Those are exactly the places where the federal Yugoslav Army had strongholds, the strongest potential for warfare.

### **Croatian government does nothing**

Now, when it was obvious that the war was imminent, the war was spreading against Croatia, the Croatian government was still hesitating, because strong pressure, parallel political activity from abroad, came along with the Serbian attacks. That is, the stronger the Serbian attacks were, the stronger were the British and French accusations against Croatia for its fascism, Ustasha crimes, and so on, in order to politically disarm Croatia, to deny it the right to defend itself. And when Croatia started to organize its defense, it was said, "No, Croatia is going to commit genocide against the Serbs; they are right, because you are Ustashas, you are connected to the Nazis," and so on. And so all these Serbian moves went on without any moves from the Croatian side.

The Serbs saw that they had in fact a free hand from the international community, from the British and French. They decided to hit very hard. So an organized attack started from Vojvodina, previously annexed to Serbia, over the Danube River.

This general attack on Croatia in eastern Slavonia, which was followed by the famous battle of Vukovar, could have been very simply prevented, if only the Croatian government



*War correspondent Srečko Jurdana: The Serbs from the very beginning did not hide what they were up to. For the international community, there was no excuse.*

had had some courage to do this. The Danube River is very wide here, very hard to cross—for an untrained federal army, almost impossible to cross. There are only two bridges here; these bridges could be mined; they could be blown up without any problem. In fact, the local people knew what was going to happen, and they made all the preparations, got explosives, everything was there on the spot, and they got on the telephone to Zagreb and said, “We have prepared everything, we can stop them, just give us a nod to blow these bridges up.” Zagreb gave the strictest orders *not* to do this, because it could *provoke* the Serbs to attack.

Finally, when the government started to contemplate the possibility of blowing the bridges up, the Serbs already had five divisions on the Croatian side. The battle of Vukovar had begun.

### **The battle of Vukovar**

The attack on Vukovar began with the infamous killing of 15 Croatian policemen.

Serbs had first kidnapped two Croatian policemen from the police station at Vinkovci, near Vukovar. They had taken them to Borovo Selo, a suburb of Vukovar. After that they telephoned to Vinkovci and said, “If you want your men back, come to Borovo Selo and then we’ll negotiate.” The Croatians responded very naively. Fifteen men jumped into a bus and went to Borovo Selo to negotiate with the Serbs the return of their two colleagues. They were ambushed by a large group of Chetniks, shot below the knees in order to

make them helpless, and then they were massacred en masse, their eyes were dug out, and so on. This was the first slaughter in the war. After that, the man who led this ambush on the Serbian side, Vukasin Soskocanin, appeared on Novi Sad television, and admitted openly what had happened. He said: I killed six Croatians, and I’ll kill 600 more. The Serbs, from the very beginning, did not hide what they were up to. For the so-called international community, there was no excuse that they didn’t know what was going on. No! The Serbs were doing this from the very beginning, and they were openly saying so on television.

The battle of Vukovar had started. Let us analyze some of the most important events.

The battle of Vukovar lasted almost three months. It started in a very curious way. First there were some Serbian shellings from the other side of the Danube River, and the Croatian government decided to pull the children out of Vukovar and to move them to the Croatian islands, to Losinj. After a couple of weeks, they said, “The school year is about to begin, and anyway, the Serbs are not so mad as to attack the city, so we’ll bring the children back into the town.” They put them into buses and returned them to Vukovar. And at that very moment, when the children were getting off the buses in a central Vukovar square, the general shelling of Vukovar began, with this very square as a principal target. So these children had to be immediately evacuated to shelters and cellars, and they practically did not come up to the light of day until the fall of Vukovar.

That is another example of the naive behavior of the Croatian government concerning this war.

The course of the battle of Vukovar is well known. On the Croatian side some 1,800 men resisted bravely the general, all-out Serbian attack—armored units, tanks, artillery on a massive scale, aviation, anything that was at the Serbs’ disposal. Yet, they were losing.

First of all, the battlefield of Vukovar was very carefully, very cleverly, covered with mines. Croatians managed to surround Vukovar with minefields. So the Serbs suffered very heavy losses of tanks. Secondly, the defenders developed a well-known, but still very interesting, anti-tank tactic. In later phases of the battle, they were letting tanks come into the town, almost to the center of the town, where the streets are narrow. They destroyed the first and last one, and what remained in between, the column of tanks, was basically helpless, and almost all were destroyed. Still, the Serbs kept falling into the trap. “The road’s clear, let’s go in”—and 17 or 20 tanks came in, and then came the surprise. During the course of the battle, the Serbians lost some 350 tanks, according to very conservative estimates. Some estimate up to 600 tanks. Among soldiers, the casualties were 7-10,000, at least. Unfortunately, some of them were Croatians. How is that? Croatians were killed in the front lines of the federal Yugoslav Army. This is another example of the Croatian government’s naiveté.

## Croatian hostages

Along with the general attack on Croatia, which was performed step by step, federal Army commanders played some politics also. They used some dirty tricks. They proclaimed a recruitment drive. "We are 'Yugoslavia.' So we are authorized to recruit soldiers, Yugoslavian citizens. Now your turn has come, you have to report and go to the Army." They told the Croatians, "Give your guys to the Army." What did Croatia do? People from the Croatian government went directly into the cities where the recruitment was going on, in order to persuade the men to go into the federal Army, *in order not to provoke repression*. The men knew what was going on; they didn't want to go there. But from the highest levels, they were told, "You are doing a favor to your country. You must think *politically*. We are trying not to spread the conflict." And immediately after they reported to the federal Army, they became Serbian hostages. Some of them were killed inside the barracks, because the Serbs treated them as enemies since they were Croatians. Many of them—not only Croatians, but also Muslims, Hungarians, Albanians, practically anybody who wasn't a Serb—were pushed into the front lines. They were pushed into trucks, transported to the battlefield, and told, "You go ahead, the enemy is in front of you and you have to fight him. It's basically practice; you don't have to be afraid." You must understand that these people were subjected to a complete information blockade. They didn't know what was actually going on.

I heard these stories from the people who fought at Vukovar. They told me, "We saw the groups of Yugoslav soldiers running toward us, so we killed them. They were enemies. We didn't know who was attacking us. Only later, when we checked their identities, did we discover that they were in fact non-Serbs, many of them Croatians."

But Serbs suffered terrible losses in the battle for Vukovar. My estimation then was that they were on the edge of complete defeat—not technically, but psychologically. I thought, "They're losing tanks, vehicles, artillery, weapons, people. They're losing everything, yet they're attacking on and on. They're losing generals, the most important officers. They're developing the Gallipoli syndrome! Regardless of losses, they have to take this town." It was something stronger than reason. I said to myself, "If we manage to break them here, they will never psychologically recover from it; they will never get the psychological strength to go on with the war." This thinking you could note also in the Croatian Army, which had managed to establish itself by then.

That was the end of October and the beginning of November 1991. A major breakthrough operation from the Croatian side started toward Vukovar from Vinkovci, in order to break the Serbian encirclement. The operation was a successful one. Croatian forces managed in a rather short time to get to the suburbs of Vukovar, to the point named Marinci, a small village near Vukovar. That was basically the Serbian defeat. When they got to Marinci, the Serbs knew they were losing,

they were finished. We needed perhaps one day or two to get into Vukovar—the major Croatian forces—and in Vukovar, to connect with the defending forces there, and it would all be over. The Serbian losses of 10,000 people, a couple of hundred tanks, and big airplanes, and so forth, would have been in vain.

## Betrayal by the West

What happened there? An interesting thing. A telephone call from [European Community negotiator Lord] Carrington to Mr. Tudjman. He demanded an immediate interruption of this breakthrough operation. He said, "No! You are expanding the war. We want *peace*. We want a peaceful solution. You should let the Red Cross convoy enter Vukovar, not your army. Let the Red Cross convoy evacuate the wounded from the Vukovar hospital." It took some time, but basically Mr. Tudjman obeyed the demand of Mr. Carrington and Mr. Vance, and he ordered that the operation be interrupted. Croatian forces stopped on the road to Vukovar. The Serbs relaxed. They started to joke around. They wouldn't let the Red Cross convoy in. But after the fifth try, after the convoy evacuated 400 people from the Vukovar hospital and returned to Zagreb, in the process of allowing the Red Cross convoy into Vukovar, Serbian forces—there was a strict cease-fire then—went in immediately after it, and quickly linked up with the military headquarters in Vukovar. That was basically the fall of Vukovar.

There was another time that Serbia was facing complete defeat, and was saved only by intervention from outside. Croatians, without an army, without anything, had started spontaneously to attack Serbian military facilities in Croatia. It was amazing how quickly these barracks were taken. The Serbs did not have any organized defense of these barracks. This was in summer 1991. A general attack on Serbian military barracks started in Croatia. In some days, Croatians managed to get enormous quantities of weapons out of these barracks. Belgrade felt very threatened by this process, and another phone call came, from Mr. Vance and Mr. Carrington, to Mr. Tudjman, and they said, "No you can't attack barracks any more. We will impose a peaceful solution to this problem. If you go on with your attack, you will be sanctioned, you will not be recognized as a state." The attack on the barracks was, of course, interrupted, and the cease-fire in Igalo—on the Croatian-Montenegrin border, at Tito's famous villa—was signed by Mr. Kadijevic, Mr. Tudjman, Mr. Milosevic, and Mr. Vance—a cease-fire which implied immediate interruption of Croatian operations. The Serbs did not honor the cease-fire, but proceeded with the war, but in the negotiation process, they managed to save all the remaining weapons, which were enormous quantities of tanks, vehicles, missiles, guns, artillery, rockets, ammunition, anything from these barracks, and deployed them to critical points on the battlefield in Croatia and at strategic positions in Bosnia.

## The road to Bosnia

So it was the weapons taken out of the Croatian barracks, taken out by the direct order of the famous tandem, that enabled the Serbs to conduct a general attack on Bosnia. Of course the Bosnian government, led by Mr. Izetbegovic, observed silently the placement of these weapons at strategic mountain positions, and, just as Tadjman had, declared that they have no quarrel with Serbs, they're honest Yugoslavs, they have good relations with the federal Army, and there is no reason for this Army to attack them. It *won't* attack them, because it is basically a Croatian-Serbian war, and the Muslims don't have anything to do with it.

But the Muslims *did* have something to do with it, since all of Bosnia was serving as a logistical base for the attack on Croatia. Croatia was attacked from points throughout Bosnia. Without Bosnia, the Serbs would not have been able to create this kind of general war. Yet, the interpretation of Mr. Izetbegovic was, "I have nothing to do with it." He was very well warned what Serbs might do to Muslims—not only by the obvious example of what was going on in Croatia, but from his own historical experience. During World War II, Muslims suffered terrible casualties from Serbs. They committed genocide against Muslims during World War II. This wasn't enough for the Muslims; they said, "No, this won't happen again. It's not possible in these times; this is over."

We know, of course, what happened, immediately after the Unprofor [U.N. "peacekeeping" forces] took over in Croatia. The coming of Unprofor was a precondition for a general Serbian attack on Bosnia, because Unprofor kept guard over the Serbian occupied territory in Croatia, so the Serbs had a free hand to reconcentrate and regroup their troops for an attack on Bosnia, and also to use tanks and artillery otherwise needed in Croatia, to be transferred to Bosnia and start the offensive that is now going on.

In my opinion, there were two crucial moments. One was the cease-fire at Igalo, which interrupted the attack on military facilities, and the other, the siege of Vukovar and the Red Cross convoy. At these moments, Croatia had a clear victory in its hands. The federal Yugoslav Army was much overestimated. It was weak, in fact. It was very strong in appearance—plenty of weapons, plenty of everything. But it was weak in structure, because many officers were not Serbs, many soldiers were not Serbs and could not be trusted. Pilots, particularly, were not Serbs. And the motives were not clear. Milosevic was after an all-out war against Croatia and others in order to create Greater Serbia. The general commanding structure still had some "Yugoslav" thoughts in their heads—Kadijevic and others. It wasn't clear whether they were really, exclusively for the Greater Serbia idea, or did they want, perhaps, some kind of Yugoslavia. Perhaps some "Titoism" remained in their heads. The situation was rather unclear at these moments.

## Decisive action was needed

What was needed, then, was to react decisively. To attack the federal Army, not to give it the necessary time to transform itself into a Serbian Army, which would act only according to Milosevic's ideas. The Army was a mastodon. It appeared very strong, but was structurally very weak, very slow, and you had to attack it *swiftly*, not to give it time to accommodate to the war situation.

Unfortunately, the people who organized this war, Carington and others, knew this very well. They put strong pressure on Croatia to give this necessary time to the federal Army, to transform itself into a Serbian one. This happened, and when this transformation was finished, together with the successful pulling out of weapons from the Croatian barracks, then Serbia clearly had an advantage. But it could have been prevented from the very beginning.

The clear indication of a structural weakness of the Yugoslav Army was the removal of all former generals, of all former commanding cadres, the forced retirement of Mr. Kadijevic, Mr. Mamula, Mr. Blagoje Adzic, and other generals who perhaps were not quite adequately responding to Mr. Milosevic's views of how this war should be carried out. After they had done their duty, they were removed, and loyal Serbian officers replaced them. This is a pretty clear indication of the structural weakness of the Yugoslav Army. These generals were not trustworthy, for Milosevic.

## Bosnian Croats, Muslims declare their solidarity

*From a document issued in Ottawa on Feb. 3:*

The Bosnia Hercegovina Information Center Executive Committee (BH Exec), comprised of Bosnian-Hercegovian Muslims and Croats, deems it necessary to issue the following statements to show the Canadian and world public the truth behind the events in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The truth is all the more necessary because of the labels, clichés and deliberate distorting of the facts promoted by the world political community and the communications media.

We Canadians and residents of Canada of a Croat or Muslim descent, representatives of the BH Exec and with the full support of the Bosnian and Hercegovian community of Ottawa-Carleton declare:

- that we have come together and formed this Committee to publicly show and denounce the existence of hatred between our two peoples.