

want to tell you that the Ugandan medical service was one of the best on the continent. The Ugandan education system was one of the best on the continent. You read the statistics of 1950s, 1960s, and even 1970s, and early 1980s, and you will see. Idi Amin never committed the havoc that Museveni has committed today in Uganda.

EIR: What do you mean?

Kaganda: The economy. The economy now is being sold to Asians, to British-Asians, not Asians. I am sorry, I do not mean Indians. These are not Indians. The little trade that there is, is all being shared there between Museveni and his British colleagues and some people from Belgium, France, Germany, and Britain.

The place is being recolonized, and they say the economy is booming.

The foreign exchange bureaus are draining Uganda, and the bureaus are being run by Museveni, and Eriya Kategaya, and Salim Saleh, and the British-Asians. There is no money in Uganda, except that which is circulating among them.

The people who have money in Uganda are the military. That's what they are getting from the U.S. and Britain, and the Scandinavian countries, from the IMF. The money that is going to Uganda, may not be assigned to the military, but it is going to the military anyway.

EIR: Could you elaborate on the British influence in Uganda?

Kaganda: The Ugandan Peoples Congress has always given the foreign ambassadors of these countries all the information they need. So, they know much more than they are willing to say. I know *in camera* they agree; they know it is not possible to have free and fair elections in Uganda. The secretary of the Commonwealth Secretariat said that the Commonwealth was not willing to be involved in the Ugandan elections, because we know that the constitution and the law is against the declared position of the Commonwealth leaders in Harare; it is against the Harare Declaration [1995]. But I am amazed that after the elections, they have now reversed their position. They are willing to accommodate the Ugandan parliamentary delegation in the Commonwealth parliamentary association. They are only contradicting themselves; they know the truth: The Ugandan Parliament today does not qualify as a representative institution, because the political parties were not allowed to participate in the elections.

EIR: When you say, Uganda is being recolonized, who is the recolonizer?

Kaganda: Who put Museveni in power? He is their agent. His leaders today are British. The Conservative Party seized Museveni and put him in, and they deal with him in business. There are some American businessmen who have key interests in dealing with Museveni. They see Museveni as the new broom that can be used to sweep across Africa.

IV. Museveni's wars of annihilation against Uganda

During the 1996 Presidential campaign, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni hailed himself for becoming a duly elected President, after ten years in the post. In rallies, he attempted to justify his previous years of un-elected rule: "I would like to distinguish my use of violence from other dictators. We used the gun to put an end to the use of the gun. There was no other way."


However, a review of the grim realities of life in Uganda since 1980, when Museveni took to the bush to fight the results of what he charged were "rigged" elections, reveals a different story. It is finally becoming widely acknowledged that Ugandan troops were among the invading forces against Zaire in October 1996 and remain in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is also known by many in the West that the Rwandan Patriotic Front invasion of neighboring Rwanda to the south in 1990 and in 1994 was carried out by a section of the Ugandan Army—some say up to 20% of its 100,000-man force.

What is far less known, is that since Museveni took to the bush in 1980 to gun his way to power, and again, since he marched into Kampala on Jan. 29, 1986, *Uganda has never been at peace within its own borders*. Not only has the "use of the gun" not been ended. It has been assiduously promoted by Museveni and his intransigent stance that any rebel force must surrender to him unconditionally.

Today, as **Map 2** shows, entire regions of Uganda are at war. In northern Uganda, where Museveni continues to fight his 11-year war against the Lord's Resistance Army, and where his cohort John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Army is installed with Museveni's protection, the entire economy has been collapsed; its population uprooted again and again, and dying. The region is a war zone for Museveni's own revenge against northern Uganda and his British-dictated war against Sudan. The result is that the northern third of the country is virtually cut off from the other parts, because there is no method of safe transport from say, Kampala, to Gulu, save by plane.

Now the west has also become a war zone in the last year, where the Alliance of Democratic Forces, a force regrouping former guerrilla organizations, has managed to seize towns and is going into major battles against the Ugandan Popular Defense Forces (UPDF). Insecurity reigns as well in the Kampala area itself, according to multiple sources. The only area apparently free from insurgent violence is southern Uganda, Museveni's home base, and where any funds remaining inside

Military, insurgency, and guerrilla activity in Uganda





A demonstration against Congo dictator Laurent Kabila, in Bonn, June 1997, by the Civil Rights Movement Solidarity. The banner reads, "Stop the 'Final Solution' of the Kabila Alliance." Museveni was behind Kabila's invasion of Zaire in October 1996, and his own nation has never been at peace since he took to the bush in 1980.

the country have been funneled.

The constant insurgencies ongoing in Uganda are the reason that U.S. Ambassador Michael Southwick warned, to the great annoyance of the Ugandan President, that the "security situation in Uganda is a major barrier to the tourism industry," as reported on July 12 in the Ugandan *Monitor*.

Why the wars

Since his days at Dar Es Salaam University and his self-definition as the apotheosis of revolutionary leadership in Africa, for Museveni, any opponent, especially if armed, is *ipso facto* a "reactionary," which can only be a target of eradication through "purgative violence" perpetrated by the revolutionary. Museveni's long-standing personal embrace of the "purgative violence" theories of existential philosopher Frantz Fanon are what drive Museveni personally to oversee "the charge" against the insurgents—as he deployed himself in December 1996 "behind the sandbags" to direct operations against the Lord's Resistance Army.

However, aside from Museveni's own personal psychological needs, the instigation of wars inside Uganda has other motivations, more in line with the requirements of his British sponsors.

First, the insurgencies provide the justification for the continued militarization of Uganda's society and body politic. It provides the excuse for continued military rule; an excuse to continue to ban the political parties. In this context, the civil wars have functioned to sever the Ugandan military from

the Ugandan population, making it far more malleable as a mercenary force for British geopolitical designs in the region.

Second, the constant wars *inside* Uganda give the cover for the securing of military equipment and weaponry, which is used in part against the insurgencies, but which more generally have been diverted to use in Rwanda, Sudan, and former Zaire.

Third, Museveni's wars against insurgencies have become a war of annihilation against that section of the Ugandan population suspected of sympathizing with the insurgent force. This has brought untold suffering and death upon the Ugandan people. Counterinsurgency has thus become a vehicle for "population war" against Uganda's people, a Malthusian war of eradication against the subsistence-farming peasant Museveni considers to be the chief obstacle to Ugandan "development." In the North, it might also be a consideration to Museveni and his British mentors that such peasants are farming on land believed to be rich in gold, diamonds, and oil.

The pattern of death

From the moment that he was appointed minister of defense in the governments of Yusef Lule and Godfrey Binaisa in 1979-80, Museveni was operating on his own agenda of taking full power in Uganda for himself. His dismissal by President Binaisa in 1980 was prompted by the fact that, under cover of the Defense Ministry, Museveni was organizing his own private parallel army. His recruits were the Rwandan Tutsis living in exile in Uganda, some since the 1960s and

others from colonial times. Many of them had been brought into the notorious State Research Bureau of Idi Amin, and upon the disbandment of the Amin regime, joined league with Museveni, himself a Hima/Tutsi.

It is this parallel army that Museveni took to the bush in 1980, when national elections brought Ugandan Peoples Congress candidate and former President Milton Obote to power. Museveni's own fledgling party, the Ugandan Patriotic Movement, failed to receive more than one seat in the parliament. Museveni, who had opposed holding any elections, cried vote fraud.

Museveni took as his base of guerrilla operations the Luwero Triangle, carved out of the area immediately to the north and east of Kampala. Museveni's war to come to power was fought from here.

Beginning in 1983, a propaganda campaign was launched by Roger Winter of the U.S. Committee on Refugees, charging that the Ugandan military, under orders from President Obote, had carried out a war of mass death against the population of the Luwero Triangle. However, it is noteworthy, that not even Museveni himself makes this charge in his autobiography, *Sowing the Mustard Seed*.

Instead, he writes, under the heading "Evacuating the Luwero Triangle," that, "As far back as December 1981, when I returned from abroad [the United Kingdom], I had proposed that we should encourage the population to leave what we called 'the liberated zones.'" It should be noted that the relocation of subsistence farmers and peasants is itself a policy that will lead to mass death, since the peasant's subsistence comes from the land on which he lives, and without whose sustenance he has no means or resources on which to live.

Museveni describes that his plan for the removal of the civilian population was defeated by his own executive, but he continues to argue in his autobiography:

Evacuation of the civilian population "would have relieved us of what became a major responsibility and would have left the liberated zones thinly populated and relatively easy to defend. . . . There were three main advantages to evacuating the Luwero Triangle zone. . . . Firstly, it would allow us to concentrate our forces for offensive operations against the enemy, instead of being forced to scatter our few rifles to try and protect the population. . . . Secondly, a depopulated Luwero Triangle would starve the enemy of information. . . . Finally, a less populated operational zone would reduce the need for the supply of food and medicines. Too many people in an operational area could lead to the collapse of the struggle because of the problems entailed in looking after them, even before one started tackling the problems of actually fighting the war."

The reality is that in the course of the war, the Luwero Triangle, the base of operations for Museveni's National Resistance Army, was *depopulated*. According to Cecilia Ogwal, in her 1995 paper, "Dictatorship and Donor Policy in

Uganda," "The war was launched [in 1980 by Museveni] not against the government or government installations, but first against citizens whose ancestors came from the North and East and settled in Luwero District. Within days of the launch, much of rural Luwero was a theatre of death and devastation. The victims — men, women, and children — were bayoneted, clubbed to death, and those who sought to run were shot. . . . People of all ethnicities fled to police stations, to the district headquarters, to the home of chiefs, to neighboring districts, and to the bush. The insurgents mined all roads and even cattle tracks leading to neighboring districts. . . .

"The second group of victims were the leaders and members of the Ugandan Peoples Congress, the party which won the 1980 elections. . . . The UPC leaders and members together with their families who failed to escape were hunted from house to house and killed.

"The third victims were the people with means — food, livestock, and money. These were ordered to provide the insurgents with such means and without payment. Those who resisted or demanded payment were tortured or killed. . . . Government troops on account of severe constraints and the mines did not get into the interior until well into 1982."

According to Mrs. Ogwal, the bloodletting in Luwero under Museveni's orders was confirmed by a breakaway insurgent group, which was captured in May 1982 by government troops. Her report brings to mind the reports of atrocities committed by Museveni's Tutsi Legions from Uganda and Rwanda throughout eastern Zaire against the Hutus over the last year:

"The [captured] inmates of the camp recounted how their leader (who was not captured) had visited Museveni's fortress accompanied by some of them for a peace conference. They told of having seen as they entered the fortress hundreds and hundreds of human heads on poles and up trees along the perimeter of the fortress. Inside the fortress, they were taken to a large grass hut in which there were many human heads with fresh blood. Pointing to the heads, Museveni was said to have told the visitors: 'This is what we do to those who don't agree with us.'

"According to the eyewitnesses, whose villages were raided and who were made to go to the fortresses, . . . from time to time in the afternoons, the very old men, the sickly (men) and boys too young to be child-soldiers were led into the bush, ostensibly to collect firewood. They were never seen again. Likewise, the female captives who were old, breast feeding, sickly, pregnant or too young were taken towards a river ostensibly to bathe and all never returned. . . .

"On becoming President in 1986, Museveni virtually confirmed the massacres and decapitations dramatically in two ways. The first was the exhibition of male child soldiers. Museveni claimed that his army found the children abandoned in villages and adopted them. The lie could not hide how only male children who were then made child soldiers were abandoned. . . .

“The second confirmation was the mocking order by Museveni that the remains of the dead be collected and exhibited on roadsides. In the collection, Museveni’s soldiers took journalists to scattered graves where only skulls were unearthed. No one who had not participated in the burial of the skulls could have known of the sites of the graves.”

The horrors of the Luwero Triangle match the pattern of Museveni’s military operations in the wars to come, after he took power.

Destruction in the east

Museveni strode into Kampala in January 1986, in the midst of negotiations which were being held between his forces and those of the Ugandan National Liberation Army in Nairobi, Kenya. Negotiations came to an abrupt halt, as Museveni caught his negotiating partners off-guard and seized Kampala.

From 1986 through 1988, a bitter war was fought between Museveni’s National Resistance Army and the Ugandan Peoples Army in eastern Uganda, covering the districts of Soroti, Kumi, Pallisa, and sections of Lira and Apac. If, as the report on the war in the North, issued by Paul Ssemogerere and the Democratic Party, is correct, that more than 300,000 people have died in the northern war in the last decade, the deaths

were far higher in the east in the 1980s. All means of subsistence of the population in the east were destroyed. Many simply died of starvation.

Museveni himself described his method in an interview published in *New Vision* of June 27, 1989: “There was a policy of destroying food-stuffs being used by the rebels. The population was warned in advance through the dropping of leaflets by helicopters written in vernacular. These leaflets were telling the people to vacate the fire areas where the security forces would clash with rebels, to safe zones. Now whether this policy is continuing or not is no longer a major issue because we have already cleared the rebels out in most areas. In the remaining areas, there isn’t any food any more. There is nothing to destroy.”

The region was formerly the major cattle-breeding center in the country, and the city of Siroti was the site of the biggest cattle market in East Africa, with a packaging plant supplying the entire African region. The cattle were systematically taken away, by sweeps of Museveni troops disguised as rustlers. The Siroti market and plant were destroyed. Without cows, without food, without means to plow, up to 2.7 million people of eastern Uganda were left with no means to survive.

Mrs. Ogwal writes in her document, “Dictatorship and Donor Policy in Uganda,” of scenes that have been confirmed by many sources: “The operations were carried out in a vast territory which was inhabited by some 5 million people. The entire food-stuff in granaries and fields were destroyed or plundered by the army. Millions of livestock were also plundered. Also destroyed were homes, boreholes, water wells, schools, dispensaries, cooperative society stores, farm implements of all types, household goods, including chairs, tables, beds, beddings, plates, and cooking utensils and pots. Everything that could sustain life was destroyed or plundered.”

Similar policies were carried out from 1986 onward in the north, where the soldiers of the former government’s army feared that Museveni would repeat the mass murder of the officer corps carried out by Idi Amin against the Ugandan Armed Forces in 1971. As one man who attempted to negotiate a peace between Museveni and the northerners of the former government army retells it: “We told Museveni, ‘Don’t come in with the sword. If you come in with the sword, there will be violence, but if you come in peace, there will be peace.’ We went to work to disarm the [former government] troops. We were able to disarm many of them. But then Museveni came in with the sword anyway—he declared war on the north, came in, setting fire to villages, killing people.” Here too, Museveni’s troops drove the cattle of Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, and Apac to the south or further, stripping the north of its productive capacity.

By 1988, betrayal from within and political disorientation brought about the defeat of the former government forces in the east, who had been joined by Alice Lakwena’s Holy

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
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London's culture of the gun

To maintain control over Uganda, British intelligence relies on a political environment which functions as a petri dish for one politically ineffectual armed insurgency after another, thus ensuring that the viable alternative of the qualified political parties coming to the fore, is prevented.

This tragic reality was identified by Mrs. Cecilia Ogwal, then Assistant Secretary General of the Ugandan Peoples Congress, in her 1995 paper "Dictatorship and Donor Policy on Uganda." She wrote:

"In Uganda, it is the gun in the hand of Lt. General Museveni and that gun alone which had made him last so long. He is a gunman *par excellence*. The *New Vision*, which is the mouthpiece of his dictatorship, of 26 November 1990, reported him as having told a funeral gathering that he began to conspire in 1969 and undertook overt action to rule Uganda by force of arms. He achieved his objective, through the gun and much blood in 1986 and

has since with the support of the donor community ruled through the same means.

"Because of how Uganda is governed, the authorities announce from time to time the emergence of a new rebel group which 'has been or will be crushed.' This development of rebel groups emerging from time to time to take the place of the political parties to show opposition to the dictatorship, does not equate with any belief that there has been, under the dictatorship, much improvement in human rights observance or peace and stability. It is, on the contrary, a definitive demonstration, though still feeble, of resistance against the intensive oppression in Uganda under the dictatorship. *The growth of this form of opposition to the dictatorship and not the growth of the political parties is what the new constitution and the policy of the donor community to collaborate with the dictatorship in all schemes, will promote. . . . The donor community are eager and willing to side with the dictatorship and to make Uganda the suzerainty of a despot which, in turn, will encourage the rise or growth of gun-men groups as the only alternative voice against the Museveni dictatorship*" (emphasis added).

Spirit movement.

In 1991, the successor to the Holy Spirit, the Lord's Resistance Army of Joseph Kony, went into full operation in the north. Museveni and the National Resistance Army launched a counter-offensive against the LRA, but especially against the northern population, under the rubric that it was supporting Kony (see documentation below).

To this day, this war in northern Ugandan continues; its horrific toll on the northern populations continues. Hundreds of thousands of people in the northern districts of Kitgum and Gulu have been herded into "protected villages," surrounded by barbed wire, unable to farm or eke out an existence. In Gulu district, most of the population of 390,000 people have been forced to live in "protected villages" at 15 different sites.

On Aug. 16, 1996, Africa Features Network reported a scene that is familiar to northern Ugandans: "More than 10,000 people were rounded up in a pre-dawn operation jointly mounted by the army and the police in an effort to nab rebel collaborators over the weekend. Men, women, and children were reportedly tortured during the operation in which they were herded into a park near the town where the screening was conducted, the local press said. It was not disclosed whether any alleged rebel collaborators were identified during the operation. Maj. Gen. Salim Saleh, commander of the northern army, told the press that the swoops are among the strategies the Uganda People's Defense Forces is to use in an attempt to end the eight-year rebellion in the north."

In March of this year, according to Minister of State for International Cooperation Dr. Martin Alier, cholera broke out in the "protected villages" in the northern Kitgum district. On April 28, the United Nations openly questioned the existence of the camps: "The villages are a risky strategy, by gathering people in crowded conditions with little to do except wait for the next relief handout."

Furthermore, none of these tactics have worked to arrest the insurgency. The brunt of the attacks of both the LRA and the Ugandan Armed Forces appears to be against the population, as the community leaders of Gulu and Kitgum have protested. However, Museveni has rejected any and all calls for a negotiated settlement. Member of Parliament Ken Lukvamuzi reported on March 20, 1997, that he had been served with death threats at his home, for his demands that the government end the war in the north.

Last December, Ugandan Maj. Gen. David Tindefunza, who led the Operation David assault on the north in 1991, left his post as military adviser to Museveni. Commenting on Museveni's self-deployment to the front, he asked: "Now the President is in Gulu in sandbags. If all these big commanders can't fight Kony and it requires Museveni to go into sandbags, this country is in trouble. It shows there is something basically wrong with this country. If you go into that area [the north], you can't imagine that it is part of Uganda. If you do not end a war in 11 years and your people are dying, are you worth being a government?"