

Russian Duma report denounces Yeltsin's policy in Chechnya

by Rachel Douglas

In December 1994, Russian troops went into action in the Chechen Republic, in the North Caucasus region in the south of Russia, where clashes still continue after nine months of bloodshed, with tens of thousands of casualties. Excerpted below are the findings of the special Parliamentary Commission of the State Duma [of the Russian Federation] to Investigate the Causes and Circumstances of the Crisis Situation in the Chechen Republic, a document that is brutal in its indictment of the Russian Executive branch and sweeping in its attribution to overseas "anti-Russian forces" of backing for Chechen separatism.

Attention to this Duma review of the war in Chechnya has been nil on the part of the western press and intelligence journals, a grave error of omission. *EIR* has translated these sections of the document, not to concur in all of its findings, but because they reflect anger against President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, perceived as selling out to western interests, and the view that those western interests have rapacious intentions toward Russia — an anger and an assessment now prevalent in Russian opposition circles. The passage in Section 4, alleging that NATO member Turkey armed the separatist Gen. Jokhar Dudayev with former Soviet weapons received from arsenals in eastern Germany, expresses such hostility, as do the report's references to the presence of western-trained Afghanistan War veterans as mercenaries in Chechnya.

The setting for an anti-western backlash in Russia is otherwise identified in Lyndon LaRouche's "EIR Talks" radio interviews of Sept. 13 and 20 (see pp. 52 and 53).

The commission was chaired by Stanislav Govorukhin, a prominent Russian filmmaker who was elected to the Duma in 1993 on the Democratic Party of Russia slate, and is heading his own slate in the December 1995 Duma elections. Through his film and best-selling book, *The Great Criminal Revolution*, Govorukhin became a prominent critic of the policies carried out by Yeltsin and others under the banner of reform.

The Govorukhin hearings were marked by acrimony and recriminations, like most discussions of Chechnya among leading Russian figures. Five of the 11 members of the commission refused to sign off on its findings, which focused

blame on Yeltsin and his governments. Readers may compare the commission findings with Roman Bessonov's background feature on the Chechnya war (*EIR*, April 28 and May 5, 1995).

Italic passages are emphasized in the original. Brackets denote summary by *EIR*. Subheads are added by *EIR*.

On causes and circumstances of the Chechnya crisis

From Section 2: Basic Phases of Development of the Chechen Crisis.

In the spring of 1991, in the framework of an election campaign-related tour of Russia, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) B.N. Yeltsin expressed support for the sovereignty of the [Chechen] Republic, repeating his famous thesis: "Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow!"

It is hard to believe that Yeltsin . . . did not understand what this would lead to. That means that he made promises with just one goal — to obtain votes at any price. And so it happened. In the 1991 presidential elections, B. Yeltsin received 80% of the votes in the Chechen-Ingush Republic, far more than he did nationwide. . . .

The Second National Congress of the Chechen people, held in May-June 1991, elected Gen. Jokhar Dudayev chairman of its executive committee. The Congress declared the independence of the Chechen Republic and its exit from the R.S.F.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. The Executive Committee of the National Congress of the Chechen People was declared to be the sole legal organ of power in this non-existent republic. . . .

Testimony before the Commission has established that such separatist "successes" were able to occur, thanks to the approval and sometimes overt support of the entourage of President Yeltsin and Chairman of the [Russian] Supreme Soviet Khasbulatov.

On Aug. 23, 1991, for example, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R.'s Committee on Legality, Law and Order, and Combatting Crime Gen. of Internal Troops A. Aslakhanov arrived, together with Deputy Prime Minister of the R.S.F.S.R. I. Grebesheva. With them was

S. Khajiyev, seen by the Russian leadership as a possible successor to [Chechen-Ingushetia Supreme Soviet leader] Zavgayev.

At an extraordinary session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Chechen-Ingushetia, these representatives of the Russian leadership warned D. Zavgayev about the impermissibility of using force to resolve the political crisis, i.e., they effectively ensured the victory of the separatists.

[The rise of Dudayev culminated in his cancellation of scheduled elections in October 1991, and the holding of Oct. 27, 1991 elections elevating him to the Presidency of Chechnya, which the Govorukhin Commission characterizes as a "coup d'état."]

On Nov. 2, the Extraordinary 5th Congress of People's Deputies of the R.S.F.S.R. adopted a resolution "to recognize as unlawful, the elections for supreme legislative body and President, held in the Chechen-Ingush Republic on Oct. 27, 1991, and any laws they adopt to be not subject to implementation."

In accordance with this resolution, on Nov. 4 R.S.F.S.R. Vice President A.V. Rutskoy issued an instruction to establish an Operational Staff for the Crisis Situation in the Chechen-Ingush republic, which was to have prepared the text of a decree proclaiming a state of emergency in Chechnya.

In the final stages of drafting the decision to adopt such a decree, only a small circle of individuals took part, including, besides the vice president, R. Khasbulatov, S. Shakhray, N. Fyodorov, V. Stepankov, V. Barannikov, A. Dunayev, and some other officials. The text of the document went through several drafts and compromises and was signed, despite the critical situation, only on Nov. 7, because, as several witnesses testified, it was difficult to make contact with B. Yeltsin, who had gone to Zavidovo for the holiday.

The implementation of that Decree, however, was effectively prevented by the [Soviet] Union authorities, above all U.S.S.R. Minister of Internal Affairs Barannikov, who was highly critical of the idea from the outset. Barannikov did not hide that he would take no part in implementation of a state of emergency, which was taken as an oblique expression of the overall posture of the U.S.S.R. leadership and President Gorbachov.

Indeed, events after the declaration of the state of emergency were tragi-comical. The OMON [special forces] unit sent into Grozny was blocked by armed units, but it could not engage them, since the personnel and their weapons had been flying in separate airplanes and had landed at different airports (Mozdok and Vladikavkaz, respectively).

After a few days, the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. had to cancel the decree on the state of emergency, to which President Yeltsin agreed.

From that moment on began the consolidation of an authoritarian regime in Chechnya, with the direct abetment of

Russia's central authorities, which resulted in the tragic events of 1994-1995.

Chechen international travel authorized by Moscow

The end of 1991 was marked by further seizures of state-owned and military facilities, the beginning of creation of [Chechnya's] own military units, and a series of resolutions by the Chechen-elected parliament, intended to provide a legal basis for all these actions.

The Chechen authorities constantly declared the republic's independence, its non-membership in Russia, allegedly approved by the population in the October elections; and they asserted their pretensions to independence under international law, which was recognized, incidentally, by no one.

In reality, little Chechnya, having no access to the sea and having lost its "friendly" foreign border after the fall of Gamsakhurdia in Georgia, could not have any real independence.

The entire existence of "independent" Chechnya depended not only on the position of its new leaders, but on the policy of the federal authorities. And gestures of good will toward recognition of Dudayev as the official leader of the Chechen Republic continued right up to the end of 1994.

The government telephone directories for various republics, territories, provinces, and districts of the Russian Federation listed Jokhar Musayevich Dudayev as President of the Chechen Republic. In the index of names in B.N. Yeltsin's book *Notes of a President*, published in 1994, Dudayev is identified as President and Chairman of the Government of the Chechen Republic. In the directory issued by the government publishing house Rossiiskiy Vesti in 1995, Dudayev is also called President of the Chechen Republic. The recognition of the Dudayev regime de facto existed during this entire period, including after the events occurred that led to very serious charges against that regime (the false *avisos*, train robberies, exodus of the Russian-speaking population in the face of discrimination, etc.). . .

Despite the hard line of the separatists, contacts between the federal authorities and the Chechen Republic never ceased. They went on at the level of agencies reflecting the general position of Russia, that Chechnya is a subject of the Federation. This only aided the rebel regime.

For example, permission was granted to the Government of the Chechen Republic to issue Russian citizens' foreign travel passports to inhabitants of Chechnya, on which they could travel to the far abroad. This was of no small importance for the trips of Dudayev's emissaries, and even of Dudayev himself, for both political and economic purposes. *The Commission cannot term these actions by officials otherwise than as criminal abuse of office. . .*

From Section 3: "Financing of the Illegal Regime."

The proclaimed goal of creating a sovereign Islamic State required substantial resources, above all financial ones. The

Chechen Republic used every opportunity to fill its coffers, including official financing by the Russian Government. While recognizing the presidential and parliamentary elections in Chechnya as illegal, *the federal organs of power nevertheless continued to finance that republic.*

This included cash from Moscow. In late 1992, Chechen Prime Minister Mamadayevev brought in 2.5 billion rubles.

Another source of official financing was the deduction of money from the Russian Pension Fund to pay pensions on Chechen territory. Dudayev diverted these funds for other purposes. And, despite reliable reports on the massive non-payment of pensions, this financing continued until March 1993 . . . when it was halted by decision of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

Estonia provided financing aid to J. Dudayev in 1993. On March 20 and 21, 1993, two airplanes from Tallinn to Grozny, under the guise of the diplomatic pouch, brought a total of 18.2 tons of Soviet money, taken out of circulation in Estonia—2.5 billion rubles. Thus was a financial crime committed, subverting the economy of Russia.

The Commission heard testimony, that in 1994 a well-known Russian bank, the Kredobank, sent \$700,000 and then \$650,000 U.S. dollars to Chechnya.

Oil money

The greatest source of both ruble and hard currency revenues was oil.

Chechnya received billions of U.S. dollars from the sale of oil and petroleum products abroad in 1992-1993. Only the direct assistance of Russian government agencies could have provided for the shipment of such huge volumes of oil into Chechnya, the transport of oil abroad by Russian pipelines, and the receipt of petrodollars by the Dudayev regime.

In this connection, the Commission finds the following:

In 1991, the oil and natural gas industry in the republic included 54 firms. The largest production association in Chechnya, Groznefteorgsintez, subsuming three oil refineries: the Novogroznenvsk Refinery, Sharipov Grozny Refinery, and Lenin Grozny Refinery, as well as the Grozny Petrochemical Combine. In addition to gasoline for automobiles, diesel fuel, fuel oil, and gasoline for use in the chemicals industry, the Groznefteorgsintez firm produced the special airplane oil MS-20 and hard paraffins.

Data collected by the Commission show that Grozny received, for processing in these plants: 15 million tons of oil in 1991, 9.7 million tons in 1992, 3.5 million tons in 1993, 2.98 million tons in 1994. A substantial portion of the "imported" oil [from oilfields not within Chechnya—ed.] came from Western Siberia.

Despite the direct financial damage inflicted, there were no decisions adopted, neither at the presidential nor the government level, for any special procedures in work with the oil and gas complex of the Chechen Republic. Moreover, at a July 6, 1992 meeting of the two ministers of fuel and



Clockwise, from top left: Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and former Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar. The Duma report scores them for "official connivance" in allowing the Chechen separatists to gain control, while citing Yeltsin's remark "Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow."

energy, V.S. Chernomyrdin and Z. Durdiyev, the Russian side raised no objections, but rather actively examined questions of further "cooperation" and the conclusion of international deals.

According to official Ministry of Fuel and Energy data, the supply to Grozny of Stavropol oil was halted in August 1993, and from Dagestan, only in November 1994, less than a month before the commencement of operations to restore the constitutional process.

One of the partisans of this official policy was Ye.T. Gaidar, who testified to the Commission: "The Grozny Oil Refinery is the largest oil refinery in Russia, supplying the large part of the North Caucasus, Stavropol, Krasnodar [major grain-growing areas—ed.], and so forth. In this connection, to shut off the oil spigot would have meant, minimally, leaving them without fuel before planting, which would have severely punished not only Chechnya, but also Russia."

In reality, the petroleum products were going to various commercial organizations . . . and for export. And the exporter was Chechnya, not Russia.

The decision on the apportionment of export quotas was made at the highest level of the government: That is why Dudayev lodged this request directly with Ye.T. Gaidar. Ministry of Fuel and Energy documents show that quotas were given out punctually in 1992, 1993, and 1994, and in 1994 the quota allowed was 65,000 tons higher than in 1993.

The countries importing oil and petroleum products included Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Germany, the Baltic countries, and Turkey.

Moreover, fully exploiting the atmosphere of official connivance, the Chechen side actively utilized the following schemes for the illegal export of oil:

1. Re-export of oil to third countries from CIS [Community of Independent States] republics and the Baltic.

2. Export of oil as raw material to be returned after processing, which is convenient in that it is not subject to taxation at customs. But after refining, the petroleum did not return to Russia, but was sold to third countries for payment made to Chechnya.

3. Straight contraband, thanks to the "imperfection" of agency rules, as well as the very convenient transparency of

borders inside the Soviet Union.

For domestic consumption, there was widespread theft of oil and petroleum products by illegal cutting into pipelines.

How was the final stage, the receipt of funds, effected? According to testimony by officials, for the "convenience" of the recipient (Chechnya), the Central Bank of the Russian Federation as of June 1992 ceased settling accounts through the Chechen National Bank, leaving the flow of financial resources into Chechnya absolutely unsupervised. Various commercial structures got into this business, eagerly playing the middleman between the shipper (Chechnya) and the recipients of petroleum. Minister of the Chechen Republic Z. Durdliyev testified that the money from these deals was concentrated in the Chechen National Bank.

Thus the movement of funds from the sale of oil and

LaRouche: Russia is heading for an explosion

The following is an excerpt from an "EIR Talks" radio interview with Lyndon LaRouche on Sept. 13:

EIR: There have been remarks in Russia that NATO is carrying out genocide against the Bosnian Serb civilian population. Can you give us your thoughts about this?

LaRouche: You have to go back to the time of the Halifax Conference of the Group of Seven earlier this year, at which the United States government, for various reasons, not all entirely to the President's or his administration's discredit, failed to deal with the crucial strategic situation confronting him at that moment: that is, the Russian situation.

Yeltsin is enlisting, by demagogic methods, many of his opposition to support him on this attack on the United States as such, as well as NATO, and Halifax. The United States government failed to realize that the IMF [International Monetary Fund] system and the IMF conditionalities, and the attempt of the Clinton administration to establish a policy of cooperation between western Europe, Russia, and so forth — these two policies were at opposite poles, and one or the other would have to give. . . .

The problem here is that many in the United States government are soft on free trade or, some, soft-headed — not quite as bad as most Republicans on the other side of the fence, but soft nonetheless. And they failed to realize that the key to U.S. Russia policy, and also to China policy, as well as to Middle East policy, as well as to

Europe policy, hangs on financial and economic questions. That in Russia there is a disaster, an explosion about to break out. The present situation will not continue. There is a point of decision that has been reached; there is going to be a violent, in some sense, upheaval in Russia in the very immediate weeks ahead.

And the reason it will tend to occur in the way it is now tending to occur, is that the U.S. government did not bite the bullet on the financial and economic questions at Halifax. It's not too late for that to be understood, but if somebody uses the period of the election campaign to avoid that issue, then the Clinton administration would be in trouble, as well as the United States government, because failures will always be thrown at the guy on watch, that is, the current President. . . .

Now the second error that the government is making, is for the same reason that the action on the Bosnia question was delayed so long. Remember, Clinton wanted to do something about the Balkans situation in his campaign, and he made efforts during 1993, and especially in 1994 to get this under way. The reason it didn't happen then, is because of our ever-beloved allies, especially Britain, and at that time Britain's stooge, France's President Mitterrand and people like that. So we didn't act. Now, again, the same question comes up. The U.S. policy toward Europe and Russia is moderated by the implicit veto-authority of our so-called ever-loving allies! As a result of this stupid policy, we have done a stupid thing. We have pushed for the eastward extension of NATO, which is a catastrophic mistake, under the present conditions. There's *no need* for an eastward extension of NATO, if we have the right policy on economics and other Russia policies generally. There is no need for a collision with Moscow on the question of justice in the Balkans, if we didn't have a stupid economic policy, still, by default; and if we didn't have this eastward-pushing NATO policy. . . .

petroleum products, was not monitored by the government of Russia and, consequently, was not subject to taxation. Substantial funds in rubles and hard currency went to build up the Dudayev regime.

Comparison of the total volume of oil extracted in Russia (over 600 million tons) with the oil produced in Chechnya (1.5 million tons in 1994) convincingly shows, however, that the loss of this source of oil for Russia, was not the reason for the military operation in Chechnya.

Another major source of funding were the numerous financial operations linked with false avisos and counterfeiting of Russian currency.

Ministry of Internal Affairs data show that by the beginning of 1995, over 500 Chechen-ethnic individuals had been indicted in the false *aviso* affair, while 250 more are under

investigation. The false *aviso* operations earned over 4 trillion rubles.

Chechen organized criminal groups have conducted counterfeiting and dissemination of counterfeit currency in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

Favorable conditions, namely the lack of any monitoring by the federal authorities, facilitated the emergence of a criminal free economic zone in Chechnya. Its main components were: tax-free import and export of goods; illegal trade in petroleum products; illegal arms trade; narcotics contraband; extortion of Chechen businessmen in Russia and abroad; financial speculation on the Russian markets.

Established bus and plane routes to countries of the Middle East, West and East Europe (up to 150 flights per month) made it possible to import a huge quantity of products

From "EIR Talks," interview, Sept. 20:

EIR: Prime Minister Chernomyrdin presided over the Second Congress of the "Russia Is Our Home" party, which issued a report that characterized the raw materials industry as "feeding the Fatherland," and contrasted it to the defense industry, "a parasite gobbling up the State budget." Does this differentiation between the raw materials industry and the defense industry indicate any kind of factional situation in Russia?

LaRouche: This is the gut of it. The policy of Thatcher, and supported by Bush, from the end of 1989 through the end of Bush's term, and continuing as a policy of some elements in the United States today, is to ensure that Russia never rises again, by turning Russia into a raw-materials-exporting, deindustrialized country, dependent for its food supplies largely upon high-priced, western food imports.

As a result of that, you have a faction in Russia, which Chernomyrdin is presently identified with, which is the top faction, in a sense. Yeltsin is in the middle of this. . . . The British today would say, and do say, that they control Chernomyrdin. I qualify that, that they may not control Chernomyrdin personally, who, I think if he thought he were going to lose, would jump to the other side. But they do control the Chernomyrdin policy, the "raw materials only" policy.

The issue in Russia is between Russian patriots, and they come in all stripes, including old communists and everything else, who are concerned that Russia is being destroyed, as it is, by this policy. They view Chernomyrdin's policy as that of a *comprador*, as that of a foreign agent, the kind of guy who's likely to get his neck chopped off, if they come to power. And most Russians on the high level agree with that hatred of what Chernomyrdin's policy represents.

But the Russian people have been divorced from politics, because of the events of October 1993 — real politics in Russia, involving the people ended with the shooting of the Parliament. That was the end of democracy in Russia, or any attempt at it. So now, the people are sitting on the sidelines, suffering, trying to survive. The industries are crumbling, the food supplies are short, everything is becoming terrible. But what is coming, is not a revolt from below. It's not a mass-based party revolt. It's a revolt from *inside the government*. . . .

The United States is pushing NATO eastward, which is a stupid mistake at this time. The United States is also continuing to support the IMF conditionalities on Russia, which is the pivotal issue.

So, while the Clinton administration is trying to deal with Russia in a constructive manner, as an administration, at the same time, because of deals it has, it is supporting the same policies — the eastward extension of NATO and the IMF continuation — which are the very things which put the United States into an adversary position with respect to those who are likely to come to power, in the power struggle. This is the source of the conflict between the United States and Moscow over Iran.

So there's a lot of idiocy on the U.S. side, in failing to realize that we must stop talking about democracy in Russia. *We killed democracy in Russia*, when we insisted upon IMF conditionalities, and encouraged the Russian government to shoot down its own Parliament in the bloody cannonfire across the Moscow River [in October 1993]. *There has been no democracy in Russia since then, and we, the United States and the Brits, did it, by insisting upon the IMF policy, on supporting the so-called "reform."* . . .

Yes, there is a conflict. This can come to bullets. This can happen within weeks or months at most; that's the situation. It's serious.

and sell them in Russia, without paying taxes.

Was there an opportunity for the authorities to stop the uncontrolled stream of untaxed goods from flooding the Russian market? Yes, there was. It would have been sufficient to establish a customs point between Chechnya and Stavropol Kray. But for the Russian authorities, this would have meant recognizing the sovereignty of Chechnya. And despite the enormous financial losses for the Russian economy, this was not done. It appears that the personal gain of State officials and profit for commercial firms outweighed the State interests of Russia.

Substantial financial harm was inflicted on Russia by direct robberies on the Grozny section of the North Caucasus Railroad. In 1993, five hundred and fifty-nine trains were attacked, with complete or partial robbery of around 4,000 freight cars and containers, worth 11.5 billion rubles. In eight months of 1994, there were 120 armed attacks, with the robbery of 1,156 freight cars and 527 containers. The losses exceeded 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, twenty-six railroad workers died during train robberies.

Internal Affairs Ministry data show that Chechen criminal groups have virtually monopolized the illegal narcotics market in many regions of Russia, especially the Far East, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Pskov, and other major cities. In 1994 alone, over 70 Chechens were arrested on Russian territory in connection with large-scale narcotics operations.

Of key significance in the narco-business was the Shalinsky Region of Chechnya, the site, until January 1995, of the main production base for the refining of a powerful narcotic—high-quality heroin—its packing and warehousing. These drugs were sold abroad through Libya, Yemen, Colombia, Romania, the Baltic, Abkhazia, and Azerbaijan.

The arms flow

From Section 4: The Arming of Chechnya.

. . . On the night of Oct. 11, 1991, the extremists carried out their first attempts to penetrate the territory of some military units. These provocations subsequently became a regular occurrence. The Dudayevites attacked the sentries guarding military facilities, hijacked cars, stole weapons, physically attacked officers and servicemen. Thus began the process of disarming, not the Chechen, but the Russian Army.

[The report reproduces a 1992 order by Defense Minister Pavel Grachov, among other documentary evidence of the transfer of Russian Army artillery and other equipment to Chechnya. It gives a two-page inventory.]

The weapons left behind during the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya or transferred to the Dudayevites with the knowledge of Russia's military leadership were enough to equip four, and according to some sources seven fully-deployed army divisions. . . .

NATO weapons transfer alleged

Turkey played a big role in arming the Chechen Army. The first shipment of arms from Turkey was delivered by road

in November 1991, in the guise of humanitarian assistance. After the reunification of Germany, Turkey received from NATO a substantial quantity of Russian arms from the former G.D.R. [East Germany]. A portion of those arms and ammunition was shipped into Chechnya through Azerbaijan.

In addition, a Committee for Solidarity with Chechnya and a Committee for Solidarity with the Peoples of the Caucasus were established in Turkey, which were centers for financing the Dudayev regime and supplying weapons to Chechnya. Data in our possession show that between January and April 1995, these committees, with assistance from Turkish secret services, transferred around U.S.\$700,000 into Chechnya. The Turkish spy Isak Kendir, caught red-handed by the Federal Security Service (FSB) in the combat zone of the Chechen Republic, confirmed that these committees are tied to the secret services.

Other Islamic countries also have helped the Chechen Republic with arms, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The supply routes go through Abkhazia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

The well-established ties with various countries of the near and far abroad also made it possible for the Dudayevites to recruit mercenaries from Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Egypt, Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Azerbaijan, Abkhazia, and elsewhere. In the earlier phases, these mercenaries were used as instructors, but then as professional combat operatives during the armed conflict in 1994 and 1995, to kill Russian troops, especially officers.

In this connection, the rather passive position of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the minister himself, Deputy of the State Duma Kozyrev, are shocking.

From Section 5: Violation of Human Rights of Civilians in Chechnya.

The sources of the Chechen crisis are to be found in the national policy of the ruling Communist Party in the U.S.S.R., continued by the current leaders of Russia, who came into the big political arena from the ranks of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union].

In the 1920s and 1930s, there was a policy of patronizing the peoples of the Caucasus, including the Chechens, against the backdrop of repressive measures against the Cossacks (decocksackization).

In 1944, the Chechen people fell victim to deportation. The resettlement of Chechens based on nationality alone, their subsequent "planned" resettlement back into the Caucasus and the 1957 transfer to Cossack lands from Stavropol Kray to the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic, and the constant accent on the "national question" in the cultural, social, and administrative areas—all this bred inter-ethnic tension at the level of daily life.

With the weakening of central power at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, inter-ethnic relations began to deteriorate in Chechnya. The leadership of the republic and of local organs of power began to use national slogans,

for the sake of popularity. Russian-speaking inhabitants of Chechnya began to be driven out of leading positions in industry, education, science, and management. Various methods were used, from threats and insults to murder and kidnapping.

Before Dudayev came to power, the population of Chechnya was 30% Russian. Since then, 200,000 people of an 850,000 population have left. Naturally, most of them were Russians.

It should not be forgotten that the majority of Chechnya's industrial capacity was created by the Russian and Russo-phone population. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Chechens were making their living outside of the republic: Around 40% of Chechens lived in other parts of Russia either permanently or temporarily, during recent years.

[Here follows an account of alleged insults, murders, rapes, grave desecrations, and other elements of "moral terror" against the Russian population in Chechnya.]

Questioning of refugees made it possible to establish, that there were deliberate actions to drive the Russians out of Chechnya. . . . Summing up, it can be said that what happened to the non-indigenous civilian population in the Chechen Republic during the existence of the Dudayev regime can only be termed genocide.

Faulty intelligence estimates

From Section 6: Russian Federal Authorities and the Armed Opposition to Dudayev.

[The Commission reports that it established, but did not investigate in detail, that Russian State agencies also funded opponents of Dudayev. This included Federal Security Service (FSB) recruitment of Russian Army personnel to participate in opposition actions, and the supply of money, transport, communications equipment, and weapons. These covert operations were poorly supervised and resulted in poor intelligence.]

The strength and capabilities of the opposition groups and their ability to coordinate actions were overestimated and support for them was often inadequate and ill-conceived, while the strength of Dudayev's military and political organization, its self-organization, where the strong spine of a professional army could be instantaneously supplemented by volunteer militia units, its mobility and preparedness for serious combat were seriously underestimated. (Suffice it to recall the explanation S. Stepashin gave in a published interview: The taking of Grozny was prevented by a system of defense works, built after 1991, while our attacking forces only had maps made earlier. But Grozny was an open city all those years, and it is hard to understand what the FSB was doing, if it was unable to supply the Army even with basic information on defenses.) . . .

[In late 1994,] the Russian leadership faced a choice: to fundamentally reconsider the policy of [supporting] an armed overthrow of the Dudayev regime, toward which it had been leaning since the summer of 1994, distance itself from the

organizers of that overthrow . . . and to begin serious negotiations with the regime which controlled the greater part of Chechnya's territory; or, to try to do itself, what the opposition had been unable to.

The choice was made in the style of those improvisations typical of the Russian political leadership, and very fast. The approach termed "conspiratorial-adventuristic" by member of the Presidential Council E. Pain was adopted. On Nov. 29, the Security Council meeting took place, where the decision was taken to begin military actions.

The Commission notes that the Security Council has no constitutional right to take such decisions.

While investigating the circumstances that led to the commencement of combat, the Commission sought from Council Secretary Lobov the transcript of the Nov. 29, 1994 Security Council session, and also repeatedly invited him to testify before the Commission in executive session, but to no avail. This may be because the Commission became aware of the SC secretary's words at that session: "We need a little victorious war. . . ." This may not be a precise quotation, but one way or another it is evident that a military victory over Dudayev, which seemed close and easily attainable at the outset, was needed by the President of Russia and the "war party" in his entourage, for their own domestic political purposes.

From Section 7: An Undeclared War.

[The Commission reports that its findings on the causes of military disasters for Russia during the Chechnya operation are based on interviews with many officers.]

1. Planning did not take into account Dudayev's possession of a regular and well-armed Army, numbering as many as 50,000 men. The operational plan provided for deployment of a group numbering only 38,000.

2. There was no political and propaganda backup for the operation to settle the crisis. There was no work among the local population, and the armed opposition to Dudayev was not included in the operation, as a result of which Chechens thought that Chechnya was being occupied by Russia and several former opponents of Dudayev went over to his side.

3. The understaffing of units of the Russian Army in peacetime was so great, that "pick-up" regiments had to be formed, even bringing in the marines. . . . Many members of tank and armored carrier crews in the infantry only met each other during combat. Is there any need to explore how many unnecessary casualties resulted from this bad principle?

4. The low level of military equipment — obsolete and worn out equipment was used (helicopters, tanks, communications). . . .

5. Instead of developing the front on the base of the North Caucasus Military District, a special combined command was established consisting of Grachov, Yerin, Stepashin, and Yegorov. Any sergeant knows that an army cannot be commanded by a quartet. . . .

In light of the above, the question lawfully arises, of

whether the President and members of the Security Council possessed reliable information on the low level of preparedness and material equipment of the federal armed forces, and on the international situation in Chechnya, the high combat capability of the Chechen Army, its military power, weapons, the presence of foreign mercenaries and instructors, Dudayev's support from the Chechen population and a number of Islamic States?

Leaders of our security agencies assured the Commission, that such information was constantly reaching the Kremlin. Thus it must be a question of the President and his entourage ignoring such information. . . .

The security agencies are not in any condition to carry out the full work load they did in the past.

Beginning in 1991, the U.S.S.R. KGB has undergone five reorganizations and changes of name. Its Investigative Directorate, Foreign Intelligence, Border Troops, Guard Directorate, etc. were removed from the KGB. The KGB lost its special forces units (Alfa group left in 1991 to guard the President, and Vypfel was reorganized in 1993 after the October events). It should be noted that, in the meantime, the quantity of generals in the security agencies has increased sevenfold.

With each reorganization, the security organs lost their best cadre, the experienced and devoted professionals. Many of them were swallowed up by commercial structures, so that today some private organizations have their own full-scale intelligence centers, able to conduct the full array of intelligence and subversion operations, just like a State.

In a word, by the beginning of the Chechen campaign in December 1994, the State security system was so broken down, that the secret services were incapable of carrying out national tasks and were oriented only toward preserving and strengthening the power of Person Number One and his entourage.

As for the GRU [military intelligence], it is restricted to intelligence operations abroad. The President's secret decree of Nov. 30 finally gave it the right to conduct intelligence operations on Chechen territory. But that was just ten days before combat began!

. . . Military specialists said, "What was terrible, is that we were fighting not with shepherds, but with officers and generals from the same academies as we."

The Chief of Staff of Dudayev's Army, for example, was Maskhadov, a professional artillery man, a colonel, former commander of the missile corps and artillery in the Southern Group of Forces of the Russian Army, in Hungary. Military specialists considered him one of the best artillery officers in the Army. . . .

Sweeping conclusions

From Section 8: Conclusions.

In the process of investigating the question entrusted to it, the Commission studied many aspects of the problem of

Chechnya, which in a short time has turned into a region of general criminality, which has swallowed trillions of rubles in a four-year period and, essentially, thus robbed every citizen of Russia.

Chechnya has baldly revealed the character of the Russian ruling regime, which granted a unique opportunity for the massive robbery of its own country (from the free export of oil to the false *avisos*), for the creation of armed militias out of criminals released from prison, and for the organization of genocide against its own people.

Numerous facts that became known to the Commission in the course of its work, allow the presumption of active influence by various international forces, both on the process of destabilizing the ethnic situation, and on the growth of separatist moods in that part of the North Caucasus region. Various forms of mercenary activity and material assistance with money, weapons, and communications equipment came into play.

Judging by all the evidence, it was not without the assistance of these forces hostile to Russia, that the planned collapse of the Armed Forces has been implemented, as well as the weakening (under the guise of reform) of the State security agencies.

Nor is it possible to ignore the overt attempts by anti-Russian forces, to redirect the blade of Islamic fundamentalism from its "Western" (Catholic) direction to an "Eastern" (Orthodox) one. The active aid to the separatists by several Islamic and Catholic countries clearly confirms this.

[Among its recommendations for action, the Govorukhin Commission calls for the impeachment of President Yeltsin, increased parliamentary control over the composition and activity of the government, and specific laws, some of which are enumerated below.]

1. Law on the Principles and Procedure for the Organization of Elections for the Executive and Representative Branches in the Chechen Republic. . . .

2. Law on the Responsibility of Organs of State Power and Officials for Failure to Implement Decisions of the Constitutional Court of Russia. . . .

5. Law on Procedure for the Use of the Armed Forces on Russian Territory.

6. Law on Changing the Administrative Borders of Stavropol Kray, with the return of Shelkovsky and Naursky regions from Chechnya. These could become the home of Russians who left Chechnya.

7. Law on the Cossacks, guaranteeing real self-administration for Cossack villages and settlements, and the assignment of certain State functions to Cossacks, such as border protection duties. . . .

The Commission is extremely disturbed by the holding of talks with the separatists, under conditions where the Commander in Chief has repeatedly stated that they have been defeated.