


Interview: Mavriks Vulfsons

Latvia's battle for national survival and independence



Mavriks Vulfsons is a Latvian TV news commentator. From 1963 to 1989, he was a lecturer at the Latvian Academy of Arts in Riga. He helped to form the Latvian Popular Front in 1988 and was elected a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. There he was a member of the Commission on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. After Latvia declared its independence, he was elected to the Latvian Supreme Council and served as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Supreme Council. He later served as ambassador-at-large under Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans. He is a leading figure in the Latvian Jewish community. William Jones interviewed him on Feb. 20-21 in Washington; the interview has been abridged.

EIR: Under the terms of the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreements in 1940, the Baltic states, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, were ceded by Hitler to Stalin. Establishing the existence of the secret protocol became therefore a necessary precondition for the Baltic states, during the period of the Gorbachov "thaw," to establish without a shadow of a doubt the legitimacy of their demand for independence. You, as a member of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union during that period, were intimately involved in establishing the existence of, and making public, that secret protocol. What happened?

Vulfsons: In the beginning, because I was a historian, I was very interested in getting the protocols relating to Latvia. But we could never publish them in the newspapers. Then I went to Germany and received permission, as perhaps the first foreigner, to see the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany. I came there with a TV team and they showed me the copies of the protocol. They were on a film band, together with thousands and thousands of other copies of documents relating to relations between Germany and Russia, including copies of documents dating from the time of Peter the Great. There was no doubt that they were really copies of this document.

But I thought that that was not enough. So I went to northern Bavaria with the help of the German Foreign Ministry to meet Johnny Herwart, a legend, a person who had helped build up the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the war. He had been the ambassador in London and in Rome

and was quite an old man in those days. But he had been with von der Schulenburg, the German ambassador to Moscow, in August when Ribbentrop came; he was with them all the time. So I called him and said I would like to visit him. He was very happy to meet.

Herwart was on the spot when the protocol was signed. He got the order from Ribbentrop to call Hitler from the Austrian Embassy in Moscow, not from the German Embassy, because they didn't like that, to ask Hitler if the demand of Stalin that west Latvia, with the two important ports of Liepaja and Ventspils, be given to the Russians, were acceptable. This was, at the last moment, a condition of Stalin. Ribbentrop had only the authority to give eastern Latvia, up to the Daugava River, to Stalin. Stalin had said if these ports weren't included, the Russians wouldn't even sign the Non-Aggression Pact, and this was very important for the Germans. Herwart went to the phone and called Hitler's aide, who kept him waiting for some time, then came back to the phone and said, "Yes, we are in agreement." Stalin was happy and they drank champagne and signed the protocol.

It was important to establish that the protocol did indeed exist, for those historians in Latvia and for the official Communist political leadership in Latvia, which doubted its existence.

Then on June 2, 1988 I made a speech in a meeting of the most important intellectuals of Latvia, about 500 people in all, and in the presence of the five secretaries of the Communist Party, two of whom would later become important. One of them was Boris Pugo, who would later become Soviet interior minister, and who committed suicide as an organizer of the August 1991 coup. And the second, a very important person in Latvia, with a very dubious post, was Anatolijs Gorbunovs, the secretary in charge of ideology, and now the chairman of the Latvian Parliament. I told the Latvian people that I had read the secret protocol word-for-word, the first time the Latvian people had heard its contents, and then I said, "So we can see that it was not a revolution that occurred in Latvia in 1940, but rather a conspiracy between two bandits." And that the fate of Latvia was decided during the night when Stalin and Ribbentrop and Molotov drank their champagne and when Ribbentrop came back from having seen Tchaikovsky's *Swan Lake*, saying how wonderfully he



Mavriks Vulfsons and Mikhail Gorbachov. Says Vulfsons, "I became disappointed with Gorbachov, because it became clear that he was behind many of the bloody events of the period."

had enjoyed it.

This was like a bomb exploding, because I spoke before the TV cameras. Pugo came up to me afterwards, red-faced, and said, "You have killed Soviet Latvia." Gorbunovs wrote a few days afterwards in the newspaper that I was "an ugly person." But the people saw me as a hero. When I returned home, the steps to my apartment were full of flowers.

In some ways, this was the most significant speech which was delivered at that time. Two weeks later we had our first legal meeting. It was on June 14, the anniversary of the first big deportations of Latvians by Stalin in 1941. Forty thousand people came; it was filled with KGB men and police, but it was the first major demonstration. This date is always celebrated now as a reminder of Stalin's cruelty, the cruelty of the regime. And then on Oct. 7, we had the first congress of the Latvian Popular Front. I was elected to the board and this was the beginning of our movement. In a very short time, the Popular Front became a very strong organization. In the elections to the Supreme Soviet—as we were still in the Soviet Union—the Popular Front got more than 55% of all votes. You must take account of the fact that in Latvia there were many Soviet military forces, 200,000 strong, and we had a million Russians living there. So it was a very good result. Not every Latvian was a supporter. There were many communists who were against me.

I won this election even in the Russian quarters of Riga and even in one regiment that was deployed in Riga. My

opponents claimed that I was getting ready to build ovens to burn the Russians, but I was successful.

I then worked in Moscow on two commissions, the Foreign Relations Committee and the Commission to Investigate the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. We were about 30 people from the Baltic states and from Russia. The chairman was Aleksandr Yakovlev, the second person in the hierarchy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but a liberal man. After two months, in December 1989, we were ready to make a statement in the Congress of People's Deputies, the highest body in the Soviet Union, about this issue. On the first vote to nullify Molotov-Ribbentrop, we received about 400 votes—from the delegation from Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, some votes from Moldova, Ukraine voted for us, but it fell through.

We asked that it be voted on again, and before this vote I gave my second important speech, which was quite historic, since it was seen all over the Soviet Union. I said that it was unjust that a great people do not perceive what has been done by Stalin. I asked them in a very dramatic speech to approve our proposal to make the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact null and void from Day One, at the point it was signed. Lukyanov, who was chairman of the Supreme Soviet, kicked me off the podium and turned off the microphone. Many women deputies wept at the speech and cried that I should have the floor to finish. When I stepped down, Mikhail Gorbachov said, "Let him go back," so I was able to finish my speech. We got then about 800 or 900 votes, so that I succeeded in

mobilizing 500 votes with this speech. But it was still not enough.

Next day there was a third vote, and there we got some help from Yakovlev. When all the deputies had left the chamber of the Supreme Soviet, Yakovlev and I stayed behind. He told me that the most important thing would be to persuade the minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, who was a very strong supporter of the Union and a conservative Communist. He always voted against us. Yakovlev said it would be important that he not speak at the next session. I took the text of our proposal and asked the Ukrainian minister to show me the passage that he found objectionable. He said that he objected that it said that the annexation should be declared null and void from the beginning, because it was signed together with the Non-Aggression Pact, and this was a legal document. I told him that perhaps we could find a suitable formulation. He formulated the same thing in different words. Then we shook hands and I went to Yakovlev and told him, "He's ready." Yakovlev said, "I also have something up my sleeve, but I couldn't do it before you had spoken with him. Tomorrow you will see my weapon." I suppose he had in his pocket the Russian copy of the protocol which had been in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the whole time, but which was a well-kept secret at that time. He was a good diplomat, and on this issue he was honest. Then we were able to pass the resolution. I returned to Latvia on Dec. 24. There were 30,000 people waiting for us on our return.

Then we had elections in Latvia and I was elected in April 1990 to the Supreme Council of Latvia, and at the first session on May 4, we announced Latvia as an independent country. I proposed Mr. Gorbunovs as the chairman of the parliament. I worked then as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and as a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. I was fired from the commission, one and a half years later. In November we held a memorial on the 50th anniversary of the shooting of more than 30,000 Jews in two days time in Rumbula. It was an important day. It happened at a period when Latvia was becoming very nationalistic.

The Popular Front was not a nationalistic organization. It was an umbrella organization for different nationalities. About 10-15% of the members were Russian and there were some very good Polish and Jewish people involved in it. It was a very decent organization. But the stronger we became, the more people, who had not been active in the Popular Front, came out of their holes, where they were sitting and waiting, and then many of these became active nationalists. At its third congress, the Popular Front changed direction, becoming not the Popular Front of Latvia, but the Latvian Popular Front. Nationalism became quite strong.

Therefore, the first speaker in Rumbula was the chairman of the parliament, Mr. Gorbunovs. He spoke very warmly about the victims of fascism, but suddenly made a statement reprimanding the Jews for their responsibility for all that had happened in 1918 and in 1914. You see, there is a legend

spread by the Germans that the Jews were the KGB. But the KGB was predominantly Russian and Latvian. So when I heard about these statements made at the grave where 30,000 old people and children had been shot in two days, I spoke out that the Latvians must also be reminded that they also were guilty in this tragedy, since many of those who shot the Jews, even before the Germans entered the country, were Latvian fascists. The root of this was the 1930s regime of Karis Ulmanis, an authoritarian and anti-Semitic, but non-fascist, regime. I said then that I was accusing the Latvians, but not because they murdered. That there were Latvian murderers is not the fault of a nation; every nation has such people. But I accused them of having remained silent, in their homes, in the streets, and in their churches. There were only some decent people who helped save the Jews. And these were a lonely minority.

This speech cost me dearly. I fell ill. I was very excited by the whole thing. It was cold, in November, but I thought of those who took that last train during those cold November days in 1940. They had to undress and lie in their graves. I fell ill, but the Commission on Foreign Affairs used this case to kick me out and they voted against me. They wrote a protocol. But they were not very far-sighted. I returned from the hospital a few days later, and went to the commission and looked at the copy of the protocol. It was called "The Jewish Case." Now we have had only one "Jewish Case" in our history, and by "we" I mean we in the East. And the biggest case was Stalin's case of the "Doctors' Plot." Then I went to the commission a few days afterwards, and said I knew that they had taken a decision to kick me out, but that I would give a copy of the protocol to the press if they didn't recall me. Then I was recalled to my position and we remained in something of a stalemate.

EIR: Was Latvian independence readily accepted by the Gorbachov leadership?

Vulfson: Remaining a member of the Supreme Soviet, I, of course, voted. I sat in a place where Gorbachov could always see me. I guess I was one of the eldest members, and therefore he paid some attention to me. On our first vote, I think it was Vytautas Landsbergis [later the President of Lithuania], or maybe someone else, who proposed that there should not be a Ministry of Culture in Moscow, but rather that culture being national, there should be a Ministry of Culture in every republic. Gorbachov saw that I had voted for the proposal, and he called me to him. It was our first meeting, shortly after the government had been formed. He said to me, "You look like an intelligent person. How could you vote against the Ministry of Culture being in Moscow?" I explained my position to him.

After this, we often met and discussed many, many questions. We had, for some time at least, a very good relationship, and I received from him a promise to give Latvia its economic independence. It sounded very good, but it was

empty. You cannot be economically independent when you have no political independence. Afterwards I became disappointed with Gorbachov, because it became clear that he was also behind many of the bloody events of the period. Although I called his aide, Anatoli Chernyayev, with whom I had good relations, on the eve of the bloody events in Riga in January 1991 and warned him that he must call Gorbachov immediately and tell him that in Riga there threatened the same bloodshed as had occurred in Vilnius [Lithuania] some days earlier, when Soviet troops had occupied the press building and opened fired on civilians. The Vilnius shootings had been a terrible event and very bad for Gorbachov. After the Vilnius events, 300,000 persons came to Red Square, Russians who protested the bloodshed. I wasn't thinking about Gorbachov's fate, but about bloodshed in Latvia. But Gorbachov had locked his door and didn't receive Chernyayev. Gorbachov was therefore also responsible. Afterwards, we seldom met.

Many times I spoke with Gorbachov about the problems of giving Latvia independence, since it had been illegally occupied by Soviet troops. Gorbachov said, "Yes, but 50 years have passed and we have become brothers." I answered him, "It was not a brotherhood, it was a rape. But if you would come now, and say that you are giving us back our independence, there would be a million people to greet you in Riga. If you were to give us our independence, you would have a very good record in the West for a long time." "I have it," he said. "Yes," I replied, "but it would mean that you will remain President for a long time." He said to me, "You are not right. You and some of your colleagues are of that opinion, but the Latvians would like to stay inside the Union. Now we have glasnost, democracy, and I like Latvia very much. It is not like Lithuania." He had had a bad experience in Lithuania, where they had been very impolite to him. He said, "You know, the person in the Soviet Union who would let the Baltics go would be punished by the people." So, we saw things differently.

EIR: The biggest conflict has been around the large Russian minority which lives in Latvia. How do you envision a solution to this problem?

Vulfsons: This is one of the most difficult problems in Latvia, because in the time of Soviet annexation, 700,000 Russians came to live there. Today they make up 38% of the population. When they came to Latvia, they were a dominant factor. We had a Latvian government and a Latvian parliament, but they controlled the state. The representative of Moscow was the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and he was really the one in charge.

The Latvians suffered very much under the occupation. When I say "Latvians," I don't only mean ethnic Latvians. The first deportation was the 14,000 persons on June 14, 1941. It was very cruel. These people were taken out of their beds and brought to rail cars used to transport cattle, and

were sent to Siberia. Among these 14,000 deported the first time, 5,000 were Jews, rich Jews; It was a deportation along social lines. The rich ones and the Latvian aristocracy were deported. Stalin and his regime thought that in case of war, these would remain on the German side. He thought this even of the Jews. He had such an imagination. He was very naive on this question.

The second deportation was connected with the collectivization in Latvia, when more than 45,000 people were deported, especially Latvians, but also many Jews. Hatred of the Russians, especially on the part of those Latvian families who lost their parents, their brothers, their children—this hatred is very strong. Strong feelings are raised over the fact that there are 1 million Russians living in Latvia, some of whom have lived in Latvia before, but they see almost every Russian as an ethnic alien. Today the Latvians are afraid that if the Russians remain and have the same rights as Latvians, they will in a short time become a majority in the country. If they become citizens, they will choose their deputies in our parliament. Maybe sometime, after 10 or 20 years, it is feared they will vote in the parliament to rejoin with Russia. This is the fear of a part of the population.

My point of view, and the point of view of our party, the Party of Harmony, is the following. Of course, the Latvians must have better conditions so that they can have more children. The Latvians live in worse conditions than the Russians, and this is one of the reasons they have fewer children. But we also believe that if we do not give citizenship to the loyal part of the Russian population, to those who have been with us in the difficult times when we struggled for Latvian independence, those who had voted for an independent, democratic Latvia (and it was about one-third of our Russian population), then we will always have national tensions. This is the problem. But our parliament has now decided to create a quota system.

EIR: Has this been acceptable to the Council of Europe?

Vulfsons: Oh, no. They have condemned it. They say there must be a strict law explaining to Russians living in Latvia the procedure by which they can apply for citizenship. There are, however, some conditions with which we agree. We agree that those who are married to citizens and those who were born in Latvia and are today more than 18 years old may apply. These have grown up in Latvia, they know no other country. They don't know what Russia is. They must be the first people who become eligible for citizenship in the near future. Afterwards we would ask that everyone who had lived in Latvia for ten years before independence was declared, from Aug. 21, 1980, be allowed to apply for citizenship. They must know the language on an everyday level, about 1,500 words, pass an examination, swear an oath of loyalty and fidelity, and affirm that they reject any other citizenship, that they are not applying for Russian citizenship. Then they should be eligible to become citizens. Final-

ly, we disagree with the government position that you must also prove that you have an income. There are so many people unemployed—engineers, teachers, etc. Every one of them must have the possibility of getting citizenship. It must be a strict law. But the ruling coalition foresees a system of quotas, which would be premised on the economic and demographic situation in Latvia at the time. In the program of the present coalition government, it is written that the government must determine such a quota every year.

EIR: There were a number of troubling incidents in connection with the ethnic strife recently, such as the incident where two Russian generals were arrested and handcuffed by a district Latvian official. What happened?

Vulfsons: There is one district of Riga where there live more Russians than Latvians (in Riga the Russians comprise 67% of the population). One individual, Andrejs Rucs, had become a virtual dictator there, with a strong political base in the local district council. About 80 people on the council supported him. He has his own armed guard and is doing many things contrary to our laws, but the government is cautious regarding him. More than one year ago, our parliament ruled that the Russian Army had to leave by Dec. 31, 1993. When this decision was taken, I wrote an article in the newspaper, entitled "Will We Declare War on Russia on Dec. 31, 1993?" It was so childish to take a one-sided resolution on the issue of when the Russians had to leave. We could make a proposal, but the parliament cannot simply decide that issue, which of course was a subject of negotiation.

Rucs used this parliamentary decision and said, "Now they are here illegally, and I can push them out." He and his people broke into an installation belonging to the Russian Army, a house approaching the status of a bordello. Rucs came in and told them to leave. At that point, two Russian generals arrived, one of them the deputy commander-in-chief of the Group of Northwestern Forces, and said they would call their people and tell them that this was not the way to take over these premises. When the generals said they would not permit the expropriation, Rucs ordered them handcuffed and told them they would be sent to Russia escorted by his armed men. Rucs told them that parliament had given them no right to stay here. As it happened, Yeltsin spoke by phone with the Latvian President and told him that he was giving him 30 minutes to free the generals. Yeltsin then ordered three divisions, the Fleet and the Air Force, to be ready to free the generals.

The world stood at this moment on the eve of a major conflict, even more fateful than that of Yugoslavia, since it would involve Russia. Now, the President has special security forces, and he ordered them to liberate the generals. The generals were in a nearby forest. They had not been beaten, but they had been pushed around a bit. Then they were released. On the same day, when the Russian ambassador to Latvia tried to go to the place where the generals had been

arrested, he was taken at gunpoint and not allowed to enter. This was quite fantastic. The parliament took a decision to fire Rucs and the Latvian police stormed his council building and disarmed everyone there. In this way, the government reacted quite swiftly. But, a few weeks later, the same Rucs was again chosen as chairman of this council. He now has pretensions of becoming the next mayor of Riga, because he is seen by Latvians as a hero.

EIR: Discussions with the Russians seemed to have reached some compromise on the troop withdrawal, with some mediation from the United States. Most of the major problems seem to have been resolved, except the issue of the early-warning radar in the town of Skrunda. What is the problem that remains with the Skrunda facility?

Vulfsons: The Russians said that they were prepared to withdraw their troops by Aug. 31, 1994, but on one condition—that we allow them to keep the early-warning station in Skrunda. Initially they wanted to keep the Skrunda station for six years. Latvia made a counter-proposal of three years. Then the Russians said five years. At that point, Clinton and Yeltsin came to an arithmetical compromise of four years and invited all the parties to come to Washington to explain to them that four years would not hurt Latvia. Prior to this, however, the Russians had agreed to let a Latvian guard surround the area and inspect the facilities. They also agreed that the installation would be a civilian, not a military, facility: The personnel would be civilian. Now we are discussing the rent for the facility. The right wing has apparently forced the Latvian government to ask for \$400 million a year. The Russians have proposed \$2 million. Of course, both proposals are unserious, ironic. But maybe they'll succeed in hammering out a compromise.

EIR: How do you view the U.S.-supported Partnership for Peace?

Vulfsons: I think that, since this is an offer given to every country in eastern Europe, including Russia, it is the right of the Latvian government to join it, the same as Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland are doing. I think it is more a political event than a military one. The troops from all the Baltic states participating in it would equal one battalion, which will be trained by NATO. But this is not enough to defend Latvia, even if they were armed with sophisticated weapons. I'm not even against Latvia joining NATO, but only on one condition: that relations between NATO and Russia are stable and good, and that Latvia has normal relations with Russia. Latvia should not be together with Russia, but also not against Russia. Nobody must get the impression that Latvia's joining NATO provides a bridgehead for aggression against Moscow. This is the first condition. And the second is the following. If Latvia relies on NATO—and I think it can happen—it must think three times and be very cautious. Why? Because even if Latvia joins NATO, Russia

will be suspicious about this small country on its border, and under certain circumstances, especially if we have bad relations with the Russians inside Latvia, Latvia could get into a very dangerous situation: A conflict within the country, Russian intervention, spying on NATO, many things could happen. NATO will never come to our help. It [the Partnership for Peace program] is a line which is being conducted with a good heart, but not with the might of NATO.

EIR: Latvia has been lauded by the International Monetary Fund for having faithfully followed the IMF's bitter economic and financial prescriptions. How do things really look economically as a result?

Vulfsons: I myself see a close connection between the prescriptions of the IMF and the collapse of our economy. Our Gross National Product has fallen by half in three years. This means we also have a problem with the budget, because without production there are no taxes. The current year's budget is only higher than last year's budget because we have a 37% inflation. The majority of the population can buy about 30-40% of that which they bought with their wages three years ago. Three years ago, we did not have a healthy economy, but you could buy something, even pensioners could buy something—and I mean not only potatoes, or bread and sometimes milk, which they can still do today. Previously, every pensioner, a retired professor or a non-skilled worker, would get the same amount of money, 22.3 lats. One lat, relatively high against the dollar, is worth \$1.72. So 22 lats are approximately \$40. Although some things in Latvia are cheaper, a person would pay about half of his monthly pension for rent. That means you have less than 70¢ a day to spend. And 70¢ a day means that you can buy one loaf of bread, some potatoes, and maybe, every couple of days, a liter of milk, or a bit of oil to cook potatoes. How long can you live in such conditions? We have 700,000 pensioners, we have many unemployed, about 200,000. One hundred thousand are registered, and about 100,000 represent hidden unemployment. They are getting 15-20 lats a month. They are living in a really terrible situation. In the latest survey of how people view the future, 54% thought that things will get worse, 28% thought things would remain the same, and only 8% had any hope that things would become better; 3% didn't know.

The reasons for this pessimism are simple. As a result of IMF policy, the lat has been at a very high rate of exchange. That means that it is favorable for those who are exporting goods to Latvia, and many foreign firms are exporting food to Latvia, food of lesser quality, which is cheaper than what our farmers produce. This is killing our farmers. Secondly, when the rate of the lat is so high, then everything that is being produced in Latvia cannot be sold, neither in the East nor in the West. Of course, it would always be difficult to sell in the West. We can't be competitive there. But in the East, we could sell our products, if the prices were not so

high. One lat is worth 3,000 rubles. That's unreal! For 3,000 rubles you can buy much more than for one lat. So the high exchange rate prevents us from exporting. It promotes the imports which are killing our farmers, and not only the farmers, but also the producers of other imported products.

When you ask the monetary authorities about the situation, they tell you, "It's good that you can't produce anything. The day you produce nothing will be the happiest day in Latvia." Of course, we must build a new industry. But who will build it? And what will happen to the workers who still have their jobs today? They don't get any money. They are paid with the products they produce, which they must then sell to buy something else. These are things we have never experienced, even in Soviet Latvia, which of course was no paradise.

The second major problem is that of credit. The banks are giving loans at 7.5% per month. That means about 100-115% a year. Who can borrow money on such conditions, even if inflation were, like last year, at 37%? Only those people who can quickly buy and then quickly sell. It can only be to finance trade, not production. But production is your only real source of taxes and wages. Those entrepreneurs who are ready to produce something and are in need of this credit, won't take the risks involved to make innovations. Of all those intellectual workers who are working in the budget institutions, as teachers, as doctors in some places which are not privatized, in different state organizations, the highest wage is 100 lats, about \$170. The entire level of income has gone down.

EIR: What solution do you see?

Vulfsons: We need some form of "selective protectionism." We must leave one part of the big enterprises which had previously worked for Russia, especially, in the hands of the state, maybe turning them into stock companies where the owners are the employees of the plant. These, we must subsidize. Not much, but enough to allow them to pay their workers wages which they can live on. We must create the possibility for exporting products to Russia. Then we have to deal with taxes, and we must protect our markets from foreign dumping.

EIR: You have also expressed interest in the proposal by Lyndon LaRouche for creating a Paris-Berlin-Vienna "Productive Triangle" which could supply the East with the needed capital goods for economic reconstruction. How do you see that as an alternative to "shock therapy"?

Vulfsons: I don't know this project very well. I know the concept, but I find it difficult to speak about it, because I think that the enunciation of it will be very difficult. It must be a full reconstruction of thinking, of policy, of economic management. There must be the will of a broad section of society to make such a revolutionary development. How will it work, if implemented? Quite well, I think. But it must be seen in realistic terms.