LaRouche reports on his visit to Russia

The following are excerpts from a radio interview with Lyndon LaRouche by Mel Klenetsky of "EIR Talks" on May 2:

EIR: I understand that you had a very successful tour in Russia, and the audience here would certainly like to hear about some of the things that you were involved in over there. LaRouche: First of all, the primary occasion for the trip to Moscow, was to participate in a seminar which was sponsored by a number of institutions, including those associated with the Russian Academy of Sciences. The chairman of the event was a former leading economist of the Russian government, Leonid Abalkin. The other participants were all notables, including the last prime minister of the former Soviet Union, who is also an economist, among his skills.

I laid out my view of the present strategic situation, and what the relations between Russia and the United States must be, from an historical standpoint of the past 60 years or 55 years especially, of U.S.-Russian relations, in very frank terms, which was, I think, well-received. . . . We had other discussions, and I got more and more into some of the terra incognita of current Russian politics, and so forth. All very good.

EIR: The large debt that Russia owes has been rescheduled by the Paris Club. What will be the impact of that?

LaRouche: It has something to do with President Clinton delivering on his promise to do something to alleviate the worst features of Russia's foreign payments situation. . . . But it doesn't address the problem. For example, the Russian state enacted legislation which would have put an export tax on export of petroleum and gas. That would mean it would be paid at the border going out of Russia. This would have netted for the Russian government a tax revenue of about \$23 billion. This would have solved the major problem of the Russian government's administration. Everything is sort of breaking down around the edges, for lack of money from the government to meet all its responsibilities.

Also, attached to that, was a regulation concerning the import of alcoholic beverages. Now, the problem—the reason for this thing being attached, is fairly important. There are 34,000 people who have *died* from imported vodka and other alcoholic beverages which are defective. But this, of course, includes the massive imports into Russia from Archer Daniels Midland, which is, of course, one of the big stockholders in Bob Dole's campaign, and very closely tied to the Hollinger Corp. and to Bob Strauss, a *soi-disant* Democrat, a Harri-

man Democrat.

So, the IMF stepped in, and demanded and ordered the Russian government, like a satrapy of the Roman Empire receiving orders from Rome, to cancel these laws.

Now, one should be reminded that the total amount of money being offered as loans to Russia by the IMF, is on the order of magnitude of \$4 billion, as against more than \$23 billion which Russia could have generated on its own, but is forbidden to do so by the IMF. Now, that's where the real dirt lies.

This is very dangerous. When you take the effort to extend NATO as a political and military, or, really, a supranational organization of continental Europe and Britain, to the borders of Russia, at the same time that you are driving the Russians into a rage with these IMF and related conditions, you're creating a very dangerous strategic situation. . . . You can induce the coming to power in Russia of the kind of government in Russia we definitely don't want. Now, although Russia still has thermonuclear weapons of relatively first grade, the more significant thing is that Russia has other kinds of influence and capabilities. . . .

Remember that in the period of nuclear weapons, there developed beginning especially the 1950s, the doctrine of special warfare, which is sometimes called irregular warfare. . . . The significance of this in the postwar period, has been that, with the power of thermonuclear strategic weapons, these arsenals, that conflict among powers, or major powers, was generally deemed to be run best through so-called surrogate actions, or "managed conflict below the threshold of general thermonuclear engagement."

Under these circumstances, the most significant kind of capability of conflict which emerged around the world, was not really the nuclear weapons, because they were not intended to be used. But the actual conflict lay in the area of what is called special warfare, or irregular warfare.

In this area, as many people may recall, particularly the older generation, my generation and so forth, the Russians got rather good at that. And, they still have today, if they choose to reach out and grab it, they still have today a very nasty capability for exciting irregular warfare or the equivalent, in various parts of the world. With the world in its presently explosive condition, not just the Balkans, but Africa, the Middle East, and so forth, that could be very nasty....

There are certain realities of Russia which have to be addressed, as in the United States. Whether Clinton's going to be reelected or not, is *not* the relevant question. It would be bad if he *weren't* reelected; but if he *is* reelected, that doesn't solve anything by itself. He has to have the right policy. Because the United States is in a crisis, and the kind of policies the President is talking about in the campaign, have *nothing to do* with the crisis he's going to have to face by the end of this year or the beginning of next.

Similarly in Russia: Who's elected President, is not the issue. It's a question of what the policy's going to be, and


how is the United States going to respond to that policy configuration? What is the way that we can legitimately, without undue interference in the internal affairs of Russia, respond to the *strategic implications* of the Russian election. . . .

Here's the point. Russia can no longer tolerate the IMF conditionalities, the so-called present reform, which was put into place by Margaret Thatcher, France's President Mitterrand, and George Bush. That can no longer be tolerated, and it's going to go. After the election, it'll happen. . . .


What is clear, is that there will be a reform in Russia. But the question which is on the table now, is the question of what will be the *new form* of reform which is introduced in Russia after the elections? Under no circumstances could there be a workable reform which is a continuation of what many in Washington think is U.S. policy for Russia's economic and foreign and financial policy. *That can not work*.

Therefore, when you get people like Yavlinsky and Lebed, and so forth, meeting together, there are implications of that which bear upon the election *as such*, the election combinations, not merely for this year, but for four or so years down the line. But, what's more important here, is a shuffling behind the scenes of a regrouping of forces, to try to avoid a head-on collision of some people, while coming up with a stable, united majority of the Russian forces, who will stand behind a *new form of reform*, as opposed to the one which has been hegemonic and in practice up to this time.

That's what people have to bear in mind.



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