

## **EIR**Feature

# **British oligarchy launches new war against Sudan**

by Muriel Mirak Weissbach

On Jan. 13, Ethiopian forces, together with guerrillas of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), launched an invasion of Sudan, from Ethiopian soil. The advance against the cities of Kurmuk and Qasan in the southern Blue Nile district, along the Ethiopian border, is intended by the aggressors as the first step toward an assault on Damazin, which controls about 80% of the water supply for the capital, Khartoum. From there, the next step would be an assault on the capital directly, combined with orchestrated uprisings against the government.


With this invasion, a new phase in the war of the British against the sovereign nation of Sudan has begun.

There can be no doubt that the entire operation has been planned, guided, financed, and executed by the British directly. As *EIR* has documented, it was Baroness Caroline Cox, deputy speaker of the House of Lords and head of the so-called Christian Solidarity International (CSI), a front for British intelligence, who organized a conference of the opposition political parties, the Democratic Unionist Party and the Umma Party, in the Eritrean capital of Asmara, in June 1995. At that conference, a strategy was mapped out for redirecting the civil war, primarily fought in the south, toward the east, and to extend hostilities into the north, in an effort to move against Khartoum and overthrow the government of Gen. Omar al-Bashir.

It was Baroness Cox, who organized a session at the House of Lords at the end of November 1995, which brought together those opposition parties, as well as representatives of the IGADD (Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, a grouping including Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia), and their British masters, to carry the strategy further. At the House of Lords meeting, a resolution was voted up, explicitly endorsing the Asmara call for war, and pledging aid to organize the belligerent forces: "In the struggle for the overthrow of the NIF [National Islamic Front] regime and the struggle for the restoration of democracy and the rule of law, the opposition forces need unity and solidarity.

FIGURE 1

**More British-directed operations against Sudan**



- 1** Eritrean forces, under cover of the only remaining faction of John Garang's SPLA, invade Sudan on Jan. 12, and seize garrison town of Gadamyeeb, heading for Kassala. Targets are the transport lines linking Khartoum to Port Sudan. Asmara, Eritrea, is headquarters for National Democratic Alliance, anti-Sudan coalition organized by British Baroness Caroline Cox.
- 2** Ethiopian forces, under same cover, invade Sudan on Jan. 12 and seize border garrisons of Al-Kali, Daimonsour, Shali al Fil, Gisen, and town of Kurmuk. Target is city of Damizin, and Rosieres Dam on Blue Nile River, which supplies Khartoum with 80% of its electricity, and supplies both Sudan and Egypt with water for irrigation.
- 3** Ethiopian forces seized Pochala garrison town in fall 1996
- 4** SPLA remains holed up in enclave in southern Sudan, holding the fortified town of Nimule.
- 5** British-backed invasion of Zaire from Uganda and Rwanda brings Zairean fake rebel force up toward border with Sudan, creating possible renewed threat from the south.
- 6** Destabilization of government of Central African Republic, which maintains friendly relations with Sudan.

The conference resolves that the unity of all the political groups opposed to the fundamentalist National Islamic Front (NIF) regime is of paramount importance and measures should be taken to promote this unity” (emphasis added). Further “debate” took place at a British Foreign Office seminar on June 3, 1996, while concrete moves were being made to implement the plan to open the eastern front.

During Jan. 7-15, 1996, Baroness Cox and her CSI cohort John Eibner went to Eritrea, to bring President Isaias Afewerki into the operation. Eritrea, like Ethiopia and Uganda, was granted debt relief and new credits, in payment for its services to the British. On Feb. 2, 1996, Afewerki delivered the former Sudanese embassy to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the gaggle of opposition groups under Cox’s umbrella, to serve as their headquarters. With that move, the political center of operations against the Sudanese government was officially moved to Eritrea. Militarily, too, the Eritreans promised assistance; Afewerki was quoted by the London-based Arabic newspaper *Al Hayat* on Jan. 25, 1996, saying, “If the alliance needs weapons, we will support the Sudanese opposition without any hesitation.” Eritrea started arming and training Bija tribesmen in the north for actions against Khartoum. At the same time, it offered its port of Mussawa to Israeli experts, to train 200 Sudanese ex-naval officers for planned operations against Port Sudan.

## In this section

The author visited Sudan on Dec. 17-23, 1996, with Lyndon and Helga LaRouche. They met with President Gen. Omar al-Bashir and other leaders of the government and parliament, as well as with a dozen former rebel leaders.

On Dec. 22, Lyndon LaRouche gave a lecture at the Friendship Hall in Khartoum, which we publish here. He also spoke at the University of Khartoum.

Concluding this *Feature* are interviews with former Congressman James Mann (D-S.C.) and State Delegate Thomas Jackson (D-Ala.), members of a delegation of U.S. elected officials who visited Sudan last fall, on the initiative of the Schiller Institute, to investigate the allegations that have been made against that country’s government (see *EIR*, Oct. 11, 1996). The delegation found that the charges of slavery and other crimes were without foundation. In future issues, we will hear from other members of the delegation.

Throughout 1996, Cox led the British campaign to impose sanctions on Sudan, for alleged harboring of terrorists, as part of the overall war strategy to deny the country the means to defend itself. At the end of January 1996, the first United Nations Security Council resolution against Sudan was passed, and the U.S. State Department announced that the American embassy would move from Khartoum to Nairobi, for fear of terrorist attacks. Later in 1996, diplomatic sanctions against Sudan were imposed. Cox et al. escalated their propaganda campaign, with massive press coverage of alleged slavery in Sudan and so forth.

In late summer to early autumn of 1996, activities were stepped up, and the drumbeat for war became louder. Under the direction of the Eritrean government, which was hosting them, the members of the NDA voted to accept SPLA leader John Garang as their military chief. This signalled the consolidation of the military and the political opposition forces, under the British. On Dec. 11, 1996, Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the opposition Umma Party, left Khartoum, to take up his post in Eritrea. In November 1996, it was reported in the press, though denied *pro forma* by the U.S. State Department, that Washington was providing \$20 million to Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, which it had designated as the “front-line states,” in a war to be fought against the Sudanese central government.

The president of the Sudanese National Assembly, Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, told the London-based Arabic language newspaper *Al Qods al Arabi* on Jan. 6, that al-Mahdi’s departure to Asmara signified war. It “exposed the Sudanese people to an international and regional threat,” he said, as the backers of al-Mahdi “have now opened the gates for war.” The leader of the DUP, the other half of Baroness Cox’s NDA opposition grouping, Muhammed Uthman al-Mirghani, told *Al Sharq al Awsat* on Jan. 9, that Sudan was “on the verge of a popular uprising.” He predicted that “fundamental changes in the Armed Forces and in the popular defense ranks” would be seen soon, in support of the opposition. Mirghani was confirming the British war plan: Exert military pressure from Ethiopia and Eritrea, then orchestrate a political uprising in the capital, to overthrow the government.

What occurred on Jan. 13, was that the first shot in that war was fired. It is no coincidence that Baroness Cox, according to reports in the London *Financial Times* and Germany’s *Süddeutsche Zeitung* on Jan. 15, was *precisely in that area of eastern Sudan, just one week before the invasion took place.*

Regardless of what the immediate outcome militarily may be—whether or not the invading forces succeed in holding the positions they have occupied—the situation must be considered extremely grave. The Sudanese President, General al-Bashir, announced a general mobilization of the military, and the Osman Digna brigade of the People’s Defense Force was reported on Jan. 14 to be preparing to leave for the war zone.

Turabi, in the *Al Qods al Arabi* interview, pointed out that

in the east, “there is only a plain with no forests, no swamps, and no mountains on the border between the neighboring states and Sudan.” Referring to Sudan’s earlier humanitarian support for Ethiopians, he said, “yet here they are now aiming their missiles at us and, as long as they continue doing this, we should reciprocate, particularly in view of the fact that in Sudan there are hundreds of thousands of Eritrean fighters.” This is a reference to the Eritreans who sought refuge in Sudan, and who oppose the current government in Asmara. Turabi made clear that the Sudanese “do not want to turn Africa into an area of conflicts such as those of the Great Lakes area, with everything that is happening between the Hutus and the Tutsis. . . . This is what the Westerners want and they are backed by agents who indeed want this to happen.” Turabi said that these forces “want it to happen in southern Sudan and Zaire,” and added that the Sudanese would be “capable of defending themselves in the south, in the east, and anywhere else.”

Unless the invasion from Ethiopia can be stopped—and the Sudanese government has demanded an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council to move in this direction—there is a real danger that the British will succeed to spread war throughout the Horn of Africa, and engulf Sudan from the south as well, in the hell of the Great Lakes genocide.

### **The civil war has ended**

It is crucial for policy-shapers and the general public to understand that none of the fighting which has broken out was necessary or inevitable. None of the fighting has been the expression of any dynamic internal to Sudan. In fact, the leading reason why the British have accelerated their drive to expand the war and overthrow the Khartoum government over the past months, despite their failure to impose wide-ranging sanctions, is that *they feared that the Khartoum government would have succeeded in negotiating a peaceful solution to the conflict.* To prevent this at all costs, they have jumped the gun and opened the eastern front. At the same time, they have censored any and all reference to the peace negotiations in the mass media.

The simple facts of the matter are the following: Since April 1996, the Sudanese government of General al-Bashir has been succeeding in negotiating with various rebel factions, formerly associated with Garang, to bring about a durable political solution to the civil war. What has unfolded over the last ten months is a peace process in Sudan, whereby recognized political and military leaders of the movements once at war against Khartoum, have signed a Peace Charter with the government. The Charter (see *Documentation*) is a document outlining the principles upon which a final peace treaty is to be worked out. As of the end of 1996, leaders representing 80% of the former rebel movements had signed the Peace Charter. In essence, it is only Garang and his motley following, which has refused to come to the negotiating table.

Considering that this war has ravaged the country since 1956, when the departing British occupying forces threw a hand grenade over their shoulders, so to speak, to ignite the hostilities, and has continued, with brief respite between 1972 and 1983, to cause suffering and death to hundreds of thousands of human beings, one would expect the "international community" to stand up and applaud the successes of the Sudanese government, in opening a prospect, finally, for peace. Recalling the enthusiasm with which the news of a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement was welcomed in September 1993, and the energies rightly deployed in the search for peace in Bosnia, and in Northern Ireland, one wonders why there is no cheering for the cause of peace in Sudan.

### Former rebel leaders meet LaRouche

During a visit to Sudan in December 1996, Lyndon LaRouche had the opportunity to meet at length with a large group of political and military leaders of the rebels, who have since joined the peace process. They included military commanders and executive officers of the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). It also included commanders from the Nuba Mountains SPLM/A. Many of them had been formerly, intimately associated with Garang; some came from his tribe, the Dinka, and were even related to him by marriage. They had

been his comrades-in-arms, and had fought as part of his movement over a decade. Now they were signators, or representatives of signators, of the April 10, 1996 Peace Charter and related documents.

The picture they painted was one of hope: that the war which had cost so many so much, could be brought to an end, under terms which satisfy the aspirations of those who pursued hostilities for so long. As one spokesman presented the case, there are five reasons why they opted for peace:

1. War was not an end in itself, but a means to obtain certain political aims; therefore, if it were possible to achieve the aims through non-belligerent means, so much the better.

2. The current government was ready to negotiate, and had initiated contacts for talks as soon as it had come to power in 1989.

3. The Sudanese economic crisis, which was caused by the war, was hitting the southern Sudanese population, displaced persons, and refugees, more than any other social strata. These were the same people whom the rebels had taken up arms to liberate, and their condition must be taken into account.

4. Sudan is besieged by many enemies, and the central authority is being targeted. If no central authority is maintained, then scenarios like those in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Liberia could be repeated. If this were to unfold in Sudan, if the central authority were to be destroyed, with



*The LaRouche delegation meets with former Sudanese rebel leaders, December 1996. Leaders representing 80% of the former rebel movements have now signed a Peace Charter with the government.*

the country's vast area of 1 million square miles and 500 different tribes, then no power under the sun would be able to put it back together again. There would be no hope for peace.

5. There have been internal problems of the movement; the SPLA, which had been a unified movement under Garang, disintegrated into eight different factions, which fell into conflict among themselves, in fratricidal, inter-tribal warfare. This self-destructive process, which resulted from a failure in Garang's leadership, had to be stopped.

Just how the splitting process occurred, is documented in the case of the SPLA contingent from the Nuba Mountains, which has also, recently, joined with the Peace Charter. As a leading representative and signator of the separate Nuba Mountains "Declaration of Principles" (see *Documentation*), explained, these forces had joined the SPLM/A-led rebellion in 1984. They believed, however, that they were fighting for a united Sudan, according to a political manifesto issued at the time, in which their rights would be protected. By 1994, at the SPLA's first national convention, Garang, however, decided to annex parts of the Nuba Mountains to Bahr al Gazal, and there are reports that Garang arrogated to himself the right to sell off or mortgage land under his military control, to outsiders, in exchange for weapons. In December of that year, Garang signed a declaration with Sadiq al-Mahdi's Umma party, which gave the SPLA the right to self-determination, and the option of a federation or confederation, but did not acknowledge the rights of the Nuba Mountains.

With the Asmara agreement of July 1995, the process of disenfranchisement was furthered. In June 1996, the Nuba Mountains group split from Garang, and, a month later, opened negotiations with the government, for peace.

Thus, the leaders explained, they opted for negotiated peace. Once having signed the Peace Charter, they realized, however, that the work had just begun. They had to go back to their constituents, both military and civilian, and explain to them what they had done. This work has not been limited to the south; on the contrary, leading figures from the factions which have opted for peace, have travelled to Khartoum and other areas in the north, to talk to northerners, who, they said, had also been part of the problem.

To the extent that the whole population is not informed of the causes of the war and the perspectives for real peace, there can be no progress. The southern leaders have also travelled to camps where persons from the south, displaced by the war, are living, to bring them the news of the Peace Charter as well.

They report that the Peace Charter, which is to be further developed into a peace agreement, has created confidence between the north and the south, because it addresses all the problems of southern Sudan. The Nuba Mountains leaders pointed out, that the document they signed acknowledges—for the first time in 40 years—that there were problems in the region which prompted people to take up arms against the government. The documents signed, are open-ended docu-

ments, which can accommodate those who have not yet signed. The Peace Charter, all the signators agreed, is a document which does not aim at excluding anyone; even John Garang could sign it.

## Remaining obstacles

The obstacles which the former rebel leaders have encountered have been significant and must be overcome. Objections to the Peace Charter have come from two crucial quarters: remaining rebel political leaders in the south; and representatives of the U.S. government and the "international community" more broadly.

Southern politicians still loyal to Garang, have posed two objections in particular: that the Charter had been signed with an "undemocratic and fundamentalist government." To this, the former rebel leaders have replied, that Sudan has moved over the last six years, to constitutional legitimacy, under General al-Bashir, whereas Gaafar Nimieri, who ruled with an iron fist for 16 years, never excited their passions for protest. Regarding the "fundamentalist" nature of the current government, they have pointed out, that it was not the current government, but that of Nimieri, that introduced Islamic law (*Sharia*) in 1983, thus rekindling the conflict. A further point stressed in discussion with the anti-Charter front, is that if one wants to make peace, one must do so with the government in power, not with an opposition. Furthermore, the opposition leaders, such as Sadiq al-Mahdi (and Muhammed Uthman al-Mirghani), when they were in government under a "democratic," multi-party regime, did not make any moves to initiate peace talks to end the war. Sadiq al-Mahdi, said one former SPLA rebel, "would have solved the problem, if he had wanted to, when he replaced Nimieri in government, but he had no solution." As for the leading spokesman of the rejectionist front, Garang, the government has made overtures to him, but to no avail. Garang has made no comment on the Peace Charter.

The response of the "international community" has been, at best, to ignore the moves toward peace, and let the British run amok. The British, under the leadership of Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords Caroline Cox and her Christian Solidarity International, have responded to the existence of the Peace Charter, by beefing up support for the war party of Garang.

The U.S. response has been two-faced, at best. There have been contacts between the signators of the Peace Charter and Washington. In fact, since last April's signing of the Peace Charter, at least two delegations of southern Sudanese have visited the United States, in an attempt to explain the peace process and organize support for it. What transpired was something quite different. In discussions, the Americans have brought up objections to the Peace Charter, some of them curiously close to those of the rejectionist front. First, it is said, the National Islamic Front government is not the right government to make peace with, and is a government that supports terrorism. Furthermore, it is said that political parties

must first be established, before the problems of southern Sudan can be solved. And, finally, it is said that self-determination for southern Sudan can come about, only through the work of such political parties (those in the National Democratic Alliance based in Asmara). Responses from the signatories from southern Sudan, to the effect that, indeed, the Peace Charter *does* include provisions for self-determination, appear not to have impressed Washington's representatives.

One delegation which visited Washington, and was received by the National Security Council twice, as well as members of Congress, challenged the Africa experts present, by asking them: What would happen if, indeed, the Bashir government were overthrown and the north/south conflict were *not* solved? The response they received indicated that the Africa experts "were not concerned with solving the southern Sudanese problem. They have a different agenda."

The consensus expressed by the group of former rebel leaders who met with LaRouche, was unequivocal: If political executives and military commanders representing 80% of the forces who had been on Garang's side, have signed documents establishing the principles on which a peace treaty can be hammered out, then the United States, first and foremost, should promote this process in every way imaginable. "We say to the U.S.," said one, "that by besieging Sudan and isolating Sudan, you are doing us, the Sudanese people, a great disservice." Another put it this way: "The U.S., as a superpower, certainly has a right to safeguard its national interests, and to look after what it believes to be most urgent; but, it has a moral responsibility to help peace *in any country*. We need the international community, and *especially the United States*, to stand with us. Our priority is peace, democracy, and development; we cannot understand why the U.S. does not support us." Another said succinctly, "The U.S. should help solve the problem, rather than help continue the war."

The Sudanese Peace Charter is a reality, and is fast being transformed into a peace treaty, which is to be put up to the vote of the people in a referendum. If the Sudanese war can be ended, a process of stabilization can begin, which is urgently needed in a region that is being turned into an inferno, by the British and their puppets in Uganda and Rwanda. Peace for Sudan means, immediately, the opportunity for the government and people to turn their energies and resources to the task of economic reconstruction and development, which can only benefit the entire continent.

The crucial factor, determining whether peace prevails in Sudan, or whether the British plan to spread war throughout the region, succeeds, is the American factor, as the protagonists of the Peace Charter know all too well. They are doing their part, and fighting an uphill battle, to bring the good news to the world at large. The question that awaits an answer, is: What will the second Clinton administration say to the peace process in Sudan?

Since Jan. 13, that question has gained in urgency: Will Clinton let the British-led war inflame the entire continent?

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## Documentation

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### 'Political Charter, April 1996'

*Below is the declaration signed by the Sudan government and southern rebels, called "Political Charter, April 1996":*

This charter has been concluded between the: 1) Government of Sudan; 2) South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A); and 3) Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM/A Bahrel Ghazal Group—BGG).

In recognition of the series of previous peace talks, the parties have pledged to put an end to the ongoing civil war in the Sudan. They agreed on the provisions mentioned below in this charter:

1. To resolve the conflict of Sudan through peaceful and political means.

2. The unity of the Sudan, with its known boundaries, shall be preserved, its entity shall be secured against all internal and external threats. The parties shall endeavor to keep peace, justice and supremacy of values of right, goodness and virtue.

3. After full establishment of peace, stability and a reasonable level of social development in the south, and at the end of the interim period, a referendum will be conducted by the people of the southern Sudan to determine their political aspirations.

4. Recognizing the constitutional development, implementation of the federal system and political practice based on the values of participatory democracy, the two parties shall endeavor to boost the progress in these fields in the light of changing situations.

5. Citizenship shall be the basis of rights and duties in furtherance of the values of justice, equity, freedom and human rights.

6. *Sharia* and custom shall be the sources of legislation. However, states may enact legislation complementary to the federal law in matters peculiar to those states.

7. Cultural diversity in Sudan is recognized; Sudanese people are encouraged to freely express the values of this diversity.

8. Freedom of religion and belief shall be observed and a suitable atmosphere shall be maintained for practicing worship, *dawa*, proselytization and preaching. No citizen shall be coerced to embrace any faith or religion.

9. Social development is an extreme priority for the achievement of which the government shall plan for confidence-building and expediting the process of alleviating of poverty, ignorance and illiteracy. The states shall also work for the spread of knowledge and achieving self-sufficiency.

10. Power and national wealth shall equitably be shared for the benefit of the citizens in the country. The details shall be worked out by the two parties.

11. A coordination council shall be formed between the southern states for better implementation of this agreement.

12. The two parties will work together for stability and improvement of living conditions in the affected areas according to the provisions of the subsequent Peace Agreement. Both sides shall carry the duty of implementing the security arrangement, resettlement, reconstruction, development and preservation of rights and duties.

13. Sudan shall interact with African and Arab nations and the world community on the basis of the effective Sudanese identity for the benefit of Sudan.

14. Sudanese in general, and the southerners in particular shall be mobilized to rally behind and support the subsequent peace agreement.

Signed, 1) Maj. Gen. (Brig.) Al Zubair Mohammed Salih, First Vice President of the Republic of Sudan; 2) Cdr. Dr. Riak Machar Teny Dhugon Chairman of NLC SSIM and Commander-in-Chief of SSIA; 3) Cdr. Kerubino Kuanyin, Chairman of SPLM/A (BGG).

Dated 10 April 1996, Khartoum

### **Nuba Mountains 'Declaration of Principles'**

*Below is the text of the Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Nuba Mountains Problem (Sudan), signed on July 31, 1996 in Nairobi, Kenya, by Engineer Ismail Ali Saadeldin, deputy chairman of the central committee of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Sudan People's Liberation Army, Nuba Mountains, and chairman of its negotiations team; and by Ahmed Mohamed Haroun, director general of Peace and Resettlement Administration, South Kordofan, and chairman of its negotiations team.*

In the Name of Allah, the Merciful and the Compassionate  
Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Nuba Mountains Problem (Sudan)

Out of our conviction that both peaceful and political dialogues are the ideal, and appropriate means for resolving all the Sudan's conflicts and problems. Having realized and acknowledged the fact [that the] Nuba Mountains state problem is one of the Sudan's historical and longstanding problems that requires a solution through an objective and constructive dialogue between the concerned parties so as to create a conducive atmosphere and a peaceful coexistence as well as achieving a prosperous future for the Nuba Mountains state.

And in recognition of the parties to the peculiarity and the unique nature of the solution of the Nuba Mountains state problem in comparison to that of any other regions in the Sudan.

And in recognition of those efforts exerted by the region's sons internally and externally, the parties referred to hereafter declare, therefore, their commitment to the following principles as means for reaching a final and everlasting just solution for this problem in question:

1. To recognize that there has been a longstanding problem in the Nuba Mountains state which has led to the armed

struggle since 1984.

2. The parties, therefore, confirm their commitment to the peaceful and political solution channelled through constructive dialogue as an ideal means to solve all the Sudan's problems, conflicts and disputes.

3. The two parties have acknowledged their abiding and observing the unity of the Sudan with its geographical and political borders of 1956.

4. The parties have acknowledged the importance and necessity of taking [a] stand and a vision of the problems from [a] regional perspective and within the frame of a united Sudan as the ideal means for solving the Nuba Mountains state question far from that of the SPLM/A of Dr. John Garang's faction.

5. The parties have agreed to consider the political charter "10th of April 1996" as a general frame for solving and as a ground for embodying the rest of Sudan's problems and questions of a national nature.

6. The *Sharia* and the customary laws shall both be equally the legislative sources of the Nuba Mountains state, in addition the region has the right to legislate complementary laws to those federal ones on questions and problems peculiar to the Nuba Mountains state.

7. Citizenship shall be the basis for the rights and duties that include freedom, equality, justice and human rights.

8. The parties acknowledge, and are self-committed to principles of the religious and faiths right, including creation of a peaceful, satisfactory and conducive atmosphere for worshipping, preaching and practices. Without forcing any citizen to believe/accept any faith or religion contrary to his/her will.

9. The parties acknowledge the federal system as a vehicle of governance that can provide the region's citizens with their rights to participate in the administration of their region's affairs and its development, together with their balanced and full participation in the federal power.

10. Powers and resources are shared on [an] equal and just basis between the Nuba Mountains state and the federal government, details shall be worked out by the two parties in separate protocol.

11. Eradication of any and all kinds of socio-economic, cultural injustice and grievances. That includes any agricultural, non-agricultural and other lands which have been unfairly distributed or owned, headed by agricultural schemes, reforms and redistribution in a way that preserves respect of the natives and avails greater opportunity and priorities for the indigenous people of the area to invest and develop their land.

12. To join efforts for eradication of all kinds of backwardness, illiteracy and ignorance which have caused such situations of injustice and grievances. This alongside with the designing, implementation and execution of a special development program for the Nuba Mountains state in such a way that achieves equitable development between the Nuba Mountains state and other regions in the country for a purpose of achieving the region's welfare.

13. The government of the Sudan shall abide and undertake a special humanitarian program for relief, reconstruction, rehabilitation and resettlement for solving and dealing with all kinds of negative effects [and] shortcomings resulting from the war. This shall also include an emergency crash program for facing the humanitarian urgencies and needs, such as the relief, and otherwise as appropriate.

14. To acknowledge the local cultures and their development as well as to support equal opportunities to reflect them and be expressed within other cultures of the people of the Sudan in all fora mass [sic] of expression accredited by both the Nuba Mountains state and federal government.

15. The war has badly and effectively led to the destruction of the natural resources, environment and gross violation of human rights in the Nuba Mountains state. The two parties, therefore, undertake to deal with these negative effects resulted during the twelve-years war.

16. The parties have asserted the unity of the Sudan, condemnation and rebuff of the tribal acts and practices. The parties, therefore undertake assurance of the democratic rights of the people of the Nuba Mountains state for achieving and gaining their national and regional just rights, equal and identical within the framework of the united Sudan. This in the event of any political changes without having any influence from internal and external forces.

17. There are some issues outside the armed conflict and

disputes which has been agreed upon by the parties. Such issues have been dealt with in a separate document attached to this declaration.

18. The two parties shall work together in developing a detailed program for the general principles mentioned in this declaration. This shall be implemented by joint efforts which shall be required for mobilization towards achieving of these principles ending the war in order to realize the comprehensive peace and stability.

Note: Attached is the document referred to in article 17.

In the Name of Allah, the Merciful and the Compassionate The Sudan government delegation in its negotiations with the SPLM/A Nuba Mountains central committee has taken notice of the report which has been prepared by Dr. Abdul aati Badr Suleiman, deputy chairman of the production unit of the International Atomic Energy Agency (report attached in two languages) about the existence of an atomic radiation in Miri dam and its extensions around Kadugli town.

On this respect, the Sudan government delegation declares its undertaking to work side by side with the SPLM/A Nuba Mountains central committee and specialized authorities for all necessary arrangements and procedures dealing with that report. The delegation, therefore, values very much the tremendous effort made by the members of the SPLM/A Nuba Mountains central committee, for finding and acquiring this important document.

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Buffalo	1700	Prague	2300
Cairo	2400	Rangoon	0430*
Calcutta	0330*	Richmond	1700
Caracas	1800	Rio de Janeiro	1900
Casablanca	2200	Rome	2300
Chattanooga	1700	St. Louis	1600
Chicago	1600	St. Petersburg	0100*
Copenhagen	2300	San Francisco	1400
Denver	1500	Santiago	1800
Detroit	1700	Sarajevo	2300
Dublin	2200	Seattle	1400
Gdansk	2300	Seoul	0700*
Guadalajara	1600	Shanghai	0600*
Havana	1700	Singapore	0530*
Helsinki	2400	Stockholm	2300
Ho Chi Minh City	0600*	Sydney	0800*
Honolulu	1200	Tehran	0130*
Hong Kong	0600*	Tel Aviv	2400
Houston	1600	Tokyo	0700*
Istanbul	2400	Toronto	1700
Jakarta	0500*	Vancouver	1400
Jerusalem	2400	Vladivostok	0800*
Johannesburg	2400	Venice	2300
Karachi	0300*	Warsaw	2300
Kennebunkport	1700	Washington	1700
Kiev	2400	Wellington	1000*
Khartoum	2400	Wiesbaden	2300
Lagos	2300	Winnipeg	1700
Lima	1700	Yokohama	0700*
Lincoln	1600	Yorktown	1700
Lisbon	2300		* Mondays