

and a strong supporter of Democratic Party presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche.

The ADL works closely with the CAN, and played a crucial supporting role in the Waco tragedy through its Australian affiliate. Phony reports on Branch Davidians living in Australia were funneled through the U.S. Embassy there into the BATF, setting into motion the initial targeting of the group.

Coverup jeopardized

The Feb. 27 jury verdict puts new pressure on Attorney General Reno and new FBI Director Louis Frieh to conduct a long-overdue cleanout of the Bureau and the Justice Department's in-house paramilitary units, whom the American public is increasingly coming to view as little more than death squads.

Following the initial Feb. 28, 1993 shoot-out at Waco, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen ordered an in-house probe of the shoot-out. The report passed back to Bentsen was a scathing indictment of the BATF hierarchy. Senior agents at the scene knew in advance that plans for their armed assault on the Branch Davidian compound had been leaked to members of the sect, but the decision was nevertheless made to proceed with the assault. BATF Director Steven Higgins was fired by Bentsen, and five top aides were suspended as the result of the inquiry.

But over at the Justice Department, no such self-criticism has been forthcoming. Deeply entrenched networks, in some cases held over from the "Gay" Edgar Hoover era, are in a struggle with the new director to block any cleanup. An in-house FBI review of the April 19 Waco raid absolved the Bureau's SWAT unit of any wrongdoing or even poor judgment. However, a parallel report on the April events, commissioned by the White House, strongly contradicted the FBI report and said that the bloodbath could have been avoided had federal agents taken a range of other options.

The Waco verdict will not be the last word on government death squad operations. There are scores of similar cases across the country which never gained the notoriety of the Weaver or Waco tragedies, but which are still being pursued.

Not the least of these cases was the Oct. 6-7, 1986 paramilitary raid on the publishing offices of associates of Lyndon LaRouche. Some 400 federal, state, and county police, backed up by U.S. military counter-terror units, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers, conducted a 24-hour siege, which was cut short when Lyndon LaRouche sent a personal telegram to President Ronald Reagan alerting him to the action. The ADL and CAN played a central role in that armed assault as well; six volumes of evidence of massive government corruption in the case are already on file with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, Virginia.

Time is running out on the federal government's deeply entrenched, but now highly vulnerable police state apparatus.

The strange spy case of Aldrich Ames

by Edward Spannaus and Jeffrey Steinberg

Veteran CIA agent Aldrich Hazen Ames and his wife Maria del Rosario Casas Ames were arrested by FBI agents on Feb. 22, in what is emerging as a bizarre tale of alleged espionage and double-agentry involving Russia and the former Soviet Union. According to a 35-page FBI affidavit, Ames began to function as an agent of the Soviet KGB from about May 1985 on, and he continued to provide classified information to the Russian Federation's Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS, or SVRR). The affidavit asserts that Ames had been paid more than \$1.5 million by the KGB and SVRR; this amount has now risen to over \$2.5 million.

How Aldrich and his wife managed to spend large amounts of unaccounted-for cash, and still evade detection over a period of years, is only one of the many unexplained mysteries of this case.

If the allegations against him are true, Ames is the highest-level U.S. intelligence official ever caught spying for the Soviets. Intelligence officials have been telling Congress and the press that as many as 10 agents recruited by U.S. agencies were betrayed and killed as a result of Ames's espionage; others dispute that figure, and point to the likely presence of still other "moles." Some observers have pointed out that the uncovering of Ames provides a convenient explanation for U.S. intelligence failures during the middle-to-late 1980s, failures which in reality have much deeper and more diverse causes.

A spy's career

Ironically, Ames is the son of career CIA officer Carlton Cecil Ames, who is reported to have worked under James Jesus Angleton, the former chief of CIA counterintelligence who was notorious for his obsessive hunts for Soviet moles in the agency. The young Aldrich Ames joined the CIA in 1962 at the age of 21. The CIA sent him to college; two years after his graduation, Ames was sent into his first field post, in Ankara, Turkey, in 1969. In 1972, he was transferred back to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and beginning in 1976, he spent five years in New York City attempting to recruit Russians to "turn" and work for U.S. intelligence.

In 1981, Ames was sent to Mexico City, where he met his present wife, who was then serving as the Colombian cultural attaché. According to accounts, Ames recruited her to also work for the CIA. At the end of 1983, Ames was

transferred back to Langley, and became chief of counterintelligence in the Soviet-East European Division of the CIA's Operations Directorate, responsible for all counterintelligence directed against the Warsaw Pact.

From 1986 to 1989, Ames was posted to the CIA station in Rome. According to some reports, Ames came under suspicion as early as 1987; other reports say it was in 1989. In any event, during 1991 he was transferred out of the Operations Directorate, into the Counter-Narcotics Center of the Intelligence Directorate, where he was in charge of intelligence for the Black Sea region, while a joint FBI-CIA investigation into his suspected espionage activities was opened.

The FBI's case against Ames

Because the CIA is prohibited by law from conducting domestic law enforcement investigations, the case against Ames was put together by the FBI. The evidence presented by the government, as contained in the FBI affidavit backing up search and arrest warrants, and also presented in a March 1 court hearing, is almost entirely derived from electronic surveillance, bank records, and searches of Ames's home, office, computer, and trash.

The March 1 hearing was a combined preliminary hearing and detention hearing for Ames and his wife, to determine 1) whether there was probable cause to send the case to a grand jury, and 2) whether the Ameses should be held without bail before trial. The court ruled for the government on both issues.

As presented so far, the government's case is largely circumstantial. Under cross-examination in the hearing, the government's sole witness, FBI Special Agent Leslie G. Wiser, Jr., conceded that the FBI had never seen Ames meeting with a Russian, had never seen him passing or receiving documents, and had never witnessed him receiving money from the Russians. The most significant evidence presented consisted of two documents claimed to have been found during a search of Ames's house following his arrest. One was a nine-page 1989 letter to Ames from Soviet intelligence, telling him that his priority task was to identify any U.S. agents in the Soviet intelligence services. The other was a financial record dated May 1, 1989, allegedly found in a box in Ames's home study, which began, "Dear friend, your balance sheet is \$2.705 million. . . ." Prosecutors played these documents for maximum exposure to the hordes of reporters filling the courtroom. But at least one reporter in the courtroom expressed skepticism regarding the government's hot new evidence, commenting, "It sounds too good to be true."

Much speculation surrounds Mrs. Ames; various reports indicate that she is cooperating with the government against her husband, but this is denied by her attorney. Although there was no assertion of innocence coming from Aldrich Ames or from his attorney (nor need there be at this stage), Mrs. Ames's lawyer repeatedly stated that she intends to assert her innocence. The Ameses did not appear to be on friendly terms during the hearing.

The prosecutors took great pains to prevent discussion of classified information, or of the basis for the electronic surveillance which was ordered last summer by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Sources report that there is already a big dispute between the CIA and the FBI/Justice Department, since the CIA will resist disclosure of the classified information which the FBI/DOJ will need to bring the case to trial. The CIA will try to restrict the case to one based primarily on financial evidence, so as not to disclose secrets which could jeopardize ongoing operations or embarrass the agency.

The CIA's vulnerability

The Ames spy scandal is symptomatic of a much deeper problem that persists today: the massive corruption of the entire intelligence process that can be traced immediately back to the "secret parallel government" fiasco of the 1980s. Back in 1985, when Aldrich Ames was apparently receiving his first cash payoffs from the KGB, then-CIA head William Casey and his White House cowboys—Oliver North, Richard Secord, et al.—were collaborating with the KGB, the East German Stasi, and the international drug cartels in smuggling arms to the Nicaraguan Contras.

Mansur al-Kassar, a Syrian national listed in the CIA's computers as a KGB asset, was paid a total of \$1.5 million by the Reagan White House through Swiss secret bank accounts, to pass Warsaw Pact arms to the Contras and to help negotiate for the release of American hostages in Lebanon. According to several published accounts, the U.S. government turned its back on al-Kassar's other main source of revenue: the smuggling of illegal narcotics into the United States and western Europe.

In Rostock, East Germany, a senior Stasi official, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, was also colluding with the North-Secord "Project Democracy" team in funneling arms to the Contras. There are grounds to believe that Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme was assassinated after he stumbled onto the East-West spy collusion in the flow of illegal guns and drugs around the world. Evidence has subsequently surfaced that intelligence agencies of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact had foreknowledge of the Palme hit.

One former senior CIA official described the current situation as being "totally out of control." During the fast-and-loose decade of the 1980s, when Casey encouraged his CIA operations officers to go "off the reservation" and set up private front operations to service U.S. intelligence requirements, an already-uncontrolled situation deteriorated into a swamp of corruption. For every official CIA employee, there were anywhere from one to three contract employees, assets, snitches, etc.—with virtually no guidelines on their behavior.

Under those circumstances, the sense of mission was all but lost, a premium was placed on corruption, and secret collusion with Moscow on the international arms and drugs market assured that any conventional techniques for detecting Soviet "moles" could not work.