

Brazil battles to defend its nuclear energy program

by Lorenzo Carrasco and Alberto Sábato

The Brazilian National Congress is embroiled in a battle whose outcome will be decisive for the future of the nuclear programs of the two major South American nations, Argentina and Brazil, and for every nation battling for the right to develop in the face of the new world order regimen of "technological apartheid." Brazilian nationalists, including nuclear experts allied to sectors of the military and the Congress, are trying to prevent ratification of the infamous Four-Party Nuclear Safeguard Accord, signed in 1991 by the Presidents of Brazil and Argentina. Besides fighting against hostile foreign interests anxious to keep Brazil backward, they face opposition from Brazil's own Foreign Ministry, Itamaraty, which is well known for its one-worldist tastes.

The accord subjects previously autonomous nuclear installations—and with them, all industrial installations and all advanced technological research facilities of both countries—to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The battle dates back to 1991, when the National Defense Committee of the Chamber of Deputies rejected several articles of the Bilateral Brazil-Argentina Accord which opened the door to IAEA inspections.

What is at stake is not a traditional safeguard program, but implementation of a new model of internationally enforced safeguards *directly tied to the U.N. Security Council*. In effect, the new program would subject Brazil and Argentina to the same treatment Iraq has received since losing the Persian Gulf war.

The specific objective of the architects of the Anglo-American "new world order" is to destroy the scientific and technological potential of Argentina and Brazil, Ibero-America's most precious resource if it is ever to break with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and launch a self-suffi-

cient process of economic development.

Argentine and Brazilian diplomats are fully aware that the Four-Party Accord now under debate is an instrument for implementing the so-called "challenge inspections" imposed by the IAEA in its recent documents Gov/2554 and Gov/2657, put out by the board of governors of the IAEA, and to which *EIR* has obtained access through European diplomatic circles.


The pressures on Brazil are immense, since the Argentine Congress has already ratified the Four-Party Accord, and ratification by the Brazilian legislature is all that is necessary for full treaty enforcement.

Not a legal matter

Neither civilian nor military nationalist sectors in Brazil have a handle on how to confront the pressures of the Anglo-American establishment, docilely transmitted by the Itamaraty clique. Their problem is that they still cling to legalistic technicalities in their efforts to oppose ratification, naively believing that challenge inspections are not authorized under the accord, simply on the basis that Gov/2554, which specifies the challenge inspections, was signed *after* the Dec. 13, 1991 signing of the Four-Party Accord.

Yet Argentine and Brazilian diplomats involved with this issue know quite well what is involved. The Argentine Foreign Ministry stated in a November 1991 memorandum entitled "Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards," that "these powers [forced inspections] are compatible with the spirit, and with certain supposed specifics, of the accord that Argentina and Brazil have concluded with the IAEA."

The memorandum also says that "Argentina feels it should offer to the IAEA . . . whatever powers and means



Brazil's Angra dos Reis nuclear complex in Rio state was to have three plants. Shown is Angra 1, which was completed when this photo was taken in 1982.

will permit it to fulfill its function and act efficiently and quickly in cases where there exists reasonable suspicion that a state subject to this accord is in violation of its obligations under it. . . . In that context we believe that: a) even challenge inspections are justified if they are carried out to guarantee non-proliferation; b) it would be in order to speed up the system by delegating . . . [the powers of] the board of governors to the director general; c) it would be reasonable that in cases where the board of governors believes there exists a risk . . . it should be able to order urgent challenge inspections, even when the mechanism set up to solve controversies has not been exhausted. . . . It is even reasonable that the board have the power to take the case to the [U.N.] Security Council in case a member state refuses to collaborate.”

Thus, it is clear that the Argentine Foreign Ministry is fully aware of the implications of the accord.

As for the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, their officials are hardly more subtle. In a private Foreign Ministry memorandum obtained by *EIR* which discusses the Brazilian vote in favor of challenge inspections in North Korea, it is stated that these inspections “are of special interest to Brazil inasmuch as the terms of the accord with Korea conform, in this particular, to the pattern used by the IAEA for comprehensive agreements, of the same form as the Four-Party Accord. . . . In the case of Korea, the most delicate point did not refer to the right of the IAEA to carry out challenge inspections, since

that much was clear. . . . It had to deal above all with the potential precedent that would be set for the carrying out of inspections of allegedly non-military installations, based on information not obtained by the IAEA. That point is much more pertinent for Brazil, in light of the questions pending in Congress over the approval of our safeguard accord, and the intention of some groups to defeat it.”

The perversity of the Brazilian diplomats goes beyond merely justifying the vote on North Korea: “We feel that the political aspects surrounding the question and the probable parliamentary lineup make it not only unsuitable, but unviable, to come out against the challenge inspections. We have here the concrete probability of a country . . . that has been severely questioned by the international community because it . . . effectively ridiculed the commitments it assumed when it ratified its accord with the IAEA.”

Brazil's history of submission

The process of submitting to safeguard policies previously rejected by Brazil and Argentina because they were correctly viewed as discriminatory, officially began on Dec. 13, 1991 in Vienna, with the signing of the Four-Party Nuclear Safeguard Accord by Presidents Fernando Collor de Melo of Brazil (since ousted from office) and Carlos Menem of Argentina. In practice, those signatures were intended as death sentences for the nuclear programs of both nations.

EIR foresaw this maneuver two years earlier. In a March

16, 1990 article, "Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation under Threat," *EIR* denounced the operations of the non-proliferation mafia, coordinated by Brazilian physicist Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, whose views had also seeped into the Brazilian Physics Society (SBF) and the Association of Argentine Physicists (AFA). This mafia orchestrated the creation of an "anti-nuclear network of 'civilian agencies' to end the autonomy of the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear programs," *EIR* reported.

At that time, Pinguelli stated, "We want to inspect the Navy installations to ensure that the nuclear fuel they are producing there doesn't exceed 20% enrichment."

Pinguelli was never more than the local agent of foreign interests. But the campaign he began turned into a huge operation when sections of Anglo-American intelligence began to act under the facade of "pacifist organizations" such as the Ford Foundation and the Federation of American Scientists. It appears probable that that operation was led by U.S. physicist David Albright and his colleague William Higginbotham, both participants in the Manhattan Project which created the first atomic bomb in 1945, and who today play the part of "repentant nuclear scientists."

In its March 16, 1990 article, *EIR* charged that Pinguelli and other scientists were pushing the notion of "oversight," in order to create "unwarranted frictions between Brazil and Argentina which, in the calculations of the anti-nuclear networks, would end up destroying any nuclear cooperation programs between the two nations."

EIR also reported that the U.S. reaction to Brazil's late-1980s announcement that it had achieved the full nuclear fuel cycle was that Brazil should put all its nuclear installations "within reach of IAEA inspections," on pain of raising "suspicions they are using nuclear technology for other than peaceful purposes." *EIR* noted that "this is the same argument used today by . . . the 'universalist' group at Itamaraty . . . which recently demanded . . . that Brazil sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty."

Unfortunately, all of *EIR*'s predictions have come true. Collor and Menem implacably foisted the Anglo-American agenda on their nations' nuclear programs. With international backing, Presidents Collor and Menem installed perferentially one-worldist teams in their foreign ministries. Individuals such as Marcos Coimbra, Rubens Ricupero, Marcos Azambuja, Celso Lafer, and Helio Jaguaribe, on the Brazilian side, and Domingo Cavallo, Guido Di Tella, and others, on the Argentine side, were inserted to dominate their nation's foreign policy actions. Both ministries generally work in tandem.

The result of this treasonous capitulation is that Argentina cancelled its Condor II project, while Collor created a scandal against his own country by publicly denouncing the unknown "Solimoes Project" (whose existence was vehemently denied by the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission, CNEN), charging that it supposedly sought to manufacture

Admiral Alberto's battle against Bernard Baruch

Efforts to sabotage Brazil and Argentina's nuclear programs are far from new. They began in the infancy of the age of nuclear energy, and became intense after World War II. In August 1946, the U.S. Congress approved the McMahon Act, which limited nuclear cooperation between the United States and other countries to exploration for and extraction of uranium. Along with this came the creation of the United Nations' Atomic Energy Commission. The commission's first meeting was attended by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and four other countries, invited as "observers" because of their status as having the world's largest uranium reserves. Those countries were Brazil, India, Belgium, and Canada.

At that meeting, American representative Bernard Baruch presented a proposal for creating a supranational agency to "control ownership of world uranium and thorium reserves," an affront to national sovereignty. The infamous "Baruch Plan" operated on the thesis of the "injustices of nature": that those countries lacking in nuclear technology should have been graced with considerable reserves of strategic minerals.

Brazilian representative Adm. Alvaro Alberto was the only one present at the meeting to oppose the injustice of the Baruch Plan, describing the U.S. policy as an attempt to force the mineral-rich nations to surrender their natural wealth. In 1951, Alberto proposed legislation to protect Brazil's reserves of thorium and uranium from foreign looting. He advocated the concept of "specific compensa-

nuclear components for military use.

At the same time, nuclear mutual cooperation accords between the two countries were cancelled and replaced by the Brazil-Argentina Accord for the Exclusive Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (the so-called Bilateral Safeguards Accord), which fulfilled precisely the demands made by Albright, Higginbotham, and Pinguelli. Finally, despite *EIR*'s warnings, in December 1991, Collor and Menem signed the Four-Party Accord.

New world order allies

In Brazil, the Foreign Relations Ministry had an important ally in José Goldemberg, a malthusian physicist and known agent in Brazil of the interests of the world condominium that the Anglo-American oligarchy maintained with the Soviet *nomenklatura* before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Goldemberg, who was both science and technology and education

tions," meaning that commercial transactions in strategic minerals should not be conducted in dollars, but only in the form of technological exchanges.

Secret diplomacy

Admiral Alberto's resistance did not suffice to prevent a U.S. assault on Brazil's reserves. In 1952, in a single transaction, the United States imported the entire thorium quota guaranteed by a two-year agreement. In response, Admiral Alberto asked the Brazilian government for authorization to begin negotiations with other countries, and left for Europe to make contacts with France and Germany, the latter still occupied by the Allies.

There, Alberto met with Prof. Otto Hahn, the father of nuclear fission, and with two other professors, Paul Harteck of the Hamburg Institute of Physics and Chemistry, and Wilhelm Groth, to arrange for Germany to build Brazil the centrifuges it needed for isotope separation. At this point, Admiral Alberto's trip took on aspects of a secret mission, in that his purpose—transferring prototypes of uranium centrifuges to Brazil—forced him to rely on secret diplomacy which bypassed the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, as well as other decision-making agencies such as the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Mineral Production. The admiral requested and received special authorization from President Getulio Vargas to get the Foreign Ministry to back a secret shipment of the machines. Less than 24 hours after the authorization was granted, however, the Allies' Military Security Board seized the centrifuges in Göttingen and Hamburg. The seizure had been orchestrated by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC).

Admiral Alberto contacted Lewis Strauss, who was

then AEC head, but he was offered no hope of getting the confiscated machines released. Strauss, according to Alberto's close collaborator Renato Archer, "told the Brazilian admiral, in the presence of the Brazilian ambassador, that like all scientists, he [Alberto] was crazy and that everything he was proposing was pure fantasy, did not exist."

Alberto forced to resign

The USAEC's action forced Admiral Alberto to return to Brazil with empty hands. His resignation from the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) followed in March 1955. One year later, in 1956, a committee of the Brazilian Congress gained access to secret U.S. diplomatic documents which revealed the intense U.S. pressure to force Alberto's resignation.

The downfall of President Getulio Vargas himself was related to Brazilian resistance to exporting radioactive minerals without technological compensation. The day before Vargas's death, he was visited by a group demanding that export of radioactive minerals and monazite sand (thorium) be authorized. Only days later, in August 1954, a new government decree authorized the exports.

Anglo-American pressure on Brazil to accept the post-war technological order set back Brazil's development of the technology of ultracentrifuging for uranium enrichment by 30 years. In just the same way, the new accommodation by the top echelons of the Foreign Ministry to the demands of "technological apartheid" and the "new order," under the illusion that Brazil will "now, finally" be treated as a First World country, will merely produce a gigantic backward step in the technological development of the country.

minister under Collor, but who essentially functioned as a Rasputin, frequented the same "environmentalist" and "pacifist" circles in which Pinguelli Rosa and other scientific mediocrities of the Brazilian Physics Society and the Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science (SBPF) traveled.

But Goldemberg always maintained greater "international credibility," thanks to his foreign godfathers. For example, the "suggestion" to Collor that Goldemberg be brought into the cabinet was presented by Yevgeni Velikhov, former head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and one of the main links between the Anglo-American oligarchy and the Soviet *nomenklatura*.

Cardoso: Anglo-American darling

The strengthened presence of the social democracy in the government of Itamar Franco, who replaced Collor last fall after Collor was impeached for corruption, is perhaps the key

indicator that very little has changed in Brazil with Collor's political demise. Indeed, the popular mobilization against Collor that the nation witnessed in the months leading up to Collor's indictment, appears to have been in vain. Under Franco, the neo-liberal economic policies have continued unchanged, as has the submissive foreign policy conducted by the Collor government.

In this environment, the figure of the newest darling and strong man of the Anglo-American establishment has emerged: Senator and now Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a founder and executive board member of the Inter-American Dialogue, whom Henry Kissinger described on June 16 as "a spectacular finance minister."

A sociologist trained by French social democratic circles, exiled during the years of military government in Brazil, Cardoso is today a spokesman of the Anglo-American establishment in Brazil. The public reference by the Inter-Ameri-

can Dialogue that Cardoso is one of its members "on loan" to an Ibero-American government should be given great weight, not only because of that organization's policies, but because four of its members are in U.S. President Bill Clinton's cabinet, and other members are serving in high positions in his administration.

Cardoso has for a long time been the principal leader of a powerful internationalist lobby in Brazil, which brings together personalities such as Marcilio Marques Moreira (finance minister under Collor), Celso Lafer (foreign relations minister under Collor), Helio Jaguaribe (secretary of science and technology under Collor), José Goldemberg, José Mindlin (São Paulo businessman with strong connections to U.S. Zionist circles), not to mention politicians and congressmen from the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), who predominate in the present government.

An intimate friend of Itamar Franco, Cardoso initially occupied the post of foreign relations minister, and recently was made the economic "czar" in a desperate attempt by Franco to maintain the neo-liberal program contracted between Collor and his Anglo-American mentors. This is intended to repeat in Brazil the same formula adopted by the Menem government in Argentina, where Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo has been the country's leading executioner and point-man for the policy of destroying the Argentine economy.

The entire strategy of the Brazilian one-worldists, which was not dethroned with the fall of Collor, is well summarized in an article by Cardoso entitled "Foreign Policy: The Universalist Option," published in *O Estado de São Paulo* on Jan. 24, 1993. In this article, Cardoso states that "the autarkic development option is excluded," and reaffirmed his faith in "globalization and the market economy."

Concerning the new nuclear safeguards policy, Cardoso affirmed that "the accord signed with Argentina and the IAEA situates us in the best western tradition, which thereby qualifies us to actively participate in the construction of a new system of more equitable and democratic international relations." Cardoso is referring to the offer by Brazil to submit itself to the new world order in exchange for getting a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, even though it be in the capacity of a mere seat warmer, without the right to vote.

"In the past," continued Cardoso, "we viewed the development of the South as an almost autonomous process and as a fundamental factor for stability, peace, and world security. Today, although we continue to believe that development is an essential element of global security, we are convinced that the growth of the industrialized countries and our relations with them are decisive . . . which requires, therefore, a pact for growth as an indispensable element to defeat nationalism . . . [and] pressures for emigration."

One of Cardoso's most beloved Brazilian friends is Secretary of Strategic Affairs Adm. Mario Cesar Flores, the

former minister of the Navy under Collor, who has begun to face strong criticism from reserve officers for his inaction regarding the disgrace of the safeguards accords. Apart from Cardoso's influence, Flores's conduct is explained by his acceptance of one-worldist principles and his belief that the concept of national sovereignty is on its way out. In his recent book *The Basis for a Military Policy*, Admiral Flores says (p. 90), "it appears that the idea of restricted sovereignty and the broader, associated concept of global unity, cannot be rejected *a priori* as absurd, and may even correspond to the natural course of history; perhaps they will even come to be important components in the evolution of the 21st century; who knows, they may finally end up producing an integration of humanity that is superior to that resulting from the juxtaposition of sovereign nation-states, which are generally in conflict with each other."

In a recent conference held in the Naval Club of Rio de Janeiro, Flores argued that Brazil's acceptance of international restraints on its autonomous nuclear program "is inevitable if we want to enter the 21st century as part of the First World."

Cardoso's one-worldist circle

At the same time, Flores has already agreed with Itamaraty to replace the president of the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission, traditionally appointed as Brazil's representative to the IAEA, with the Brazilian ambassador to Vienna—i.e., with a Foreign Ministry official. With this move, all participation of the nuclear and military sectors in the decision-making process has been eliminated.

It comes as no surprise that Admiral Flores has been favorably cited by participants in the Anglo-American plot to destroy the Armed Forces of Ibero-America. In the preface to the book *The Military and Democracy: the Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*, known also as the "Bush Manual" (among other reasons because it was financed by Bush's State Department), the authors mention Flores as one of the "high-ranking officers" who "have been involved" in the "success" of the project.

Under Admiral Flores's presidency of the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE), the perverting influence of Itamaraty has grown enormously, displacing the military sectors traditionally charged with matters of intelligence and national security. Exemplary is the case of the SAE's secretary general, diplomat Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves, who concurs with Cardoso in transferring control over intelligence and national security to Itamaraty.

Another bosom buddy of Cardoso is the one-worldist Helio Jaguaribe, a former official in Collor's government and the Brazilian oligarchy's guru on international questions. In his book *New International Scenario* (Ed. Guanabara, 1986), Jaguaribe says that "submitting the principal means of international violence to the control of a representative and effective international authority would eliminate the risk of war,

as long as that authority continued to be effective and truly international. . . . Such an authority is, in the final analysis, the only means of maintaining a stable world peace. *The concept of international guidelines which subject all the nations of the world to a single legal international order, under the legitimate control of an international authority, is not only an age-old concept but is the only truly rational solution yet found to achieve this end.* *Perpetual Peace*, by Immanuel Kant, written in 1795, and *The Problem and the Paths to Peace* by Norberto Bobbio, written in 1979, could be mentioned as two references, one old, one modern, on this matter” (emphasis added).

Even more serious is the fact that Helio’s son Roberto Jaguaribe is the chief Brazilian negotiator supporting the capitulation of the country to international inspection. An adviser to Itamaraty, Roberto Jaguaribe works in coordination with Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves, SAE secretary general.

In statements published on Jan. 28, 1993 in *Jornal do Brasil*, Roberto Jaguaribe said that “Brazil is at a disadvantage because it hasn’t ratified the accord [with the IAEA], and it will lose immeasurable political advantage. . . .” Roberto Jaguaribe has lied on many occasions that the “challenge inspections” will never be applied to Brazil, while surreptitiously leading a powerful lobby in Congress to push for signing the Modified Tlatelolco Treaty which, in the new text of Article 16, compliantly confirms the full implementation of forced inspections on the signatory countries of Resolution 290, of Aug. 26, 1992: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.

The Battle of 1995 approaches

The pressures on Argentina and Brazil are enormous. Recently, the director general of the IAEA stated in Washington that “Brazil, Argentina, and North Korea are, today, the nations that most attract the attention of the international community in the nuclear area,” as reported in *O Globo* last May 24.

In Brazil, the pressure will increase because in 1995 the Brazil-German nuclear agreement comes up for review, and the Siemens company has said that it will not renew it unless and until Brazil accepts the complete IAEA safeguards, including the challenge inspections, which subject virtually every industrial installation, and scientific or technological research facility, to surprise inspections.

However, renegotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 will also create new opportunities to question the entire unjust system of “technological apartheid.” Argentina and Brazil could play a leading role in defeating the designs of the new world order and in reopening dialogue on the concept of Collective Economic Security, which links the problems of international security, including the so-called safeguards, to the issue of economic progress in the developing countries.

The true history of non-proliferation

by Lorenzo Carrasco and Alberto Sábato

In 1995, when the first international meeting to renegotiate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will convene, one of the most important international confrontations will take place between those nations that still defend the principles of the sovereign nation-state, and those powers and oligarchic groups that want to replace the nation-state with a world government which asserts the right to forcibly intervene anywhere on the planet on the grounds of defending a supposedly “perpetual peace.”

The NPT was imposed in 1970 by the major victorious powers of the Second World War in order to brake and dominate the spreading use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But its authors now perceive the treaty, in its present form, to be insufficient to assure this control.

Although, officially, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) predicts that the treaty will be extended indefinitely, since the end of 1991 many Anglo-American specialists have begun to question the propriety of maintaining the NPT in its present form, charging that in its function of supervising and punishing violations it is too vulnerable to political influence. Unofficially, it is known in many western and eastern diplomatic circles that there is ongoing discussion of the possibility of replacing the NPT, or at least strengthening it by sanctioning the use of force, including military force, to compel compliance with the treaty’s mandated “safeguards.”

In reality, the NPT is utterly bankrupt, due to several factors.

1) The crumbling of the Soviet Union revealed the fragility of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) in the face of the emergence of separate republics in the former Soviet Union which possess nuclear weapons. Some of these nations, such as Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, still have ICBM installations, while the rest only have tactical nuclear weapons. One problem is the possibility that these weapons might be used in warfare in the turbulent regions of the defunct Soviet Union.

What most concerns the Anglo-American oligarchy immediately is that Ukraine has declared itself an independent nuclear power and that, with its 1,800 nuclear warheads that make it nominally the third largest nuclear power in the world, it may demand the right—identical to that of Russia—to be seated in the U.N. Security Council. Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma made exactly that proposal to the Ukrainian Parliament in early June, which provoked an immediate reaction from the United States, France, and Britain,