with a public concern for everyone to have health care as it is needed.

That generates a certain amount of private as well as public employment activity, and reduces costs to the economy as a whole, which is essential. Then we look at the requirements of the global population. Major export projects, which our region can produce, agreements with other countries—we'll do such and such a product for your market, in such and such a quantity, let's make a five-year agreement. And we'll make certain guarantees, and you'll make certain guarantees.

It's not all done necessarily by governments, but it'll be facilitated by governments, by government intervention into credit insurances and things like that to make sure this trade occurs. It's like bidding on contracts, in which a government acts to facilitate its qualified private firms in going abroad and bidding on contracts, where the government acts in a sense as a helper in getting these contracts. The concern of government should be to try to get the contracts for its own industries, and then on the basis of the contracts, we try to get some credit generated, which is negotiable in the international markets for what we're going to produce.

As a practical matter in the case of Scotland, there are a number of things which the Scots are well able to do, or could be able to do as well as anybody else, and that's the area in which the Scottish factor in international trade should be considered.

On the basis of calculating what the national income is, we can see what the Scots standard of living is, and we can get an estimated budget for national, domestic production—how much we have to import, how much we have to produce locally—and come out with some kind of a sensible result. Then we can get our industry people together on that sort of basis, and sit down and talk about a 7-year, 10-year, 15-year perspective, because our objective is to encourage long-term investment. The function of government in this respect is to negotiate the conditions, and to mediate the establishment of a consensus which creates a long-term consensus and relevant agreements, a climate for those things which we think are suitable long-term investments. Thus, people can invest with confidence, go out and begin to buy the things which represent long-term investment to build up the industries.

One of the problems at present, particularly with the so-called myth of utopian free-market deregulation, is that it is impossible for any entrepreneur, virtually, unless there is some kind of monopolistic or corrupt influence, to make long-term investments. They don't know what the markets are going to be next year or two years from now, and we have to think about creating rationally an agreement about what would be sensible long-term investments and say, okay, that's a national policy, let's stick with encouraging that, and we set our tariff rates, our tax rates, our credit policies accordingly to facilitate the private industries to do just that. And we say go ahead, get on with it boys, now go and do it, if you fail, you fail, but if you succeed, you can succeed.

Danes back Maastricht under economic threat

by Poul Rasmussen

In a referendum on June 2, 1992, Danish voters greatly upset the European elites when they rejected their plans for a monetarist European Union, the so-called Maastricht Treaty. However, rather than immediately embarking upon a plan to obliterate this obstinate land of only 5 million souls from the surface of the earth, which undoubtedly was the initial inclination of the ruling European circles, it was decided to give the Danes a second chance. So finally, on May 18, Danes succumbed to the immense international pressure, and voted in favor of the Maastricht Treaty.

Before the first referendum on Maastricht, *EIR* reported that the treaty would destroy national sovereignty: "National governments and parliaments lose their entire influence over the future of their countries' economic, financial, credit, trade, and budgetary policies. . . . The control of the principal economic parameters by a supranational power structure is total" (see *EIR*, May 22, 1992, pp. 4-7).

One of the major problems in giving the stubborn Danes their second chance to please the establishment, was how to come up with a plausible reason why a second referendum should be held at all. Therefore, at the December European Community (EC) summit meeting in Edinburgh, a set of cosmetic amendments to the Maastricht Treaty was devised solely as an excuse for the Danish government to present the same treaty to Danes for a second time. According to this "Edinburgh Agreement," Denmark would be exempt from the projected European citizenship, closer police collaboration, common defense policy, the European Monetary Union, and the common currency.

Since all of the Danish exemptions actually belong to the second or third phase of the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty was left unchanged. According to the treaty itself, the final formulation of the common European defense policy, the final decisions concerning the Monetary Union, and the time schedule for the implementation of a single European currency, will not be made until 1996, when a new governmental conference is to be convened. Therefore, the Danish "exemptions" as they are formulated in the "Edinburgh Agreement," are exemptions to a policy that does not yet exist. To complete the absurdity, it also means that if and when the policies for the second and third phase of the union are formulated in 1996, the Danes will have to have a third referendum to finally decide upon the policies they have already been granted exemption from.

Armtwisting, threats, and blackmail

In the May 18 referendum, only 56.8% of Danes voted in favor of the Maastricht Treaty and the amended Edinburgh Agreement. Taking into account the enormous campaign from the government and the Danish establishment to secure a "yes," it is impressive that 43.2% of the voters still voted "no."

While the debate leading up to last year's referendum largely was focused on the actual content of the Maastricht Treaty and its implications for the future of Europe, this year's campaign was totally devoid of any content. It is no exaggeration to describe the campaign of the Danish government and industry as blatant threats and blackmail.

According to the arguments of the Danish establishment, the real issues of the May 18 referendum were as follows: If the Danes were to say "no" a second time, the remaining 11 member states of the European Community (or 10 states, if England also stayed out) would immediately proceed to form a European Union without Denmark. Therefore, Denmark would be left out of all major European political decisions in the future. In addition, the country would gradually slide away from all the old EC agreements, like the Common Agricultural Program, as these are replaced with new agreements in which Denmark would not participate. After the other Scandinavian countries joined the new European Union, Denmark would become politically isolated.

Obviously, in these days of worldwide economic depression, the most effective scare tactic involved the economic future of the country. Already during last year's referendum, wild stories were pushed about exploding unemployment in case of a successful "no" vote. But this year, the same stories were followed up by concrete threats of layoffs from a number of leading Danish industries if their employees voted "no." On top of this, interest rate hikes, devaluation of the Danish kroner, and other gloom and doom predictions were presented as absolutely unavoidable consequences of a new Danish rejection of Maastricht.

It would be wrong to claim that the Danes finally voted in favor of the Maastricht Treaty. They did nothing of the kind: They voted "yes" out of fear of being politically and economically destroyed. The Danes still profoundly dislike the idea of a monetarist European Union. In a survey by Danish Radio published two days before the referendum, 75% of the Danes clearly stated that they preferred a Europe of sovereign nation-states to a federal European Union of the type described in the Maastricht Treaty. The survey also made it clear that a primary reason Danes were voting "yes," was the fear of the consequences for the country if they voted otherwise.

Intimidation of a whole nation is not a good start for a European Union.

Organized crime's gambling: the case

by François Lepine

The U.S. Department of the Interior on April 27 placed a moratorium on government lending to Indian gambling casinos. A spokesman for the Bureau of Indian Affairs was quoted by Associated Press saying that in view of the opposition that was developing to the casinos, they felt it was necessary to stop the loans temporarily, pending further discussion. One of the congressmen involved in blocking the loans, Rep. David Obey (D-Wisc.), a senior Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee, objected after the BIA put money in President Clinton's stimulus plan to finance Indian gambling in his home district.

Today, gambling in America is a $550 billion business, of which Indian gambling is a small, but growing, fraction. But without the legalization of gambling on the Indian reservations, there would never have been the explosion of riverboat casinos, race tracks, state lotteries, and video poker games that has hit the United States in the past decade. The huge volume of cash transactions in gambling provides a ready vehicle for laundering drug money and other ill-gotten gains—a fact which organized crime has not exactly ignored (see *EIR*, Jan. 15, 1993, "Dope, Inc. Targets Indian Lands for Casino Gambling").

The BIA has made or guaranteed $61.1 million in loans to 28 gaming operations nationwide, of which only a small portion has been repaid. In Minnesota, for example, of $40 million in loans made to eight tribes, only $2 million has been repaid.

It is past time that the BIA's aid to gambling casinos be stopped: It is certainly a crime against natural law, when a government agency encourages the destruction of its citizens' morality in this way.

Since 1981, when a Florida court ruled that the Seminole Indians had the right to have high-stakes bingo, under the pretext that Indians can themselves regulate what is legal on their sovereign reservations, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and especially Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Ross Swimmer, intervened at every point to promote Indian gambling:

- They interpreted a Reagan administration policy paper calling for encouraging private enterprise while cutting the budget deficit, as a "yes" to gambling casinos.