

Nanjing left far behind

The fate of peasants looking for a city job strikes one even more in Nanjing, which was not officially declared "an open-door city" until sometime last year, and therefore does not attract foreigners or Taiwanese, who are only keen on real estate investment.

Many construction coolies in the Nanjing area suffer under conditions worse than their cousins in Beijing—they sleep on the pavement; some men earn their living by pulling bicycle carriages loaded with coal, furniture, or waste paper, while the women try to sell a basket of vegetables or fruit brought to the city on bicycles.

Nanjing, the old capital during six dynasties yet much ignored for the past 45 years, does not even have sufficient public transportation. Bicycles, seen also in most other cities, flood the narrow streets by the thousands.

Public transportation is supplemented by privately managed mini-buses leased to operators whose only concern is a full load, not fast delivery. These mini-buses, or multi-passenger jumbo-taxis, are as big as caravans, picking up whoever is willing to pay many times what a fare would cost on a public bus.

Although passengers sweltering in the steaming hot summers find it very pleasant to be able to stop the mini-bus anywhere along the road, they are equally irritated by long delays where ticket girls yell repeatedly to pedestrians in order to grab more customers.

But even here you can sense that things are moving, especially beyond the southern outskirts of the city around the area proposed for a new international airport. The whole district, which has gone from a village, to a small town, to what is now called a new industry and technology development zone, is a satellite city of Nanjing.

It actually looks like the whole town is just one big construction site with office buildings, new apartments, department stores, and factory blocks mushrooming up—all in contrast to the primitive shelters for the peasant workers who are building the place from scratch almost with their bare hands.

The new openness of China is seen as a chance for prosperity by many Chinese, such as young engineers from the Nanjing automobile manufacturers, who expressed their hopes and excitement about new contracts to be signed with Japanese automakers to make auto parts in Nanjing.

However, if the direction of this development depends solely on the wishes of foreign investors, the rural areas may never get any benefits from it. In that case, coastal cities will be populated by millions of peasants looking for jobs and living not only in ugly red-brick huts, but also under the bridges and in shanty towns, just as in any Third World country.

Hopefully, on the next trip to China, I will see fewer peasants seeking jobs.

Russia's politicians: another 'anti-fascist'

by Roman Bessonov

The author is a Russian journalist.

Ever since Mikhail Gorbachov's early days in power, public opinion in the U.S.S.R. and then Russia has been deeply, and artificially, divided into two camps. Some magazines and newspapers, such as *Nash Sovremennik* and *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, developed Slavophile views, setting out to protect Russians from hostile ideological winds from the West and explaining economic problems as the result of evil influences from Jews or the Caucasus peoples. *Ogonyok* magazine and *Moscow News*, by contrast, declared that Russia should become a part of western civilization. They promoted anti-militarist views and admired everything foreign, calling it progressive.

Only after some years did it become clear that the new, revived "Third Rome" imperial ideology and the Russia-for-sale ideology were both cooked up in the Ideology Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee. Aleksandr Degtyarev, who as deputy chief of that department supported the first nationalist movements such as *Pamyat*, was a close friend of the most active "westernist" in the CPSU, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev (director of the Ostankino television company today).

When the communist empire broke into pieces, the westernists appealed for "freedom for everybody and ourselves" and the Slavophiles declared that "Russia can do without these minorities, who only eat up our food." Russian President Boris Yeltsin, when he signed the Declaration of Independence of the Russian Federation, was obligated to both of these forces. Their struggle did not cease as he became President.

Growth of separatism

The Democratic Russia movement, which contained many young activists and a few old dissidents, existed as a united political force only until August 1991. It split at once, when it became clear that some of the democrats stood for dividing Russia into many smaller countries and others demanded an indivisible, well-armed Orthodox Russian state. Things followed a similar pattern in the political elite, with some exceptions. Politicians, having more to lose, are less

Are they preparing campaign?

sincere and do not reveal their views at the drop of a hat. Sometimes they declare views quite opposite to their political behavior.

Former KGB general Aleksandr Sterligov, for example, used to speak out as an extreme nationalist. His nationalism was directed not outside the country, as was the case with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, but inside. Sterligov appealed for the establishment of a Russian ethnic state within the Russian Federation, including only those regions which "agree to be Russian." In fact, he stood for the division of the country; he had ties to some elites in the most developed regions of the country and expressed their separatist interests. He welcomed the declaration of a Vologda Republic, for instance.

Along with the liberal democrat Gennadi Burbulis, Aleksandr Sterligov supported the Chechen leader Dudayev. He influenced the ataman of the Don Cossacks, Nikolai Kositsyn, to sign a mutual support agreement with Dudayev, which included the obligation to block Russian Army units passing to Chechenya through the "national Cossack territories." Thus, "Russian nationalist" Sterligov supported not only Chechen separatism, but also Cossack separatist ideas, based on the myth of an original Cossack nation. (In fact, the Cossacks originated from peasants who fled serfdom in the 18th and early 19th centuries and settled on the Don and Kuban rivers.)

Sterligov's concern for Chechens and Cossacks can be explained only by specific commercial interests in the North Caucasus region. The most reliable version is that he derives profit from oil extraction in Chechenya, but the text of his agreement with Kositsyn suggests an interest in arms trafficking, too.

In late 1991, Gennadi Burbulis spoke out for the autonomy of the Khanty-Mansy national minority in Western Siberia, although these small peoples numbered less than 10% of the population in the Khanty-Mansy national district. But that region is very rich in oil and gas. It was clear that the "liberal" motto of "freedom for you and us" was covering for mere profit interests.

The fact that Burbulis also supported Jokhar Dudayev was unveiled only recently, in August. The former chairman of the Council of Minorities in the dissolved (in September

1993) Russian Parliament, Ramazan Abdulaptipov, mentioned two other names in this connection: Ruslan Khasbulatov, the speaker of the dissolved Parliament, and former Minister of Press and Information Mikhail Poltoranin.

The case of M. Poltoranin

Speaking of Poltoranin: Having been forced to resign in 1993 and then elected chairman of the Commission on Press and Information in the new State Duma (Parliament), this man has become an object of a well-organized attack for "nationalist views and anti-Semitism." In fact, Poltoranin has changed his ideological clothes twice. He was an obedient communist functionary, being editor of the Moscow CPSU paper *Moskovskaya Pravda*, and did his best to become a close ally of the chairman of the CPSU Moscow Municipal Committee, Boris Yeltsin. This was in the 1980s. Poltoranin also enjoyed favor in the CPSU Ideology Department, controlled by the above-mentioned Yakovlev. In 1991, Poltoranin became a radical liberal politician (which meant that he supported everything Yeltsin said and took every opportunity to emphasize his loyalty to his patron). In late 1992, Yakovlev and Poltoranin tried to form a new political party to unite all the "radical democrats," a project they called Liberal Union. It was not realized, due to rough relations between Poltoranin and Yegor Gaidar. The same thing happened in the summer of this year, when Poltoranin, Ella Pamfilova (former "democratic" minister of social care), and Marshal Yevgeni Shaposhnikov declared a new political coalition that would unite the entire democratic movement once again.

By this time, Poltoranin had already lost his popularity in liberal circles. Even true Yeltsinists were annoyed with his political style, his crude and exaggerated flattery of Yeltsin, which was his weapon on the road to his ministerial chair, and especially the episode when he kicked out former liberal Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov, declaring that this rival "was not active enough in the struggle against communofascists."

Less than a year later, Poltoranin was already using "opposition" terminology in the political game, but in the same crude and insulting way. In the spring of 1993, he attacked the Independent Television Company (NTV), financed by Vladimir Gusinsky's Most (Bridge) Bank, in an attempt to take revenge for its disobedience to him while he was minister. Gusinsky and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov probably did do a lot to force Poltoranin's resignation. The war of influences and funds for control of television had started two years before, and Poltoranin did not succeed in preserving a monopoly. He only reduced the quality and increased the corruption at Ostankino TV, and those who left Ostankino under his pseudo-ideological pressure now work at NTV.

The point here is not whom Poltoranin attacked, but how he did it. In an interview on Ostankino, he declared

that NTV and the newspaper *Sevodnya* (also financed by Most Bank) were ruining Russian national traditions and speaking "camp Hebrew language." He did not explain what he meant by "camp Hebrew," but that was a signal for a great number of liberal journalists to attack him, since the phrase was understood as a hint that Gusinsky is Jewish.

Just at that time, it became known that Poltoranin's protégé, Chairman of the State Committee on the Press Boris Mironov, was the author of a novel called *The Madman* (1992), in which the hero's name was Mikhail Nikiforovich Poltorainov—a brave journalist who devotes his life to the struggle against both Communism and Zionism. Mironov had made his career by means of overt and crude flattery like this. That he felt compelled to make his point by choosing such a name for his hero reveals the low intellectual level of both Poltoranin and Mironov.

The fact that the book was written two years ago suggests that the author expected a certain kind of anti-communist and also anti-Semitic ideology to prevail and become state doctrine. The serfs were sure of their master. Obviously, they began to voice nationalistic and anti-Semitic views, in the sure belief that the President would support them.

After the Parliament was smashed

After Black October 1993, when Yeltsin realized that the United States was going to support his power and not the separatists such as Kirsan Ilyumzhinov (president of Kalmykia, within the Russian Federation), who were awaiting his fall, Yeltsin pronounced his Third Rome ideology at last. He probably found this necessary to retain his power and to find mutual understanding with the Russian Orthodox Church (which did not support him in October, because it was the opposition that spoke of patriotism and Russian unity at that time). He allowed the mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg to sweep the "people of Caucasus nationality" out of town. He allowed Vladimir Shumeiko to develop a certain kind of "national power ideology," and Shumeiko's freshly sewn "nationalist suit" did not prevent him from becoming chairman of the upper house of Parliament, the Federation Council (it is well known that these election results were grossly falsified in Shumeiko's favor).

Poltoranin and Mironov saw that the President's openly expressed political views had shifted to the Third Rome ideology, leaving the Russia-for-sale views to small liberal politicians such as Konstantin Borovoy or the numerous "centrists-regionalists." But poor intellect makes for bad jokes in a complex political game. The time has passed when everything was clear, when one had only to repeat what the chief was saying but say it louder.

On Aug. 22, Mironov spoke at a seminar for journalists in Orenburg, openly calling himself a Russian nationalist. He added, "If Russian nationalism is fascism, then I am a fascist." Several days before, he signed state subsidies for some opposition newspapers. He also repeated in many audi-

toriums, that journalists should be obedient to local administrators and that censorship remains an important task of the state.

Mironov's views were well known in various political circles and to journalists. But the attack began only in late August. Several days later, Mironov was forced to resign—just as used to happen in Stalin's times—when a wave of official criticism was prepared and kept on hold until the signal was given "from above" to deliver it to the press. Of course, an administrator with ministerial rank calling himself a fascist is a matter for scandal. Still, there are so many reasons for scandals aside from Boris Mironov, and so many other orders for the President to sign, that it cannot be certain that the words he uttered in Orenburg were the only reason for his resignation.

Unofficial sources report that President Yeltsin is not satisfied with the Russian mass media. They say he was especially affected by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's latest speech on TV, where the writer accused Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev of selling the Russian Far East to the Chinese and the Japanese, as well as by filmmaker and Duma deputy Stanislav Govorukhin's statements that Russia under Yeltsin has become a criminal and totally corrupted country. It is becoming clear to people that the Third Rome ideology is only a coverup for the economic and management crisis.

In this situation, it is easier for the Russian leadership to separate itself from nationalist views and launch a new campaign against "fascism," including, of course, not only real fascists, but many other politicians who disagree with or oppose the ruling elite. Such a new drift benefits Yeltsin, because thus he can satisfy the expectations of the most powerful Russian bankers (many of whom are Jews), who control the main press, so their money won't be used against him by such powerful rivals as Yuri Luzhkov.

Some of the well-known radical liberals, who developed the Russia-for-sale views and spoke for separatism, have sensed this new tendency and are showing their eagerness to return to big politics. Former Minister of National Problems Galina Starovoitova, for instance, who in 1991 suggested dividing Russia into 70 small independent states, now wants to become minister of defense!

Boris Mironov was a victim of his own narrow-mindedness. Whether he is a sincere nationalist or just a parrot ready to repeat anything that seems fashionable at the moment, he clearly made a mistake that ends his career. Under Yeltsin, one must always be ready to change clothes and do it in time.

Yeltsin himself is obliged to drift to nationalism and back to cosmopolitanism, plowing down those not sharp enough to sense the deep currents of Russian politics. For a weak leader, that is the only way to retain power. It is the way many Russian leaders manipulated the country—backing some forces and making them oppose others, and then vice versa, using the ancient principle of "divide and conquer."